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THE FOURTEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

For the first time during the fourteen years of the existence of the Mississippi valley historical association was Wisconsin privileged to act as hostess for its annual meeting. Madisonians like to recall that it was in their city in December, 1907, that the final arrangements were made by which the association came into being. Meanwhile the sister states of Minnesota, Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, and Indiana have each been twice the Mecca for Mississippi valley historical pilgrims, while Iowa entertained in 1910 and expects to be the meeting place for next year; twice the south, at New Orleans and Nashville, has opened hospitable doors to the association; once the farther north, at Grand Forks, North Dakota, extended its welcome to visiting members. The meeting was arranged at an earlier date than has been usual, because it was the time of spring recess of the University of Wisconsin; in consequence the weather man treated the association to a dramatic surprise, when the last day dawned upon a howling northern blizzard, bringing the heaviest snowfall of the entire winter. Not only was the automobile drive abandoned, but some of the delegates were inconvenienced in returning home by the delay of trains. This unexpected dénouement was the only untoward circumstance in an unusually successful session. Not only were the numbers larger than ever before, but every person on the program was present but four, two of whom sent their papers to be read. The attendance was representative as well as large; members came from nearly all portions of the great valley. From Texas came not only President Boucher, but also several other delegates; Oklahoma, Kansas,

Nebraska, South Dakota, as well as the nearer states, all showed their appreciation of the opportunity by sending their representatives. The Mississippi valley historical association is proving its popularity as well as its usefulness.

As with all such gatherings, the opportunities for acquaintance and personal contacts were chiefly valued. To promote these opportunities the local committee arranged a reception at the hospitable home of President Birge, and a luncheon on Friday for the business session, while the state historical society and the department of history of the state university tendered to the association on the same evening a dinner at the University club — all of which proved to be most enjoyable occasions. All the sessions but one were held in the library building; for the president's address the association convened in the assembly room of Wisconsin's beautiful new capitol, when many members of the legislature were in attendance. Mr. Boucher somewhat startled the believers in traditional history by reëxamining and restating the ante-bellum history of the south with regard to the charge that it was the southern statesmen who were aggressive and grasping, with ambitions for control which knew no bounds. As a preliminary he stated that he himself was a northern man, had never been south until a few years ago, and was examining the question on a purely theoretic basis. He centered his discussion around the annexation of Texas and the Mexican war, and by newspaper citations and extracts from contemporary correspondence he showed that the south in that period was not united even on a definite policy of defense, to say nothing of aggression. At this session for the delivery of the presidential address, Mr. Joseph Schafer, recently of Oregon, now superintendent of the Wisconsin historical society, presided.

Mr. Milo M. Quaife, president of the association for last year, called the first meeting to order at half past two o'clock on Thursday, April 14. After a few words of welcome, he introduced the first speaker, Mr. Clarence H. McClure of the Central Missouri state teachers' college, who had for his subject "State and local history." The author presented a history of local histories, showing how these state histories were first written with the idea of the state as sovereign, then after the civil war with a strongly national bent. More recently state history has

been written from the point of view of the close relationship between the state and the citizen, and of its importance to the child as a connective link with national history. The paper closed with a discussion of the value of local history societies with their several activities.

Mr. Floyd C. Shoemaker, the dynamic secretary of the State historical society of Missouri, followed with a suggestive address on "Popularizing state history." The author's own career is a commentary on his subject. Six years ago he took charge of the Missouri society when it had a biennial appropriation of but slightly over ten thousand dollars. He has so successfully popularized the society's work that the legislature has made a fifty thousand dollar grant for 1921-1922. By enlarging its popularity Mr. Shoemaker has not only placed his institution on a sound financial basis but he has also built up a library and a research staff of eight trained assistants, compared to two of a few years past. He has secured the active support of the historians of his state and has obtained for the *Missouri historical review* the largest circulation of any such journal west of the Mississippi. He explained how he has increased the membership to twelve hundred, with additions at the rate of over fifty a month. There is no valid reason, he contended, why a state historical society should have less than two thousand members. A large active paid membership is not an end in itself, however, but a firm foundation upon which other valuable structures may be built. Popularizing should not be forwarded at the expense of scholarship; rather, scholarship should become the medium of educating our democracy. A scholarly article or book need not be dry. Some of our most original and scholarly historians, such as Parkman, Thwaites, Turner, and Roosevelt, are popular authors. Their labors never dulled their pens. The state historical society should not be conducted for scholars only; coöperation with localities and development of state history result in better historical publications, better textbooks, teachers better trained in state history, a larger library, more adequate state support, and an ever-increasing number of citizens actively interested in forwarding historical education.

At the same session the problems of archæological research and of museum-making were taken up by Mr. George R. Fox of

the Three Oaks (Michigan) historical museum, and Mr. Edward C. Page, who has created a famous historical museum at the normal school at De Kalb, Illinois. Mr. Fox asked for more coöperation between the historians and those interested in prehistoric remains. The historian bases his work on documents, which may be intentionally or inadvertently distorted. The maker of an object records with exact truth his mental state, and his degree of attainment. State historical and archæological societies should work hand in hand as they are doing in Ohio and in Wisconsin. Mr. Page gave an outline of his own experience in making and using a museum. He has always had, he remarked, a *penchant* for saving things. In May, 1912, he obtained a small room with a few wall cases in the normal building. He has obtained his objects only by gift, has utilized the local press, personal contacts, and teachers' meetings to make known his wants. The service men have contributed a great deal. The articles are labeled and arranged with care; the rooms are always open and visitors come at all times of the day and every day, occasionally as many as five hundred in one day. He also lends the material freely wherever it can be used, to schools, churches, clubs, et cetera. Museums of this kind are within the reach of most institutions.

The program for the third session, on Friday morning, evinced a homogeneity in its diversity if one considers it as dealing first with the red men, then with the pioneers of the revolutionary epoch, the trans-Mississippi pioneers, including the Mormons, concluding with a revaluation of the statesman who evoked the pioneer struggle caused by the Kansas-Nebraska act. Mr. George A. Wood of Ohio state university sketched the history of the Mohegan Indians (or, as the bureau of ethnology would have us say, the "Mahican"). Additional interest was evoked by the fact that the "last of the Mohegans" make their home now in Wisconsin.

Mr. James G. Randall, recently elected to the University of Illinois, declared that "the middle West owes its very existence as an American community to General Clark, who wrested the western posts from the British during the Revolution, making a Mississippi boundary possible in the treaty of independence." Mr. Randall reported the results of his researches in the records

at Richmond and Washington concerning Clark's service of supply. While engaged in his campaigns Clark received inadequate support from both Virginia and congress, and had to meet all the necessities of his troops in a semihostile country practically without money — a task calling for the highest statesmanship. Supplies could best be drawn from New Orleans. There Oliver Pollock was Clark's agent, and he completely impoverished himself in his operations for his country. His later years, like those of Clark himself, were embittered by a lack of adequate recognition of services freely given during the national crisis. In the course of his paper Mr. Randall called attention to the fact that no adequate biography of Clark has been written and he emphasized the importance of this theme for a true understanding of western history.

Mr. R. S. Douglas of the Southeast Missouri state teachers' college showed what a large part Missourians have had in exploring, acquiring, and developing the west. Missouri traders, trappers, and prospectors penetrated every part of the western country. Missourians were prominent in the acquisition of Texas, of Oregon, and of the territory obtained from Mexico. The two great western highways, the Oregon trail and the Santa Fe trail, led from Missouri. Thousands of the people of this state went out to subdue, to organize, and to govern the far western states.

The "State of Deseret" was the topic treated by Mr. Oscar A. Kinchin of Butler college, Indianapolis. He outlined the growth of a great agricultural community in the valley of Great Salt lake, described the theocratic régime (1847-1849), the infusion of the gentiles, and other forces opposed to the existing government. The convention of March 4, 1849, formed a constitution for Deseret; then attempts were made to gain admission into the union, which failed, when territorial government for Utah was granted in its stead.

Mr. William O. Lynch of Indiana university thinks that the character and abilities of Stephen A. Douglas have been blackened to make him a proper foil for Lincoln; since he was the latter's rival, he has become the "villain for the drama." Douglas died at the age of forty-eight; his last acts after the outbreak of the civil war did him infinite credit. If Lincoln was the can-

didate in 1860 of a sectional party, he was more fundamentally a union-saver. In 1860 Douglas was also a sectional candidate, having few more southern votes than Lincoln; he also was first and last a union-saver. It may be possible to give Douglas credit for sincerity in championing popular sovereignty as a means of settling the slavery principle in the territories. Conscience, wisdom, and patriotism such as he showed at the end of his career are not sudden growths. While not desiring to extenuate his faults, Mr. Lynch does desire to do justice to the character and leadership of Douglas.

During the luncheon hour which followed the morning session the business of the association was completed. Detailed reports need not here be given. Mr. William M. Connelley of the Kansas historical society was chosen president. The devoted service of the secretary-treasurer, Mrs. Paine, was recognized by a rising vote. The invitation to meet next year at Iowa City was accepted.

The afternoon session of the association was presided over by Mr. Clarence W. Alvord, one of the founders and the second president of the association. Mr. Alvord first introduced Mr. W. M. Gewehr of Morningside college, who spoke on four factors which account for the rapid development of Methodism in the early west. These factors were the itinerating system with its adaptation to a scattered population; the hymnology of the denomination; its vital local organization of classes and class leaders; and the camp meeting which acted as a social bond and developed an *esprit de corps* that overcame the isolation of the frontier.

Mr. Donald L. McMurry's paper on the political influence of civil war pensions in the years 1885 to 1897 seemed to awaken much difference of opinion. Mr. McMurry contended that from twelve to fifteen per cent of the voters in the northern states were old soldiers, and that pensions were thinly disguised bribes from public funds to advance the interest of parties or of demagogues. Public sentiment favored the claims of the soldiers and congressmen considered them a contract obligation. Pensions also became related to protection and tariff reduction. Cleveland's veto of pension bills contributed to his defeat in 1888; while the scandals in the pension bureau under Corporal

Tanner were potent influences in the republican defeats of 1890 and 1892.

Very recent history was the subject of Mr. Carl Wittke's paper, "Ohio's German language press in the campaign of 1920." Mr. Wittke of the Ohio state university was in a position to know that the German papers of Ohio denounced Governor Cox because upon him had fallen the mantle of Wilson. The league of nations was pronounced a pro-British arrangement, Senator Hiram Johnson was approved for his opposition to the league and the treaty of Versailles, Harding was strongly supported by the German-Americans, who considered the election results as proof of their power and political influence.

The afternoon session terminated with an account by Mr. O. B. Clark of Drake university of the "Advertising propaganda of early Iowa." Methods of attracting immigration were common to all western states; those of Iowa were typical and were under both private and governmental auspices. Special inducements were held out to European immigrants; in 1860 a commissioner was appointed to superintend state activities; ten years later the matter was in the hands of an immigration board, which sent agents both to the eastern states and to Europe.

At the sixth session, held on Friday evening, April 15, President-elect Connelley presided, and called first for the paper of Mr. Charles W. Ramsdell of the University of Texas, on "The public lands and the Indians in Texas, 1846-1859." Texas, unlike other western states, upon entering the union retained exclusive jurisdiction over its public lands. The Indians, on the other hand, became wards of the federal government. The public law of Texas acknowledged no Indian right of occupancy and the general government failed to make arrangements for cession of territory to the Indians. Threatened with starvation, they raided the stock of the white settlers. Finally, in 1855, the federal government placed a portion of the Indians upon lands which the state set aside for the purpose. Four years later, these reservation Indians were forced to remove into Indian territory in order to protect themselves from the white settlers who believed that they were implicated in the raids of 1857 to 1859.

In proper succession to Mr. Ramsdell's article came that of Mr. E. E. Dale of Oklahoma. Mr. Dale was unable to be present.

His paper, read *in extenso,* concerned "The ranchman's last frontier," in what is now Oklahoma. The rise of the cattle industry after the civil war was phenomenal. Oklahoma between Texas and the northern ranges became a strategic region. The federal government would not permit the Indians of that region to lease their lands; ranchmen continued to come in, however, and by extralegal organizations protected their property. By 1906 the last open area of the state was settled and the ranchmen were driven from this, their last stronghold.

From Oklahoma the program advanced north to Kansas. Mr. J. F. Botkin of Wichita, who was to speak on "Fifty-five years in Kansas," was not present. Mr. Ralph R. Price of the Kansas agricultural college at Manhattan made a plea for a more careful estimate of the struggle over the admission of Kansas to statehood. Now that the heat of partisan controversy has died away, a study of the English bill in connection with the Lecompton constitution induces certain conclusions at variance with the accepted history of that document. Mr. Price believes that the English bill was neither a bribe nor a threat on the part of congress, but was eminently fair and reasonable. Studies such as this are timely and conducive to good understanding between the northern and the southern sections of our country. The author had, like Mr. Lynch, a good word to say for the motives of Stephen A. Douglas in the Kansas-Nebraska bill.

This session, largely devoted to the southwest, fitly closed with a paper by Mr. Erastus P. Puckett of the Central college, Missouri, on New Orleans' relation to the western trade. The monopoly of this city was threatened when the Ohio valley was tapped first by the canal systems, then by the railroads that by the forties had drawn to the eastern seaboard much of the western commerce. During the decade of the fifties the railroads reached the Mississippi west of Chicago. New Orleans became alarmed and conventions to discuss the trade crisis were held. Plans for a north and south railroad were formed, backed by local and state aid. The latter could be obtained only by constitutional change. A convention was called and the Louisiana constitution of 1852 was adopted. The New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern railroad was begun, but by 1860 had only 206 miles in operation. Eventually this road became the southern extension of the Illinois Central.

The seventh and final session of the meeting, on Saturday morning, April 16, was devoted to the history teachers' section, when Mr. Howard C. Hill of Chicago university high school presided. The papers concerned the present tendencies of social studies in elementary, high, and normal schools, and in colleges and universities. Mr. J. R. H. Moore, of the Emmerich high school of Indianapolis, told of a movement in his city for the general improvement of the grade school curriculum. The first point was to decide on the objective — the purpose of grammar school history instruction should be to produce good citizens, which means people who think, think straight, have courage, do their duty at the ballot box and elsewhere, and above all value American institutions because they have some idea of what they have cost and why they should be perpetuated. After much committee work a "minimum essentials" was deduced which will be tested by three years' experience.

Mr. Roscoe C. Ashley of Pasadena sent his paper to be read. Twenty-five years ago very little history was taught in high schools; at the present time a fairly uniform series of courses involving three years is provided. These courses are more alike in appearance than in fact. Many high schools require but one year of history. Throughout the Mississippi valley citizenship is usually taught in the junior high schools; also modern European history, which touches American life at many points. The attention given to debating is valuable in training students to think; it is especially emphasized in the north central states.

Mr. Walter B. Davison of River Falls, Wisconsin, normal school sent out a nation-wide questionnaire preliminary to preparing his paper on the teaching of history in normal schools. From the answers he received he drew the following deductions: First, the need of more academic history in nearly all normal schools; second, the need to differentiate methodology for teaching grade and high school students; third, an inclination since the war to confine the emphasis too closely to contemporary history; fourth, overemphasis on methodology at the expense of academic foundation. Hopeful tendencies are the extension and reconstruction of history courses and the subordination of political and military history to economic, industrial, and social phases of historical study.

Mr. Paul Knaplund of the University of Wisconsin outlined the methods in use at that institution for freshman courses. Last year the total enrollment in these introductory courses was 1,545; this year it is 1,279.

All too brief was the time allotted for the discussion of this question of history teaching, in which Mr. Schafer, Mr. Page, and others took part.

With this session the fourteenth annual meeting of the Mississippi valley historical association came to a close. Its influence in the stirring of thought, the formation of friendships, and the exchange of experiences will linger long in the memories of those who were privileged to be present. The by-products of such meetings are their most valuable *raison d'être.*

To the local committee, especially to its chairman, Dr. M. L. Edwards, assistant professor of history in the extension division, University of Wisconsin, much credit is due for the careful arrangements and thoughtful plans that made the meeting so wholly a success. Every provision was made for the entertainment and comfort of the members, and the efforts of the committee were greatly appreciated. Despite the weatherman, the Madison meeting will make a pleasant page in the annals of the association for all time to come.

IN RE THAT AGGRESSIVE SLAVOCRACY[1]

From most of the historical works covering the ante-bellum period one gains the impression that the dominant factor, controlling the course of events, is found in a powerful, united, well-organized, aggressive slavocracy. Some of the more prominent details of the picture are as follows: Shortly after the war of 1812 this aggressive slave power began to sense its strength and future possibilities. As its designs were unfolded and became generally known, the first successful effort to check its growing power came in 1820 with the Missouri compromise. This proved but a temporary setback, however, for the south then looked toward Texas, with the result that in 1836 Texas was asking for admission as a slave state. In the meantime, the south had forced upon the union an acceptance of its tariff views in 1833. Though the antislavery forces now began to mobilize for a general crusade against the aggressions of the slaveholders and did succeed in delaying Texan annexation for a decade, that aggressive southern group ultimately had its way and added another slave state. Not content with the annexation of this Texan domain, from which five slave states might ultimately be made, the south pushed the country into the war with Mexico to gain still more territory for the expansion of its institution and more votes in congress to insure its domination. At the same time this selfish section, willing to promote only its own interests, managed affairs so that our just claim to much of the Oregon territory was forfeited, simply because if it had been pressed the result would have been the addition of more free states. When the Wilmot proviso was offered as a stop to the program of southern aggression, the south succeeded in defeating it and secured the lion's share in the compromise settlement of 1850. The next and most unpardonable work of this aggressive slavocracy was the Kan-

[1] This paper was given in part as the presidential address at the fourteenth annual meeting of the Mississippi valley historical association at Madison, Wisconsin, on April 14, 1921.

sas-Nebraska bill of 1854, with the repeal of the compromise of 1820, which had been planned for a decade. This was soon followed by the Dred Scott decision, designed to make slavery in all the territories absolutely secure. The next step was to be, through another such decision, a forced legalization of slavery in all of the then free states.

Through it all the oligarchy of slaveholders in the south had become drunk with power and their hopes and ambitions knew no bounds. Controlling the situation as the planters did in the south, including the border states, and united on all serious questions of policy where the "peculiar institution" was involved, in spite of the appearance of party division on smaller matters, they would be able to control the policy of the country; for a compact minority, with the advantages of great wealth and leisure to devote to public affairs, could govern in any country. With the successes enumerated above to their credit, and their control of the presidency, which was almost continuous beginning with 1844, and control of the house, the senate, and the supreme court either established or within reach, they developed imperialistic plans to bring Cuba, Mexico, and Central America under their system of control. The resources and opportunities of the section were to be fully developed through a series of southern commercial conventions which would launch successful propaganda for the conservation of cotton soils, the perfecting of the efficiency of labor units, the promotion of manufacturing establishments in the south, the building of a railroad to the Pacific along a southern route, the reopening of the African slave trade to furnish the additional labor needed, and the establishment of steamship lines from southern ports to Europe. Thus the south would control the nation, and through King Cotton it could control the destinies of the rest of the world; and the corner stone of its ideal scheme of civilization was to be slavery. It would have a perfect society in which every man should have a place — the best place for which he was fitted — and should keep it.[2]

This is the picture, not thus drawn in its entirety in any

[2] Numerous references could be given to general histories, biographies, and special works to show how generally accepted is this view. The purpose of this paper is not to contradict any one author, however, but to examine the soundness of view of a whole group.

one account, but large sections of it appear in most accounts. It is the purpose of this monograph to examine the picture in detail and to see whether it is true to facts. Was the south united throughout the ante-bellum period in its position on big questions of policy and action? Was it really united on any single big issue? Was it normally aggressive, or was it on the defensive?

Those historians who see in the ante-bellum south only an aggressive slavocracy admit that a primary requisite for that section to have been on the aggressive would seem to have been unity of purpose and action. The well-known fact that there were two thriving political parties in the south in the decade 1840-1850, when the south is supposed to have got well started on its aggressive program, is dismissed with the simple statement that though each party might twit the other on occasion with being disloyal to slavery, in any great crisis they were almost certain to unite. True, this is the logic which is demanded by the acceptance of the doctrine of an aggressive slavocracy. But, is it true to facts?

One does not read very far in newspaper files or correspondence collections of the ante-bellum period in the south before one encounters frequent complaints and laments, registered in all seriousness, that such a situation — unity of purpose and action politically — did not exist. Party divisions were not mere surface affairs; party ties did not hang loosely, and party allegiance was not renounced lightly. Indeed, the true state of affairs seems to have been that party divisions cut deeply through the body politic; party ties were strong, and party allegiance was renounced only under most abnormal and forceful circumstances. Personal political feuds between individuals and groups were as bitter and persistent as in any other section of the union. If he who is obsessed with the idea of a united and aggressive slavocracy reads newspaper and correspondence material, the frequency with which such complaints as the following are repeated should make him pause: the south is not united; apparently it cannot be united — certainly not for defense in advance of an anticipated attack, but perhaps it may be united after an "overt act" has been committed; (such an "overt act," however, capable of uniting the south, did not come prior to 1860;) there are few southern statesmen with big views and

disinterested motives; there are too many selfish, spoils-seeking politicians, interested only in serving personal ends; party ties are stronger than sectional ties; spoilsmen are ever ready to knife each other or honest men interested in principles; the majority of the party rank and file are strongly inclined to temporize with principles and to postpone ultimately inevitable issues; since the abolitionists are so insistent and such persistent fighters, and since the south is not united and not aggressive, the politicians see that they have more to gain and less to lose by giving in to the former at the expense of the latter; the northern enemies of the south have many shrewd statesmen enlisted in their ranks who will not commit the blunder of taking such an advanced position as will result in uniting the south, but who by slow and careful advances are succeeding in deluding the south and keeping it distracted until the time will be ripe for the final step of complete abolition, with assurance of success; the safety of the south depends less upon the patriotism (to the south) of its politicians, than upon the boldness of its opponents.

In the following pages it will be demonstrated frequently that southern unity did not exist. Even in congress the south did not present a united front which might have enabled it to make demands with assurance of having them met; however, there was a nearer approach to unity of purpose and action among southern men in congress than among their constituents at home, the section over. It was difficult enough to get the people of a single state to agree upon and take a definite stand, as is witnessed by the history of South Carolina from 1828 to 1861; and as for getting several states to agree even upon an interpretation of the situation at any given time, to say nothing of concerted action, it seemed to be utterly hopeless, for it seemed almost hopeless in the case of two states, neighbors with apparently identical interests, South Carolina and Georgia.

On several occasions in the period from 1840 to 1860 men wrote in private correspondence that the only real hope they had of ever getting the south to take a united and effective stand in defense of its rights lay in South Carolina, which seemed to be the only state where there was enough of unity, steadfastness to principle, and boldness to cause the state to take a

stand; this would likely result in an attempt to coerce South Carolina which could not be concealed from the people of the other southern states, who would then, and then only, be brought to real, effective, united action for defense of the section. On the other hand, it was just as frequently predicted that any movement started by the "palmetto state" was sure to fail for want of support from the other southern states, so great was their distrust, jealousy, and hatred of the leadership of that state.

The ante-bellum period was characterized, in South Carolina and in the south generally, by waves of excitement. An examination of any one of these will reveal the same general story: much talk about necessity of action — of united action; but it never materializes. Always there are bitter party feuds, distrust of leaders, complaint of lack of proper leadership, et cetera, *ad infinitum*.

The story of the whig party in the south is a forceful proof of the lack of unity. When the "peculiar institution" was assailed from the north, of course the state-rights whigs came to its defense. As it was early seen that the northern whigs tended to be more actively hostile to slavery than were the northern democrats, the southern whigs were reminded of the fact and taunted with being traitors to their own interests. Quite naturally, perhaps, then, as long as the alliance between the southern and the northern wings of the party was continued, the southern whigs were more moderate in their defense of slavery than were the southern democrats. Throughout the struggle in congress over the gag resolutions the compact front of the south was broken again and again quite perceptibly by whig votes. The same was true of the votes in the house on the election of a speaker and in the senate on the ratification of appointments made by the president, when objection was raised that the man under consideration was an antislavery man. Indeed, through the eighteen-forties many southern whigs denounced the democrats for eternally dragging forth the slavery question to cover up the real issue, whatever it might be, and to stir up agitation. When the national whig party became irreparably split over the slavery question, it did not mean that from that time on there was a united south with a single purpose and a

single policy. Though southern whigs agreed to disagree with their northern party brethren they could not agree among themselves nor with the southern democrats on a position to be held against the common foe; and, though the national democratic party continued its existence down to 1860, there was marked disagreement in the southern ranks of that party as to policy.

Throughout the ante-bellum period there were men in the north who were not ready to support all the aggressive measures directed against the south; these men were styled "northern men with southern principles," and were referred to more contemptuously as "doughfaces." There seem to have been quite as many men in the south who were inclined to be conservative, less radical in demands, and willing to make concessions; these men were called "southern traitors" in some quarters. But the striking difference between the sections in this respect was that, while in the north there was pretty general agreement in classifying men as "doughfaces," in the south there was a lack of agreement as to who were the "traitors;" a man might be to one group in the south a wise and honest statesman, while at the same time to another group he might be a political charlatan and a traitor. Many men who were called traitors by various compatriots in the south might be named. There was considerable interest in, and comment upon, the Calhoun-Benton feud. Some referred to Benton as "Tommy the traitor" and developed their meaning at length, but admitted that if Benton could "force on" his opponents "the livery of Calhoun and disunion" he could "make them odious enough to scare children with." When, in all seriousness, one group of correspondents referred to certain political leaders as traitors to the south and to other leaders as wise and honest statesmen; when another group of correspondents referred to the same leaders with terms of classification just reversed; and when still others classed both groups of leaders as traitors, the historian must conclude that the section was thoroughly disorganized and that it possessed no real unity of purpose or action.

It was the irony of fate that the southern statesman who saw, perhaps more clearly than any other, the necessity of southern unity for defense through the maintenance of the "true Republican principles," and who strove earnestly to

promote such unity of action in support of basic principles, was the very one who perhaps caused more division and bitterness of strife within the section than any other man. No man ever had followers more devoted and enemies more bitter among the "people at home" than John C. Calhoun.

Instead of a united, aggressive slavocracy, one finds evidence at almost every turn that the true picture is quite the reverse, and that keen students of public affairs realized full well that cross-purposes and disorganization prevailed. Again and again, throughout the period from 1835 to 1860, complaint was registered that, vainly putting its trust in national parties, without unanimity of opinion either as to the dangers that menaced or the remedies to be applied, with no distinct issue, no certain aim, no wise plan of statesmanship, no well-defined ideas of what it might have to fear, to hope, or to do, the south was dragged along, ingloriously enough, by the fatal delusions of national partyism, a source of profit to its southern betrayers and a spoil and a mockery to its northern enemies. Though the opinion was frequently offered that if united the south would be invincible, at least in the protection of its rights, it was almost as frequently admitted that it seemed impossible to get the section to unite even for self-defense, let alone for a positive or an aggressive program, within the union. Hence it was that toward the end of the period some sincere believers in the preservation of the "Constitutional Union" as the best policy for both sections began to hope for secession by a single state as the only development which could bring about southern unity; and many of these men admitted at the same time that they feared that such unity would last but a short time beyond the formation of a southern confederacy, and that disorganization and disintegration would soon follow.

When the historian finds that some southerners boasted of how they might control the nation if they could but secure unity among southern statesmen and politicians, and that individuals or groups urged this item or that one for a southern program and boasted of the wonders it would work, is the historian to interpret them literally? In most of such instances were they not in the mood of a small boy going down a dark alley, whistling as loud as he can to keep up his courage? Just as the boy's

whistling is so forced and strained that he hits many false notes, so the boasting of southerners gives one the impression that it was forced, unnatural, not sincere, and hence false notes were struck.

When the south struggled for power in national councils, was it for political strength to be used aggressively? Did the south have a positive program to be put through in its own interest to the exclusion of, or the positive injury of, the other sections? Did not the south want political strength mainly or simply to block and stop the aggressions of its opponents? Did it ask anything more than to be let alone and not to be made to bear the burden of legislation injurious to itself alone?[3]

The charge of aggression was made against the south for the first time seriously and rather generally in the middle eighteen-thirties, when projects for Texan independence from Mexico and annexation to the United States were launched; this time was also marked by the launching of the aggressive anti-slavery crusade in the north. During the next decade the charge was made with ever-increasing frequency and reached the height of its strength and popularity at the time of the

[3] To give all the source citations in correspondence collections and newspaper files upon which these observations are based would require unwarranted space. Reference can be made simply in a general way to the Hammond papers, the Calhoun papers, *The correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb,* edited by Ulrich B. Phillips (American historical association, *Annual report,* 1911, volume 2—Washington, 1913), *Correspondence of John C. Calhoun,* edited by J. Franklin Jameson (American historical association, *Annual report,* 1899, volume 2 — Washington, 1900), and files of southern newspapers of the ante-bellum period, now in the possession of the University of Texas, the Alabama state department of archives and history, the Charleston library society, South Carolina university, and the library of congress. Many secondary works, such as Arthur C. Cole, *The whig party in the south* (*Prize essays of the American historical association, 1912*—Washington, 1913), are valuable. Letters especially valuable for a picture of the south at different times are the following: Calhoun from J. W. A. Pettit, June 18, 1847, from Wilson Lumpkin, August 27, 1847, August 25, 1848, from H. W. Connor, October 6, 1847, from A. Bowie, January 19, 1848, and from Louis T. Wigfall, January 4, 1849, in the Calhoun papers; Stephens to James Thomas, February 13, 1850, to J. Henly Smith, January 22, September 15, 16, 1860, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb,* 184, 457, 496, 497. Another volume of Calhoun correspondence is now being edited by R. P. Brooks and C. S. Boucher, for publication by the Manuscripts commission of the American historical association, as one volume of the *Reports*; it will contain about four hundred letters written to Calhoun from all parts of the country in the eighteen-forties. Hereafter, in this monograph, this collection of correspondence, as yet unpublished, will be referred to as the "Calhoun papers."

Mexican war. It held sway in the north until 1861, has persisted from that day to this, and is repeated in books published within the past year, 1920.

The settlement of Texas by emigrants from the south was as natural a development as any phase of the westward movement. At a time when migration westward — the pushing into new lands and the development of them — was one of the most important and generally characteristic movements in all parts of the United States, why was it not to be expected that the south would share in this common impulse? and, when it developed that the south did share the impulse and acted on it, why was this worthy of being labeled a criminal conspiracy?

In view of the facts that the culture of cotton by the plantation system required larger units of land and exhausted the land relatively more rapidly than the northern type of agriculture with varied crops and smaller units, it was natural that the southern frontier should lead, as it did into Missouri and Texas. Furthermore, at a time when the westward migration in the United States was steadily increasing and when the western prairies were designated as the Indian country, or were closed to the south by the compromise of 1820, it would seem natural that the stream of advance should have been diverted to the southwest. Those who have made a critical study of the colonization of Texas, however, have found that the settlement of that state, in the early days before its independence, was not promoted by slavery, to any appreciable extent. A few slaveholders were attracted by the opportunity to secure cheap lands, but the early emigration to Texas was chiefly of "land-hungry" men of small means, small farmers, back-country men of the Jackson-democrat type, and very few were owners of more than a very few slaves, while the majority were not slaveholders at all. Slaves were brought into Texas in greater numbers after independence and after annexation, but the majority of immigrants were still nonslaveholders, and the slaves constituted only twenty-seven per cent of the total population of Texas in 1850 and only thirty per cent in 1860. There seems to be little, if any, evidence to show that the settlement of Texas was due even in small part to the political ambitions of the south to increase the slaveholders' strength in congress. When Texas was ripe for annexation, the accomplishment of

this desideratum was delayed a decade by the slavery complication. If there had not been a single slave within the limits of the United States, the independence of Texas and its subsequent incorporation into the union would likely have come about, as a result of the natural course of the westward movement, but with this possible difference: annexation might have come ten years earlier than it did. Slavery, instead of stimulating the annexation, actually delayed it.[4]

During the period of delay, caused by the opponents of slavery, the south learned that these opponents were planning attacks which would be impeded by an accretion of strength to those about to be assailed; and, by the same token, which prompted a determination on the part of antislavery men to prevent this accretion of strength, southerners saw that it was their cue to be interested in it. Then it was, in the period when Texas was kept waiting for admission, that great numbers in the south for the first time demanded annexation as necessary for their safety in the national councils. True, a few, such as Robert J. Walker of Mississippi, as early as 1835 urged annexation because it might give the south six additional slaveholding, antitariff states, securing to the south a checking power in the senate against hostile legislation. But it was not until later, after Texas had been held off for some time, that great numbers in the south came to demand annexation for this reason; not until the aggressions of the abolitionists forced them to this as a defensive position. And even this same Robert J. Walker was a consistent expansionist, whether slavery was involved or not, even more than he was a guardian of the institution.[5]

Further, on the eve of the annexation of Texas the south was interested in adding that state to the union because of the inter-

[4] George P. Garrison, *Westward extension, 1841-1850* (*The American nation: a history*, volume 17—New York, 1906), 90; James E. Winston, "Texas annexation sentiment in Mississippi, 1835-1844," in the *Southwestern historical quarterly*, 23:1-19; Calhoun from Thomas Scott, April 4, 1844, from William Hale, May 18, 1844, from Wilson Shannon, May 25, 1844, from Sam R. Thruston, December 2, 1844, from William C. Anderson and others, November 6, 1845, Calhoun papers. The writer is indebted for valuable suggestions and information on the history of Texas to his colleagues, Mr. E. C. Barker, who has done considerable work on the Anglo-American colonization of Texas, and Mr. C. W. Ramsdell.

[5] Winston, "Texas annexation sentiment in Mississippi," in the *Southwestern historical quarterly*, 23:2; R. M. T. Hunter to Calhoun, October 10, 1843, Calhoun papers.

national dangers arising from English designs in Texas — dangers, both political and economic, to the whole union — quite as much as it was interested in this possible increase in political strength for the defense of slavery in the union, or in the avoidance of the danger of having as a neighbor a state to be abolitionized under English influence. Many of the letters in southern correspondence of 1844 and 1845 show that the writers, southerners, were thinking mainly about the international aspect of the Texas annexation question; thinking of the peace and prosperity of the nation as a whole; fearing a Texan alliance with Great Britain that would lead to diplomatic troubles, and most likely to war; fearing the bad commercial effects on the nation as a whole of independent Texas allied commercially with other nations and waging commercial warfare upon the United States. The great majority of these letters contain no mention of more votes in congress for slavery; some of them show anxiety over the effect of emancipation in Texas upon the slave states, and a desire to block this further aggressive move by Great Britain against a domestic institution in the United States. Indeed, some southerners thought the annexation of Texas of so grave importance to the United States as a whole, for international and commercial reasons, that they would have been much more outspoken for it, had it not been for the fact that the slavery embarrassment caused them to approach the subject with the greatest caution.[6]

But, once the slavery issue had been clearly drawn in connection with Texas, many southerners realized that to permit it to be rejected because it would enter as a slave state would be for the south to surrender all rights. After Texas had been kept out for some eight years, the south seems to have become fully awakened to the importance of Texas in connection with

[6] Calhoun from R. M. T. Hunter, October 10, 1843, from F. W. Pickens, November 24, 1843, from Richard Hawes, March 21, 1844, from Isaac Van Zant and J. Pinckney Henderson, April 22, 1844, from James Gadsden, May 3, 1844, from R. F. Simpson, May 24, 1844, from William M. Gwin, August 20, 1844, from Duff Green, December 13, 20, 1844, from Eustis Prescott, January 4, 1845, from J. S. Mayfield, February 19, 1845, from J. Hamilton, February 28, 1845, from A. J. Donelson, March 24, 1845, Calhoun papers; George D. Phillips to Cobb, February 21, 25, 1845, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb*, 65, 66; Calhoun to Charles J. Ingersoll, July 2, 1844, Calhoun from Ambrose D. Mann, October 31, 1844, from William R. King, January 29, 1845, from John Tyler, June 5, 1848, in *Correspondence of John C. Calhoun*, 599, 982, 1022, 1172.

slavery. Then, with the views of Great Britain and the northern states not only disclosed but openly avowed, the annexation of Texas became to some southerners the most vital issue since the American revolution. "On it," wrote one of these, "hinges the very existence of our Southern Institutions, and if we of the south now prove recreant, we . . . must [be] content to be Hewers of wood and Drawers of water for our Northern Brethren."[7]

South Carolina, the state usually accredited with being in the van when an aggressive program to serve southern interests was on foot, did not become generally interested in Texas until 1843; and even then that state and its great statesman, Calhoun, were quite as much interested in the tariff and in general governmental reform as in Texas. Indeed, they became insistent upon the annexation only when they saw that defeat of that project would be regarded as a great victory for the abolitionists and would serve to encourage them in further aggressions. Another phase which interested South Carolinians quite as much as any other was the danger that Texas would fall into the hands of a commercial rival whose hold would involve international trouble in view of the Monroe doctrine.[8]

One of the best proofs that the south was not united in a deep-laid slavery-extension plot to add another slave state is found in a suggestion, made late in 1843, that the Texas ques-

[7] Calhoun from E. J. Black, March 4, 1844, from Richard Hawes, March 21, 1844, from J. H. Howard, May 2, 1844, from James Gadsden, May 3, 1844, from L. A. Hoe, May 11, 1844, from J. H. Hammond, June 7, 1844, from R. F. Simpson, August 4, 1844, from W. M. Corry, February 14, 1845, Calhoun papers; Wilson Lumpkin to Calhoun, March 23, 1844, Calhoun to George W. Houk, October 14, 1844, in *Correspondence of John C. Calhoun*, 624, 942; Cobb from Thomas Ritchie, May 6, 1844, from J. W. Burney, January 31, 1845, from Junius Hillyer, February 15, 1845, Toombs to Stephens, February 16, 1845, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb*, 56, 62, 63.

[8] Chauncey S. Boucher, "The annexation of Texas and the Bluffton movement in South Carolina," in the MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW, 6:3-33. F. W. Pickens wrote to Calhoun on November 24, 1843: "I fully agree as to the importance of the Texas question in all its bearings. I think we are bound to take the highest and most decided grounds. I think the possession of Texas as a British colony would be the just cause of war, and if the non-slaveholding states oppose its admission upon the ground of its strengthening the slaveholding interests, etc., we will be bound in self respect and self-preservation to join Texas with or without the Union. It is a grave and a momentous question in all its bearings, and I am ready to pledge all that I am and all that I hope to be on its issues." Calhoun papers.

tion might be used to unite the south politically in an endeavor to defeat both Clay and Van Buren and prevent the betrayal expected in tariff legislation. Again and again letters written in the early part of 1844 show that the south was not united on any stand and that the men who saw the international and sectional dangers involved in the defeat of annexation were trying to devise some means to arouse southerners to present a united front for Texas. In South Carolina embarrassment was caused by the Bluffton movement led by Robert B. Rhett for state action — nullification or secession — against the tariff, for this movement created distraction just when unity was needed.[9]

Letters written to Calhoun during 1842, 1843, and 1844 show that the writers were interested primarily in keeping the democratic party, and thus the administration of the government, true to certain principles — basic principles of administration, illustrated specifically in the tariff, currency, banking, public lands, et cetera, and only secondarily in slavery. There are no signs of a "plot" of an "aggressive slavocracy." Indeed, there are dozens of letters with no mention of slavery. Accordingly, Texas was not the biggest issue in the election of 1844, from the standpoint of many a southerner. It was the basic change of principles for national administration, the triumph of true democracy — "the true Republican principles," as they were called — that was welcomed so much with the victory of Polk.[10]

[9] Virgil Maxcy wrote on December 14, 1843: "Some of your friends at Washington I fear would hesitate at taking issue with Mr. V. B. and Mr. Clay on what they consider your extreme notions on the subject of Tariff alone, and for that reason to prevent the possibility of a schism or any faltering in the ranks it seemed to me expedient to strengthen your position and your hold on them by the addition of the Texas question. This course would I think strengthen you throughout the South, where I should hope there would be no division on the Texas question, tho' on the subject of a protective tariff, there are still some, who feel a toleration for discrimination, not only for revenue, but for the purpose of incidental protection or *encouragement* of manufactures." Calhoun papers. See also Boucher, "The annexation of Texas and the Bluffton movement in South Carolina," in the Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 6:9; Calhoun from R. M. T. Hunter, October 10, 1843, from J. H. Howard, May 2, 1844, from James Gadsden, May 3, 1844, from Eustis Prescott, May 11, 1844, from J. H. Campbell, May 14, 1844, from F. H. Elmore, July 30, 1844, from H. Hailey, July 30, 1844, from F. W. Pickens, August 10, 1844, in the Calhoun papers; Virgil Maxcy to Calhoun, December 3, 1843, in *Correspondence of John C. Calhoun*, 896.

[10] Calhoun from J. H. Hammond, February 3, 1844, from R. B. Rhett, February 21, 1844, from George McDuffie, March 10, 1844, from F. W. Pickens, August 10,

After Calhoun became secretary of state southerners urged him to take "the highest grounds" on the Oregon question quite as often as they urged a similar course regarding Texas. Many of these correspondents were able to view the two questions more disinterestedly, from the standpoint of national welfare, than many of their brethren in the north. They did not worry about the future admission of new free states formed from the Oregon territory, and indeed were not sure that if Texas were divided the result would not be three free states and two slave states formed from its territory.[11] Many men agreed with Howell Cobb of Georgia, who was an ardent "fifty-four-forty" man and was quite disgusted that we surrendered so much of the Oregon territory and yet showed such haste to bait Mexico.[12] After Polk, in his message of December 2, 1845, announced that "the proposition of compromise which had been made [by the United States] and rejected [by England] was by my direction subsequently withdrawn and our title to the whole Oregon territory asserted, and, as is believed, maintained by irrefragable facts and arguments,"[13] and Calhoun urged caution and moderation to avoid a war with England, but at the same time was ready to insist on a fair and just settlement, southerners generally approved this stand. In Calhoun's correspondence, however, there is no evidence that the south wanted to limit the Oregon territory in order to limit the area of the free states. The only references to the slavery question are

1844, from Francis Wharton, August 21, 1844, from J. Hamilton, September 12, October 4, 1844, from W. R. King, November 29, 1844, from J. S. Barbour, December 18, 1844, from Duff Green, March 26, 1845, Calhoun papers.

[11] Calhoun from F. H. Elmore, March 11, 1844, from F. W. Pickens, April 22, 1844, September 29, 1845, from G. W. Houk, October 1, 1844, from Thomas G. Clemson, November 11, 1845, from H. W. Connor, January 6, 1846, from Elwood Fisher, January 10, 1846, from J. H. Howard, January 16, 1846, Calhoun papers; George D. Phillips to Cobb, December 30, 1845, Stephens to George W. Crawford, February 3, 1846, Cobb to his wife, May 10, 1846, and several letters to and from Cobb in the middle of 1846, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb*, 69, 71, 76.

[12] Charles J. McDonald, former governor of Georgia, wrote to Cobb on July 7, 1846, from Macon, Georgia: "The whole course of Congress in regard to the Oregon question has shown the ignoble spirit that would concede to power what it would maintain against a nation less able to defend its usurpations." *Ibid.*, 84. See also John H. Lumpkin to Cobb, November 13, 1846, *ibid.*, 86.

[13] James D. Richardson, *A compilation of the messages and papers of the presidents, 1789-1897* (Washington, 1897), 4:395.

occasional allusions to the northern charge that the south, having secured Texas, wanted to let Oregon go by default or greatly to reduce that territory, so as to lessen the power of the free states. And here the remarkable thing is the slight attention paid even to this charge, which was false. So far from being on the aggressive, the south was not yet thoroughly awake to the necessity of defensive measures.[14]

As annexation was delayed, through the later eighteen-thirties, it became evident that the south was not and could not be united as a champion of annexation. In the early eighteen-forties southern whigs were inclined to oppose the annexation project, lest it reflect credit upon Tyler and, later, upon Calhoun, who became secretary of state. Clay, while on his triumphal progress through the south on the eve of the campaign of 1844, concluded that the southern interest in and insistence upon annexation was much less than represented, and he acted accordingly in his "Raleigh letter," which indeed was approved by several southern leaders. The points raised by Clay regarding a compromising of our national character, the danger of a war with Mexico, and the danger to the integrity of the union had weight with many southerners, and especially with southern whig members of congress.[15] While some of these southern opponents of annexation, both democrats and whigs, in the early days of the campaign of 1844 clearly stated that their objection was merely against too hasty action and that they hoped for annexation when temporary difficulties had passed, others followed the reasoning of Waddy Thompson and opposed annexation on the fundamental grounds that, by causing emigration from the old slave states, it would weaken and would ultimately endanger the slave interests in the old states. Some whigs objected that the annexation question was endangering party success and others were distinct champions of the union and opposed annexation because it might lead to a dissolution of the union.[16]

[14] Many letters written in the first half of 1846, in the Calhoun papers. Albon Chase to Cobb, May 20, 1846, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb*, 77.

[15] Cole, *The whig party in the south*, 110, 111.

[16] George McDuffie wrote to Calhoun from Washington on January 3, 1843: "There is an impression here that the administration are negotiating for the annexation of Texas, but nothing certain or definite has transpired. My own opinion is that nothing, but a very high state of necessity will justify the measure

The position of Clay and the whig party proved unsatisfactory to many voters who had supported the party in 1840, however, and the whig vote in the south was materially lessened, due both to the Texas question and to the lack of something corresponding to the "Log Cabin and Hard Cider" appeal to the districts outside the black belt. It was not the south alone, however, nor the Texas issue alone, which elected Polk in 1844. The vote of the north and the Oregon question were equally responsible. The people the country over, north as well as south, were wild for expansion, "manifest destiny," and comparatively little attention was given to problems involved in slavery extension.[17] After the popular verdict was known and the joint resolution method of annexation was resorted to, enough southern whigs gave in to cause the success of the measure, but the general body of the southern whig congressmen opposed on grounds of constitutionality or because they believed it would prove disastrous to the slaveholding interests in some if not in all of the old states.[18]

either on the score of justice or policy. It would be *ipso facto* making war on Mexico, if done without her concurrence, and there would be hazard that Great Britain would take part with Mexico." Calhoun papers. See also Boucher, "The annexation of Texas and the Bluffton movement in South Carolina," in the MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW, 6:3-33, and R. F. Simpson to Calhoun, August 24, 1844, in the Calhoun papers.

[17]Cole, *The whig party in the south.* Calhoun from Thomas Scott, April 4, 1844, from William Hale, May 18, 1844, from Wilson Shannon, May 25, 1844, Calhoun papers.

[18] Cole, *The whig party in the south,* 118. Toombs wrote to Stephens on February 16, 1845: "I see nothing but evil to our party and the country that can come out of this question in the future. . . . I concur with you in but one of [your re]asons for desiring annexation and that is that [it will] give power to the slave states. I firmly believe [that in] every other respect it will be an unmixed evil to us [?] and not without natural disadvantages as well as [advanta]ges." Toombs wrote to George W. Crawford on February 6, 1846, concerning the Oregon question, that he thought it was raised by the democrats simply for political purposes, and that Polk was playing it for such. Toombs said that he thought that Polk had no idea of making war on anybody other than the whigs, and that he hoped to get the whigs in a compromised position on the question before the country. "There is another view of this question, purely sectional, which our people don't seem to understand. Some of our Southern papers seem to think that we are very foolish to risk a war to secure anti-slave power." He predicted an early compromise on the forty-ninth parallel, and "therefore a loss of half the country." He did not "care a fig" about any part of the Oregon territory and would gladly give all of it to anybody else but the British. "The country is too large now, and I don't want a foot of Oregon or an acre of any other country,

Even if the south is cleared of the charge of promoting a conspiracy to add Texas to the union with the idea of making some half dozen slave states out of it for the sake of gaining strength in the senate, there still remains the charge that the slavocracy was responsible for bringing on the Mexican war with a view to adding enough more territory to make several additional slave states.

'T wouldn't suit them Southun fellers,
They're a dreffle graspin' set,
We must ollers blow the bellers
Wen they want their irons het;
May be it's all right ez preachin',
But *my* narves it kind o' grates,
Wen I see the overreachin'
O' them nigger-drivin' States.

. . . . . .

They may talk o' Freedom's airy
Tell they're pupple in the face, —
It's a grand gret cemetary
Fer the barthrights of our race;
They jest want this Californy
So's to lug new slave-states in
To abuse ye, an' to scorn ye,
An' to plunder ye like sin.

Aint it cute to see a Yankee
Take sech everlastin' pains,
All to git the Devil's thankee
Helpin' on 'em weld their chains?
Wy, it's jest ez clear ez figgers,
Clear ez one an' one make two,
Chaps thet make black slaves o' niggers
Want to make wite slaves o' you.

Thus it was that James Russell Lowell, through his fictitious spokesman, Hosea Biglow, represented the sentiments of thousands in the north during the summer of 1846. From this time until 1861 the charge of aggression was hurled with ever-increas-

especially without 'niggers.' These are some of my reasons for my course which don't appear in print.'' Such expressions as these are the exception even in private correspondence of the period. *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb*, 63, 72.

ing vigor against the south by the abolitionists, and the writer believes that the persistence of the charge from the end of the war to the present in historical works is due to the fact that most of these works have been based on sources which, in the final analysis, are really of abolitionist origin. The writer believes that the south, instead of being the aggressor, was on the defensive throughout almost the entire ante-bellum period; and that so far from having the unity which was a primary necessity for an offensive campaign, the south could not often, nor for long, agree upon even a defensive program, down to the very eve of the civil war. Individuals at times took a stand which may perhaps best be termed "aggressively defensive." The well-known individualism of the southerner, however, militated against united action to the extent that there was no organized, unified aggression.

Although southerners were accused of being treacherously overanxious to avoid war with England, if necessary to gain territory in the northwest which would add nonslaveholding territory to the union, at the same time that they were anxious for war with Mexico to add slaveholding territory to the southwest, it can readily be shown that many of them really and consistently wanted to avoid war with both. Some southerners, indeed, while favoring a firm stand against England on the Oregon question, recommended patience with Mexico. The writer knows of no southerner who openly or secretly advocated war with Mexico, before war had actually begun, for the sake of adding more slave states. President Polk, who has been accused of having been a sectional president, interested primarily in serving southern interests, seems to have been more of a national expansionist *per se* than the leader in a proslavery plot. And the writer has found little if any positive evidence that, even after the war was begun, southerners supported it in the early period for the sake of conquest of future slave states. Their interest in this phase of the war was aroused only when their attention was forced to it by the Wilmot proviso. Such stand as they then took was again a defensive one.[19]

[19] Calhoun from F. W. Pickens, April 22, 1844, September 29, 1845, from J. H. Howard, January 16, 1846, from Charles Anthony, February 17, 1846, from Edward J. Black, February 22, 1846, from Alexander Wells, April 9, 1846, from Adam Hutsman, April 10, 1846, from Wilson Lumpkin, May 20, 1846, Calhoun papers; Duff Green to Calhoun, February 22, 1846, in *Correspondence of John C. Calhoun*, 1073;

From 1842 to 1846, judging from newspapers and correspondence, southerners were thinking more about the tariff than about the territorial phase of the slavery question. They were anxious to avoid war with both Great Britain and Mexico, if it could be done with honor, because war with any power would interfere with their program for tariff and general governmental reform.[20]

When President Polk, on May 11, 1846, declared in his message to congress that Mexico had "passed the boundary of the United States," had "invaded our territory and shed American blood upon American soil," and that war existed, notwithstanding "all our efforts to avoid it," existed "by the act of Mexico herself," Abraham Lincoln, in his famous "spot resolutions," and John C. Calhoun, in numerous speeches in the senate, questioned the president's statements; and while Lincoln implied that war had been courted and begun with unbecoming haste, Calhoun said so definitely. He deplored the war, not simply for the manner in which it had been brought on, but for its consequences. He remarked to his friends when the war, which he believed could and should have been avoided, had actually begun, that it was a step from which the country would not be able to recover for a long time, if ever; he added that, for the first time since entering public life, he was unable to see the future.[21]

George McDuffie had been outspokenly opposed to the annexation of Texas both on the score of justice and of policy, for it "would be *ipso facto* making war on Mexico, if done without her concurrence.[22] Wilson Lumpkin, former governor of Georgia,

John P. King to Cobb, May 7, 1846, Cobb to his wife, May 10, 1846, Cobb from Albon Chase, May 20, 1846, from William H. Hull, May 22, 1846, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb*, 75, 76, 77, 78.

[20] Letters from Wilson Lumpkin to Calhoun, May 20, November 26, 1846, in the Calhoun papers, are typical of scores of letters in this and in other collections.

[21] *The works of John C. Calhoun*, edited by Richard K. Crallé (New York, 1857), 4:355, 363, 371.

[22] George McDuffie to Calhoun, January 3, 1843, Calhoun papers. J. Gregg wrote to Calhoun on February 17, 1847: "You have fully confirmed what I have thought all along and said frequently in my family though I did not care to say much about it out of doors whilse the war was going on, that if Gen'l Taylor had not been ordered from Corpus Christi to the Rio Grande we would have had no war and that Mr. Polk had very injudiciously and imprudently dragged us into it as there was no kind of necessity whatever for that ill fated movement.

"The Abolitionists and Northern Members generally objected and predicted that the annexation of Texas would lead to a war with Mexico but we all Mr.

wrote on May 20, 1846, in a tone which indicated anything but rejoicing. "We are *actually* at war with Mexico, whether Constitutionally so or not," he said. "And I now seriously apprehend our difficulties with England will not be speedily adjusted. Indeed I think it possible, that our Mexican war may be the commencement of troubles, that may shake to the center, all the principal governments of the Civilized World. Should the great battle of the World come, we shall of course claim to ourselves the credit of fighting on the side of liberty and Republicanism against Monarchy and Despotism. But I cannot see so clearly where we may find ourselves at the close of the

Polk and all [*sic*] insisted on it that this would not necessarily follow, nor would it had it not been for Mr. Polk's utter lack of judgment and unaccountable indiscretion." Calhoun papers.

P. S. Buckingham wrote on February 21, 1847, that Calhoun's friends in Virginia were grateful to him for "the high and impregnable moral ground which you have taken on the subject of our Mexican difficulties. The people regard the War as Mr. Polk's War." *Ibid.* Cobb wrote to his wife on May 10, 1846: "It is now settled that we are at war with Mexico, and on tomorrow the President is to send in to Congress a war message, and immediately legislation will be had for the prompt and energetic enforcement of our rights against Mexico. . . . I confess I do not feel so warlike myself. I prefer a foeman worthy of my steel. The reflection that we are so eager to avenge ourselves upon this poor, imbecile, self-distracted province, and at the same time sacrifice rights more 'clear and unquestionable' to appease the threatened anger of her Brittanic Majesty, is to me humiliating in the extreme. However I will do my duty in both cases honestly and fearlessly, and trust the result to God and to my country." Albon Chase, editor of the *Southern Banner* (Athens, Georgia), wrote to Cobb on May 20, 1846: "I am not disposed to argue any point connected with the Oregon or Texas controversy. I am ranked here as a 54° 40′ man, though I do not hesitate to avow that I would yield much for the sake of peace. I would take 49° if England offered it, to avoid a greater evil than the failure to obtain possession of our territory north of that line. And in this, at least, am not inconsistent with myself; for if while at peace, Mexico had entered into a negotiation relative to boundary, I would not insist upon the whole country east of the Rio Grande for the whole length of that river. I would have been gratified at a compromise with her even, for the sake of peace. But it is too late now, and it may ere long be too late in regard to Oregon." William Hope Hull wrote to Cobb from Athens, Georgia, on May 22, 1846, that Clarke county was too much under the influence of whiggery to have much enthusiasm in raising troops for Texas. He cautioned that the democratic party should not get itself into an untenable position on the boundary of Texas, and that the true boundary was not the Rio del Norte for its whole course. "No possible logic can prove that Santa Fé and the other towns on the east side of the river on its upper streams, were ever a portion of Texas. The true line would leave the river somewhere above Mier, and follow the mountains north, leaving a large section between the line and the upper parts of the river." *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb*, 76, 77, 78.

great struggle." He hinted rather strongly at a belief that the president had been duped by the wiles and schemes of a war faction which wanted the war to give it "influence, consequence and popularity." He regretted that the principle had apparently been recognized that the president could at any time force the country into war, without the aid or consent of congress, and that patriotism demanded of congress the supplies to carry on that war, without even allowing it time to deliberate.[23]

When news arrived of the skirmishes on the Rio Grande, Calhoun did his best to get the administration to separate the question of war from that which related to the rescuing of General Taylor and his forces. The means necessary for the latter, he said, could, with propriety, be granted at once, but time should be taken for due and deliberate consideration of the former. Had this been done, he later asserted, all legitimate points would soon have been gained from Mexico, without an indefinite and expensive war. Many letters of approval came to Calhoun when he clearly laid the blame for the war upon the lack of judgment and the indiscretion of the administration.[24]

As the war wore on and men and money were consumed in great quantities, Calhoun raised the question of the objects in view. He had at first to accept the statement of the president that it was not for conquest, but merely to establish our boundary line and to secure indemnity for claims which antedated the war. But, when it looked as though more than enough fighting and conquest had come to pass to satisfy such objects, and there seemed to be real danger that all Mexico might be conquered, either to be held as a province or to be incorporated in the union, Calhoun sounded a warning against such a policy as dangerous from many standpoints. Again and again he urged his "defensive line" policy as best to serve all interests of the United States.[25]

[23] Wilson Lumpkin to Calhoun, May 20, 1846, Calhoun papers.

[24] Calhoun from J. Gregg, February 17, 1847, from P. S. Buckingham, February 21, 1847, from Wilson Lumpkin, March 11, 1847, from Joseph Pickens, January 6, 1848, *ibid.* See also Calhoun, *Works* (Crallé, ed.), 4:380; John A. Campbell to Calhoun, November 20, 1847, Calhoun to Andrew P. Calhoun, May 14, 1846, to Thomas G. Clemson, May 28, 1846, in *Correspondence of John C. Calhoun,* 1139, 690, 691; John P. King to Cobb, May 7, 1846, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb,* 75; the *Charleston Mercury,* May 19, 1846.

[25] Calhoun, *Works* (Crallé, ed.), 4:396, 409, 418, 421; *Charleston Southern Patriot,* June 27, 1846; *Greenville Republican,* February 18, April 16, 1847, Janu-

Calhoun showed that on northern congressmen quite as much as on those from the south rested the blame for the precipitate (to use no stronger word) recognition of the war. He showed also that the responsibility for the determination not to come out of the war without taking a good slice of Mexican territory—a determination voiced by much of the country at large by the end of 1847—lay with northern congressmen of both parties quite as much or more than with southerners. His idea of the propriety of seizing and holding such portion of the Mexican territory as would be ample to cover "all proper claims" was limited to holding it only until the differences between the two countries were settled. And, certainly, the United States having unnecessarily brought on this war, the prewar claims should not be stretched to include indemnity for the cost of the war.[26]

South Carolina newspapers quite generally took the view that as soon as the enemy was put beyond the Rio del Norte the war should end; accordingly, the lack of moderation displayed in the north, where great armies and a march on the city of Mexico were talked about, worried South Carolinians.[27]

Southerners complained that the United States government, in beginning the war unnecessarily and continuing it far beyond any point of necessity, had not gained reputation in the eyes of the world for justice, moderation, or wisdom.[28] Thomas G. Clemson, a South Carolinian, wrote from Brussels in June, 1846, that he regretted that the Mexican war had given the monarchies of Europe another opportunity to display their lack of sympathy with the United States and its institutions and to point with scorn to the "efficiency" of republican forms of government. "If," he said, "we could now bring about an honorable peace [after Taylor's success] and retire from the

ary 21, 1848; *Charleston Mercury,* January 10, 11, 1848; *Columbia Telegraph,* February 4, 1848.

[26] Calhoun, *Works* (Crallé, ed.), 4:381.

[27] *Charleston Mercury,* May 18, 25, 1846; *Charleston Courier,* May 15, 1846; *Charleston Evening News,* May 15, 1846; *Charleston Southern Patriot,* June 5, 1846.

[28] "Much as I regard military glory," said Calhoun, "much as I rejoice to witness the display of that indomitable energy and courage which surmounts all difficulties—I would be sorry indeed that our government should lose any portion of that high character for justice, moderation, and discretion, which distinguished it in the early stages of our history." *Works* (Crallé, ed.), 4: 410.

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Mexican territory without the usual excesses that invariably follow successful armies, it would be a great point gained.''[29]

Many a southerner's comments on the war were confined to the national and international aspects of it, with slight reference, if any, to the sectional phase.[30] James Chestney, writing from Tuscaloosa, Alabama, on November 23, 1846, condemned the Mexican war because it would bankrupt the treasury, endanger the cause of free trade, and create discontent in every section of the union, while it offered no compensating gain.[31] To many the great dangers of the war, other than the possible conquest of and attempt to hold all Mexico, seemed to be the great increase of the national debt, the extension of the patronage of the executive, the prospect of abandonment of a metallic currency for the paper system, and the abandonment of the practical benefits of free trade because of the necessity for increasing the duties to meet the heavy interest burden of the debt. These occupied the attention of many far more than the prospect of adding new slave states.[32]

[29] Thomas G. Clemson to Calhoun, June 27, 1846, Calhoun papers. A. J. Donelson, a Tennesseean by birth, wrote from Berlin on January 8, 1848, in a similar vein.

[30] Wilson Lumpkin to Calhoun, May 20, 1846, Calhoun papers. Thomas G. Clemson, writing to Calhoun on March 28, 1847, commented on the war from international and national standpoints, and added: ''One thing I regret, that is mixing of the slavery question. It appears to have been unavoidable and will perhaps unite the South, and thus enable them to hold on to the advantages they have recently gained.'' *Ibid.*

[31] Calhoun papers. Chestney added: ''However guilty the government of Mexico may be, the wretched inhabitants of that part of the world are innocent, and the terrible calamities and distress that have been heaped upon the people of Monterey and its vicinity have produced no compensating or corresponding benefit either to the American government, the army, or the American people. I think I speak the language of truth and soberness, as well as of humanity, in regard to the matter, and I am satisfied the best part of the people of the South Western States are disposed to see the affair terminate. . . . I trouble myself very little with politics, but claim a devoted attachment to the great cause of democracy and of human liberty, which are identical with the cause of humanity itself.'' The belief was frequently expressed in the south that more of evil than of good would come from the war. Wilson Lumpkin to Calhoun, March 11, 1847, *ibid.*

[32] Calhoun, *Works* (Crallé, ed.), 4:421; Calhoun to Clemson, February 17, 1847, in *Correspondence of John C. Calhoun*, 718; Calhoun from Wilson Lumpkin, May 20, 1846, from F. W. Byrdsall, August 4, 1846, from R. B. Rhett, May 20, 1847, Calhoun papers; Cobb from John P. King, May 7, 1846, from Charles J. McDonald, July 7, 1846, from James F. Cooper, July 8, 1846, from John H. Lumpkin, November 13, 1846, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb*, 75, 84, 85, 86. F. W.

Robert Toombs of Georgia wrote to Calhoun on April 30, 1847: "I begin to fear that the question [*of slavery*] is fast approaching a crisis. It seems our successes in Mexico have greatly raised the pretensions of Polk and his cabinet, and the weakness and divisions of Mexico will in all probability induce her to accede to terms which we ought not to demand and which will be disgraceful to her and ruinous to us. You are aware of my early and uniform disrelish of the idea of the appropriation of Mexican Territory. I can see nothing but evil to come of it. And now I do not clearly see how it can be well avoided to some extent."[33]

True it is that one of the most ardent expansionist propagandists in the Polk administration was the secretary of the treasury, Robert J. Walker of Mississippi. Early in the war he advocated taking all the territory belonging to Mexico north of a line drawn due west from the mouth of the Rio Grande to the Pacific. His chief reason for this policy was not to increase the area of slavery but to sustain the administration by meeting the demand of the people of the country at large for territorial acquisitions. He was not an aggressive proslavery man, as is shown by the fact that for years he advocated gradual emancipation in the United States; he proposed it for Texas as a condition of annexation; he freed his own slaves in 1838; he sustained the treaty for suppressing the African slave trade; he opposed the repeal of the Missouri compromise; and, while governor of the territory of Kansas, he pursued such a course that he was accused of being a traitor to southern interests.[34]

Byrdsall wrote to Calhoun from New York on August 4, 1846: "One of our Commission merchants or agents of manufacturing establishments of other States, a brother of the well known Whig Simeon Draper, avowed to a gentleman of my acquaintance, that he hoped the Mexican war would involve the country in a public debt of one hundred million dollars. When questioned as to the reason, he replied because it would compel the restoration of a high Tariff. This man is but one of a numerous class whose selfish interests overrule all considerations of the loss of life and destruction of property which must occur before such a debt could be incurred, as well as all other considerations of patriotism or common justice. And yet it is very probable that he (as well as most of the class he belongs to) is a member or elder of a Christian church — a praying and hymn singing man." Calhoun papers.

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] Elwood Fisher to Calhoun, September 24, 1846, Calhoun papers; Louis B. Pendleton, *Alexander H. Stephens* (*American crisis biographies*—Philadelphia, 1908), 83. T. R. R. Cobb wrote to Howell Cobb from Athens, Georgia, on June 23, [1847]:

David Johnson, governor of South Carolina, wrote to Calhoun on October 26, 1847: "The case contemplated by the Wilmot proviso may never arise. If unhappily it should—for I should deprecate the acquisition of territory from Mexico by conquest—the new states will probably come to our aid." He added that, even admitting that the war had been rightfully begun to protect ourselves against the intrusion of Mexico, we had done enough when we drove the Mexicans out of the territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande; and to push the war further, for conquest and for permanent occupation, was unwise, unjust, and contrary to his notions of moral right.[35] Eustis Prescott wrote to Calhoun from Memphis, on November 8, 1847: "If we must receive territory, it should be open to the citizens of every state with their property, [and] if such territory ever applies to become a member of the Union, the people will decide whether we shall or shall not prohibit slavery within her borders."[36] James Gadsden, of Charleston, South Carolina, wrote to Calhoun on January 23, 1848, that "the great object at this time is to arrest the mad designs of conquest. . . . The cry of the administration on that subject has been echoed and the whole Pack of hungry land hounds have opened up on the scent." He still hoped, however, that the whigs and the sober-minded patriots of the democratic party would combine against large acquisitions and would rescue the country from "the catastrophe into which Presidential making and a blind ambition of conquest is hurrying Polk and his advisers."[37] John A. Campbell, of Mobile, Alabama, thought that

"I am opposed to this Government dismembering Mexico. Let us whip her decently and give her a good government, such as the *people wish.* If they *afterwards* wish to be annexed we can do it. I am for *extending the area of freedom,* but not by *war.* The odious doctrine upon which Britain acts of taking territory for *the expenses* of the war is anti-Democratic. Let the glory of our government be that *not one* citizen lives under its laws that is not there by *choice.*" *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb,* 88.

35 Calhoun papers.

36 *Ibid.*

37 He added, however, that probably the Sierra Madre range was the great natural barrier which should be placed between the Anglo Saxon and the Spanish races. "A river will not answer. The whole of a valley must be settled by the same people, and the valley of the Rio Grande is so susceptible of a large population, that it will constitute a barrier population, which with the difficulties of the Sierra Madre will always make us safe on that frontier." Calhoun papers.

the war had been wrongfully begun; that acquisition of more territory was dangerous to the union from many standpoints not connected with slavery; and that, from the standpoint of the balance of power between the slaveholding and the nonslaveholding states, it would be ruinous to the former, for much of the territory, because it was unfit for use by slaveholders, was bound to make free states.[38]

Of course, once their country was at war, the people would support it, whether right or wrong. Through 1846 and 1847 many letters were written to Calhoun approving his course in the beginning when he tried to avoid the war, but suggesting delicately that now since the country was actually at war, it would not do for anyone to fail to lend a vigorous support. Southerners who were actually suffering in their fortunes through the "accursed war" were loyal patriots in the country's time of need, even though they had no stomach for the manner of getting into the war or for the prospect of what was to come from it.[39]

Most of the men quoted or referred to above were democrats. What was the attitude of the southern whigs? As partisans their cue was to oppose the war and to discredit the ambitions of the democratic administration as far as they dared without laying themselves open to the charge of being traitors to their country. The statement has been frequently made, however, that during the ante-bellum period party differences were submerged in the south whenever any crisis appeared which involved sectional interests connected with the "peculiar institution." If this is true then surely here was a time, according to the orthodox version, when southern whigs and democrats alike should have joined forces to secure this accretion of strength for the section. The facts are that not even the democrats were united in the course often attributed to them and

[38] John A. Campbell to Calhoun, November 20, 1847, in *Correspondence of John C. Calhoun*, 1139.

[39] Calhoun from Wilson Lumpkin, May 20, December 17, 1846, from H. W. Connor, January 9, 1847, from J. Hamilton, February 7, 1847, Calhoun papers; Cobb from Thomas R. R. Cobb, May 12, 1846, from J. B. Lamar, June 24, 1846, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb*, 76, 82; *Charleston Mercury*, November 10, December 12, 1846; January 12, 16, February 1, 1847; *Greenville Republican*, October 30, June 19, 1846; January 15, 22, 1847; *Charleston Southern Patriot*, January 19, 1847.

the whigs pursued, almost unitedly and quite consistently, a policy of opposition to the war and its resulting acquisition of territory. Many of the whigs had opposed the annexation of Texas because they wished to avoid a dishonorable war and they opposed the course of the president largely on that basis. Even the whig annexationists, such as Stephens of Georgia and Brown of Tennessee, charged that the war was unnecessary and unjustifiable; they condemned it as a war which aimed solely at conquest. "Even the lay members of the party soon began to lose the enthusiasm which a successful war, giving promise of desirable acquisitions of territory, usually arouses. They then demanded that the war be terminated at the earliest possible occasion."[40]

With the introduction into the house of the Wilmot proviso in August of 1846, providing that none of the territory which might be acquired from Mexico should be open to slavery, the south was again put on the defensive. It was soon confronted with assertions made on the floor of the senate and elsewhere that all parties in the nonslaveholding states had come to a fixed and solemn determination upon two propositions: one was that there should be no further admission into the union of any states which permitted, by their constitutions, the existence of slavery; and the other was that slavery should not thereafter exist in any of the territories of the United States. Surely this was warning enough to cause southerners to calculate their relative strength in the union and to resolve that for the sake of preserving the union, as well as for their own protection in it, this design of the antislavery forces must be thwarted. So, instead of being aggressively interested in the Mexican war at its beginning as a means of adding slave states to be used

[40] Cole, *The whig party in the south,* 119; Pendleton, *Alexander H. Stephens,* 76-83, 89-92; John B. Lamar to Cobb, June 24, 1846, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb,* 82; Joseph Pickens wrote to Calhoun from Eutaw, Alabama, on January 6, 1848, that he and his whig friends approved of Calhoun's speech on the war; some of the "old Hunkers" did not. "I have from the first thought that the War might have been avoided if proper prudence had been used by Mr. Polk. I think he lacks the bump of caution if nothing else. I have no hesitation in believing that the President violated the Constitution knowingly and willfully in rushing us into this uncalled for and unnatural War with Mexico, and if his acts are allowed to go unrebuked the Constitution is a perfect dead letter." Calhoun papers.

for an aggressive purpose, the south was forced, during the course of the war, to become interested in a negative and defensive phase of the territorial question; it must prevent the war from being used to serve an aggressive purpose by the enemies of slavery.[41]

Joseph W. Lesesne of Mobile wrote that although in the earlier period of the war there had been in the south, as in the north, a strong sentiment for acquisition of territory—because "an insane thirst after land" was "the great American disease"—there was now, in August of 1847, a growing disposition in the south to come out boldly against further acquisition of territory as the only practicable mode of saving the south; for, if a result of the increase of territory should be the enactment of the Wilmot proviso into law, it would mean ruin for the south.[42] Thus the early enthusiasm of the south for new territory was of the character common to the people of the country as a whole. But when southerners appreciated fully the slavery complication and saw that the prospect of new territory was causing further attacks by the abolitionists, they rued the day when conquest was begun.[43]

When the Wilmot proviso brought the sectional issue squarely

[41] Calhoun, *Works* (Crallé, ed.), 4:340; Calhoun from J. Hamilton, February 7, 1847, from Samuel A. Wales, June 17, 1847, from J. W. A. Pettit, June 18, 1847, from F. W. Byrdsall, July 29, 1847, from Daniel E. Huger and others, August 2, 1847, from Joseph W. Lesesne, August 21, 1847, from Elwood Fisher, August 22, 1847, Calhoun papers; Calhoun from Edward Fisher, December 2, 1846, from Wilson Lumpkin, January 6, 1847, from Fitzwilliam Byrdsall, February 14, 1847, Calhoun to Mrs. T. G. Clemson, December 27, 1846, in *Correspondence of John C. Calhoun,* 716, 1096, 1102, 1104; *Charleston Mercury,* January 14, February 17, June 24, 1847; *Greenville Republican,* January 22, February 12, 1847; *Pendleton Messenger,* January 22, 1847.

[42] Joseph W. Lesesne to Calhoun, August 24, 1847, in *Correspondence of John C. Calhoun,* 1130.

[43] Joseph W. Lesesne, writing to Calhoun from Mobile on August 21, 1847, commented at great length on the fact that the people of the south were not sufficiently aroused for their own defense against the attacks from the north, of which the Wilmot proviso was but one example. "Should the Whig party concur with us that for the sake of peace on this question we will take no more territory we may escape the dangers that threaten us." Elwood Fisher, writing to Calhoun from Cincinnati on August 22, 1847, said that political rumors had it that the Silas Wright men of New York insisted on acquisition of territory to augment the strength of the nonslaveholding states, and that both parties in that state were warmly in favor of the Wilmot proviso because they could make of it good political capital with the people. Calhoun papers.

before congress southern whigs joined southern democrats to block the measure, and were successful, thanks to some "northern men with southern principles." The northern whigs having shown fairly clearly their antislavery character, southern whigs tried to solve the problem of party harmony by proclaiming their hostility to the acquisition of territory as a result of the war. Indeed, they came to believe that not simply the preservation of the whig party was at stake, but quite as likely either the "peculiar institution" or the union. Patriotism therefore demanded that this dangerous slavery complication be avoided by blocking annexation of Mexican territory.[44] Even General Taylor, who, it has been said, was later elected as a southern president, announced, after Mexico had been placed at the mercy of the American armies, that he was decidedly opposed to the acquisition of any territory south of 36° 30′, which might endanger the permanence of the union by fomenting a sectional controversy. Furthermore, when reports began to be circulated that conditions of soil and climate would make slavery a physical or an economic impossibility in most of the new region proposed to be annexed, the Wilmot proviso became simply an insulting abstraction which, together with the danger of additional free states in the southwest, could be avoided by blocking annexation.[45]

Thus opposition to the annexation of Mexican territory was accepted by many southern whigs, and many southern democrats as well, as the foundation for the defense of the southern institution and southern rights. The Wilmot proviso was but one aspect of the greater issue. A law passed by the general assembly of Pennsylvania in March, 1847, to impede and prevent the recovery of fugitive slaves, was regarded as a more definite proof that the north was preparing to weaken slavery bit by bit until its utter collapse was assured. Nothing less than this was the ultimate aim. "The Mexican war has been used by our northern and eastern enemies as a means by which they hope to rob us of all constitutional guaranties, subvert institutions most essential to our peace and prosperity, strip us of the insignia of sovereignty, pass a sentence of social degeneration

[44] Cole, *The whig party in the south,* 119; Luther J. Glenn to Cobb, December 1, 1847, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb,* 89.

[45] Cole, *The whig party in the south,* 121-123.

upon us, and effect our complete and total ruin," wrote Percy Walker from Mobile on October 10, 1847.[46]

Even when faced by this crisis, however, the south did not rally upon a defensive position as some of its truer citizens, less interested in party politics, would have had it do. Apathy was breeding future trouble, when decision and firmness were needed to avoid it. Southern unity would work wonders—would solve the problem once for all, some believed—but that essential was lacking. A few men saw clearly the course events were taking in the north: the abolitionists, though few in number, were recruiting their ranks steadily, and by clinging steadfastly to their basic principle they were holding the balance of power between the two main parties and were forcing concessions now from the whigs and now from the democrats. They had, as a result, come to be courted alternately and together by both parties until in many places it had come about that no politician was considered "available" who could not enlist in his behalf this necessary abolitionist vote. The only chance for southerners to maintain for any length of time their rights under the constitution was to be found in united action; yet little headway could be made in this direction.[47]

[46] He added: "The assault has been kept up for years, but under the false assurances that the great majority of the non-slaveholding people were not parties to it, we have remained idle and inactive, until our enemies have become powerful enough to control the Legislatures of *Ten* Sovereign States, which in the most solemn forms of Law, have declared against us. . . . Our action should be calm, determined, and above all united. We must endeavor to make the Southern States think and feel and act alike, upon this subject. How is this to be done?" Calhoun papers. Calhoun from C. J. Faulkner, July 15, 1847, from Joseph W. Lesesne, September 12, 1847, from H. W. Peronneau, September 25, 1847, from L. M. Keitt, October 1, 1847, from David Johnson, October 26, 1847, from Wilson Lumpkin, December 20, 1847, from Wyndham Robertson, Jr., May 10, 1848, from F. W. Byrdsall, June 25, 1848, from L. H. Morgan, June 30, 1848, from Chesselden Ellis, July 5, 1848, from B. F. Porter, July 17, 1848, from G. B. Butler, July 29, 1848, *ibid.*; Calhoun, *Works* (Crallé, ed.), 4:527; Wilson Lumpkin to Calhoun, November 18, 1847, in *Correspondence of John C. Calhoun,* 1135; Isaac E. Holmes to Cobb, August 21, 1847, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb,* 88.

[47] Calhoun from Wilson Lumpkin, August 27, 1847, from Joseph W. Lesesne, September 12, 1847, from H. W. Connor, October 6, 1847, from Percy Walker, October 10, 1847, from David Johnson, October 26, 1847, from A. Bowie, January 19, 1848, from J. A. Campbell, March 1, 1848, from W. W. Harlee, June 8, 1848, from W. L. Yancey, June 14, 1848, from F. W. Byrdsall, June 25, 1848, from Joseph W. Lesesne, July 5, 1848, from Benjamin F. Porter, July 17, 1848, from Wilson Lumpkin, August 25, 1848, from Z. L. Nabers, November 29, 1848, Calhoun

Once the treaty was concluded and the new territory acquired, the debate began in earnest concerning the powers of congress over the territories and the rights of citizens therein. Even on this question, however, the south could not agree on a defensive program.[48]

papers; Wilson Lumpkin to Calhoun, January 6, 1847, in *Correspondence of John C. Calhoun,* 1102. A rather unique view of the acquisition of territory from Mexico was presented to Calhoun in January, 1848, by a northern Presbyterian clergyman who asked that his name not be used, but said that the subject matter he presented could be used. He gathered much of his information from abolition sources and the more numerous class of antislavery men who did not belong to abolition organizations. With these classes primarily, he said, the project of an extensive acquisition of Mexican territory was fast gaining ground; in their view, the more extensive the better. Whether slavery were extended over this territory or not, they thought that the annexation of it would ultimately overthrow the institution. Of course, if they could get the territory and keep it free, the forces of slavery would be so surrounded and outnumbered that the end of the institution would soon be compassed. But, even if slavery were not excluded, extensive acquisition of territory was favored for the same ultimate result, though it would be longer in attainment. They reasoned as follows: in proportion as slavery is extended over a greater area, in that proportion is it weakened; the slaves taken to the new territory must come from the old slave states; in those states fewer slaveholders and friends of slavery would be left to bear up against the onsets of their enemies; white laborers would flow in to take the places of the removed slaves; as immigration and the laws of population gave preponderance to the nonslaveholding whites, antislavery presses could be set up right among the slaveholders without fear of molestation; then the battle would be more than half won, and the slaveholders could be defied; the south did not have slaves enough to take permanent possession of extensive territory and hold its own in either the old or the new states; with powers divided and energies distracted it could be cut to pieces in detail. Only temporarily, too, would the south have the preponderance in congress, for while gaining slave states at the south, it would soon lose them at the north; Virginia, Maryland, Delaware, Tennessee, Kentucky, and North Carolina would soon become free. The writer concluded: "From what I can learn I think the signs of the times hereabouts indicate that the Abolitionists and their coadjutators will go for extensive annexation at all hazards. If they can enforce the Proviso they will. But if not they will favor *secretly* if not *openly* what they regard as the *next best,* i. e. a great extension of territory and a *corresponding* expansion of slavery. This will, perhaps, explain the reason why the National Era, the antislavery paper at Washington, goes for the acquisition of territory and yet strenuously urges the Proviso. It betrays their *secret* intentions." He said that extensive acquisition was favored in the north not alone by the antislavery men, for the reasons stated, but by various other classes, each expecting it to serve a peculiar interest; among such classes were the ardent friends of the administration, speculators, capitalists, manufacturers, the military, et cetera. George H. Hatcher to Calhoun, January 5, 1848, Calhoun papers.

[48] Chauncey S. Boucher, "The secession and co-operation movements in South Carolina," and "South Carolina and the south on the eve of secession," in *Wash-*

The Wilmot proviso, which precipitated one of the most bitterly contested phases of the slavery controversy, was certainly not loftily conceived. It had its origin among democrats who were discontented over the veto of internal improvement bills and the distribution of the patronage. Another factor was impatience in regard to Oregon; the northwestern expansionists did not get as much territory as they coveted, and they claimed that half of Oregon had been given away.[49]

Though the Wilmot proviso was introduced in 1846, and many in the south at once saw that a crisis was at hand which demanded concerted action, and many suggestions were offered as to the best method of procedure, no agreement on policy or plan of action could be reached in the next four years — indeed, such agreement within a single state was rare, and when reached at all was agreement only upon a first step which committed the state to nothing and might lead or be turned in almost any direction. Even in the state which was supposed to be most radical and most free from internal party strife — South Carolina — no agreement could be reached on a platform statement of policy and action which meant anything more than vague hints or threats. The proviso did little to unite the south beyond evoking an agreement in opinion that the placing of such a principle upon the statute books should be defeated if possible. Southerners concurred in a general way in the belief that they might have some rights in the territories, but as to what the extent of those rights was, upon what legal or constitutional basis to rest them, they could not agree; in other words, while they were united in believing that the Wilmot proviso must be resisted, they could not agree upon the necessary positive position or statement with which to parry. Many suggestions of principle or policy were made, but from the presentation of the proviso until the election of 1860 the south was not united upon a thoroughly satisfactory answer to the troublesome and complicated territorial question.

ington university studies, Humanistic series, 5:97-101; 6:83-144; *Charleston Courier,* November 27, December 2, 8, 16, 1847; South Carolina, *House journal,* 1847, pp. 204, 206; Joseph W. Lesesne to Calhoun, August 24, 1847, in *Correspondence of John C. Calhoun,* 11, 30.

[49] William E. Dodd, *Expansion and conflict* (*Riverside history of the United States* — Boston and New York, 1915), 170.

The divergence of opinion in the south in regard to future policy or action, after the acquisition of territory had become a certainty, is shown by the division among southern whigs: some advocated disunion if the proviso were passed; some would have accepted the extension of the Missouri compromise line as a fair settlement involving mutual concession; a significant minority were ready to acquiesce, if the proviso should pass both houses and receive the president's signature.[50]

Calhoun answered the Wilmot proviso with a denial of a constitutional power in congress to discriminate between the states by passing a law which would "directly, or by its effects, deprive the citizens of any of the states of this union from emigrating with their property, into any of the territories of the United States." The section could not be thoroughly united on this pronouncement, however, for there were prominent lawyers of both parties in the south who believed that congress did have jurisdiction over, and power to deal with, slavery in the territories.[51]

The proposal to extend the Missouri compromise line of 36° 30′ to the Pacific coast was not without its embarrassments on points of principle, for it would "yield up forever the constitutional question"; it would be a complete admission of the power of congress over slavery in the territories. Nevertheless, the position of many was clearly stated by a man who said: "Although . . . the north has no *right* to claim our exclusion from one foot of the territory, yet as they do claim it most earnestly and there is no *practical* benefit in our setting up a counter claim to any above 36° 30′ I am for settling the controversy by adopting that line." Others, who were interested mainly in the success of the democrats in the coming election, had little patience with constitutional quibbles, asserting that "this idea that constitutional questions may not be compromised is all fallacious." They preferred the "Missouri basis" because that would satisfy the northern democrats best and would bring party harmony, since both the northern democrats and the southern democrats could, without sacrifice, still retain their

[50] Cole, *The whig party in the south,* 124; Calhoun from J. T. Trezevant, June 7, 1849, Calhoun papers.

[51] Calhoun from J. A. Campbell, March 1, 1848, *ibid.;* Cole, *The whig party in the south,* 137.

particular views in regard to the extent of congressional control over the territories.[52]

Squatter sovereignty, put before the senate in the Dickinson resolutions in December, 1847, and approved by Cass in the Nicholson letter later in the same month, was not satisfactory to all. Objection was frequently registered that it was but a temporary evasion of the points of constitutional principle and not a permanent and satisfactory solution of them; and there was too much certainty of embarrassing complications which would develop from an attempt to apply the theory in actual practice. Many, however, were interested mainly in the election of Cass, were willing to accept his Nicholson letter as satisfactory, resented attempts to force a definition of squatter sovereignty any more clear than Cass had made, and opposed "pressing nice, hair-splitting distinctions on the subject upon our northern democratic friends, whose liberality should be appreciated but not abused." Such men, however, might state very clearly, privately, their reasons for believing that a territorial legislature had no right to prohibit slavery and that such action could be taken only when the constitution for statehood was framed. However, when a southerner contended "that our people should have permission to go" to the territories "with their peculiar property and *risk* the decision of a majority when the territory forms a constitution and demands admission as a State, and that Congress should guarantee this privilege," he was met with the argument presented by his neighbor, "If you yield that settlement to Congress, will it not be surrendering our rights to the Wilmot proviso men?"[53]

An added complication was introduced by the question whether by Mexican law slavery was legally prohibited in the new territory. How to deal with the Mexican law without abandoning the principle that slavery rested upon state or local law only,

[52] Calhoun from R. K. Crallé, July 23, 1848, from Laurel Summers, October 21, 1848, Calhoun papers; Cobb from Hopkins Holsey, December 31, 1847, from William Rutherford, Jr., April 16, 1850, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb*, 91, 189; Boucher, "The secession and co-operation movements in South Carolina," in *Washington university studies*, Humanistic series, 5:97-101.

[53] Calhoun from Louis T. Wigfall, June 10, 1848, from M. Torrance, June 19, 1848, from B. F. Porter, July 17, 1848, Calhoun papers; Cobb from Luther J. Glenn, February 12, 1848, from Henry L. Benning, February 23, 1848, from James C. Dobbin, June 15, 1848, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb*, 95, 97, 107.

and without invoking national legislation for its protection, became a difficult question.[54]

The plan of the so-called Clayton compromise, providing territorial organization for Oregon, New Mexico, and California, and leaving the question of slavery to the operation of the constitution of the United States as interpreted by the supreme court also met with objections. It was recommended in July, 1848, by a senate committee composed of northern and southern men of both parties; it passed the senate with the aid of most of the southern whig members — though they disagreed in expectations as to its operation; but it was shelved in the house, partly because of the efforts of southern whigs who believed that the court could only recognize the continuance of the Mexican law which prohibited slavery there.[55]

At least one Alabama man, a member of the state legislature, thought that the only policy which promised "any good *practical* results" was for each southern state to arm and equip a regiment of volunteer emigrants and send them into the new territory to protect all southerners who might go there, "in the full enjoyment of their property of whatever description, should any effort be made, either by savages, Mexicans, or others to wrest it from them."[56]

As one reads the opinions of southern men on the territorial question, expressed both publicly and privately from 1846 to 1850, one can only conclude that the situation was well stated by Joseph W. Lesesne of Mobile, when he wrote: "You must be aware how very various and conflicting the opinions of even good and able men at the south are with regard to the question of Slavery in the territories. All profess to be agreed that the Southern people are entitled to occupy them with their slaves as much as the Northern people with their goods and chattels. But how is this right to be enjoyed? how is it to be

[54] Cobb from Henry L. Benning, February 23, 1848, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb*, 97; Calhoun from J. A. Campbell, March 1, 1848, Calhoun papers.

[55] Cole, *The whig party in the south*, 125; Calhoun from R. K. Crallé, July 23, 1848, from H. V. Johnson, August 25, 1848, Calhoun papers; Stephens to the editor of the *Federal Union* (Milledgeville, Georgia), August 30, 1848, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb*, 117. See also Boucher, "The secession and cooperation movements in South Carolina," in *Washington university studies*, Humanistic series, 5:70.

[56] Calhoun from Benjamin Gardner, September 5, 1849, Calhoun papers.

endangered? and if assailed, how is it to be protected? whether the question is not a purely legal or political one? These are points upon which no two persons are entirely agreed, and are full of intrinsic difficulty.'"[57]

It seemed to many in the south that the abolitionists were but showing their hand when they forced the territorial issue in the face of the fact, which many men seem to have realized, that there was but little territory in the recent acquisitions where slavery could be maintained profitably. The country was by nature dedicated to freedom. The valleys of the Sacramento and the San Joaquin were said to be almost the only districts in the territory acquired from Mexico where slavery could exist, and the question was soon settled there by the inrush of opponents of slavery following the discovery of gold. The territorial question was an abstraction. Many northerners and many southerners knew this. The northerners, or at least the abolitionists, insisted on the technical exclusion of slavery by law simply for the sake of principle, determined to check slavery at every point, hoping ultimately for a checkmate. By the same token the southerners who admitted that it was an abstraction were interested in it even as such, because they saw that if the abolitionists were allowed to gain point after point without opposition, they would ultimately strike at slavery in the states.

The election of 1848 shows again that at this time there was no such thing as a united, aggressive slavocracy. In spite of the truckling of Van Buren and others of the abolitionists, in spite of the evidence of the effective political use to which the abolitionists could be put, and in spite of the signs of the times found in the operations of the free-soil party, the south could not agree. The campaign of 1848 showed, perhaps, that for the first time the south was united on the view that southern interests must be protected. This, however, did not result in unity of action; for, having been brought to this realization of the necessity of a defensive (not aggressive) policy, southerners could agree no further. The southern electoral vote was almost evenly divided between Cass and Taylor, in spite of the fact that Taylor was run as a southerner, who could at least

[57] Calhoun from Joseph W. Lesesne, July 5, 1848, Calhoun papers.

be relied upon to check the progress of the antislavery movement, if necessary, by the exercise of the veto power. Fillmore, true, was then regarded as a bitter pill for the south to swallow in order to get Taylor — for a president had been known to die and give the vice-president an opportunity for mischief — but serious doubts were registered in many quarters as to whether Taylor could be the regular whig candidate and at the same time a true southerner. Furthermore, his Allison letter left many in doubt as to whether he would veto the Wilmot proviso if passed by a majority of congress. Party ties continued binding. There was as much interest in the spoils of office as ever. How could the south be united on an aggressive campaign to get control of the presidency, when the leaders of the section were so far from agreement on the question supposed to be of greatest interest to the people? The word "supposed" is used deliberately, for many men were interested quite as much in Taylor's views on the tariff as in any other point involved in the election. While one southerner had only praise for Cass and denunciation for Taylor, in view of the interests of the section, his neighbor used words equally strong, but with the names in reverse order. Even though some regarded a choice between Cass and Taylor as a choice between evils for the south, a third party, devoted to southern interests only, was out of the question at this time, for it would rally but few recruits.[58]

Following the election of 1848 — which settled nothing — events soon brought on a crisis. With the discovery of gold in California, settlers rushed to the west in such numbers that the territorial question obviously could be delayed no longer. The abolitionists were registering the vow again and again that not another slave state should enter the union; they were making persistent demands for action against slavery and the slave trade in the District of Columbia; interference with the rendition of fugitive slaves was becoming more frequent.

In view of this situation the south became aroused, as never

[58] Letters by Elmore, Rhett, Brydsall, Fisher, Lumpkin, Peronneau, Johnson, Prescott, Calhoun, Paulding, Harlee, Wigfall, Yancey, Ellis, Seabrook, Wilson, Webb, DeBow, 1847 and 1848, Calhoun papers; letters by Toombs, Cobb, Thomas W. Thomas, James C. Dobbin, Henry R. Jackson, Thomas Smith, W. C. Daniell, John Forsyth, James F. Cooper, 1848, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb.*

before. Some defensive action seemed to be imperative, but no agreement could be reached. During the course of the year 1849 literally scores of suggestions for a policy and more or less definite action were made in as many different quarters. The writer actually has catalogued more than forty plans offered for the people of a county, congressional district, or state, individually, and for the south as a whole.[59]

Through this maze of suggestions it is clear that though a majority realized that the south was in a desperate position, there was no agreement as to the best method of procedure; and, further, even when a more or less definite proposal for action was made, there is little evidence that the proposition had been carefully thought out to a logical conclusion; more often than not the suggestion came from a befogged mind.

Early in 1849 one of the suggested measures was attempted. On January 15 the southern members of congress met in caucus to consider an address prepared by Calhoun. The reports of the debates in the caucus seem to show that the hopes of those who expected southern politicians, whigs and democrats, to unite in defense of southern rights, were groundless; instead, the southerners persistently divided on the old party lines, and even the democrats could not agree among themselves. The whigs displayed their conservatism and loyalty to the union. Their opposition was not sufficient to prevent the publication of the address, but they did succeed in relegating it to the status of a party affair and thereby robbed it of much of the effect anticipated for it by its promoters. Toombs wrote to Crittenden that he had told Calhoun very bluntly "that the union of the south was neither possible nor desirable until we are ready to dissolve the Union . . . and that we intended to stand by the government until it committed an overt act of aggression upon our rights, which neither we nor the country ever expected."[60] The southern whigs, in the main, simply would have none of "Mr. Calhoun's desperate remedies," and in several state legislatures successfully exerted a moderating influence as reflected in state resolutions. They still placed

[59] To give the exact source citation for each one of these suggestions would take too much space. They are found in newspaper files and correspondence collections covering the year 1849.

[60] Quoted in Cole, *The whig party in the south*, 140.

hope in Taylor's administration to protect their rights, and would not believe that consideration of the disunion alternative would really ever become necessary.

The southern address reviewed the development of the abolitionist crusade, the offenses of the north, such as breaking the provisions of the constitution for the rendition of fugitive slaves, and the aggressions already launched in congress, and concluded that, unless vigorously resisted, the abolitionists would accomplish their design in the near future. Following emancipation, the blacks would be raised to political power by the north, and southern whites would sink into oblivion and degradation. Only unity of action would prevent such a calamity. However, in spite of the most earnest endeavors by those who pleaded that a united south could preserve southern constitutional rights and thus the union, the southern address, bearing the names of only forty-eight signers — a few more than half the southerners in congress — succeeded only in precipitating a three-cornered political fight in the south in the fall elections of 1849 among the whigs, the Calhoun-"chivalry"-southern-rights-democrats, and the regular or anti-Calhoun democrats. The regular democrats still believed that the northern democrats and the national party were true to the south and worthy of confidence and support. Neither democratic group had any confidence in the southern whigs, who, they believed, would support Taylor even if he signed a Wilmot proviso law. The resistance democrats had no confidence in the regular democrats, who, they believed, would cling to the party and the union until southern rights were beyond redemption. The regular democrats argued that all southerners, including the whigs, should support the northern democrats in their fight for southern rights, or these northern democrats, failing to receive the southern support they deserved, would have to abandon the southern cause and appeal for abolitionist votes as the whigs were doing. Indeed, the southern address, it seemed, had been worse than useless: it had divided the south and thus had encouraged the antislavery forces in the north.[61]

[61] Letters by Lumpkin, Wigfall, Byrdsall, Weems, Sims, Wickliffe, Starke, 1849, Calhoun papers; letters by Cobb, Hopkins Holsey, John H. Lumpkin, George S. Houston, John W. Burke, James B. Bowlin, James Buchanan, Lewis Cass, Thomas D. Harris, Henry L. Benning, 1849, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb.*

While the status of California remained unsettled, in 1849, southern whig leaders, hoping to save embarrassment for the Taylor administration, rallied about a plan to try to get the new territory admitted as a single state before the inauguration. This would remove the troublesome subject, would add but a single state to the strength of the north, and would evade the issue of the Wilmot proviso without sacrificing the honor of the south.[62]

The resistance or radical wing of the southern democrats had no patience with the temporizing of the southern whigs, saw only the prospect of further aggressions in the immediate future, and began to talk of resistance and disunion. The movement took definite form in Mississippi and resulted in the call of a southern convention to meet at Nashville on June 3, 1850. The whigs tried at first to block the movement, and then, when this could not be accomplished, to force the radicals to moderate their position. Of course by this time a number of whigs had become infected with the contagion of ultrasectionalism and had become radicals, while conservative democrats tended to draw away from the radical leaders of their party.

Taylor's message in December, 1849, disclosed his plan in regard to the territories. California should be admitted as a state at once with its free constitution, framed while congress had delayed giving it even territorial organization; and New Mexico was soon to follow the same course; thus the problem would be solved without the intervention of congress. Of course southern democrats at once denounced the heresy of "approving the Wilmot proviso in the constitution of California," and Calhoun dubbed it the "Executive proviso." Southern whigs, except a few insurgents, approved the president's plan.

Meanwhile the time approached for selecting delegates to the Nashville convention. The policy of the southern whigs, in state after state, was either to block the sending of delegates at all, or, if delegates were to be sent, to try to select moderate men. They were partially successful in both directions. Before the convention met, however, the Clay compromise measures had been introduced into congress and were being debated. In spite of the efforts of whig congressmen, Taylor refused to sponsor the compromise plan, and prepared to come out even

[62] Cole, *The whig party in the south*, 143.

more strongly for immediate admission of California and New Mexico, determined to back the latter's boundary claims against Texas with troops if necessary. Before he could succeed in bringing the issue between his plan and that of congress, he died after a brief illness. Taylor's death smoothed the way for the passage of the compromise.

The Nashville convention meantime proved virtually a fiasco for two reasons: final action had to be delayed until after the adjournment of congress, and in view of the strong pronouncements against disunion or radical action which had been registered in many southern states, the presentation of 36° 30′ as an ultimatum and the pronouncing of disunion tenets seemed worse than fruitless. When the time came for the second session, there had been a union victory in Georgia and the whigs again were unrepresented. Fire-eating speeches and discussion of radical resolutions condemnatory of the entire compromise adjustment became the order of the day — with but very little perceptible effect in either section. The convention denounced all president-making conventions and recommended a southern congress to secure concerted action of the whole south.

Distrust of the Nashville convention was felt from the time of the launching of the movement not alone among southern whigs; some conservative democrats also distrusted it because they feared that either the radicals would deliberately make demands which the nonslaveholding states could not sanction and secession would be forced, or the convention would be far from unanimous as to the proper course to be pursued and a divided front would weaken the south. The ultimatum of the Nashville convention — the extension of the Missouri compromise line to the Pacific — was indeed regarded by the whigs and the conservative democrats as an effort on the part of the radical democrats to force secession, because they wanted no compromise accepted. During the debate in congress on the compromise measures in the summer and fall of 1850, the whigs and the conservative democrats argued for acceptance, if the measures should be passed by congress, and endeavored to show that the measures really would put the south in as good a position as the extension of the Missouri compromise line to the coast.[63]

[63] Cobb from Hiram Warner, March 17, 1850, from John B. Lamar, July 3, 1850, from William H. Morton, July 10, 1850, from John H. Lumpkin, July 21,

Of course the abolitionists claimed at the time, and many historians since have maintained, that the compromise measures of 1850 constituted a one-sided bargain, a victory for the aggressive slavocracy. But it is only fair to state that many southerners also regarded it as a one-sided arrangement, in which the south gained nothing. Another free state was added — California. In the provision for the organization of Utah and New Mexico without the Wilmot proviso, the south gained nothing save a point of principle which should never have been raised — an unreasonably aggressive abolitionist move was temporarily blocked. The Texas boundary settlement, although perhaps equitable as far as Texas was concerned, was considered as a loss to the south as a whole; a large district which was slave territory under Texas was now put in a status where it might be lost by the slave interests. The abolition of the slave trade in the District of Columbia was a clear concession to the abolitionists. The new fugitive-slave law was regarded simply as a long-delayed recognition of southern rights under the constitution.

Putting it still more forcefully, some southerners said that to admit California as a state with its free constitution, without giving the south a chance to share in the common heritage of California soil, during a territorial stage, was to enforce the Wilmot proviso in an insulting form. Furthermore, the policy of the administration officials in regard to nonintervention was pronounced a fraudulent pretense; for, it was said, they had dispatched agents who engineered the whole process of forming the state government and giving it a free-state hue. A more flagrant violation of the constitution and the principles of the federative compact had never disgraced the senate. What guarantee was there that the south would not also, in due season, be robbed of the rest of the new territory, by some trick or theory conjured up for the purpose? The proposition to purchase nearly one-third of Texas, with the south's own money, to become ultimately subject to some newfangled nonintervention or proviso of free-soilism, was another outrage. The abolition

29, 1850, Cobb to William Hope Hull, July 17, a public letter (published August 20, and 21, 1850), in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb*, 186, 191, 194, 206, 208, 196; Boucher, "The secession and co-operation movements in South Carolina," in *Washington university studies*, Humanistic series, 5:84-107.

of the slave trade in the District of Columbia was not contested unanimously as a provision undesirable in itself, but as an entering wedge put there by the abolitionists to prepare for total abolition in the district in the near future.

Such were the views of many southerners, summarized by one writer as follows: "A more wretched abortion, a more miserable apology for a compromise, a more wanton insult to the understanding and the firmness of the southern people, never before was offered by professing friends or open enemies." Another said its title should have been "The ignominious surrender of the South."

Such views did not prevail, however. The voices of the conservatives were soon raised to show that the compromise settlement was fair, just, and honorable, or at least as good as could have been expected under the circumstances, and that certainly, if carried out faithfully, it left the south no grievance serious enough to cause talk about secession.[64]

To say, as a recent writer has said, that southern leaders projected a scheme to enlarge the boundaries of Texas so as to extend slavery over a large part of New Mexico, and to accept the statement of the abolitionists at the time that the payment of ten millions of dollars to Texas for the alleged surrender of claims to a part of New Mexico was a bribe to secure votes necessary to pass the other measures, and that even the boundaries conceded to Texas involved the surrender of free territory, not only misrepresents the situation, but presents what has been proved untrue. Furthermore, if the compromise was such a victory for the south, why was it necessary to buy southern votes for it?[65]

[64] See many letters of 1850 and 1851, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb;* Boucher, "The secession and co-operation movements in South Carolina," in *Washington university studies,* Humanistic series, 5:67-138.

[65] William C. Binkley, "The question of Texan jurisdiction in New Mexico under the United States, 1848-1850," in *Southwestern historical quarterly,* 24:1-38. Much light on the truth about Texan boundary lines and claims is found in Binkley, "The expansionist movement in Texas, 1836-1850," an unpublished thesis submitted for the Ph.D. degree at the University of California. The administration at Washington sustained the general claim of Texas to the Rio Grande boundary in 1845-1846; and in February, 1847, the United States secretary of state, in response to a protest from Governor J. P. Henderson, said that the military government set up by General Kearney over Santa Fé was only temporary and acknowledged the claims of Texas to that region. (Manuscript in file box 184,

To the south, the passage of the compromise of 1850 by congress served not as a pacifier, but as an apple of discord for at least a twelvemonth thereafter. Throughout most of the section forces rallied on one side for submission or union, and on the other for resistance or disunion; and in Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina there came a contest as bitterly waged as any the south had ever seen. The compromise measures were thoroughly dissected, with the result that one group pronounced the settlement, as a whole, fair, while the other group found little to praise in any single item and pronounced it as a whole most unfair and worthy only of decisive rejection.

From the time of the passage of the measure until the election of 1852, about as many and almost the same variety of suggestions were offered for state or sectional policy as had been brought forward in the period just before the passage of the compromise. Most of these hinged upon the policy of rejection of the compromise terms, or acceptance of them with the necessary accompaniment of proper guarantees for their preservation. It became a period of confusion in the south, with readjustment of party lines and personnel in regard to national policy. A few whigs still clung to the idea of a continuance of their allegiance to the national party, but the majority, believing that the northern wing of the party had become almost if not entirely an abolitionist party, looked toward the formation of a new national union party, which should eliminate the abolitionists and stand for the guaranty of southern rights on the basis of the compromise settlement. Some democrats were willing to join such a party; others still regarded the national democratic party as such a party and hence wished to maintain affiliation with it; while the ultra wing of the democratic party, joined perhaps by a few whigs, could see hope only in resistance — disunion.

After a most bitter contest waged during elections, in legislatures, and in state conventions, the conservatives won the day and an aggressive policy — secession — was defeated. A for-

department of state, Austin, Texas. The writer is indebted to Professor C. W. Ramsdell for calling his attention to this document.) Of course this does not validate historically the claims of Texas asserted consistently from 1836, but it does validate the Texas claim as contested between Texas, New Mexico, and the United States after the Mexican war.

midable majority seemed to agree that secession at the time was not the proper step, and in the debates it became clear that a very considerable number refused to accept the metaphysics of the secession doctrine and held that a state or section possessed only the inherent right of revolution, and when such a policy was adopted all its consequences must be considered. Without reading some of the newspapers and correspondence of the time it is impossible to gain a full impression of the bitterness of the contest in the south. It is by no means preposterous to wonder whether the ultra leaders were not hated and distrusted by many of their more conservative southern brethren quite as much as were the abolitionists. Indeed, in many an instance, the abolitionists and the southern radicals were put in the same category as undesirable and dangerous citizens.[66]

"Confusion" is the only word which will describe the political situation in the south from 1848 to 1860, and especially in 1851 and 1852. Indeed it was confusion confounded in the two years following the passage of the compromise of 1850, for the character of the confusion in South Carolina was different from that in Georgia, while that in Mississippi was different from that in either Georgia or South Carolina.

In South Carolina after a year of intense excitement and campaigning, with a great variety of complications introduced to becloud the situation and confuse the voter, things gradually settled down to an issue of immediate secession by that state alone versus coöperation with some one or more of the other southern states. When the question was finally settled at the polls in October, 1851, the coöperationists polled sixty per cent of the votes cast. This meant nothing except acceptance of the compromise settlement.

In Georgia it was evident fairly early that the secessionists were in a minority, and the struggle growing out of the necessary readjustment of party lines came to be one to determine control of the political policy of the state for ensuing years. The internecine party warfare continued most bitterly in Geor-

[66] Calhoun papers; *Correspondence of John C. Calhoun; Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb;* Boucher, "The secession and co-operation movements in South Carolina," in *Washington university studies,* Humanistic series, 5:67-138.

gia, with considerable shifting of personnel, for more than three years.[67]

In the south as a whole, during this period of party readjustment, the union democrats and the southern rights democrats prepared to restore harmony and coöperation. The tendency of the union whigs and of a smaller group of state-rights whigs was to give up the idea of longer affiliation with the national whig party and to join the democratic party; the campaign of 1852, especially with the nomination of Scott, fostered this tendency. The northern wing of the whig party was regarded in the south as lost to abolition, while there was still some hope in the democratic party. Party ties, however, were strong, and many were very reluctant to see them severed; indeed, toward the middle of the campaign a strong effort was made, with some promises of success, to start a tremendous reaction in favor of Scott. Every effort was made to prove him sound on the compromise of 1850. When the returns came in, however, the extent of the southern whig disaffection was shown — Scott carried only two states, Kentucky and Tennessee. It was a vote of lack of confidence, on the part of the southern whigs, in Scott and the northern wing of the party. Several sporadic efforts were made to rehabilitate the whig party in the south after 1852, but the result was only confusion. All that was clear was that though the whig party in the south was dead, the section was not united under the single democratic banner with a single policy or program in case action were needed. "The Whig party in the south had degenerated into a mere opposition party, ready to act under one name or another in the cause 'against the democrats.'"[68]

The south as a whole, at the time of the election of 1852, may be said to have reached something of an agreement on policy. The Georgia platform seemed to have become the southern platform: the compromise of 1850 was to be accepted as a

[67] Letters by Toombs, Stephens, Cobb, Thomas D. Harris, John H. Lumpkin, James Jackson, John B. Lamar, Orion Stroud, Henry L. Benning, George D. Phillips, Francis J. Grund, William H. Hull, Thomas C. Howard, John C. Johnson, James A. Meriwether, Henry S. Foote, Andrew J. Donelson, George W. Jones, John Slidell, Hopkins Holsey, John E. Ward, John Milledge, 1851-1852, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb.*

[68] Cole, *The whig party in the south,* 281; Toombs to John J. Crittenden, December 15, 1852, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb,* 322.

final settlement, but if it were violated by the north, or if further aggressions came from that section, the south was determined to resist. But this was more the appearance of unity than a reality, for there was sure to come disagreement over such points as these: what was a violation of the compromise? what was a further aggression worthy of resistance? and, if resistance were demanded, what form of action should be taken? These questions were certain to revive the old differences and prevent unity of action.

The Kansas-Nebraska bill was the next development to disturb the apparent equilibrium between the sections and to introduce further confusion among southerners. We do not as yet know all the forces back of the introduction of this measure, but it seems to have been a political job, in which many northern politicians and groups were interested, with various and sundry motives and interests to serve. To represent it as the product of a united and aggressive slavocracy is to obscure the truth. Among the various factors produced by conditions in the nation at large and in several localities in particular — factors compounded in just what proportion we do not as yet definitely know — which led to the bill to organize the Nebraska territory and to repeal the Missouri compromise, may be enumerated the following: the agitation for one or more transcontinental railways; the local demand in Missouri and Iowa for the organization of the territory; the demands of the prospective settlers and speculators; the activities of the Wyandot Indians; the necessity for adequate protection for emigrants, travelers, traders, and mail-carriers in and through the territory; the dissensions in the democratic party in Missouri and in New York; the Benton-Atchison feud in Missouri; Douglas' political position and aspirations; the question of slavery in the territories; and the appearance and growth, in some quarters, both north and south, of the idea that the principle of the compromise of 1850 had superseded that of the compromise of 1820.[69]

[69] P. Orman Ray, *The repeal of the Missouri compromise; its origin and authorship* (Cleveland, 1909); Frank H. Hodder, "Genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska act," in Wisconsin historical society, *Proceedings*, 1912, pp. 69-86; Ray, "The genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska act," in American historical association, *Annual report*, 1914 (Washington, 1916), 1: 259-280.

Though the logic of Calhoun's pronouncements upon slavery in the territories seems now to have demanded the repeal of the Missouri compromise, it is highly doubtful whether more than a very few southern leaders, if any, other than a few in Missouri, had ever seriously considered striving for such action. Southerners had more or less generally accepted the Calhoun theory for future policy, at the time of its pronouncement, but had little thought, if any, of making it retroactive. Though a few of the leaders of what was called the Calhoun wing of the democratic party in Missouri, as opposed to the free-soil wing led by Benton, may have cherished the hope in 1853 that the Missouri compromise might be repealed — and one of them, Judge William C. Price, later boasted that he had originated and sponsored the idea as early as 1844 — there seems to be only such evidence as may be drawn from inference that southern leaders like Calhoun, Davis, Breckinridge, Toombs, Benjamin, and others of "the leaders of the aggressive slavery extension party," with whom Price and the Calhoun democrats of Missouri are said to have been in close touch, were responsible for prompting and pressing for the repeal. In other words, the evidence is lacking to show that the repeal feature was the product of a proslavery extension plot among southern leaders at large. Even in so far as it was the product of the local political feud in Missouri — and this is its most intimate connection with the southern cause — it seems to have been precipitated by the aggressiveness of Benton against Atchison, and Atchison sponsored the repeal in the latter part of 1853 when forced to it, to save his very political life, in spite of the fact that he had said in the preceding March that there was no remedy for the law of 1820, since it could not be repealed.[70]

With all the pressing interests enumerated above, the territorial organization of Nebraska, whether with or without the repeal of the Missouri compromise, could not have been longer delayed, it seems. In the face of circumstances, Douglas perhaps became convinced that he could best serve the interests of northern Illinois, his party, and himself by accepting the repeal amendment, when it was urged by Atchison and actually presented by Dixon of Kentucky; and other interested

[70] Ray, "The genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska act," in American historical association, *Annual report*, 1914, volume 1, pp. 259-280.

parties who were desirous only of the immediate organization of the territory were willing to accept the repeal because they believed that territorial organization might be delayed without it and that their immediate interests would not be adversely affected by it.

Once the bill embodying the repeal of the Missouri compromise was before congress, a majority of the southern whigs in congress joined the southern democrats in support of it. The position of many was aptly put by Senator Clayton of Delaware when he said: "I did not ask for it, I would not have proposed it; and I may regret that it was offered, because I do not believe that it will repay us for the agitation and irritation it has cost. But can a Senator, whose constituents hold slaves, be expected to resist and refuse what the North thus freely offers us as a measure due to us?"[71] The first impulse of southerners in general seemed to be to welcome the bill because its great underlying principles were nonintervention and popular sovereignty, making it the logical development of the compromise of 1850. They were inclined to view it simply as a long-delayed act of justice to the south, and felt that it would certainly be unbecoming of a southern congressman to refuse it when offered. Even though it might not result in the actual extension of slavery, the point at issue was one of principle, and a wholesome moral victory might be gained.

The passage of the bill is generally represented as a victory for the slaveholding interests. But there were other interpretations of it in the south. Though all rejoiced because of the point of principle involved in this partial removal of the stigma of federal legislation directed avowedly against southern institutions, many cautioned against building false hopes upon it, for the following reasons: the act would not put an end to antislavery agitation or congressional interference, for the operation of the act would inevitably bring the question back to the floors of congress; the south would really gain nothing because of its unequal capacity for immediate expansion, as compared with that of the north; and, furthermore, slavery would not be profitable in this territory. Many objected to the bill because they believed that it established the principle of

[71] Quoted in Cole, *The whig party in the south*, 293.

squatter sovereignty in such a way as to preclude congressional protection against hostile territorial legislation. Many saw the ambiguities of the bill, and realized that it was likely to bring the issue between squatter sovereignty and popular sovereignty — meaning by the former the right of a people during the territorial stage to exclude slavery, and meaning by the latter the right to exercise such power only after reaching the condition of statehood, though not often was such a nice distinction drawn in defining these two terms even if the difference in principle was recognized. This ambiguity was glossed over, in some quarters, by talk of establishment of congressional nonintervention, or by a profession of belief that the bill said to slaveholders that they could go into the territory with their property and be safe until as a sovereign state the people decided for or against the institution. Others pointed out that northern democrats were defending the act, not as a measure of justice to the south, but as an antislavery measure — that instead of opening up northern territory to southern colonization, it really opened up southern territory to northern conquest.

There were southerners, it must be added, who spoke their minds in and out of congress against the repeal of the Missouri compromise as an unjustifiable breach of plighted faith which could serve no practical end for the south and would ultimately cause only discomfort and loss. The whigs especially were indifferent to the fate of the bill and could not share enthusiasm for an abstract principle which promised no practical advantages for the south. Apprehensions of a renewed agitation of the slavery question were frequently registered.

The Kansas-Nebraska bill was a surprise quite as much to the south as to the north; but, once it was introduced, it was natural that the south should easily convince itself that the measure was simply a measure of delayed justice involving no breach of faith in the repeal of the Missouri compromise. The south had accepted the compromise of 1820 in good faith, and had never thought of repudiating it. When new territory was acquired to the west of the Louisiana territory, the south had said again and again that it was willing to accept the principle of the Missouri compromise and extend the line to the Pacific. But the north would have none of it, had put the Wilmot proviso, instead of the Missouri principle, into the bill to organize

Oregon, and had further repudiated the principle in the long struggle over California and New Mexico. Thus the north had abandoned the principle underlying the settlement of 1820 and stood for a new one — absolute exclusion of the south from all territories. A new compromise agreement was reached in 1850, which in principle rejected both that of the compromise of 1820 and the new principle sponsored by the north. Thus, after the north had abandoned the principle of 1820 and had accepted the new one of 1850, with what grace could it now object to the application of the new principle to the present and all future cases? The Kansas-Nebraska bill would settle the question in conformity with the declared will of the whole people, bring "peace, equality and fraternity." This was the line of reasoning pursued by many northern democrats as well as southerners.[72]

It is not easy to discover the warrant for the statement made in a recent book that for ten years the leaders of the Calhoun section of the democratic party had been laboring to get rid of the Missouri compromise. Though many southerners after 1846 repudiated the basic principle underlying the passage of the Missouri compromise — that congress had power over slavery in the territories — very few, if any, of these seriously contemplated asking for a repeal of the Missouri compromise as applied definitely to the Louisiana purchase territory. Indeed they would not have been led to deny the power of congress over slavery in the territories if the Wilmot proviso had not been introduced; and, when they did deny the power, they did it with future settlements in the new territory in mind.

It is evident that during the development of the situation in Kansas which Sumner called the "crime against Kansas" and to which many historians refer as "bleeding Kansas," the south had little accurate information as to what was actually going on, either in Kansas or in administrative circles in Washington. All sorts of conflicting reports and rumors were current in the south concerning what was happening in Kansas, how much the agents of the administration were responsible for inter-

[72] Boucher, "South Carolina and the south on the eve of secession, 1852 to 1860," in *Washington university studies*, Humanistic series, 6:79-144; Toombs to W. W. Burrell, February 3, 1854, Stephen A. Douglas to Cobb, April 2, 1854, Stephens to J. W. Duncan, May 26, 1854, Cobb to ———, April 21, 1856, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb*, 342, 343, 345, 363.

fering with the working out of the principle of popular sovereignty, and what was really the policy of the president, first Pierce, and then Buchanan. Even when a few southerners agreed on what they believed to be facts, they disagreed as to the significance of the facts and as to what the attitude and policy of the south should be.

The one fact of which they were earliest certain was that the abolitionists had refused to accept the principle in good faith and to let the status of Kansas be settled through natural emigration and settlement. Many southerners from the very first feared and expected treachery, and believed that every available trick would be resorted to by their opponents to make Kansas a free state. As reports both true and false came to the south concerning the evidence of trickery and bad faith, many men were inclined to regard the outcome and the manner of its accomplishment as the final test whether the south could ever hope for justice in the union. Many became interested in the developments in Kansas and the whole territorial question, not merely for the sake of obtaining enough slave states and votes in congress to control the government, but as a question of principle. They believed that a greater question of principle was involved, the loss of which would mean that the abolitionists would then have a clear road on which to march to the abolition of slavery in the states. The rights of the southern states as equals in the union must be protected at some point at once, or they were completely lost. This was the stand at the bridge which must be taken to stop the onrush and complete victory of the abolitionists.

During the period of uncertainty as to what was happening or going to happen in Kansas, many southerners, fearing trickery from the start and receiving reports confirming their fears, could only fall back upon the view that the proof of the pudding would be found in the eating. If the south were not given a fair chance in colonizing Kansas, if artificial emigration were stimulated in the north, if the president, whether Pierce or Buchanan, should instruct or permit his agents in Kansas to discriminate in any way against southern interests, if the south, after seeing California hurried into the union "against all law and all precedent because she was a free state," should see

"Kansas subjected to the rigors of the inquisition because she had a chance of being a slave state," if Kansas were refused admission either directly or through some ingenious circumlocution, simply because it was to be a slave state — then it was likely that the southern people would forsake the leadership of the conservatives and those who had urged acceptance of the bill, and that the radicals — the secessionists — would come into power.

Though historians generally agree to-day that the proslavery men in Kansas resorted to more unfair methods than did their opponents, there were several points on which a fair-minded southerner, not knowing *all* the facts, could base an interpretation similar to one or another of those just given. However, when confronted with the same report as to what had taken place, southerners disagreed radically in forming a judgment. While some men saw only evidences of betrayal and unjustifiable action on the part of President Buchanan and Governor Walker, others saw nothing to criticize. While some insisted that Kansas must become a slave state by whatever means were necessary, fair or foul, and resorted to most specious reasoning to prove a point, others were convinced that a large majority of the people in Kansas were against slavery, that the opposition to the submission of the question, in the constitution, to a free vote and fair count was simply the result of a fear that a majority would condemn slavery, and that "an effort to get a free state into the Union over *the will* of a majority of its citizens would never be submitted to *at the south.*"[73]

Of course at the time of the Kansas-Nebraska bill the south would have welcomed the addition of another slave state, for defensive purposes in the national councils. The "border ruffians" of Missouri, however, and the slaveholders of the state generally, were interested in an immediate problem of defense which concerned them alone, primarily. The Missouri slaveholders were already surrounded by free territory on the north and east, and saw that if a free state were added on the west,

[73] Boucher, "South Carolina and the south on the eve of secession," in *Washington university studies*, Humanistic series, 6:79-144; letters by Toombs, Stephens, Cobb, Thomas W. Thomas, William H. Hull, Lucius Q. C. Lamar, Joseph E. Brown, and many others, 1856-1858, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb.*

and the underground railroad operated on three sides of this slaveholding peninsula "jutting up into a sea of free-soil," slave property in Missouri would be almost worthless. Slaveholding Missourians frequently asserted at the time of their interest in the Kansas struggle that theirs was a defensive movement to conserve existing slave property and an existing slave society. Their first thought was to defend what they already possessed. To them the settlers of the Emigrant aid society appeared to be "bands of Hessian Mercenaries," an "army of hirelings," "military colonies of reckless and desperate fanatics"—to use their own appellations.

On July 29, 1854, the citizens of Platte county, Missouri, held a meeting at Weston, at which they resolved that all settlers sent to Kansas by free state aid societies must be turned back; and they formed the Platte county self-defensive association, with the object of settling Kansas with proslavery men. So it was in the rest of Missouri: organized effort to win Kansas for slavery came only after the action of the Emigrant aid society was known. From the testimony of Missourians before the congressional investigating committee it seems that the invasion of Kansas for the purpose of voting had not been thought of until the leaders were convinced that the eastern emigrant aid societies had determined to colonize Kansas with antislavery men to make it a free state. In the south popular sentiment justified the action of the Missourians as being an act of self-defense against the unfair encroachments of the north.[74]

When in the autumn of 1855 the word came from Missouri to the rest of the south that unless recruits were sent at once to counterbalance the emigrants sent in by the northern societies all would be lost, some sporadic efforts were made in several southern states to enlist volunteer companies to go to Kansas; fire must be fought with fire. The most famous expedition was that led by Major Buford of Alabama—some three hundred men recruited from several states. Though northern ministers were raising funds to buy Sharpe's rifles for northern emigrants, Buford's men, out of respect for a proclamation by the president, were armed with bibles instead of rifles. In some

[74] Mary J. Klem, "Missouri in the Kansas struggle," in Mississippi valley historical association, *Proceedings*, 9:393-413.

localities, where a company of ten or twelve volunteers was raised, composed largely of mechanics, artisans, and a few younger sons or nephews of planters, the men were given dinners, balls, and other appropriate demonstrations and were treated as military volunteers; and no doubt many of the men must have gone in the spirit of military volunteers. The cause for which they were no doubt prepared to fight, if occasion demanded it, was not simply that of the rights of slaveholders in the territories, nor two more votes in the United States senate, but it was aptly stated on the banner which the Buford battalion carried when it left Montgomery: on one side was inscribed "The Supremacy of the White Race," and on the other "Kansas — The Outpost." This, in the minds of many southerners, was the real issue; Kansas was really the outpost of the struggle for the supremacy of the white race, because if one point of principle after another were lost, the abolitionists would accomplish their design to emancipate the slaves throughout the union; and, with no real solution as yet suggested for the negro problem which would follow emancipation, southerners believed that the supremacy of the white race, with all its civilization, was truly at stake.

During the struggle over Kansas the members of the strong southern opposition were at one with the southern democrats in desiring to see Kansas won as a slave state, since the Kansas-Nebraska bill had been passed, but the opposition condemned the use of violence to that end, opposed the adoption of the Lecompton constitution, and used the developments in Kansas to justify their saying "I told you so." It was the result many had predicted would follow the repeal of the Missouri compromise and the establishment of squatter sovereignty.[75]

Again it seems a pity that the abolitionists were so aggressive. Kansas was destined to be a free state even in spite of the repeal of the Missouri compromise. It seemed now to be demonstrated that organized efforts to stimulate a great rush of people to Kansas, to become permanent settlers, almost completely failed both in the north and in the south. These efforts have long been overemphasized. They simply stirred up a greater amount of antagonism and strife than would otherwise have been produced. The intensity of the fight for Kansas

[75] Cole, *The whig party in the south*, 331.

drew strong spirits to the territory, among them many who were attracted by the opportunities to participate in exciting adventures and dangerous exploits. On the other hand, the turmoil kept out of the territory numerous settlers who wanted homes instead of trouble. In the end the natural forces of the westward movement, normal migration and settlement, and not the artificial forces produced by the slavery controversy, determined the character of the majority of the settlers; and these forces, balanced as they were at the time, determined that Kansas was to be a free state.[76]

The Kansas-Nebraska bill put an end to all possibilities of further coöperation between northern and southern whigs. Now was the time of all times for the formation of a southern party per se, and the working out of a grand sectional agreement as to platform policies and program of action. But this could not be. There were some democrats and some whigs who favored such a course, but the radicalism of many of the former repelled those democrats who still had faith in the national democratic party, and also repelled those whigs who were still strong union men as well as those whigs who could not be reconciled to coöperation with democrats under any circumstances. The result was that the know-nothing or American party was in large part the beneficiary and attracted to its ranks a great variety of elements who had few common interests and could not be brought to accept any very definite program. Many there were who joined the ranks of the know-nothings because they believed that here lay the best possibilities of serving sectional interests. The best arguments which they could present to this end were simply that the policy of the party would help to stifle the accretion of strength gained by the abolitionists from the foreign-born, and that the party was really a national one which would aid in putting down the slavery agitation by ignoring it. The growth of the party in the south, however, was simply proof that confusion was to continue in that section and perhaps become more confounded.[77]

[76] William O. Lynch, "Popular sovereignty and the colonization of Kansas from 1854 to 1860," in Mississippi valley historical association, *Proceedings*, 9:380-392.

[77] Boucher, "South Carolina and the south on the eve of secession," in *Washington university studies*, Humanistic series, 6:79-144; Cole, *The whig party in the south.*

Even though every southern state save Maryland cast its electoral votes for Buchanan in 1856, the half million votes in the south for Fillmore showed that the opposition to the democratic party was not eliminated. Following the inauguration of Buchanan the logic of the situation again called for unity in the south—"an undivided South as the base of a great constitutional party, embracing the conservative men of all sections," as Hillard of Alabama put it.[78] But again unity was not to be attained. The national democratic party ties were still too strong for many, and as many others placed no faith in this party.

By this time there had grown up in the south what may best be called simply the "opposition"—a conglomeration of old-line whigs, know-nothings, dissatisfied democrats, and conservatives in general; their only common aims were opposition to the democrats in both local and national politics, and a cessation of the "eternal wrangling and spouting at abolitionism."

The Dred Scott decision, published two days after Buchanan was inaugurated, was an attempt on the part of a majority of the supreme court to allay the bitter and dangerous sectional controversy by an endeavor to settle the then most troublesome phase of that controversy, the territorial question. But it came ten years too late. Had the decision been rendered in 1847 the course of events in the next decade might have been considerably different—and perhaps fortunately so for all concerned. However, coming as it did in 1857, it involved too many complications. It accepted the doctrine of Calhoun, denying the power of congress to prohibit slavery in the territories; it declared unconstitutional the basic principle on which the republican party was organized, namely, the prevention of the extension of slavery into any more territories; it nullified the doctrine of popular sovereignty as expounded by Douglas and northern and many southern democrats, that slavery could be excluded by the people of a territory during the territorial stage; it accepted the doctrine of a part of the southern democrats who maintained that slavery could be excluded only at the time of statehood; it was an attempt to interpret the declaration of independence and the constitution of the United States in

[78] Quoted in Cole, *The whig party in the south*, 327.

the light of the existing conditions, claiming for this interpretation that it must be the one intended by the men of the revolutionary period.

Although there were grave misstatements of historical facts in the process by which the chief justice reached his conclusion in regard to the territories, it must be admitted that to the mind of a southerner, in view of the existing circumstances, the decision as to existing and future territorial policy could but seem eminently equitable. Perhaps a majority of northerners believed that the chief justice, in describing the sentiments of the fathers respecting slavery, was doing what Horace Greeley described as "saying a thing and being conscious while saying it that the thing is not true." This suggests a pertinent question regarding what is represented as the prevailing and accepted social philosophy of the south.[79] Were not many southerners, when they talked and wrote about the morality and justice of slavery and about its being a divinely ordained institution, in a position like that described by Greeley — but a position forced upon them by necessity of circumstances for immediate protection?

Though the charge was made at the time by republicans that the decision was the result of collusion between members of the supreme court and democratic politicians, including Buchanan and especially southerners, and that there had been a most elaborate and comprehensive program sponsored by the slavocracy to control the federal judiciary, nothing of the sort has ever been proved. No doubt it was suggested to the members of the court, after the case of Dred Scott was on their docket, that a general and all-embracing pronouncement from that august body might do much to calm troubled waters. But the decision did not allay the controversy; the court succeeded only in lowering its own standing in the eyes of thousands in the north and indeed intensified the bitterness of the conflict. The south gained nothing, except a moral victory in its own eyes, for statements soon came from many quarters in the north that the main part of the court's opinion as *obiter dictum* was mere verbiage for them and would not be accepted.

In his debates with Douglas, Lincoln said that the Dred Scott

[79] To be considered more at length by the writer in a subsequent publication.

decision had raised the alarming question whether the next step would not be a decision to legalize slavery in all the states of the union. There seems to be no evidence, however, that any such design was entertained by southerners. They realized full well that such a step would be extremely hazardous, for it would rob them of their last stronghold for defense of slavery within their own states — the argument that slavery in the states was entirely a state affair. In the light of the time, however, perhaps it was almost as natural and reasonable for Lincoln to make this charge as it was for the southerner to charge that virtually all the antislavery men of the north were definitely planning to have governmental action put an end to slavery in the slave states. In the eyes of each contestant the logic of the situation and the policies of the other seemed to lead to the step charged against the other, each taking for granted that the other had a perverted sense of justice and no sense of, or respect for, constitutional law.

The Freeport doctrine, as set forth by Douglas in his debates with Lincoln in 1858 — that a territory might by "unfriendly legislation" keep slavery out in spite of the Dred Scott decision — was not original with Douglas. In a speech in the house on December 11, 1856, James L. Orr of South Carolina had said: "There are some democrats who think the territorial legislatures have power to prohibit or introduce slavery. I do not. But, it matters not, either way, for in every slaveholding community we have local legislation and local police regulation appertaining to that institution, without which the institution would not only be valueless, but a curse to the community. The legislature of a territory can vote for or against laws. If the majority of the people are opposed to slavery, all they have to do is simply to decline to pass laws in the territorial legislature to protect it. So the question whether squatter sovereignty does or does not exist by virtue of the Kansas-Nebraska bill is of no importance. It does by virtue of their power to pass police regulations."

The shrewder thinkers in the south were not surprised by the Freeport doctrine, for by this time they saw the hopelessness of the south's position, practically, in regard to the territories. Although the constitution and the Dred Scott decision might

prevent the passage of certain laws to the injury of the slaveholder in the territories, they could not compel for his benefit the passage of laws without which slavery simply could not be maintained. Some southerners therefore suggested demanding the enactment of a slave code by congress for the protection of slavery in the territories. Although a congressional slave code for the territories seemed a logical step following the Dred Scott decision, thinking southerners met embarrassments when they considered demanding a code. What more could the abolitionists ask than thus to be given the legal right to legislate for the negro? Without affecting his legal status as a slave, they could contrive a code which would do more mischief than anything they had yet been able to do. They could give him the power to testify; they could require certain forms preliminary to his sale before a magistrate; they could invest him with certain privileges as to time, goods, dress, all perfectly consistent with his condition as a slave, which would utterly subvert the master's authority and give the negro the power of perpetual and, as far as profit was concerned, destructive annoyance. Did the advocates of the code forget that since 1847 most statesmen of the south of any reputation, "from Mr. Calhoun down," had been struggling to establish the doctrine of nonintervention by congress in the territories? Was the south in 1859 to take the position which was held in 1847 by the abolitionists and free-soilers, and from which they had been driven? Suppose a slave code were attainable; would it be worth a pinch of snuff when it had to be executed by the courts and juries of a territory whose refusal to pass a code had rendered congressional action necessary?

Yet if the south did not adopt this theory of congressional legislation, it was thrown back upon Douglas' popular sovereignty. Some men could accept neither theory, and were inclined to sigh for the good old days of the Missouri compromise. Unconstitutional in a strict legal sense, as it was to them, the Missouri compromise principle seemed the only possible solution of the difficulty. Such speculations led to the query whether it was possible to find any constitutional ground upon which the south could stand firmly, whether there were not great equities in the constitution — broad, strong, natural rights —

which southern statesmen could maintain, whether a policy could be found which would be free from that idle and mischievous spirit of legal metaphysics which had so long passed for profound political thought.[80]

Others were not so despondent and denied the necessity of a congressional code because, they said, the general laws were already sufficient to protect southern property in the territories and to make impossible "unfriendly legislation." Still others declared that a just construction of nonintervention meant no more than that congress should neither establish nor abolish slavery in the territories, but did not preclude congressional interference to counteract unfriendly territorial legislation. This interference might not be necessary, but it should be exercised whenever the territorial legislature attempted to discriminate against slave property by an omission to pass laws for its protection, or by hostile legislation. Nonintervention, it was maintained, was to be denounced as a fallacy if it denied the power of congress to protect property. There was a vast difference between the power to create or destroy by law and the power to protect rights legally existing under a fundamental law. In fact, these men declared that it was the solemn duty of congress to see that nothing was done, either by its own acts or by the acts of its agent — the territorial legislature, to which it might grant local legislative powers — that would destroy any right to which any citizen was entitled under the constitution.[81]

During 1858 there was again a movement in the south among the opposition elements to form a conservative, national, union party. They belittled the strength of the aggressive antislavery men in the north, and hoped to rally the conservatives in both sections in a conspiracy of silence, content to let slavery rest in *status quo*. The John Brown affair at Harper's Ferry, however, in October of 1859, did much to prove such a movement fruitless and to revive the sectional feeling in a more intensified form.

The whole story of the ante-bellum period is filled with most

[80] Hammond from J. J. Seibels, July 30, 1859, from W. H. Trescott, August 9, 1859, from J. L. Orr, September 17, 1859, Hammond papers.

[81] Boucher, "South Carolina and the south on the eve of secession," in *Washington university studies,* Humanistic series, 6:126-127.

unfortunate developments. Just when the conservatives in the south were devoting their utmost endeavors to guard against rash action and the rule of passion, and to insure calm judgment, the Harper's Ferry insurrection gave another forceful argument to the radical hotspurs. Many southerners who had not been inclined to pay much attention to the fire-eaters were now soon ready to believe that the people of the north would rejoice to see the whole south wrapped in the flames of servile insurrection. One report of the affair brought it straight home: among the maps found in the conspirator's possession were some of southern states marked with circles and crosses, which seemed to show that the lives and property of these communities had been doomed by the plotters. Henceforth a more careful watch must be maintained to detect agents tampering with the slaves.[82]

Although John Brown went his solitary way in Kansas, and did not have the support or countenance of the majority of the free-state men there, how could the south know or believe this? The same may be said of his operations in Virginia. Probably less than a hundred people knew beforehand anything about the enterprise at Harper's Ferry, and less than a dozen of these rendered aid and encouragement. But the affair, because it came on the eve of the final election before the war, sharpened the issue and had considerable influence. It played into the hands of extremists in both sections. On one side, Brown was soon made a martyr and a hero; on the other, his acts were accepted as a demonstration of northern malignity and hatred, the fitting expression of which was seen in the incitement of slaves to massacre their masters. John Brown became to southerners the personification of northern opposition. We know today that he was an extremist, perhaps, as some have said, unbalanced mentally, certainly not possessed of robust common sense. But by the time of his rise to notoriety, many in the south could no longer distinguish between John Brown and Abraham Lincoln, even though we know that they were as far apart as the poles. Certain it is that a man who is said to have admired Nat Turner, the leader of the servile insurrection in Virginia, as much as he did George Washington, was a most dangerous citizen at

[82] Boucher, "South Carolina and the south on the eve of secession," in *Washington university studies*, Humanistic series, 6: 130.

such a time. Abolitionists of every class had said much about war and about servile insurrection. By the later eighteen-fifties the south realized what was in the mind of John Brown; he believed that so high was the tension on the slavery question throughout the country that revolution, if inaugurated at any point, would sweep the land and liberate the slaves; he believed that he was himself the divinely chosen agent to let loose the forces of freedom. How could the south help but conclude that if war was to be forced, with the preliminary and accompanying horrors of servile insurrection and race war, the south had better try to prevent it by seceding, or at least have war come without these preliminary and accompanying horrors?

It requires but little imagination to picture the reaction in the south when the news came that when Emerson referred to John Brown as "that new saint . . . who . . . will make the gallows glorious like the cross," he was cheered with enthusiasm by an immense audience in Boston; and there were many other testimonials of the temper of the north.

During 1859 and 1860 the coming presidential election presented to the south grave questions of policy: what part should the section take in that election? just what statement of principle and what candidate should it sponsor? in case of certain election results what course should be pursued? Down to the very eve of the election there was no general agreement on an answer to any of these questions. The nearest there was to a general consensus of opinion seemed to be simply that a black republican victory would mean an end of all probability of safety for the south in the union, unless the section could really be aroused to positive united action as never before and could present as an ultimatum a demand for constitutional amendments which would without question guarantee to the southern states safety within their own boundaries.

When the South Carolina legislature in December, 1859, could not agree on a policy for the state in the immediate future, the members, in the face of this embarrassment, agreed on a compromise declaration that the southern states should appoint delegates at once to arrange a plan of united action. In a short time, however, it was seen that the attempt to promote a southern congress was a failure, for it was soon demonstrated by

action in other states that there was no likelihood that more than one or two states could be interested in the congress, so absorbed were they all in the game of president-making. Even in the case of Virginia, where a special messenger was sent to express sympathy with the state in the John Brown affair and to invite it to lead in securing a southern conference, the attempt failed.[83]

Clearly there was only one political party — the democratic party — with which the south could possibly coöperate, but there was serious disagreement as to whether the south should be represented even in that party's nominating convention. After a spirited contest — especially so in South Carolina — it was agreed in all the states to send representatives. Here, however, agreement ended. As to the platform statement to be demanded on the territorial question there was serious disagreement: some were for dropping the whole question, or for accepting any statement upon it, because it was a mere abstraction; others were willing to accept popular sovereignty, because that principle would give the south the opportunity to carry slavery wherever climate, soil, methods of production, and population would permit; others, including a majority of the southern delegates at the Charleston convention, insisted upon nonintervention so interpreted as to preclude hostile legislation by a territorial legislature and to allow for prospective legislation by congress if necessary. As to a safe candidate, worthy of southern support, there was again serious disagreement. To many, Douglas was entirely satisfactory, because they regarded him as a noble and gallant man, offering to the south all that the section could in reason expect. Others, however, regarded him as a black-hearted villain of the deepest dye, whose theories were based not on sound principles but on insidious and dangerous sophistries.

When disagreement over the platform was brought to a head in the national democratic convention at Charleston, and the delegations of eight southern states seceded, there seemed to be the prospect of united southern action. Once more, however, the agreement was only on the negative policy of withdrawing; what positive policy should follow was not easily determined. The

[83] Boucher, "South Carolina and the south on the eve of secession," in *Washington university studies*, Humanistic series, 6:134.

immediate prospect for the south did not seem to be unity of action, for evidence was painfully clear in nearly every state that there was to be a scramble for the spoils of office available either in the Richmond or the Baltimore convention — the convention of the seceders and the adjourned session of what was left of the regular convention. By no means was it clear that the disruption of the Charleston convention would bring about a dissolution of the union.

Many prominent southerners, including nineteen members of congress, thought that a grave mistake had been made by the seceders, and were for going back into the regular convention at Baltimore. Others were for sending delegates to the convention called by the seceders to meet at Richmond, hoping that this convention would be able to force the Baltimore convention to adopt the territorial principle demanded by the seceders, and thus unite the democratic party again, north and south. Still others, a minority in the south, led by the fire-eating and "chivalry" radicals, wanted the Richmond convention to take independent action and the southern democrats to remain separate and independent from any alliances whatsoever with the north, hoping that secession would be the ultimate result of such action, following the election. This group ultimately had their way in regard to splitting the democratic party, and two democratic candidates, representing two distinct parties, were placed in nomination. As August came, and it was seen that the democratic party was irreparably split, the inevitable result of the election became evident — Lincoln, the black republican candidate, would be the next president.

When election time came the conservative vote in the south was surprisingly large. Even though a vote for Bell, the candidate of still another party, the constitutional union party, indicated a willingness to play the rôle of the ostrich, his popular vote was surprisingly near that for Breckinridge. In the fifteen slave states the electoral vote was 9 for Douglas, 72 for Breckinridge, 39 for Bell. But this does not at all reflect the character of the popular vote. Lincoln polled 26,430, Douglas 163,525, Bell 515,973, and Breckinridge 571,051. If we accept the vote for Breckinridge as indicating the strength of those who were united on an aggressive policy, even to the point of secession, they are found to have constituted only about 45 per cent of the

people of the south. In the eleven states which ultimately constituted the confederacy, the popular vote was: Lincoln, 1,929; Douglas, 72,084 — 8.4 per cent; Breckinridge, 436,772 — 51 per cent; Bell, 345,919 — 40 per cent.

Secession was not a clear-cut issue in the election in the south. Indeed, in the remaining weeks of the year following the election, it was not at all clear that there would be a concerted move for secession in a majority of even the states of the lower south. There was abundant evidence of a strong union feeling, which some said was stronger than at any time in a decade, and it was apparently not at all unlikely that resistance would be delayed and offers of concession or compromise be seriously considered. In South Carolina alone there was a clear-cut determination to act — to secede; but whether its action would strengthen and rally support for, or completely unnerve and deplete the ranks of, the resistance elements in the rest of the south, few in South Carolina pretended to know. Nevertheless, the people of that state went wild with excitement; liberty poles were erected, volunteer companies drilled, and the palmetto flag was greeted with cheers for the new republic. Men who, when the legislature was convened at election time, had urged caution, unless indications were clear that the other southern states were ready to go out and only wanted a leader, now said that South Carolina must secede at once. The state convention, on December 20, when it passed the ordinance of secession, merely gave official expression to what had been determined by the people a month before. Thoroughly wearied by the long period of threatening and blustering, with nerves kept a-tingle for years by the continual wrangling with the north and among themselves, the people of this state at last had reached the point where something, anything, to relieve the tension was welcome. Though by no means unanimously convinced that they were pursuing the course which was certain to bring a decided change for the better, from all standpoints, the people rejoiced in definite action. Few pretended to see clearly what the results would be.

As some people had predicted, the action of South Carolina proved all that was needed to give the advantage to the resistance men in six of the other states which soon followed the example set by the palmetto state. In each of these states,

once the decision was made, the union men declared that they would abide by it and act accordingly. For a few weeks, while "the confederate states of America" were being organized at Montgomery, while the constitution was being framed and officers were being selected, there was really for the first time unity of purpose and action. But this period proved all too brief for the sake of the cause which was destined in a few years to become "the lost cause." Within a short time after the new government was launched there came disagreements, both personal and on policy; these ripened into bitter personal and factional feuds, and all too soon the body politic which should have been a perfect unit, in order to have any hope of success, was torn and distracted by bickerings and jealousies and honest disagreements on fundamental issues of policy.[84]

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[84] Letters by Toombs, Stephens, Cobb, Joseph E. Brown, and others, 1859-1860, in *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens, and Cobb;* Alexander H. Stephens to Robert Collins and others, May 9, 1860, in Stephens, *Constitutional view of the war between the states* (Philadelphia, 1870), 2:677-684.

THE POLITICAL CAREER OF IGNATIUS DONNELLY[1]

Minnesotans of a generation ago could boast that their state was the home of three men of nation-wide fame — Archbishop Ireland, the forward-looking churchman; James J. Hill, the railway-builder; and Ignatius Donnelly, the apostle of protest. Each was a western type. The prelate may have sacrificed a cardinal's hat to maintain his tolerant views on religion and his aggressive Americanism. The capitalist caught the vision of the west — he saw its boundless possibilities and reached out his hand to grasp them. The reformer brooded over the evils of society, and in his search for a panacea which would end the sorrows of mankind he hopefully accepted the principles of every radical organization that "evolved itself from the prolific protoplasm of the great and growing West."[2]

Of the three, Donnelly was the most distinctly western — such an erratic mind could never have been cast in an eastern mold — but he would hardly have been western had not his birthplace been somewhere else. The typical westerner had to come west. Donnelly was born in Philadelphia, on November 3, 1831. His parents were middle-class, well-educated natives of Ireland, who came to this country in 1817 in search of greater opportunity and found it, apparently, for Donnelly's father soon became a successful Philadelphia physician. The free schools of the Quaker city were at that time among the best in the country, and in them the boy Ignatius received what was doubtless the equivalent of a college course. He never forgot his debt to the public school, and repeatedly in his riper years he fought earnestly for the cause of free education. Law was to have been his vocation, and after a period of reading in the

[1] This paper was read in part at a joint session of the American historical association and the Mississippi valley historical association, held in Washington, December 29, 1920.

[2] Clipping from the *Lincoln Journal*, January 8, 1891, in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 8, in the possession of the Minnesota historical society.

office of Benjamin H. Bristow, later attorney-general of the United States, he began to practice the profession in his native city.[3]

Donnelly's career as a lawyer was seriously interrupted in 1856 when he made a trip to St. Paul and observed the possibilities of land speculation in the northwest. His marriage[4] the year before made him all the more willing to abandon the slender income of the struggling young lawyer for the limitless wealth which the west held in store. After careful investigation he located at Nininger, Minnesota, not yet a town, but a popular point down the river from St. Paul for steamboats to land, and the logical site of a good-sized future city. Here he purchased perhaps a thousand acres of land, much of which he immediately sold at a good price to other speculators. A small village appeared with mushroom rapidity, and the successful young speculator spent his newly acquired wealth in the building of a spacious mansion overlooking the Mississippi. Later he loved to tell how in this period of prosperity he walked his porch saying to himself, "Here I am, but twenty-six years old, and I have already acquired a large fortune. What shall I do to occupy myself the rest of my life?" The panic of 1857 eased his mind on this point. Nininger City collapsed. Its houses were moved away, all save Donnelly's, and when the inevitable town did appear it was at Hastings, a point scarcely thought of when Nininger was founded. Handicapped, there-

[3] This account follows Dr. Everett W. Fish, *Donnelliana: an appendix to "Cæsar's column." Excerpts from the wit, wisdom, poetry and eloquence of Ignatius Donnelly* (Chicago, 1892). The book was prepared while Dr. Fish was a devoted friend of Mr. Donnelly, and is laudatory to the last degree. It was designed for circulation during the campaign of 1892 to offset slanderous statements persistently made against Donnelly by the opposition press. It is not a formal biography, but rather a collection of miscellaneous information about Donnelly, and quotations from his works. Donnelly and Fish soon fell out, and thereafter Donnelly did not entertain a high opinion of the work. "I do not wonder," he wrote to a friend, "that you feel aggrieved at the blunders and misstatements about yourself . . . in *Donnelliana*. I also am aggrieved at them and other things in his book." Donnelly to Gordon, January 10, 1893, in the Gordon papers, in the possession of the Minnesota historical society.

[4] To Miss Katherine McCaffrey of Philadelphia. Donnelly's home life was ideal. He consulted his wife on all important matters, political and financial, and profited greatly when he took her advice. Her death in June, 1894, was an irreparable loss. They were the parents of three children, two boys and a girl.

fore, by his lands, his house, and his debts, the youthful adventurer began life anew.[5]

Resourcefulness was one of Donnelly's strongest qualities. Years later when he refused to be chastened properly by political defeat a hostile editor likened him to "the fabled giant who gained renewed strength from his mother earth. When stricken down he rose up more powerful than before."[6] Donnelly had no notion of being finished off by a single blow. His land might not grow cities, but it would grow wheat, so he planted it in wheat. He changed from speculator to farmer, struggled along with his debts as best he could, and learned by experience the trials of the pioneer who goes west to grow up with the country. In 1858 he sought to increase his income by identifying himself temporarily with a St. Paul law firm, but he never gave up his farm.[7]

As an Irishman Donnelly could hardly be expected to remain aloof from politics, especially when the issues were as exciting as they were in the years just preceding 1860. In Pennsylvania he had been a democrat, though he had once turned down a democratic nomination for the legislature partly because he was not in harmony with that party on the slavery question. In Minnesota he came out openly as a republican, and this too when republicanism was still a struggling reform cause. He began his career as a politician by running for the state senate on the republican ticket in 1857, and again in 1858, when his county was regarded as overwhelmingly democratic and his defeat seemed certain. With the odds greatly against him he was in his element, for he ever fought for the love of the fight, and he fought best when the fighting was hardest. Nor did he fail to win converts to "the cause" he represented.[8]

[5] For further details on the early period of Donnelly's career see Fish, *Donnelliana*, 21-27; William H. C. Folsom, *Fifty years in the northwest* (St. Paul, 1888), 592; Franklin F. Holbrook, "The early political career of Ignatius Donnelly, 1857-1863" (University of Minnesota master's thesis, 1916), 4-9.

[6] Clipping dated December 31, 1890, in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 8.

[7] Fish, *Donnelliana*, 27; Hiram F. Stevens, *History of the bench and bar of Minnesota* (Minneapolis, 1904), 2:23; Minnesota historical society scrapbooks, 14:2.

[8] Fish, *Donnelliana*, 27-29; Marion D. Shutter and J. S. McLain, *Progressive men of Minnesota, biographical sketches and portraits of the leaders in business, politics and the professions; historical and descriptive sketch of the state* (Minneapolis, 1897), 414. Donnelly came within six votes of election in 1858.

The talent for public speaking which Donnelly displayed during this canvass won the attention of the republican state leaders and soon opened for him a real opportunity in politics. By election time, 1859, the republicans had grown sufficiently strong in Minnesota so that they could hope to carry the state. Donnelly's services as a campaigner were not to be ignored, and in spite of his youth — he was then but twenty-eight years of age — he was named for lieutenant governor. The nomination did not come unsought. Donnelly wanted a place on the state ticket, pushed his candidacy before and during the convention with consummate skill, and won against formidable opposition. The naming of a man so young, and so new to Minnesota politics occasioned much surprise and some adverse criticism, but Donnelly's whirlwind campaign introduced him fully to the public and justified the confidence placed in him by the party leaders. The whole republican ticket was triumphantly elected, and two years later was as triumphantly reëlected.[9]

As president of the state senate Donnelly let no one despise his youth. He proved to be a parliamentarian of extraordinary skill and a born politician. His influence was exerted especially in favor of relief measures urged by the farmers, who were still suffering, like himself, from the effects of over-speculation, the panic, and hard times.[10]

Donnelly liked public office and he easily persuaded himself that he ought to go to congress in 1863 rather than to war. There were other aspirants for the honor from his district, but in political bargaining they were no match for him, and he won easily, if not too honorably. Nomination was equivalent to election, so in 1863, when he was thirty-two years of age, he found himself in Washington, the youngest member of the national house of representatives.[11]

During his six years in congress — he was twice reëlected — the representative from Minnesota occupied himself mainly with the task of securing land grants and other favors for western railroad companies. No doubt he believed this to be the best service he could possibly render to his constituents. "In those great expanses of plain and level country," he argued,

[9] Holbrook, "Early political career of Donnelly," 25-55.

[10] *Ibid.*, 59-60.

[11] *Ibid.*, 84-102; Fish, *Donnelliana*, 55.

"railroads are as important as population. And we should not be guided by any narrow or illiberal spirit in this species of legislation."[12] Apparently no western railway project was too insignificant or unpromising to obtain Donnelly's full support. His "services to the railroad companies when in Congress," declared a Minnesota attorney years later when Donnelly had become the bitter opponent of the railways, "were worth to this State millions of dollars."[13]

It seems likely that Donnelly was not unaware of the possibility of personal gain which his course opened up. He saw nothing improper about making a fortune for himself and serving his constituents at the same time. Shortly after he left congress he wrote to a friend, Jay Cooke: "I hold $10,000 of stock of the Lake Superior and Miss. R. R. Co., which was presented to me, without solicitation on my part, by the company, as some slight recognition of very important and valuable services rendered by me to the Company."[14] Nor was he altogether blind to the value of railway support in a political way. "I need not say to you," he wrote Cooke in the fall of 1870, when he was again a candidate for congress, "that I am a friend to the Northern Pacific Railway Company. I drew most of the original bill under which it took its first land grant . . . and on all subsequent occasions I have labored earnestly and I think efficiently in behalf of the Company. If I am returned to Congress I shall go there as the firm friend and advocate of the Northern Pacific R. R. Co."[15] The railways, however, repaid Donnelly but badly for all his help to them. Whatever visions of wealth they may have dangled before his eyes they allowed to fade rapidly away, and they even lent support to his political enemies. His subsequent hostility to the railroads was doubtless due in no small part to these early disappointments and to the distrust they engendered.

For the most part Donnelly's congressional career differed little from that of any other western republican. He was not

[12] *Congressional globe,* 39 congress, 2 session, 3464. See also *ibid.,* 38 congress, 1 session, 2036.

[13] *St. Paul Press,* February 6, 1874.

[14] Donnelly to Cooke, February 15, 1870, in the Donnelly papers, in the possession of the Minnesota historical society.

[15] Donnelly to Cooke, September 28, 1870, Donnelly papers.

the only one to work energetically for railway land grants to western roads and on the all-important question of the war and reconstruction he stood rigidly with the majority of his party.[16] Indeed, much of the crusading ardor, later so strikingly manifest in everything he did, seems to have been satisfied by the struggle to subdue slavery and to make abolition permanent and effective. Yet there is some striking evidence of his independence of thought. He favored with floods of oratory the establishment of a bureau of immigration,[17] and he was mainly responsible for the creation of a bureau of education.[18] His most unusual proposition was that the government should devise some system for the planting of woods and forests on public lands, and he believed that the agitation which he began for this measure led to the passage years later of the timber culture act.[19]

Before the end of his second term in congress Donnelly began to have trouble with the leaders of his party in Minnesota. Certain of them were not at all pleased when he discovered and denounced in a sensational letter to Thaddeus Stevens an obvious attempt to defraud the government by excessive appropriations for the maintenance of Indian agencies in the northwest.[20] Moreover, they feared that Donnelly aspired to a seat in the United States senate, and to win this he must displace Alexander Ramsey, republican "boss" of the state. It was decided that for the good of the party Donnelly's political career ought to be brought to an end. In 1866 he had a hard fight for his renomination; in 1868, he lost.[21]

[16] Characteristic utterances on this subject may be found in the *Congressional globe,* 39 congress, 2 session, 559-561, 1323.

[17] *Ibid.,* 38 congress, 1 session, 857-858.

[18] *Ibid.,* 39 congress, 1 session, 2967-2968; 40 congress, 2 session, 1139-1140; James G. Blaine, *Twenty years in congress; from Lincoln to Garfield. With a review of the events which led to the political revolution of 1860* (Norwich, Connecticut, 1886), 2:167-168.

[19] *Congressional globe,* 39 congress, 1 session, 2674; Folsom, *Fifty years in the northwest,* 592; *St. Paul Dispatch,* March 9, 1870.

[20] Fish, *Donnelliana,* 47-49.

[21] An account of the contest for the nomination in 1866 is given by Donnelly himself in a letter to H. L. Gordon, January 20, 1893, in the Gordon papers. See also Harlan P. Hall, *Observations; being more or less a history of political contests in Minnesota from 1849 to 1904* (St. Paul, 1904), 76-90; *A history of the republican party from its organization to the present time to which is added a political*

Donnelly might have won his fourth nomination in spite of the organized opposition to him had he not been guilty of a grave indiscretion during the session of congress immediately preceding the election. One of Donnelly's numerous land-grant bills was blocked by Elihu B. Washburne of Illinois, whose sympathy for the policy of wholesale distribution of public lands to prospective railways was slight. Donnelly, in a letter to one of his constituents, quite properly, it seems, blamed Washburne for this failure and also said that it was Washburne's ambition to see his brother, W. D. Washburn of Minnesota, in Donnelly's seat in the house. This letter was published and Washburne replied to it in a most scurrilous denunciation of Donnelly, which the *St. Paul Press* gave to its readers. Washburne declared that the whole congressional record of Donnelly was "covered with venality, with corruption, and with crime," and that he had "proved false alike to his friends, his constituents, his religion, and his God."[22] This was more than Donnelly could stand, and on a question of personal privilege he took the floor to defend himself before the members of the house. Washburne was not popular in congress—he was commonly known as "the watch-dog of the treasury"—and so Donnelly addressed a sympathetic audience. Not only did he attempt to refute the charges made against him but, to use his own picturesque language, he "carried the war into Africa," and so "burned and blistered" Washburne that even the "balm of Grant's patronage could not cover the scars."[23] In the blistering process, however, Donnelly used language which even in its expurgated state makes most extraordinary reading and of which he had no occasion to be proud. Members of the house were delighted with the discomfiture of Washburne, but they thought less of Donnelly afterwards and the incident was used to discredit him in the campaign which followed.[24]

history of Minnesota from a republican point of view and biographical sketches of leading Minnesota republicans, published by Eugene V. Smalley (St. Paul, 1896), 182-186; Paul S. Smith, "Party politics in Minnesota, 1865-1871" (University of Minnesota master's thesis, 1918), 50-56.

[22] *Congressional globe*, 40 congress, 2 session, 2354.

[23] The *Anti-Monopolist* (St. Paul), September 20, 1877; Hall, *Observations*, 77.

[24] The episode is recorded in full in the *Congressional globe*, 40 congress, 2 session, 2349-2356. See also Fish, *Donnelliana*, 73-78; Smith, "Party politics in Minnesota," 48.

Donnelly's career as a successful politician now drew rapidly to a close. There was a three-cornered fight in his district in 1868 with the regular republican nominee, the regular democratic nominee, and Donnelly as the contestants. Donnelly's claim that he was the real choice of the republicans of the district was somewhat borne out by the fact that he polled more votes than did the other republican. But the split in the party ranks resulted in a democratic victory — a price which the republican chiefs were probably willing to pay to be rid of a political nuisance. Donnelly's friends, however, were so numerous that to placate them there was some disposition to give him the republican nomination for governor. This did not materialize, however, nor did Donnelly's best-laid plans to succeed Ramsey in the United States senate avail.[25]

It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of these reverses in shaping the course which Donnelly was thenceforth to follow. But for them he might have remained an ordinary and inconspicuous politician. Because of them he was tempted to break entirely away from the old party organization and to assume that thoroughly independent attitude which he ever after maintained. It is probable that Donnelly's motive, to begin with, did not lie much deeper than his feeling of personal pique, his desire to revenge himself upon the republican leaders, and his determination to get back to congress at all costs. The transformation in his character was not accomplished in a moment; there were several years of transition. But these things in no way contradict the fact that prior to the defeats of 1868 and 1869 the reformer spirit within him had been deeply buried beneath the demands of party regularity, whereas after those eventful years it was uncovered and given the chance it needed to grow.

It required just such a shock as this to open Donnelly's eyes to the fact that the old political era was ending and a new one with new problems, new issues, and perhaps new parties was beginning. What, he asked himself, was to be the great political contest of the future? The more he thought of it the more certain he was that he knew. He had watched, it may be with envious eyes, the accumulations of vast wealth which characterized the war and reconstruction period. None knew better than he

[25] Hall, *Observations*, 76-93; Smalley, *History of the republican party*, 185-186; Smith, "Party politics in Minnesota," 50-64.

the growing power of the possessors of that wealth and the way in which they made of the government a servant and a tool for their business interests. He saw how insignificant in point of fact was the power of the people, how great was their ignorance of the plight into which they had fallen, how much they needed a courageous leader. The great struggle of the future, he concluded, would be between those who had and those who had not; between the advocates of the rights of property on the one side and the advocates of the rights of men on the other side; "between the few who seek to grasp all power and wealth, and the many who seek to preserve their rights as American citizens and freemen."[26] Rejected and reviled by the few, he aspired to become the political Moses of the many.

It was as a reformer and a defender of downtrodden humanity, Donnelly reflected, that he had joined the republican party years before. But with the passage of the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments to the constitution the republican program on the slavery question would be complete. What was to be the attitude of the party toward the issues of the new era? Would it again champion the cause of the weak and oppressed, or would it become the party of privilege and vested rights? Donnelly feared greatly for its future. He thought that he discerned on the part of the eastern creditor aristocracy a determination to take complete control of the party machinery and through it to rule the country. Already the debtor west exerted but little influence in the party councils. "It is for the people of the United States to determine," he said, "whether the republican party shall 'renew its youth like the eagle' and shall be the party of liberality, justice and popular right, or whether, forgetting its glorious record in behalf of freedom and humanity, it shall become the base instrument of cliques and rings, of aristocracies and monopolies, of capital against labor, of the few against the many."[27]

[26] A later utterance, but in the same vein as his contemporary speeches. Quoted from a Donnelly circular letter dated August 20, 1886, in the Castle papers, in the possession of the Minnesota historical society.

[27] From a speech delivered in St. Paul on August 20, 1870, in Donnelly scrapbooks, 1:127. See also statements in the *Anti-Monopolist*, April 1, 1875. Certainly Donnelly hoped for a time for reform within the party. "Meant to reform the party not to destroy it," he indorsed one letter. Roath to Donnelly, December 8, 1869, Donnelly papers. A few days later he wrote: "The Republican party is made up of good,

As for Donnelly, he would champion the party of the many, whatever its name might be. He believed that poverty was unnecessary and wrong, and that any party or group of men whose actions forced poverty or distress on others ought to be overthrown. "The first right of man," he maintained, "is to have everything essential to his happiness. Whatever stands in the way of this is not law but fraud and robbery. 'The earth is man's and the fullness thereof.' Wherever amid the fullness of the earth a human stomach goes empty, or a human brain remains darkened in ignorance, there is wrong and crime and fraud somewhere." [28]

Donnelly chose to open his battle for popular rights with a complete change of front on the tariff. In congress he had been regarded as a protectionist and in 1866 he had defended protectionist doctrines before a Minnesota audience with his accustomed skill.[29] But at Farmington, Minnesota, on October 13, 1869, he resolutely turned his back on his earlier record and came out squarely in favor of tariff reform.[30] This change of opinion came after a careful study of the subject and represented a genuine conversion. In one of his scrapbooks may be found numerous clippings, statistical tables, and outlines, which, coupled with his own notations, show the steady progress of his mind toward low tariff doctrines.[31] During the next few years he wrote and spoke constantly on the tariff. Farmers and laborers alike listened with ready ears to his argument that the eastern manufacturers were protected by the tariff in demanding unjustifiable prices for their goods; and the farmers were especially interested to learn that the low price of wheat was due also to the high tariff, which virtually denied admission to foreign manufactured products in return for American grain.[32] In 1870,

honest, intelligent, thoughtful men who . . . will insist that its principles be got right, especially upon new issues on which it has not yet taken sides." Donnelly to Dodge, December 10, 1869, Donnelly papers.

[28] Letter to the *St. Paul Dispatch*, March 30, 1870.

[29] *St. Paul Pioneer*, November 4, 1866; Fish, *Donnelliana*, 60; Smith, "Party politics in Minnesota," 26.

[30] Reported in the *St. Paul Press*, October 14, 1869. See also his subsequent letters from Washington to the *St. Paul Dispatch*, February 23, March 1, 14, 1870.

[31] Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 1. See also an interesting letter to the *Chicago Tribune*, dated December 3, 1869, in the Donnelly papers.

[32] *Speech on the tariff delivered at Ingersoll hall, St. Paul, August 20, 1870*, a pamphlet in Donnelly scrapbooks, 1:128. See also the *St. Paul Dispatch*, August

standing upon his tariff record, Donnelly became the people's independent candidate for congress. He was indorsed by the democrats, and he might have won had not his republican opponent proclaimed fully as advanced views on the tariff as did Donnelly himself. He "elbowed me off my own platform," Donnelly complained later.[33]

Probably Donnelly had hopes even at this early time of starting a new reform party. In his acceptance of the nomination in 1870 he urged upon the farmers the necessity of united action. "The great interest of Agriculture," he declared, "is almost voiceless in the nation. It is tongue-tied by parties, and gagged by tricksters. Let it organize itself. If it can achieve success, all lesser interests can cling to it and be carried forward with it to prosperity. If it perishes, the nation sinks."[34] He attempted to arouse interest in such a movement by urging antimonopoly state conventions, evidently to make ready a program for the state election in 1871, but several efforts in this direction failed to enlist sufficient support to warrant the undertaking.[35] Despairing of success along independent lines, Donnelly finally accepted a republican proposition that he return to the party ranks and write his political views into the platform of 1871.[36] He seemed discouraged even to the point of giving up the rôle of reformer and for a time he took up public lecturing on nonpolitical subjects. His ready wit and fluent tongue won hearty

25, 1870. Donnelly's friends were not a unit in indorsing his new stand. "The tariff whirlwind which you have raised," wrote one of them, "you will not be permitted to ride into power. Its only personal effect upon you is, that whereas before you had the warmest, most determined cohort of personal friends, now they are scattered and divided as their principles and feelings on the question may control them." Foster to Donnelly, August 16, 1870, Donnelly papers.

[33] Hall, *Observations*, 160-163. A copy of the petition asking Donnelly to run independently is in the Donnelly papers, September 12, 1870. The republican platform of the second district nominating convention together with the nominee's speech of acceptance is in Donnelly scrapbooks, 1: 155. For the quotation see *ibid.*, 4:78.

[34] *St. Paul Pioneer*, September 14, 1870.

[35] The *Anti-Monopolist*, October 22, 1874, reviews these efforts. See also Smalley, *History of the republican party*, 190; *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia*, 1870, p. 510; *St. Paul Pioneer*, November 30, 1870.

[36] Donnelly's return to the republican party was announced in a letter to the *St. Paul Pioneer*, September 5, 1871. He explained the incident in detail later in a speech reported in the *Daily Globe* (St. Paul), October 24, 1878.

approval for him throughout the state and his engaging personality increased the number of his friends.[37]

Donnelly's retirements from politics never lasted long. The campaign of 1872 brought him once more into the arena. He always insisted that he could have had the regular republican nomination from his district for congress that year had he been willing to remain aloof from the liberal movement. His enemies said that he turned liberal only when he foresaw that the republicans would not name him. However that may be, he came out openly for Greeley before the district nominating convention met and announced that he was a candidate for no office.[38] The old republican party, he believed, must submit to immediate and drastic reform, or "must give way to a new party, nameless perhaps as yet, which shall be emphatically the Party of the People; which shall embody the best principles of Washington and Jefferson, and embrace the best element of all the present parties."[39]

Donnelly speedily made himself at home in the liberal republican camp. He had already signified his belief that reconstruction had gone too far. "The true cure for the Ku Klux," he contended, "is the school-house." And again, "We have our Ireland in the south."[40] He also embraced the cause of civil service reform, adhering to the novel proposition that permanent tenure of office alone was the all-important necessity, and that it mattered little how appointments were made, or whether or not the appointee to begin with had any especial fitness for his post.[41] To Donnelly the great shortcoming of the liberal repub-

[37] "Six years in Washington," and "American humorists," were the titles most frequently announced. Numerous comments on these lectures may be found in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 4.

[38] A letter from Donnelly explaining his stand is printed in the *St. Paul Dispatch*, July 15, 1872. See also the *Hastings Gazette*, August 3, 1872, and the *Anti-Monopolist*, February 5, 1875.

[39] *St. Paul Dispatch*, July 15, 1872.

[40] Speech at Red Wing, Minnesota, July 4, 1872, found in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 4; *St. Paul Dispatch*, August 19, 1872.

[41] *St. Paul Press*, June 27, 1872. Donnelly's final stand on civil service reform differed rather markedly from this. In 1897 he wrote: "Civil service is a contrivance gotten up by the 'ins' to keep the 'outs' out forever. . . . We need an upturning and a brooming out of the cobwebs." *Representative*, March 17, 1897.

lican party was that it had nominated an ardent protectionist for president; but he took what comfort he could from the platform statement which favored "such a policy on the Tariff as the popular will shall dictate."[42]

A better field for his activities was furnished by the granger movement. Hard times following the panic of 1873 accompanied by a grasshopper plague in the southwestern part of the state made Minnesota a fruitful field for the political agitator. The farmers were convinced that something was wrong and turned blindly upon the railroads as the most likely cause of their distress.[43] Donnelly at once became the unsurpassed advocate of granger ideas. Here was a real issue between the masses and the classes, and in such a case he now knew where he stood. As the chief lecturer of the Minnesota granges he presented his views to assemblies in nearly every county in the state, and finally he published them in a pamphlet entitled *Facts for the granges,* which was scattered broadcast. The regulation of railway rates, coöperative buying, cheap water transportation, the restoration of specie payments, and direct taxation in the place of the protective tariff were the remedies he proposed.[44]

But how was such a program to be enacted into law? Donnelly had little faith in the original granger idea of working through the older parties. "We can't look for a remedy in the Republican party," he said. "Its brains and its pocketbook are in New England." Nor did he think the democratic party appreciably better, since "its brains and its pocketbook" were in the south.[45] Why not create a new party—a farmer's party—which would represent the wishes of the western agriculturist? The building up of a nonpolitical organization, he told the grangers, was only "to make a gun that will do everything but shoot."[46]

Donnelly's advice was heeded. Local conventions inspired

[42] *St. Paul Dispatch,* July 15, 1872; July 28, 1873.

[43] Smalley, *History of the republican party,* 194-195; Solon J. Buck, *The granger movement; a study of agricultural organization and its political, economic and social manifestations, 1870-1880* (*Harvard historical studies,* volume 19 — Cambridge, 1913), 159-166.

[44] Ignatius Donnelly, *Facts for the granges* (St. Paul, 1873), 10-17. A copy of this pamphlet is in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 5.

[45] Donnelly scrapbooks, 5:4.

[46] *Facts for the granges,* 18.

by his oratory began to call for the formation of a new party to consist of farmers and laborers,[47] and in September, 1873, as a result of this agitation more than a hundred delegates met at Owatonna, Minnesota, and organized what they called the people's antimonopoly party. Donnelly was the temporary chairman of the new party convention, sounded the keynote, and took a leading part, though not always the decisive part, in its proceedings. A full state ticket was nominated which the liberal republicans and democrats were induced to accept.[48] The republican convention, meanwhile, thoroughly frightened by the activities of the grangers, turned down the machine candidate for governor and nominated in his place Cushman K. Davis, a man whose speaking and writing in behalf of the farmers had attracted about as much attention as the work of Donnelly himself. Even so, the discontent among the farmers was so great that Davis won by the slender margin of five thousand votes, and the republican candidate for state treasurer was defeated. In the lower house of the legislature the republicans elected only 53 members out of 104, and many of the majority were as thoroughly granger and antimonopolist in their sympathies as were their adversaries.[49]

Donnelly figured in this campaign as the successful candidate from his county for the state senate. Some charged that he made the race merely to be available for promotion to the United States senate should his party in the legislature be strong enough to elect a senator. He did, indeed, receive the votes of the fusion forces for that office, and his whole life long he openly aspired to hold a seat in the upper house of congress, but no doubt he valued his place in the state legislature.[50] Certainly he made the most of his opportunity to in-

[47] *St. Paul Press,* June 5, 6, July 29, 1873.

[48] *St. Paul Press,* September 3, 1873; *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia,* 1873, pp. 510-511; Solon J. Buck, "Independent parties in the western states, 1873-1876," in *Turner essays in American history* (New York, 1910), 149-152. The full text of the platform is in Donnelly scrapbooks, 2:15.

[49] *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia,* 1873, p. 512; Smalley, *History of the republican party,* 195-197.

[50] Donnelly remained a member of the state senate for five consecutive years, being twice reëlected. Fish, *Donnelliana,* 83. The contest for the United States senatorship is described in Hall, *Observations,* 145-146. Donnelly gives his version of it in the *Anti-Monopolist,* February 5, 1875.

troduce and push legislation. "Omitting his daily minor follies," the *St. Paul Press* counted no less than fifteen prominent reform measures that he fathered during the session of 1874. Practically all of his bills failed to become law. Some of them were dropped because they were utterly unreasonable, as, for example, a bill requiring all insurance companies doing business in the state to invest their premiums at seven per cent in the same counties in which they had been received. Others, such as his proposition to fix the maximum freight rate on grain at one cent per ton per mile, were of doubtful expediency.[51] Still others represented his hobbies, and made him a laughingstock. Had he been able to convince the legislature of its desirability, "a bill to plant trees as wind-breaks along certain roads" would have been passed, and the normal schools of the state would have been abolished. Donnelly's attitude was even more objectionable than his measures. He assumed an air of superiority over friends and enemies alike; he talked entirely too much; and he made merciless use of his skill at witticisms, sarcasm, and invective to annihilate all those who opposed him.[52]

Donnelly's impractical turn of mind unfitted him for the serious business of legislation, but as an agitator he was ever superb. He found a new field for this talent when in the summer of 1874 he began the publication of a weekly journal of reform called the *Anti-Monopolist*. "Speak to the children of Israel that they go forward," was the motto that appeared above the headlines on each issue, and it was indeed an unusual number which failed to present some newly inspired message of reform. Through the journal Donnelly waged unceasing warfare against what he later learned to call "plutocracy," and all those who defended it. To his mind the struggle of the ages was on. Could the ordinary man retain his economic independence, or must he become the wage slave of the possessor of great wealth? "Lib-

[51] Donnelly was so anxious to obtain legislation unfavorable to the railways that he was even credited with the desire to bankrupt them, since such a course would at least get rid of the watered capital on which they were trying to pay interest. *St. Paul Press*, May 16, 1874. When a regulative law finally passed the legislature, it was not drastic enough to suit him and Donnelly and the man in the senate most favorable to the railways cast the only votes against it. *St. Paul Press*, March 6, 1874.

[52] *St. Paul Press*, March 13, May 6, 7, 1874; *Anti-Monopolist*, March 11, 1875.

erty," he believed, must either "overcome all her foes or perish forever from the earth." Every man "must bear a share in the great battle." And Donnelly wished it to be understood that he, for one, had "enlisted for life."[53]

In spite of the active propaganda carried on by Donnelly's paper, the antimonopolist party had not long to live. In the elections of 1874 and 1875 the semblance of an organization was maintained, but too close fraternization with the democratic and liberal republican forces tended to rob the new party of its separate identity. All three factions, democrats, liberal republicans, and antimonopolists, were grouped together in those years as the party of the "opposition," but the difference between "opposition" conventions and democratic conventions whether in personnel or in principles, grew steadily less.[54]

Donnelly viewed this situation with much distress. He had no objection to the use of democratic votes to further the cause of reform, but he did object to being swallowed bodily by an unregenerated democracy. Moreover, he could not but observe that public interest in reforms had flagged. The granges, upon whose support the antimonopolists relied, had lost much of their original vitality, for the granger movement had not succeeded in alleviating hard times.[55] There was just one ray of hope. In many of the western states, and to a considerable extent in Minnesota, the inflation idea was taking hold. A reform party which should make paper money its cardinal principle stood some chance of success. But Donnelly, unfortunately, had never embraced the greenback heresy, and in his granger speeches had even demanded the resumption of specie payments as one of the essential reforms.[56] As late as the spring of 1875 he had objected strenuously in the columns of the *Anti-Monop-*

[53] *Anti-Monopolist*, July 16, 1874.

[54] The history of the antimonopolist organization is reviewed by Donnelly in the *Anti-Monopolist*, July 12, 1875, September 21, 1876.

[55] Solon J. Buck, *The agrarian crusade. A chronicle of the farmer in politics (Chronicles of America*, volume 45 — New Haven, 1920), chapter 5.

[56] *Anti-Monopolist*, April 22, 1875. "We must oppose all inflations of the currency," he argued in 1870, "which serve only to keep up an unnatural state of things, raise prices, increase the cost of living, and benefit nobody but speculators and gold brokers. For these principles, for one, I am ready to enlist as a high private and fight in the rear rank." Letter to the *St. Paul Dispatch*, March 2, 1870. His hard money stand is also stated in his pamphlet, *Facts for the granges*, 10, 15, quoted in part in Buck, *The agrarian crusade*, 81.

olist to "an unlimited manufacture of money," and had contended that the currency "must, in any event, rest upon a gold basis."

Apparently Donnelly decided to give up his own views on the currency in order to be in harmony with the majority of reformers throughout the country and thus to help along the greater "cause" of the people against the aristocracy of wealth. He began to confess confusion on the money question and likened its intricacies to those of Schleswig-Holstein. He discovered that "gold never has been and never will be the exclusive currency of the nation." He saw unexpected evils in contraction, in the national banks, and in a set time for resumption.[57] At length he could boldly advocate: (1) that there should be an abundant currency, fully equal to the necessities of business, and increasing with the increase of commerce and production; (2) that this currency should be issued by the nation itself without the intervention of any third parties; (3) that it should be full legal tender for all debts, public and private, including duties on imports.[58] In short, Donnelly not only flirted with greenbackism; he wooed and won it. Nor was his conversion the less sincere because he so earnestly desired it to come to pass. An accepted point of view was ever a challenge to his dialectic skill, and he longed to disprove it, even to himself. Moreover, the most ardent supporters of "hard money" were the very men of wealth whom it was his mission in life to oppose. How could he stand on their platform and fight the battle of the masses?

In the spring of 1876 Donnelly resurrected enough of the old antimonopoly state committee to call a convention at Owatonna, Minnesota, for the purpose of determining whether or not the state should be represented in the great greenback gathering already called for Indianapolis. The Owatonna convention was a Donnelly affair. After indorsing his views on the currency, the tariff, and civil service reform, it obediently selected him

[57] *Anti-Monopolist*, May 20, June 17, November 25, 1875, March 2, April 27, 1876.

[58] *Anti-Monopolist*, September 13, 1877. In the *Daily Globe*, October 24, 1878, Donnelly admitted that he had changed his mind twice, once on the tariff, and once on the money question. "He thought it to his honor that he had been able to study and think on these questions and [having] found that he had been in error had had the manliness to come out and avow it."

to be the chief spokesman of Minnesota at Indianapolis, nominated him to head a complete ticket for independent presidential electors, and adjourned.[59]

At Indianapolis Donnelly acquitted himself with credit. Widely known and a skillful orator, he was the natural choice of the convention for temporary chairman. His keynote speech showed that he had in mind something more than the creation of a party of one principle. What he desired was a party composed primarily of the working classes; a party which would advocate every reform that would better their condition; a "party in whose judgment and in whose heart the poorest man who toils in the mines of Pennsylvania or in the mills of New England will outweigh in consequence and importance Jay Gould or Cornelius Vanderbilt. . . . This is a people's country," he contended, "and we need a people's party. I much mistake the signs of the times if we have not formed it here to-day."[60]

The results of the first campaign in Minnesota of the independent or, as it was more commonly called, the greenback party, could hardly have been gratifying to its leaders. There was no state election in 1876, but Donnelly determined to run for congress, hoping through democratic support to wrest his district from the republican column. In their state convention, however, the democrats came out definitely in favor of Tilden and hard money, and in Donnelly's district they insisted on putting up a candidate of their own. Donnelly, nevertheless, made the race. Although he ran third in the district his personal popularity was so great that he received more votes for congressman than were cast in the entire state for Cooper and Cary, the Indianapolis nominees.[61]

Before the campaign of the following year opened, the greenback propaganda had begun to have its effect. Greenback clubs, patterned after the now almost extinct granges, were organized all over the state.[62] The circulation of the *Anti-Monopolist*

[59] *Anti-Monopolist*, February 10, March 16, April 6, 1876; Frederick E. Haynes, *Third party movements since the civil war, with special reference to Iowa; a study in social politics* (Iowa City, 1916), 112; Smalley, *History of the republican party*, 201.

[60] *Anti-Monopolist*, May 25, 1876. The platform adopted is given in *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia*, 1876, p. 781.

[61] *Anti-Monopolist*, June 8, November 2, 11, December 21, 1876; *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia*, 1876, p. 557; Smalley, *History of the republican party*, 202.

[62] Mention of these clubs is made in the *Anti-Monopolist*, January 27, March 2,

was pushed assiduously. Donnelly expounded the greenback doctrines to large audiences in his own inimitable way. And when the time was ripe a greenback convention nominated a state ticket headed by an ex-republican of "soft-money" proclivities. As Donnelly and his friends had hoped and expected, this ticket was indorsed by the democrats, whose leaders saw in fusion with the greenbackers their only chance of success. But formidable opposition only stimulated the republicans to redouble their energies, and when the votes were counted the greenback nominees were found to have been defeated by a majority of about fifteen thousand — less, Donnelly consoled himself, than the majority by which Hayes won the state from Tilden the year before.[63]

The year 1878 was the high-water mark for the greenback movement. With the resumption of specie payment fast approaching, greenbacks steadily rose in value and prices declined. For the farmers of the northwest times apparently grew harder every year.[64] A special grievance with which they must contend was the control which the milling and elevator companies exercised over the purchase price of wheat. It was confidently asserted that a "miller's ring" existed, which not only depressed to the minimum the price paid for grain, but also found means to cheat the farmer in the "grading" of his wheat. A two-quart measure was the standard container used by buyers for this purpose, and the farmers contended that "by filling the kettle rapidly, by the stroke, and by the manipulation of the scale beam, an adept could make a difference of one or two grades in a load of wheat."[65]

When the republicans of the third Minnesota district named for congress William D. Washburn, a prominent miller and the brother of Elihu B. Washburne, whom Donnelly had so mightily assailed in the national house many years before, it was not difficult to predict who his opponent would be. There was an insistent demand that Donnelly enter the field against Wash-

1876, and frequently thereafter. In the issue of March 21, 1878, a formula is given for the use of those who desire to start such organizations.

[63] *Anti-Monopolist*, September 13, October 4, November 15, 1877, January 17, 1878; Smalley, *History of the republican party*, 203.

[64] Buck, *The agrarian crusade*, chapter 6.

[65] Hall, *Observations*, 228; *Daily Globe*, October 18, 24, 1878.

burn, a demand which the former had little inclination to resist. He was normally a resident of the second congressional district rather than of the third, but an unsuccessful attempt at large-scale farming which he and his sons had carried on at Donnelly, Minnesota, in the western part of the state, gave him a technical residence in Washburn's district. Three times that year Donnelly was nominated by third district conventions: once by a council of workingmen of the city of St. Paul, once by the greenbackers, and once by the democrats.[66]

Donnelly was officially a greenbacker and he advocated soft money persistently, but the "swindling brass kettle," and the activities of the "wheat ring" were the chief subjects of his anti-Washburn orations. He had little difficulty in securing a strong following among the farmers, who rolled up a handsome majority for him on election day in all the rural counties of the district. But in Minneapolis, Washburn's home city, the miller's majority was great enough to overcome Donnelly's lead in the country. The final vote gave Washburn 21,036 to 18,024 for Donnelly.[67]

From the very day of the election Donnelly believed that his defeat was due to bribery and corruption, and the evidence which he was able to collect in proof of his contention still sounds convincing.[68] He determined to contest Washburn's seat before the bar of the house, and in December, 1879, he appeared in Washington for that purpose. His cause was a good one, and the committee before which he plead had a majority friendly to him. Donnelly fully expected to win the contest. "The chairman, Mr. Springer, is earnestly my friend," he wrote to his wife, "so is the chairman of the sub-committee."[69] In fact, the dem-

[66] *Anti-Monopolist*, September 12, 1878; Fish, *Donnelliana*, 93-96; Hall, *Observations*, 225-230.

[67] *Anti-Monopolist*, November 14, 1878; *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia*, 1878, p. 567; Fish, *Donnelliana*, 97. In the second Minnesota district a greenback-democrat named Poehler won over his republican opponent, but subsequent greenback successes in Minnesota were slight. In 1879 Donnelly presided over a convention which named a full state ticket, but in the election which followed it failed to receive democratic support and attracted only a negligible number of votes. *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia*, 1879, pp. 629-632. The semblance of an organization was maintained until after the presidential election of 1884.

[68] *Daily Globe*, November 9, 1878; *Anti-Monopolist*, November 28, 1878; *House miscellaneous documents*, 46 congress, 1 session, volume 1, no. 9.

[69] Donnelly to Mrs. Donnelly, December 20, 1879, Donnelly papers.

ocrats would have been only too glad to bolster up their slender majority in the house by seating a member who could be counted on to coöperate with them. From the republican minority Donnelly could expect only "a bitter fight . . . because they will understand that my admission will give the democrats a majority of the Congressional delegations in twenty-one states, and if the election of president goes into the House, as is highly probable, a democratic president would be elected."[70]

As usual Donnelly's hopes proved vain. The contest dragged on interminably. The subcommittee having in charge the investigation of the case favored the unseating of Washburn, and so reported.[71] But just as this was about to be recommended by the whole committee an anonymous letter was unearthed in which a proposal was made to Chairman Springer that he should vote for Washburn for a five thousand dollar consideration. There was a strong suspicion that Donnelly, or more likely one of his lieutenants, knew more about the letter than was admitted. Donnelly ever afterwards ridiculed the idea that he or any of his friends would want to bribe Springer to vote for Washburn, but the suspicion settled into belief that Donnelly's chief counsel had taken this dishonorable means to show Springer that Washburn was really capable of offering a bribe. The result was that Washburn held his seat, although congress salved Donnelly's feelings slightly by voting him an unusually large sum in compensation for his expenditures in bringing the contest.[72]

This failure drove Donnelly into one of the longest of his periodic retirements from politics. His paper went under and his debts increased. In fact, before his books began to bring him a fair income Donnelly could always prove by his impecunious state that he could not have been purchased or bribed in the way that his enemies repeatedly charged. "The same degree of energy exerted in behalf of the plunderers of the people," he declared in 1877, "would have given us half a million."[73]

[70] Donnelly to his mother, January 9, 1880, Donnelly papers; *Daily Globe,* March 10, 1880.

[71] The *Daily Globe,* March 19, 1880, prints the full report of the subcommittee. See also *ibid.,* March 25, 28, April 2, 1880.

[72] *Daily Globe,* April 4, 1880; *Pioneer Press* (St. Paul), April 2, 1880; Hall, *Observations,* 215-220; Fish, *Donnelliana,* 97.

[73] *Anti-Monopolist,* February 15, 1877; compare *ibid.,* February 12, 1875.

Donnelly now resolved upon a literary career. In 1881 the first of his books, *Atlantis: the antediluvian world,* a production in every way typical of the man, made its appearance. Donnelly loved theories, and having stumbled upon a good one he seldom rested until he had proved it to his own satisfaction. For such a purpose he had an almost limitless fund of information to draw upon. He possessed one of those peculiarly retentive memories that enabled him to recall at will practically everything of consequence that he had ever heard or read, and he read everything that he could get his hands upon. His private library became the wonder and admiration of the whole northwest. It contained books on every subject, and infinite numbers of pamphlets which he bound carefully together for future reference. He saved everything—newspaper clippings about himself or about subjects in which he was interested, the multitudinous letters which he received from his friends, and occasionally also copies of letters which he himself wrote. Armed with this heterogeneous collection of information, Donnelly essayed to prove in his first book the truth of Plato's theory that "there once existed in the Atlantic Ocean opposite the Mediterranean Sea, a large island" where original civilization developed, and from which it spread to the adjoining continents. The island, which Plato called Atlantis, eventually sank into the sea, destroying the race which inhabited it. Only a few escaped in ships to Europe or America, there to spread the "tidings of the appalling catastrophe, which has survived to our own time in the Flood and deluge legends."[74]

The success of *Atlantis* was immediate and great. Numerous editions were printed in both England and America, and the book was even translated into foreign languages. Antiquarians looked upon Donnelly's work as a mere intellectual sport, but the author really believed his arguments and convinced such men as William E. Gladstone of their truth.[75] Encouraged by the outcome of his first venture, Donnelly startled scientific circles by the publication in 1883 of a book called *Ragnarok: the age of fire and gravel,* in which he attributed the deposits of clay, gravel, and silt found upon the face of the earth to

[74] Ignatius Donnelly, *Atlantis: the antediluvian world* (New York, 1882), 1-2.

[75] *Minnesota historical collections,* 13: 341; *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia,* 1901, p. 421; *American antiquarian,* 5: 204-205.

contact in some bygone age with a mighty comet.[76] Donnelly's entirely un-Minnesotan way of producing books the very titles of which passed comprehension earned for him a vast reputation among his Minnesota friends. They called him the "Sage of Nininger," and believed implicitly in his scholarship even when they refused him political advancement.

Donnelly's reputation as a man of great learning was enhanced in some circles and damaged in others by his publication in 1888 of a two-volume work entitled *The great cryptogram,* in which he attempted to prove that Bacon wrote the works commonly attributed to Shakespeare.[77] He had stumbled upon this theory years before, and had been attracted to it as he was always attracted to anything novel or absurd. In so far as the book stated the usual argument that Shakespeare was not a sufficiently well-informed man to write the plays and that Bacon was, no particular objection could be raised. But Donnelly rested his final proof upon a complex and ingenious cipher, which was immediately rejected by the literary world and was afterwards applied with equal success to *Don Quixote.*[78] Donnelly never gave up his theory, however, and one of his latest works, *The cipher in the plays and on the tombstone,* attempted to correct the mistakes of his earlier Shakespearean venture and to apply the cipher to the curious inscription on the tombstone of Shakespeare.[79] He lectured repeatedly on this subject, although usually to very select audiences. Let Donnelly be announced to speak on "Wit and humor" or "Topics of the day," and he would be greeted by capacity houses; but when he spoke on the

[76] Ignatius Donnelly, *Ragnarok: the age of fire and gravel* (New York, 1883), 91-97. Reviewed in the *Dial,* 3:207.

[77] Ignatius Donnelly, *The great cryptogram: Francis Bacon's cipher in the so-called Shakespeare plays* (Chicago, 1888). Donnelly presents some of his arguments in the *North American review,* 144:572-582; 145:46-68; 148:307-318. A reply is printed in the same journal, 145:555-562.

[78] *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia,* 1901, p. 421. An interesting account of the origin of Donnelly's Shakespearean studies is given in an article in the *Kansas City World,* June 7, 1896. See also numerous clippings in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 9. J. Gilpin Pyle, *The little cryptogram: a literal application to the play of Hamlet, of the cipher system of Mr. Ignatius Donnelly* (St. Paul, 1888), is a caustic criticism of Donnelly's work. He is defended by William D. O'Connor, in *Mr. Donnelly's reviewers* (Chicago, 1889).

[79] Ignatius Donnelly, *The cipher in the plays and on the tombstone* (Minneapolis, 1899). See also comments in the *Representative,* March 29, November 9, 1899.

Baconian theory the masses were not interested. On numerous occasions he debated the question with Professor Freeman, a Shakespearean scholar connected with the University of Wisconsin. While Donnelly was probably a better debater, Freeman's arguments usually proved more convincing to those who knew enough about the subject to be entitled to an opinion.[80]

Donnelly's literary labors not only won for him considerable recognition the world over, but they also provided him with an assured, though moderate, income, something he had never known before. In 1888 he paid a visit to England, where he was well received and even accorded the rare honor of lecturing before both Oxford and Cambridge universities.[81]

His trip abroad opened a vast new storehouse of information for him to theorize upon. It is interesting to note that he seemed to foresee with approval the end of the American policy of diplomatic isolation. "We should throw the gigantic moral influence of this great republic," he said, "into the scale in favor of every effort of the people of Europe to improve their condition and strike down their tyrants. The cowardly policy of non-interference, which might have been wise in the days of our youthful imbecility, is no longer necessary." Nor did he fail to see the consequences of such a policy. "The time may come — it may be near at hand — when America, to preserve free institutions for her own people, will be compelled to carry the banner of liberation across the waters of the Atlantic, and advance towards the rising sun, until every despot is swept from the face of Europe." He even dreamed of leagues of nations and disarmament: "When the day comes a great federation of European republics will clasp hands across the ocean, with this mighty union of states, and kings, standing armies, aristocracies and established churches will become the fossil monsters of a dark and brutal past."[82]

Perhaps the most striking result of his European experience was his temporary reconversion to the doctrine of tariff protection. He evidently found European working conditions far

[80] Numerous accounts of these debates are given in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 9.

[81] A. J. Pegler, "Some stories of Ignatius Donnelly," in the *Minneapolis Tribune,* January 6, 1901.

[82] Extracts from a speech reported in the *Minneapolis Tribune,* September 30, 1888.

worse than he had imagined and he desired to prevent the American workingman from descending to the living scale of the laboring classes of Europe. "I tell you," he said, "that while we must do justice to the agricultural population, while we must take off of their shoulders every unnecessary burden, we must interpose a wall of protection against the underpaid, the starving labor of the old world."[83] "For every factory that is busy there in England there must be one idle in this country if we are to have free trade. For every stomach that is filled there, one must be pinched here."[84] Donnelly was indeed, as one contemporary wrote, "a veritable conundrum with the key thrown away."[85] His inconsistencies and his consistencies alike baffle understanding. In one frame of mind he steadfastly maintained in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary the impossible theories of *Atlantis, Ragnarok,* and the Baconian cipher; in another, he switched from high tariff to low tariff, from low tariff to high tariff, and then back again, for inside of two years after his return from England he was defending the free-trade position once more.[86] Perhaps there was no tariff policy sufficiently irrational to be at home in his erratic mind.

It is not surprising that in his later writings Donnelly refused to be bound by the limitations of the scientist or the literary critic, and selected romance as the most fitting medium for the expression of his views. In the year 1889, following a humiliating defeat for the United States senatorship[87] (for he was back in politics again), he began work on a book which reflected his pessimism. Donnelly had a way of identifying his own political fortunes with the success or failure of reform, and from this point of view it seemed evident that the cause of reform had

[83] *Daily Globe,* September 6, 1888.

[84] *Pioneer Press,* October 31, 1888.

[85] Clipping from the *Public Spirit* (Mankato), September 13, 1888, in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 6.

[86] Resolutions offered by Donnelly at a Farmers' alliance convention held in March, 1890, demanded "Radical revision and reduction of the national tariff on imports, and the putting of salt, coal, iron, sugar, lumber and materials for the manufacture of twine on the free list." *Minneapolis Journal,* March 6, 1890. "Some shallow people," he had declared two years before, "will tell you that Donnelly is changing so often. . . . It is the parties that have been wiggling about." *Pioneer Press,* October 31, 1888.

[87] Smalley, *History of the republican party,* 231; *Pioneer Press,* January 18, 1889; *Minneapolis Tribune,* January 18, 1889.

little chance of success. The result of Donnelly's meditations was the publication in June, 1890, of a novel entitled *Cæsar's column,* in which the author maintained that if the present state of things continued for another hundred years it would end in the destruction of civilization as well as liberty the whole world over.[88] *Cæsar's column* was Donnelly's most popular work, and sold by the hundreds of thousands of copies, although it possessed little literary merit. Some said that it imitated Bellamy's *Looking backward,* but it was really quite the reverse. Bellamy dreamed of an ideal state of society where all wrongs should be righted; Donnelly looked forward to something closely akin to the current conception of bolshevism. He foresaw a time when the lower classes, stung by their increasing wrongs, would join together in a great "Brotherhood of Destruction," including millions of members the world over, whose efforts would finally culminate in the annihilation of society itself. The book, to escape unmerited criticism, was published under an assumed name and was not for some time attributed to Donnelly. Its phenomenal success is evidence of the profound unrest of the times from which the populist movement took root and grew.[89] Donnelly, it should be said, did not preach violence; on the contrary, he taught that all necessary reforms should be made to escape violence. But he did believe that unless the wrongs of the masses were righted a social cataclysm would result.[90]

During the eighties Donnelly the author and orator somewhat overshadowed Donnelly the politician. But the politician was by no means dead. Indeed, the versatile Minnesotan was disposed rather to turn to good account politically the advertising which came to him by reason of his books and lectures. Because he wrote and discoursed on subjects covering so wide a range of popular interest he could count on friends and supporters in

[88] Ignatius Donnelly, *Cæsar's column: a story of the twentieth century,* by Edmund Boisgilbert, M.D. (Chicago, 1890).

[89] Numerous comments on *Cæsar's column,* both pro and con, are to be found in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 8.

[90] Inspired by the success of *Cæsar's column,* Donnelly produced in quick succession two other novels. One of them, *Doctor Huguet; a novel,* by Edmund Boisgilbert, M.D. (Chicago, 1891), was a story in defense of negro rights, and the other, called *The golden bottle; or the story of Ephraim Benezet of Kansas* (New York, 1892), dealt with free silver and other reforms. Neither achieved anything like the success which came to *Cæsar's column.*

all walks of life, and he frequently won a hearing for his political views in enemy strongholds where, but for his literary and forensic fame, he must assuredly have been denied.

For a few years after his failure to win Washburn's seat in congress Donnelly remained in a self-imposed retirement from politics, but in 1884 under circumstances which could hardly be called compelling, he reappeared in the political arena. In that year as the democratic candidate from his district for congress he had the satisfaction of cutting down the normal republican majority of seven or eight thousand to seven or eight hundred votes.[91] But this time the closeness of the decision did not inspire him to contest the election, although he did feel that the democratic party owed him something for making the race. Frankly basing his claim on the "lame-duck" plea, he asked of the incoming Cleveland administration appointment as surveyor-general of Minnesota — an office which carried with it a stipend of but two thousand dollars, and for which he had no fitness whatever. Donnelly did not scruple to plead that his great services to the democratic party in the state entitled him at least to this petty office, the proceeds of which he could use to good advantage in buying books for his library! The democratic state central committee, it chanced, was dominated by men of great wealth whom Donnelly had again and again affronted. It no doubt gave them great delight to announce that he should not receive the surveyor-generalship, or any other office, if they could help it. Their influence seems to have been decisive, for Donnelly continued to pay for his own books.[92]

In the rôle of party regular Donnelly was distinctly out of place.[93] Not until the Farmers' alliance come into prominence did he again find a part which he was fitted to play. This organ-

[91] An adequate account of this election is in Fish, *Donnelliana,* 104. Besides the democratic nomination Donnelly had also Farmers' alliance and greenback support. But the greenback party was virtually dead, and the alliance was regarded as a nonpolitical organization.

[92] *Pioneer Press* (St. Paul), April 19, 1885; October 12, 22, 1888.

[93] Donnelly described himself in 1886 "As one who has heretofore for many years co-operated with the Democratic party, who now desires its growth and triumph and would like to see it what its founder, Thomas Jefferson, intended it should be — the fearless defender of the rights of mankind." From a Donnelly circular letter in the Castle papers, dated August 20, 1886. But in 1891 Donnelly declared that he had never voted the democratic ticket in his life. Clipping from the *Duluth Tribune,* October 22, 1891, in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 9.

ization had made its appearance in Minnesota as early as 1881, and had grown steadily in numbers and importance.[94] It was a non-partisan affair, closely resembling the grange of the seventies, and seeking the alleviation of much the same agricultural grievances—low prices of grain, unfair systems of grading, elevator frauds, excessive railway rates, inadequate and discriminatory transportation, exorbitant interest charges, and the like. The alliance taught independence of party affiliation, but advised its members to vote only for men who would act in the interest of the farmers. By 1886 its influence was too strong to be ignored, and in the campaign of that year both parties made an earnest effort to conciliate the farmer vote. The democrats named for governor Dr. Albert A. Ames, whose record as mayor of Minneapolis had won hearty applause from the reform forces, and the republicans, with a less satisfactory candidate, A. R. McGill, wrote into their resolutions every demand that the alliance forces made.[95]

Donnelly saw great possibilities in the growing spirit of coöperation among the farmers, and naturally he could not long resist the temptation to offer his leadership to this new movement for reform. He found, however, that the constituted authorities of the alliance were not altogether willing to yield their place to him. There was, to begin with, a total disagreement as to the ticket which the alliance should support in the forthcoming election. The alliance officers quite generally favored the democratic candidates, while Donnelly leaned decidedly toward the republicans.[96] The nomination of Ames, he contended, had not rid the democratic state central committee of the party

[94] Considerable light is thrown upon the early history of the alliance in Minnesota by a report of the alliance state secretary, Eric Olson, printed in the *Great West* (St. Paul), February 14, 1890.

[95] Smalley, *History of the republican party,* 220; *Pioneer Press,* September 15, 23, 1886.

[96] Personal feeling no doubt had something to do with Donnelly's attitude. He told the truth when he wrote to a friend that "the democratic party has pretty emphatically said that it wants nothing to do with me. . . . I have been beaten for Congress by the Hill-Kelly crowd, beaten for the surveyor-generalship, deprived of the slightest recognition by the Executive, read out of the party by the Democratic state central committee, defeated in my own county, and even yet daily cartooned by the Democratic state newspaper organ. A thoroughbred Democrat would find it hard to digest this treatment; but to one who is an Independent, and who has only co-operated with the Democrats as an ally, it is especially galling." Donnelly to J. L. McDonald, October 6, 1886, Donnelly papers.

bosses — men who were the open and uncompromising enemies of reform. Furthermore, the democratic convention had refused to hear a committee of farmers and laborers who sought to present to it their views — a committee of which, incidentally, Donnelly was the chief spokesman. On the other hand, this same committee had been most cordially received by the republican convention a few days before, and Donnelly had been given an ovation. As to the platforms themselves, Donnelly found the democratic document vague and misleading, whereas the republican resolutions were on some points even stronger than the reformers had asked.[97] But Donnelly's loudly proclaimed preferences were entirely ignored. Although making no recommendation officially, the majority of the alliance leaders evidently favored Ames, and they were able to deliver to him sufficient alliance votes to reduce the republican majority to a mere handful.[98] Donnelly remained aloof from the state campaign, nursing equal grievances against the democratic machine and those alliance officers who had refused to follow where he led. He made every effort thereafter to belittle the men who had, as he thought, betrayed the alliance.[99] They learned to hate and fear him, and they constituted a little nucleus around whom gathered as time went on many other reformers who for one reason or another fell out with Donnelly. He never again knew what it was to have the undivided support of the reform element.

Failing to dictate to the alliance officers, Donnelly now determined, regardless of them, to take over the active control of the reform forces within the state. Against strenuous opposition he had succeeded in securing a seat as an independent in the lower house of the state legislature.[1] Here, because of his out-

[97] The committee referred to was a joint committee of thirty appointed from members of the Farmers' alliance and Knights of labor, and more or less officially authorized to sound out the two party conventions on their attitude toward reform. Donnelly's report is given in the *Pioneer Press*, September 24, 1886.

[98] Smalley, *History of the republican party*, 224-225.

[99] His sentiments were well reflected in a letter from the state lecturer of the alliance, at that time one of his trusted friends. "What must the Alliance do to be saved?" it ran. "In my humble judgment it will have to *unload* and throw overboard a few Jonah's or go to the bottom. It has done much good as an agitator but as a cohesive power it has been a total failure. It needs a thorough reorganization." See Thomas C. Hodgson to Donnelly, November 21, 1866, in the Donnelly papers.

[1] Donnelly first sought a nomination at the hands of the democrats of his

standing ability and his long political experience, he felt that he could easily make himself the leader of the alliance members, and with their solid support he might hope to force the republicans, who had a majority in each house, to redeem their campaign pledges.[2] This would not only secure reform legislation, but it would also serve to discredit those alliance leaders who had planned another course.

Long before the legislature met Donnelly was hard at work on his plan to unite the farmer vote. Through an extensive correspondence carried on with his friends in various parts of the state he found out definitely the names of all the farmer members elected to the house of representatives, and all other members who might reasonably be expected to support the farmers' cause.[3] To these prospective followers he sent in due time a circular letter[4] in which he asked them to assemble at an appointed place and hour on the day before the opening of the legislative session. The object of the meeting he described to be the formation of a farmer organization with which to combat the "wily politicians." It might even be possible to agree on a farmers' candidate for speaker. Donnelly's overtures met with an immediate and favorable response.[5] The farmers only awaited a leader — they flocked willingly to his standard, applauded his propositions, and at their first gathering even agreed that it would be wise to meet from time to time during the session to decide in advance what their attitude toward newly proposed legislation would be.[6]

county, only to have his purpose thwarted by the local agents of the state democratic machine. But he was not to be denied. "By the use of money," he charged, "the Ring packed the caucus even in my own county, whereupon the people of the county, irrespective of party, nominated me for the lower house, and I was elected by nearly 500 majority, although $20,000 were spent in the county to compass my defeat." Donnelly to Secretary Lamar, January 1, 1889, Donnelly papers.

[2] "I have concluded that you are about right," Thomas C. Hodgson wrote to Donnelly early in the campaign. "The republicans ought to win. They have the platform and a thorough organization of the farmers will be able to compel enforcement of the provisions of that platform." September 30, 1886, Donnelly papers.

[3] Numerous letters in the Donnelly papers, November, December, 1886, substantiate these statements.

[4] Dated November 15, 1886, Donnelly papers.

[5] See, for example, a letter of C. G. Johnsrud to Donnelly, dated November 26, 1886, in the Donnelly papers.

[6] *Pioneer Press*, January 4, 1887.

With the legislature in session early in 1887 Donnelly speedily allied himself with the republicans. So great was their anxiety to please him that he might possibly have obtained the speakership had he so desired, but he preferred to elevate an aspiring young politician named William R. Merriam to that honor, and to receive in return an appointment as chairman of the all-important committee on railroads, and membership on the judiciary, educational, and grain and warehouse inspection committees. He thus became easily the most powerful man in the house.[7] "Never in the history of our state," wrote one observer, "has it been in the power of one man to do so much good . . . by leading the friends of Equal Rights in their battle against monopoly."[8]

But Donnelly's record in the lower house duplicated in entirely too many ways his earlier record in the senate. It would be wearisome and profitless to recount it. He championed every radical or sensational measure presented, and he himself introduced no less than fifty-seven bills, of which not more than one-third ever emerged even in highly amended form as laws.[9] Judged from any standpoint except that of the achievement of notoriety, his legislative record could not be termed a success. "Donnelly entered the legislature," one editor exclaimed, "with the confidence of a large following. He started out as a powerful leader, but he has shown a wonderful lack of real power or ability. . . . [He] is brilliant, but vain and impractical. He has some good ideas but ruins all by attempting to carry everything to the extreme and riding rough-shod over all opposition. He has tired and sickened the legislature with his verbosity, and has lost his following by the continued advocacy of impractical measures."[10]

It should be noted, however, that Donnelly's unpopularity was

[7] Hall, *Observations*, 224.

[8] John F. Ames to Donnelly, January 10, 1887, Donnelly papers.

[9] The *Labor Echo*, October 20, 1888, examines carefully Donnelly's legislative record. See also clipping dated October 18, 1888, in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 6. The most important of Donnelly's bills to become law granted wide powers of rate regulation to the state railway commission, but the United States supreme court declared it unconstitutional. Donnelly was ever afterward an implacable foe of the doctrine of judicial review. *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia*, 1890, p. 555; *Representative* (St. Paul), June 28, 1893.

[10] *Hastings Democrat*, March 10, 1887, quoting the *Owatonna Journal*. Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 6.

greater among the politicians than among the people. Those who had a grievance always knew that they had in him a champion. His friends attributed his failure to the desire of opponents to bury a man who "towered head and shoulders" above them in intellectual strength, and they steadfastly refused to regard him as "a political corpse."[11] Nor did Donnelly plan to eschew politics. To be sure, he occupied himself mainly in the months following this session with Shakespearean studies, and early in 1888 he went abroad, but he had in mind all the while to renew the fight for reform when the next legislature should convene.

No sooner had Donnelly returned from Europe than he found himself drawn precipitately into a new political movement. Labor leaders, with some farmer support, had conceived the idea of welding together the various organizations of workers into a new and powerful third party. In a national way this agitation found expression at Cincinnati in February, 1887, when delegates representing more than a dozen reform groups pooled their interests to form the union labor party.[12] During the summer of 1888 the movement took root in Minnesota. A conference of labor leaders, with the assent of a few alliance men, formed for the state what they were pleased to call the farm and labor party. Their platform embraced all the latest reform ideas, except on the tariff, where it was carefully trimmed to fit the new views which Donnelly was reputed to have brought back from Europe. And Donnelly, although he had just reached Minnesota, and was not fully informed as to the probable strength or weakness of the movement, was nominated for governor. With manifest hesitation he accepted the nomination, advising the delegates to "go back to their homes and talk the matter over" before deciding definitely that they wanted him to make the race.[13]

After a few weeks Donnelly virtually took the decision into his own hands, and withdrew his name. He had started out to make an energetic campaign, and had delivered several farm

[11] *St. Paul Globe,* March 7, 1887.

[12] *Pioneer Press,* February 24, 1887; *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia,* 1888, p. 778; Haynes, *Third party movements,* 206.

[13] *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia,* 1888, p. 559; *Minneapolis Tribune,* August 29, 1888; *Pioneer Press,* August 29, 1888; see also numerous clippings in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 6.

and labor speeches, but he soon discovered that he had back of him no organization worthy of the name. There was no money for campaign expenses, or even for the printing of ballots — a matter of great concern before the Australian system of voting was adopted. To contend with the old parties under such circumstances was to Donnelly's mind like "spitting against Niagara."[14] Also, he found that a large majority of the alliance men were as yet indifferent, or even hostile, to a definite third party program, preferring rather to work through one or the other of the older parties. Moreover, certain reasons of a more personal nature influenced him to withdraw. He wished to return to the state legislature "to carry out the legislation which had failed two years ago," and if he ran for governor he could not well run for state representative at the same time. His enemies observed, too, that he had his eye fixed on a seat in the United States senate, and he would be in a better position to push his candidacy for that post as a member of the state house of representatives than as the defeated champion of a lost cause.[15]

After his withdrawal Donnelly came out openly in favor of the republican ticket, and campaigned actively for it all over the state. Under the circumstances this attitude was not surprising. Nationally, the republican stand in favor of a protective tariff suited his newly acquired views perfectly.[16] Locally, the republicans pleased him in many ways. They had recognized his ability by allowing him high committee appointments in the last legislature; they had permitted him to appear before their state convention and to address that body, even while he was a candidate for governor on the farm and labor ticket; most of all, they had nominated his portégé, Merriam, for the governorship. Nor is it likely that these actions were unaccompanied by flattering promises, which were never intended to be kept.[17]

[14] *St. Paul Dispatch,* October 11, 1888; *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia,* 1888, p. 559; Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 6.

[15] Clippings dated October, 1888, in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 6.

[16] See *ante,* 103.

[17] *St. Paul Dispatch,* October 11, 1888; *Minneapolis Journal,* September 29, 1888; *Pioncer Press,* October 22, 1888. Donnelly said later that if the farm and labor party had not placed him in nomination he would have gone into the republican state convention to vote for Merriam. But he disliked to desert his friends. *Pioneer Press,* October 12, 1888.

Donnelly's withdrawal probably benefited the republicans, for they won easily, but it brought him small reward. He lost his seat in the legislature by a margin of less than a hundred votes;[18] he commanded the support of only a handful of alliance men in his race for the United States senate;[19] and he was ever afterwards regarded by those who had organized the farm and labor party as a traitor to "the cause." This campaign did much, also, to increase the number of those who held that Donnelly was primarily a place-seeker and a turncoat who would willingly adopt any means or serve under any banner to advance himself politically.[20]

Donnelly did not wholly merit this reputation. He was always easily flattered and easily duped. No doubt he believed sincerely that in lending his support to the republicans he was doing the best thing possible for "the people," for whose welfare he had a real and lasting passion. "You must be independent of political parties," he told a Minneapolis audience during the campaign, "and yet ready to use them when it is to your advantage. Parties represent colossal masses of unreasoning votes; when you can compel a political party to fight your battles, you force all this horde of barbarians into the column that defends you. It is sometimes easier to correct a party than a people. A compact minority, wisely balancing itself and holding itself calmly together, amid the clamors of howling armies and mercenaries, can throw itself into either side, and eventually decide the conflict, and carry off the fruits of the victory."[21]

Deprived of his legislative prominence, and balked in his senatorial ambitions, Donnelly turned his attention in 1889 and 1890 to the further building up of the Farmers' alliance.[22] He accepted the post of state lecturer, and with an able force of

[18] *St. Paul Globe,* November 17, 1888.

[19] *Pioneer Press,* January 12, 18, 1889. Donnelly was the populist candidate in 1895 for the United States senatorship, but failed then as ignominiously as in 1889. In both cases it seems that he really thought that he might be chosen.

[20] Donnelly's connection with the farm and labor party is explained, and his course defended, in the *Great West,* February 21, May 23, 1890.

[21] Address delivered in Minneapolis, September 29, 1888, and reported in the *Minneapolis Tribune,* September 30, 1888. See also Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 6.

[22] The *Great West,* a radical weekly newspaper edited by Dr. Everett W. Fish, gave great attention to Donnelly's activities, and furnished him valuable support. If not so in name, it was in fact the official alliance sheet. The first issue was published October 18, 1889.

deputies he began to spread alliance principles with a vigor never known before. Conditions favored his work. Whatever the prosperity of other classes during the eighties, the lot of the farmer grew steadily more unendurable. Even abundant harvests of grain seemed only to glut the markets, and to depress the value of cereal products until the grower was fortunate indeed if he realized more than the bare cost of production. Mortgages were universal and interest rates high.[23] Donnelly and his lieutenants so skillfully played upon the farmers' misfortunes that the new alliance chapters in the state began to be numbered by the scores and hundreds. In 1890 it was printed on the official alliance stationery that "During the year preceding the annual meeting of March 4, 1890, 235 new alliances were formed; and nearly 800 in all appeared on the roll of the State Alliance. Within one month after the annual meeting of 1890 nearly 100 new Alliances have been organized and the cry is 'still they come.' We hope to have 1000 . . . by the middle of the year."[24]

Since Donnelly was undoubtedly more responsible for these results than any other man in Minnesota, many of his friends urged that he be elevated to the presidency of the state alliance as a fit and proper reward. They felt too, as one editor said, that "The men now at the head of this organization are not competent to lead this army to victory, and they must give place to men who are equal to the emergency."[25] Probably Donnelly concurred fully in the view that the time had come when it would be the part of wisdom to give him full control. He knew his own competence, and was willing to do his part.

At the annual meeting of the state alliance in March, 1890, Donnelly's friends presented his name for the office of president, no doubt confidently expecting the triumph of their favorite. But the anti-Donnelly forces had also been active, and had agreed upon an opposition candidate, R. J. Hall, who defeated Donnelly by a few votes.[26] It was urged successfully that Don-

[23] *Nation*, 50:269, 329; *Pioneer Press*, February 2, 1888, March 6, 1890; Buck, *The agrarian crusade*, chapter 7.

[24] Abundant in the Donnelly papers, June, July, 1890.

[25] *Great West*, March 7, 1890.

[26] *St. Paul News*, March 6, 1890; *Great West*, March 7, 1890; *Pioneer Press*, March 7, 1890.

nelly was too conspicuous as a politician to head the alliance, and that he was in too close fellowship with the republicans. He opened himself to the latter charge when he smoothed the way for his friend Merriam, then governor, to deliver before the convention a low-tariff speech calculated to win alliance support for the republican ticket when the governor should be a candidate for reëlection in the fall.[27] Nevertheless, Donnelly's influence in the convention was great. He was allowed to revise the alliance constitution, to state in a lengthy platform of principles the political views of the convention, and by a unanimous vote to retain his position as state lecturer and organizer.[28]

Earlier, even, than the March convention there was a strong movement under way in favor of the transformation of the alliance into an independent political party. Its size and continued growth both suggested and made feasible such a project. Indeed, if the farmers could only be persuaded to stand solidly together, as now it seemed they might, they could outvote all other classes, and could take control of the government of the state. And, since the alliance program called for reform through legislation — legislation which the older parties had seen fit, for the most part, to deny — the logic of the situation seemed to call for the nomination and election in 1890 of a straight alliance ticket, which would put into effect without delay the reforms which the farmers demanded. The circumstances were carefully considered during the March convention, but it was finally decided to leave to the discretion of the executive committee, composed of all the state officers, the calling of a nominating convention to place a third party ticket in the field.[29]

Strangely enough, Donnelly was not especially pleased with this turn of affairs. No one believed more steadfastly in alliance principles than did he, and no one had worked more earnestly to make the alliance a success, but when independent political action was suggested he demurred. Perhaps he felt that the

[27] *St. Paul News,* March 6, 1890; *Pioneer Press,* March 5, 1890. The speeches of Donnelly and Merriam before the convention are published in full in the *Great West,* March 14, 1890.

[28] *Minneapolis Journal,* March 7, 1890; *St. Paul News,* March 7, 1890; *Pioneer Press,* March 7, 1890.

[29] *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia,* 1890, p. 299; *Nation,* 51: 42; *St. Paul Globe,* March 7, 1890.

possibilities of coöperation with the republicans had not yet been exhausted, as his course in presenting Governor Merriam to the March convention seemed to indicate. Or, perhaps he believed that the movement among the rank and file was not yet strong enough to warrant the leaders to proceed.[30] No man ever learned less from experience than did Donnelly, yet he could hardly have been wholly blind to the failures which had overtaken him in the past when he had attempted to lead without a ready band of followers behind him.

Whatever Donnelly may have thought, the demand for a straight alliance ticket was irresistible. The March convention had scarcely adjourned before the local chapters began to be heard from on the subject. So insistently did they urge that the alliance "go into politics" that even Donnelly was convinced, and at length joined with the other members of the executive committee to call the desired convention for July 16, 1890.[31]

But Donnelly's tardiness in responding to popular desire cost him the alliance nomination for governor — a nomination to which it would seem that his life-long labors for reform had entitled him. His enemies charged him with insincerity, and pointed to his record in 1888, when he had withdrawn from the farm and labor ticket in favor of Merriam. To nominate Donnelly in 1890, they said, would be to turn the alliance over to the republicans.[32] And they won converts by their talk. This nettled Donnelly. "I came here," he told the delegates to the July convention, "with the intention of absolutely refusing to permit my name to be used in this convention, but I tell you this: If it is the sense of this body, with anything like unanimity, that I should lead your cause . . . I am ready to raise your banner aloft and carry it, my friends, so help me God, until the sun goes down on the day of election."[33] After repeated balloting, however, it was found impossible to nominate Donnelly, and S. M. Owen, the editor of a Minneapolis farm journal, was selected to head the ticket. Donnelly was not even permitted

[30] *St. Paul News*, June 17, 1890; *Great West*, June 20, 1890; *St. Paul Globe*, July 1, 1890.

[31] *St. Paul Dispatch*, June 16, 17, 1890; *St. Paul Globe*, July 1, 1890; *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia*, 1890, p. 556; Smalley, *History of the republican party*, 232.

[32] *St. Paul Globe*, July 2, 11, 17, 18, 1890; *Minneapolis Journal*, July 18, 1890; *St. Paul News*, July 18, 1890.

[33] *St. Paul Globe*, July 18, 1890.

to write the platform upon which the alliance candidates should stand.[34]

The results of the election of 1890 revealed how vast were the possibilities of the new movement. Donnelly was convinced that the farmers would have won had he only headed their ticket. As it was, Owen polled 58,514 votes to 85,844 for Wilson, the democratic candidate, and 88,111 for Merriam. The Farmers' alliance and democrats had nominated the same man for the office of state auditor, and he was of course elected by an overwhelming majority. Because of the alliance defection the republicans lost to the democrats every congressional district in the state but one, while the alliance elected enough members of the legislature to hold the balance of power in each house. It sent Donnelly to the state senate in spite of the active opposition of both the old parties.[35]

With the movement assuming such proportions Donnelly began to feel more than ever aggrieved that he who had laid the foundation for all this success should occupy in it only a secondary position. More than that, those highest in authority sought to discredit him with the alliance hosts — even to brand him as one who had planned to betray the cause. During the summer of 1890 he had actually been told by President Hall that his presence at a certain alliance gathering was not desired! "I would not go through another year like the last for all the gold in Golconda," he wrote to a friend. "Every meeting of the Executive Committee was a battle. Whatever I proposed for the good of the order was opposed by Hall because I proposed it."[36] Donnelly resolved that nothing short of his triumphant election to the presidency of the alliance would be an adequate vindication of the course he had pursued. "I have determined," he said in a circular letter issued to the alliance, "— putting all modesty aside — to present to you my own name for the office of President . . . If you have faith in me; if you believe that for a quarter of a century I have fought the battles

[34] *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia,* 1890, p. 556; *Minneapolis Tribune,* July 18, 1890; *Great West,* July 25, 1890; *St. Paul News,* July 18, 1890.

[35] *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia,* 1890, p. 557; Smalley, *History of the republican party,* 236; Fish, *Donnelliana,* 83; *Great West,* November 14, December 5, 1890.

[36] Donnelly letter books, 5: 289, in the possession of the Minnesota historical society.

of the people, without a shade of variation or turning; if you believe that the railroad corporations of this state have not money enough to buy me to desert the cause of the people . . . then I ask you to support me."[37] By appealing over the heads of the leaders to the actual farmers who furnished the votes Donnelly easily secured a large majority of the delegates to the next alliance convention pledged to support his candidacy. In December, 1890, he received the office which he coveted,[38] and during the four years he held it Donnelly and the Minnesota alliance became practically interchangeable terms.

An additional reason why Donnelly had fought so hard to secure the presidency of the alliance was that he believed the office would enable him to speak more authoritatively on alliance matters when he should again take his place in the state legislature. There he hoped to combine the alliance forces with either democrats or republicans in order once again to fight for the farmers' program of reform.[39] In this, as usual, he fell far short of success. He was able to bring about a temporary fusion with the democrats, and to agree upon certain plans for legislation, but in the long run his legislative activities in 1891 were no more productive of results than his previous efforts in the same direction. It was not without reason that a St. Paul paper declared at the end of the session that "No man on the floor of either house did as much as Ignatius Donnelly to prevent the enactment of wise and needed laws. He was not the author of a single constructive measure of any value . . . and by his endless chattering, his buffoonery, his appeals to the gallery, he frittered away the golden hours in which something might have been achieved."[40]

Meanwhile certain preliminary steps had been taken toward the formation of a nation-wide party of the people. In December, 1889, a national labor congress, representing the various Farmers' alliances, Agricultural wheels, Knights of labor, and kindred organizations, met in St. Louis, and though effecting no organic union they joined in the adoption of a set of demands not far

[37] *Great West*, December 5, 1890.

[38] *St. Paul News*, December 31, 1890.

[39] Donnelly letter books, 4: 196.

[40] *St. Paul Globe*, April 29, 1891. Volume 8 of the Donnelly scrapbooks contains a wealth of material on the activities of this session.

different from those eventually incorporated into the famous Omaha platform of the people's party. The growing feeling of fraternity among all members of the working classes was still further attested by a great gathering of alliance and labor forces at Ocala, Florida, in November, 1890, where much the same program of reform was proclaimed. In the elections of 1890 the state alliances very generally went into politics, and with the help of labor votes they won such success that they held a third convention in Cincinnati in May, 1891, and definitely determined to launch a new political party.[41]

By the time of the Cincinnati convention Donnelly was in full control of the alliance movement in Minnesota, and ready to lend his influence to the creation of a national organization. He led the Minnesota delegation to Cincinnati, and took an active part — perhaps the most active part — in the proceedings of the convention. He brought himself to the fore in an early session by a motion which, if adopted, would have committed the convention at the outset to the third party idea. He was opposed by Weaver of Iowa, who favored a more deliberate course, and the motion failed. But if Donnelly's action was a trifle premature it was nevertheless in line with the sentiment of the great majority of the delegates, who followed only a few days later the course he had suggested.[42]

Donnelly figured also as chairman of the committee on resolutions at Cincinnati, and he acquitted himself in this capacity with such skill that a place on the platform committee of people's party conventions was thereafter regarded as his by a sort of vested right. This accounts in no small part for the fact that the manifold criticisms aimed at the populist movement seldom struck at the English of its platforms. At Cincinnati Donnelly cut the Gordian knot of dissension among the reform forces by

[41] *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia,* 1890, p. 299; Haynes, *Third party movements,* 230; Frank L. McVey, *The populist movement* (American economic association, *Economic studies,* volume 1, number 3 — New York, 1896), 138; Buck, *The agrarian crusade,* 140.

[42] *Pioneer Press,* May 20, 1891. That Donnelly's course attracted wide attention is shown by the numerous clippings in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 8, dated *circa* May 21, 1890. He claimed later that he originated the scheme of a people's party and carried it through the Cincinnati convention in 1891. *Pioneer Press,* August 29, 1894. Occasional handbills in his papers refer to him as the "father of the Populist party."

these magic words: "We are not here so much to proclaim a creed as to erect a banner under which the marching hosts of reform can rally." The resolutions carefully evaded all controversial material. "We believe," said Donnelly, "that the party that, in such a crisis as this, shortens its platforms, lengthens its muster roll."[43]

Though the Cincinnati decision insured the formation of a third party, it was thought desirable to come into agreement with another convention called for St. Louis, February 22, 1892, before nominations should be considered. Representatives from twenty-two different labor, alliance, and reform organizations composed the St. Louis conference, and sought earnestly to find some common ground upon which all could stand. Donnelly was the man of the hour. His knowledge of parliamentary law enabled him to smooth out many of the tangles in which the convention became enmeshed; when tendencies toward acidity developed he kept the delegates in good humor by his wit and oratory; and as a member of the platform committee he again lifted up the banner of reform.[44] The resolutions committee reported both a preamble and a platform. The preamble was written entirely by Donnelly, read by him before the conference to the accompaniment of tumultuous applause, and to this day it remains the most famous document in populist history. Reproducing the argument of *Cæsar's column*, it pointed to the condition of the country and of the world in justification of the new movement. "A vast conspiracy against mankind" was envisaged, which only the intelligent coöperation of the working classes could overthrow. Failure to accomplish this end would bring the nation face to face with "terrible social convulsions, the destruction of civilization, or the establishment of an absolute despotism." With this challenge ringing in their ears the delegates adjourned, having made provision for another convention to meet at Omaha, Nebraska, July 4, 1892, to make nominations.[45]

[43] Clipping from a Cincinnati paper, dated May 21, 1891, in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 8.

[44] McVey, *Populist movement*, 140; *St. Paul Globe*, February 25, 1892; *Pioneer Press*, February 25, 1892. Numerous clippings from St. Louis papers are preserved in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 11.

[45] The preamble read by Donnelly at St. Louis differs in some details from the

Donnelly of course played an important part in the proceedings at Omaha. He was repeatedly talked of as the candidate of the new party for the presidency, but his many idiosyncracies were so many disqualifications, and it was realized that his nomination would have been as great a mistake as was the nomination of Greeley in 1872. No one wished to deny him a place on the platform committee, however, and his success in that capacity at St. Louis was repeated at Omaha. Probably the Omaha platform, nine-tenths of which Donnelly claimed to have written, expressed his political views better than any other single document. It demanded government ownership and control of the railroads, with appointments to railroad offices to be made "under a civil service regulation of the most rigid character"; "a national currency, safe, sound and flexible" to be distributed

preamble of the Omaha platform. Following is Donnelly's original version of that familiar document:

"The conditions which surround us justify our co-operation. We meet in the midst of a nation brought to the verge of moral, political and material ruin. Corruption dominates the ballot box, the Legislatures, the Congress, and touches even the ermine of the Bench. The people are demoralized. Many of the states have been compelled to isolate the voters at the polling places in order to prevent universal intimidation or bribery. The newspapers are subsidized or muzzled, public opinion silenced, business prostrated, our homes covered with mortgages, labor impoverished, and the land concentrating in the hands of capitalists. The urban workmen are denied the right of organization for self-protection; imported pauperized labor beats down their wages, a hireling standing army, unrecognized by our laws, is established to shoot them down, and they are rapidly degenerating to European conditions. The fruits of the toil of millions are boldly stolen to build up collosal fortunes, unprecedented in the history of mankind and the possessors of these in turn despise the republic and endanger liberty. From the same prolific womb of governmental injustice we breed the two classes — tramps and millionaires. The national power to create money is appropriated to enrich bondholders; silver, which has been accepted as coin since the dawn of history, has been demonetized to add to the purchasing power of gold by decreasing the value of all forms of property as well as human labor; and the supply of currency is purposely abridged to fatten usurers, bankrupt enterprise, and enslave industry. A vast conspiracy against mankind has been organized on two continents, and is taking possession of the world. If not met and overthrown it forbodes terrible social convulsions, the destruction of civilization, or the establishment of an absolute despotism. In this crisis of human affairs the intelligent working people and producers of the United States have come together, in the name of peace, order and society to defend liberty, property and justice. We desire our union and independence. We assert our purpose to vote with the political organization which represents our principles."

Printed in the *Great West*, March 4, 1892. The *Pioneer Press*, February 25, 1892, recognized in these phrases a "stereotyped Donnellian wail of woe."

direct to the people; the free and unlimited coinage of silver at the ratio of sixteen to one; a graduated income tax; retrenchment in governmental expenditures; postal savings banks; prohibition of land monopoly; and the reclamation by the government for the use of actual settlers of all railroad and alien owned lands. This program of reform, however, was to Donnelly and the true populist secondary in importance to wrenching the government from the control of the plutocrats and placing it in the hands of the people. The preamble, which Donnelly left virtually as he had read it at St. Louis, better than the actual resolutions expressed the populist views, and when Donnelly again presented his arraignment of modern society the delegates staged a demonstration which blocked all proceedings for twenty-five minutes.[46]

The campaign of 1892 marks the climax of Donnelly's career. Everyone acclaimed him, his oratory, and his platforms. The great cause of reform for which he had battled so long seemed to be on the way to certain success. He found himself one of the foremost of a magnificent and genuine party of the people. "There is not in this gathering," he boasted at Omaha, "a single president of a railroad company, there is not a single representative of any of the rings which are robbing and sucking the life blood out of this American people."[47] He looked forward confidently to a new alignment of party forces. "I should not be surprised," he declared, "before the end of this campaign to see but two parties in the country, one representing Wall Street . . . and the other the great toiling masses of the American people."[48]

Returning to Minnesota after these outside triumphs, Donnelly won new laurels. He crushed with unaccustomed ease a revolt against his leadership of the reform forces of the state;[49] he led the Minnesota alliance almost to a man into the ranks of the new people's party; and he secured for himself the populist

[46] *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia,* 1892, pp. 421, 753; *Great West,* July 8, 15, 1892. Numerous clippings from Omaha papers, and other cosmopolitan dailies, are to be found in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 13.

[47] *St. Paul Globe,* July 3, 1892.

[48] Clipping from the *Sioux City Journal,* July 8, 1892, in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 13.

[49] *St. Paul Globe,* July 7, 8, 1892; Smalley, *History of the republican party,* 238.

nomination for governor, and for his friends minor places on the reform ticket. He was now a real party "boss."[50]

That his party would win, at least in Minnesota, Donnelly never seemed to doubt. So confident was he of success that he spurned all suggestions of fusion with the democrats,[51] and declared that the new party without help could poll not less than 100,000 votes, many more than enough to win. He was not even discouraged by the republican nomination of Knute Nelson, reputed to be the strongest vote-getter in the state. Despite his sixty odd years Donnelly carried the gospel of populism personally to every corner of the state. His vitality was remarkable On the eve of election he declared that since his nomination he had made one hundred and forty speeches, had written a book, and had gained two pounds in flesh.[52]

The election results were deeply disappointing to Donnelly. They showed, he said, "that the People's party afforded no promise of reward for me or any other man." Instead of an easy first he found himself a poor third in the race, and his vote fell nearly 20,000 short of the vote which the alliance candidate had polled two years before. Donnelly clearly was not responsible for this slump, for he ran about 10,000 votes ahead of Weaver, and probably made a better showing than any other populist could have made in Minnesota that year.[53] But there was scant comfort in this. His personal ambitions were crushed —even if the forces of reform should one day triumph, the event lay so far in the future that he might not hope to participate in the fruits of victory. Ultimate triumph for the cause seemed itself uncertain, and the pessimism of *Cæsar's column* settled down on its author anew. He was never quite the same man again.

Donnelly's changed attitude was in no way more evident than in his conduct during the next session of the state legislature. Instead of the turbulent figure he had always been before he

[50] *St. Paul News,* July 15, 1892; *Minneapolis Tribune,* July 15, 1892; *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia,* 1892, p. 470.

[51] *Pioneer Press,* August 11, 20, 1892. The populists, Donnelly explained later, selected two democrats for supreme court justices because they had no lawyers of their own, and the democrats in return for this favor indorsed four populist electors, but fusion went no further than this. *Representative,* April 19, 1893.

[52] *St. Paul Globe,* November 6, 1892; *Minneapolis Tribune,* November 8, 1892.

[53] *Minnesota historical collections,* 13:338.

now became a sober and sensible legislator, interesting himself, actively in remedying defective bills, in supporting good ones and opposing bad ones, but showing little of the old time disposition to monopolize the session in the interest of his own measures.[54] "I yield to the judgment of the people," he said, "for the excellent reason that I cannot help myself, and I have no desire to make a factious opposition to the will of the people as expressed at the ballot-box. . . . I do not expect to be a candidate again for any other office, and at the end of the session I want to separate from all members of the senate on terms of kindness and good will."[55] During this period Donnelly began two important works of investigation. He uncovered a series of pine lands frauds by which the state lost payment for thousands of dollars worth of pine cut from the state school lands,[56] and he was chiefly instrumental also in revealing the existence in the northwest of a "coal combine," which effectually controlled the retail price of coal, and maintained it at a high figure.[57]

But Donnelly found it entirely impossible to abandon the habits of a lifetime. An agitator he had always been; an agitator he always would be. Once more he ventured into the journalistic field. During the campaign of 1892 he had quarreled with Dr. Fish, whose conduct as editor of a radical weekly called the *Great West* had displeased him, and now he decided to establish a rival newspaper. The *Representative,* an official organ of the populist party in Minnesota, was the result. For each issue of this journal Donnelly wrote a page of spicy editorials, in which he fairly excelled himself as a flayer of men and measures opposed to the welfare of the "masses," whom he had made it his life work to defend. In form and content the *Representative* much resembled the *Anti-Monopolist* of earlier years.[58]

Donnelly also continued to express populist views from the

[54] Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 15.

[55] *Pioneer Press,* December 16, 1892.

[56] *Report of the pine land investigation committee to the governor of Minnesota. Filed with the governor December 21, 1894* (St. Paul, 1895).

[57] *Pioneer Press,* March 24, 1893. Following this investigation Governor Nelson, on Donnelly's advice, called an antimonopoly convention to meet in Chicago, June 5, 1893. Delegates representing thirteen states attended, and passed anti-trust resolutions. Donnelly and a few followers, mostly populists, bolted the convention because the resolutions were not radical enough. *Representative,* June 7, 1893.

[58] The first number of the *Representative* was published April 19, 1893.

forum. The hard times following the panic of 1893 created a great demand for the type of oratory in which he excelled, and audiences of jobless workmen greeted with boisterous approval his denunciations of the soulless corporations that had deprived labor of the right to work, and of the supine government which refused to come to its relief. But Donnelly was always careful not to counsel unlawful measures. "The remedy," he told a mass meeting of the unemployed in St. Paul, "is not to be found in violence. . . . Those who invite outbreaks hate the laboring man."[59] "In this country," he said in a labor day speech at Anaconda, Montana, "where the ballot-box stands open, and the majority governs, if the . . . people . . . are robbed of their liberties and reduced to serfdom, no one is to blame but themselves. . . . When the majority acting through the ballot box cannot preserve their liberties, then it will be time to talk about armed revolution." But he was quick to warn statesmen of the volcano upon which they stood: "We are all of us profoundly impressed with the conviction that if some change does not take place in public affairs there will be not only political revolution but physical revolution. The masses to-day through all mining and manufacturing regions are held in check and obedience by dread of rifles and Gatling guns. As the pressure of wretchedness increases this fear may pass away, and when it does where will our country be?"[60]

Donnelly kept out of politics fairly well until 1896, interesting himself, however, in free silver, the panacea to which most of the reformers of the period trusted. As early as 1876 he had denounced the demonetization of silver, and whenever he alluded to the subject thereafter it was to defend free coinage as a fitting means of increasing the money supply. He believed that the country was growing at such a rate that the volume of currency needed to be increased. "If gold and silver cannot be issued in sufficient volume," he said, "by all means let us have paper money."[61]

While Donnelly was too great an opportunist to omit to take

[59] *Representative,* August 30, 1893; *St. Paul Globe,* August 27, 1893.

[60] Clipping from the *Anaconda Standard* (Montana), September 6, 1893, in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 14; *Penny Press* (Minneapolis), June 8, 1894.

[61] *Anti-Monopolist,* November 9, 1876; clipping from the *Cincinnati Enquirer,* May 16, 1891, in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 8.

advantage of the wave of passion for free silver, he never considered that item the central feature of the populist program. "The silver question is but an incident in the great struggle that covers the world," he declared.[62] Even when he wrote a book called *The American people's money,* it proved to be a better defense of paper money than of silver, and it included between its covers arguments favoring all the reforms for which Donnelly stood. After the campaign of 1896 was over he characterized free silver as a "single temporary side issue," and declared that "bi-metalism was tolerated by us only as the lesser of two evils." "Scientific paper money, irredeemable, based on the credit and wealth of the nation, issued and its volume controlled by the nation without the intervention of banks is the populist ideal money."[63]

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that Donnelly looked askance at the populist fusion with the democrats in 1896. It appeared to him to be a selling out of all the other and more vital principles of populism in the hope of obtaining a single insignificant reform. He earnestly desired that the populist party should preserve its separate identity, and remain faithful to the full program of the Omaha platform. Of the reforming ardor of the democrats he had grave doubts.[64]

As a matter of fact fusion was no part of the original populist program in 1896. The people's party convention that year was purposely timed to meet later than the republican and democratic conventions in the expectation that the "gold-bugs" would capture both the old organizations. The free silver elements of the old parties could then be induced to coöperate in the naming of a satisfactory third party ticket, and with the forces of "plutocracy" divided, the chances of the "masses" would be good.[65] Donnelly dreamed that the populist nomina-

[62] *Pioneer Press,* August 2, 1893. "There is no doubt," he said, "that both gold and silver should be discarded, and an international legal tender paper money established; but that is a vast reformation the world is not yet ready for; — the greater part of mankind have never yet heard of it." *Representative,* August 2, 1893.

[63] *Representative,* November 23, 1898.

[64] *Ibid.,* July 29, 1896; Haynes, *Third party movements,* 291; McVey, *Populist movement,* 182.

[65] Henry D. Lloyd, "The populists at St. Louis," in the *Review of reviews,* 14:300. "Our convention never should have been postponed until after those of the old

tion would come to him. When, however, the free-silverites captured the Chicago convention and named Bryan, the whole scheme was thwarted, and even Donnelly acquiesced apparently in the general populist determination to join with the democrats. In fact, the political views of the democratic candidate so closely accorded with Donnelly's that in later years the witty Irishman remarked that "Had there been no People's Party Mr. Bryan would never have been a presidential candidate. We put him to school and he wound up by stealing the school-books."[66]

At the populist convention, however, Donnelly found his own name still mentioned for the presidency by those most hostile to fusion, now called the "middle-of-the-roaders." Immediately his old ambitions soared and he wished to see his candidacy pushed before the convention. But several of his enemies were among the Minnesota delegates, and they chose to obtain sweet revenge for the many defeats he had administered to them in previous years. They refused him his accustomed place on the platform committee, they rejected his selections for national committeemen, and they ignored his prospective candidacy for the presidential nomination.[67] The Donnelly boom forthwith collapsed, and Donnelly came home to Minnesota more disappointed, and more broken in spirit, than he ever had been before. "Our soul is weary of this whole business," he mourned. "We shall retire to our library. . . . In the domain of literature we have a realm of our own." "If we had nominated our own candidate in July and made our own campaign, we should have polled five million votes and McKinley would have been defeated." By what process of reasoning he arrived at this conclusion, it is not easy to see.[68]

Donnelly supported Bryan in 1896, but his subsequent career

parties with the object of catching the crumbs that might fall from the tables," a correspondent wrote to "Calamity" Weller of Iowa, July 26, 1896, in the Weller papers, in the possession of the Wisconsin historical society.

[66] *Representative,* September 28, 1898. See also files of the same paper for the weeks before the July convention, and Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 18.

[67] *Minneapolis Journal,* July 22, 1896; Donnelly scrapbooks, 18: 83, 109, 113, 161.

[68] *Representative,* July 29, 1896; December 1, 1897. In spite of his determination to retire to his library Donnelly served in the state legislature in the session of 1897, and refused to run for reëlection in 1898 only because he had that year decided to be a candidate for vice-president on the middle-of-the-road ticket in 1900. *Representative,* October 5, 12, 1898.

was chiefly devoted to an unsuccessful attempt to rescue populism from the devouring jaws of a silver democracy. He placed himself at the head of a small but resolute minority, who resisted all further temptations to fusion, and avowed the belief that plutocracy could be overthrown only by a party "created expressly to fight plutocracy and which has no plutocratic element in its ranks."[69] Anxious lest the mistakes of 1896 be repeated in 1900 these middle-of-the-roaders held a convention in Cincinnati as early as 1898 to determine on a course of action. They decided in favor of immediate nominations, and they accepted a platform which the practiced Donnelly himself had written — a platform as rhetorical and impassioned as the Omaha platform of 1892. "The People's Party," it said, "was born to live and not to die. It has done more for mankind in five years than any other party has accomplished in twenty-five years. . . . We implore our fellow citizens to unite with us in one grand effort to build up a reform party that will liberate mankind." Donnelly received the vice presidential nomination, was indorsed for the same position by another convention held in 1900, and in pursuit of that office he made his last campaign. He died on the first day of the twentieth century.[70]

At the time of his death Donnelly was probably the most widely known man in Minnesota. He had addressed audiences in practically every town of the state, not once or twice but repeatedly. Everyone recognized his short, plump figure, his monkish, smooth-shaven face, his tawny hair, and his genial smile. Outside of politics people liked him, and his neighbors rarely deserted him even at the ballot-box. He knew how to be entertaining and agreeable, and utterly unpretentious even in the most ordinary society. He delighted above all to show his hospitality to the many guests who came bidden or unbidden to his home in Nininger. As a conversationalist few men have excelled him.

No one ever denied Donnelly's oratorical skill. "The expression of his face, his gestures and the very pose of the man inter-

[69] *Representative*, December 1, 1897, September 14, 1898.

[70] The proceedings of this convention and the platform which it adopted are given in full in the *Representative*, September 14, 1898. A short biography of Donnelly is printed in *Appletons' annual cyclopaedia*, 1901, p. 421.

ested the audience nearly as much as his words.'"[71] He was "the darling of the crowd, sparkling, wayward, and incalculable. He seemed to possess the whole wide gamut of expression and emotion.'"[72] "His sarcasm and withering scorn when he is aroused and angered annihilates opposition. He can laugh an opponent 'out of court' by a humorous story. He can convulse an audience with merriment and the next moment send them into tears."[73] It is said that he was like Wilkin Micawber in the use of language—"flowery and profuse." As one critic puts it, "He makes a social cataclysm out of a very small tea party."[74] This is in a measure true. Nor did his orations show great profundity of thought—he was at his best in unsparing denunciation or encomium. His argumentative triumphs were won by reasoning which was adroit and clever, but usually full of sophistry. No one could more easily make the worse appear the better reason, and apparently no one delighted more in doing so. He possessed remarkable facility in the use of statistics for this purpose, and could fairly breathe into dull figures the breath of life. Audiences listened to his deductions with interest, and almost invariably with temporary conviction.[75]

It was his jokes and witticisms that won for Donnelly the applause of the crowd. He seemed to know all the old, reliable stories, and he recited them with telling effect to illustrate his points. "Wit is the sudden juxta-position of incongruous ideas," he once declared. "Surprise is the essence of wit."[76] Yet it mattered little how familiar were the stories Donnelly told, for it was his way of telling them that made them take. On one occasion he was engaged in a debate with a speaker who related many anecdotes supposed to be amusing, but told them so badly that they failed to interest the audience. When the "sage" took the floor to reply he abandoned all pretense of argument, and

[71] *Representative,* September 28, 1898.

[72] *Minnesota historical collections,* 13:340.

[73] Clipping from *Lincoln Journal* (Nebraska), January 8, 1891, in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 8.

[74] *Pioneer Press,* December 3, 1890.

[75] Donnelly's oratory paid him well. Writing to Weller of Iowa, July 6, 1891, he stated that he received $100 and expenses for lectures on literary subjects, but he added: "I do not like to charge for political speeches, for they are with me a 'labor of love.'" Weller papers.

[76] Clipping dated November 14, 1888, in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 8.

merely told over again the stories which the preceding speaker had bungled. Needless to say, he brought down the house. His wit was quick as a flash. Once when bombarded with cabbages during a speech he shouted: "Gentlemen, lend me your ears — I don't want your heads." Just after his defeat for governor in 1892 he addressed a St. Paul audience which had been very impatient for him to take the platform. "Judging from this enthusiastic reception," he began, "I would appear to be the most popular man in the state of Minnesota —" "You are, you are," yelled the crowd; and Mr. Donnelly added, "between elections."[77] He delighted in replying to hecklers, and unless blinded by sudden anger he seldom failed to confuse them. "When you retort to your enemies with a smile on your face," he was told by one of his friends, "in your jovial, half-sarcastic way . . . you have a wonderfully strong and drawing power on your hearers which brings them to your side in droves, and utterly disarms your enemies . . . when you allow yourself to get angry and a cloud gathers on your brow like the cloud around Vesuvius on the last day of Pompeii . . . it frightens people from you."[78]

But it was the fighting instinct which, after all, was Donnelly's most outstanding characteristic. He fairly gloried in combat, and neglected few opportunities to place himself in the thick of the fray. More than this, to use his own rather inelegant phrase, he always chose to espouse "the cause of the so-called under dog in the fight."[79] He loved not merely to fight, but to fight against odds. His political career is the story of one contest after another. He became a republican to fight slavery; he became an antimonopolist to fight the railways and their allies; he became a greenbacker to fight what he called the "money power"; he became a populist to fight the "plutocracy" in whatever form it raised its head. The underlying motive of his literary labor is this same undying spirit of pugnacity. He fought traditional views in his *Atlantis,* his *Ragnarok,* his *Cryptogram,* his *Cæsar's column,* and all the rest. His passion for

[77] Pegler, "Stories of Ignatius Donnelly," in the *Minneapolis Tribune,* January 6, 1901.

[78] C. P. Carpenter to Donnelly, December 19, 1890, Donnelly papers.

[79] Clipping from the *Milwaukee Sentinel,* March, 1894, in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 16.

battle entered even into his personal relationships. He was repeatedly embroiled with his creditors; he gained endless notoriety by a great libel suit which he brought in 1891 against the leading newspaper in St. Paul;[80] he rejected the tenets of the Roman Catholic church to which he was bound by every natural tie, only to accept in his declining years the vagaries of spiritualism; and he defied public opinion by wedding, when he was nearly sixty-six years of age, a young woman of twenty-one. Said a contemporary critic, "Men like Donnelly have a constitutional aversion for anything which is established or has public sanction. Donnelly is opposed to existing parties for the same reason that he attacks Shakespeare. It is his nature to insist on combating the majority. His career proves him the prince of cranks, ready at all times to draw a lance in behalf of any new cause, provided only that it be contrary to good judgment and universal policy."[81]

While these facts of themselves largely account for the failure of so good a warrior to win victories, certain other of his handicaps also deserve mention. His painful anxiety to achieve political preferment alienated many, who for this reason doubted his sincerity. He was not a good judge of men, and seldom chose his lieutenants wisely. He was enormously susceptible to flattery, and easily deceived by those who stooped to use such a weapon. But he was also so exceedingly vain of his own opinions that he could seldom be persuaded to modify them even on the advice of his best friends. Convinced by frequent and bitter experience that no one was to be trusted, he withdrew his confidence from those who could have helped him most, and often made enemies of men who had been his warmest supporters. Once deserted by a satellite, he sought vengeance with unbecoming zeal. Moreover, he loved the unsavory notoriety which his startling deeds and thoughts induced, and he seemed fairly to rack his brain in search of new material for sensations.

No better example of what Theodore Roosevelt called the "lunacy fringe" of reformers is to be found in all American

[80] In 1891 Donnelly sued the *Pioneer Press* for $100,000 for the republication of a slanderous letter written about him by William S. King, a political enemy. He was awarded one dollar. The history of the case is set forth in the *Pioneer Press*, October 21, 1891; *St. Paul Globe*, October 24, 25, 1891.

[81] Clipping dated May 31, 1891, in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 8.

history. Donnelly was not insincere; he was in earnest, but he lacked a "balance-wheel." Had he possessed such a mechanism, however, he might have been a relatively inconspicuous and ordinary citizen. It was his affinity for the novel or unique, his willingness to accept fantastic theories and to espouse untried reforms, that made him the man he was. He, and others of his kind, are entitled to a place in history. Out of the visions which they see, the dreams which they dream, grow the realities of to-morrow. Many of their ideas are cast aside, but many of them, too, are taken up and made effective. Men have almost forgotten that once it was only the "lunacy fringe" which advocated the abolition of slavery, the regulation of railway rates, the control of the "trusts," the rights of labor, the election of United States senators by direct vote of the people, equal suffrage for men and women, and the prohibition of the liquor traffic. As a nineteenth century reformer it fell to the lot of Donnelly to advocate, along with other notions more fantastic, just such reforms as these. Judged by contemporary standards he falls far short of being a radical at all. He held to the traditional veneration of the constitution of the United States, he ever denied that he was even a socialist, and he denounced in fervid oratory every suggestion of violence among his followers. He believed that the machinery of government need not be overturned; that by the addition of certain reforms it could be made to defend the rights of the masses as well as it now defended the rights of the classes. His final appeal was always to the ballot-box.[82]

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[82] "The Constitution of the United States is but the sermon on the mount crystalized into law," he said. Clipping from the *Milwaukee Sentinel*, March, 1894, in Donnelly scrapbooks, volume 16. He described socialism as "a proposition to reform temporary abuses by universal ruin." *Representative*, May 31, 1900. "We do not believe that the path of reform is through the torch and the rifle. We believe it is through the ballot-box." *Ibid.*, July 18, 1894.

RHODES'S *HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES*

Nearly thirty years ago both historians and the general intelligent reading public hailed as a distinct contribution to the historical literature of the United States the appearance of the first two volumes of Mr. Rhodes's *History of the United States,* and, as the subsequent volumes came out from time to time, both interest and admiration grew — interest in the unfolding tale so graphically set forth, and admiration for the industry and ambition of a man, trained to a business life, who had taken upon himself the toil of searching the sources, poring over the limitless secondary accounts, and synthesizing his accumulated knowledge to produce a work which, no matter how many future histories of the period may be written, will always retain its place as a foremost exposition of that fateful era from the time of the compromise measures of 1850 to the close of reconstruction. As enunciated in the first sentence of his first volume it was Mr. Rhodes's purpose to tell the story of the United States over a period of twenty-seven years and let his labors rest with the election of President Hayes by the action of congress through the electoral commission in 1877. In 1906, fourteen years after the publication of the first volume, came volume 7, which according to the original plan was to close the account. Then followed nearly a dozen more years during which some noteworthy essays and the one volume upon the civil war indicated that the talented author was still devoting himself to historical studies, although there was no intimation that any more pretentious production was under contemplation. But early in 1919 announcement was made that Mr. Rhodes had again attacked the field of American history and that soon his narrative of events from 1877 to the election of McKinley in 1896 would be available. In due course came out an eighth volume. This work, however, failed to elicit the general commendation which had greeted Mr. Rhodes's earlier work; indeed, some reviewers were openly critical of the whole effort, while friends of the venerable author everywhere universally regretted a volume which no longer gave evidence

of the master hand of the historian of the civil war. Intimations were rife that volume 8 would in due course be followed by volume 9, bringing the narrative down to the present day. While there has been no definite announcement that such might not eventually be the case, the bringing out in 1920 of a new and uniform edition of the complete work in eight volumes, with the general index moved from volume 7 to volume 8, has been taken as the equivalent of saying that Mr. Rhodes considers his major work ended. If this be the case, as it probably is, all the admirers of a truly great historian rest well content, for none would desire a repetition of work which appeared three years ago.

The new edition contains in the preface the announcement that the original work has "been thoroughly revised from time to time in various ways. The preparation of my Oxford lectures and my one volume History of the Civil War afforded me the opportunity to go over the material for the ante-bellum period and to make a searching review of the story of the Civil War itself." A reading of the new edition seems to indicate that this is somewhat of an overstatement, since, except for an occasional note at the end of a chapter, there seems to be little change from the original work. Had a thorough revision been made, one feels that many things would have been changed, for there have been many discoveries and much new light cast upon the period subsequent to 1850. Except then for the new form with its changed binding, for all general purposes the work as it appeared at first and the new edition may be looked on as the same thing.

Nevertheless, even the bringing out in its new dress and the incorporation of the belated volume 8 form an occasion of sufficient importance to warrant the attempt at an evaluation of the work as a whole.

No two men, from the same section and with the same cultural background, would or could treat any historical period from exactly the same point of view. Far less could two persons, each equally trained in handling materials, but from diverse regions and with different traditions and sentiments inground from youth, be expected to approach the subject from the same starting point and reach altogether the same conclusions. Hence any reviewer and every reviewer can be counted on to find portions

of this or any other work handled in a manner which he conceives capable of other interpretation. In so far as there is a mere statement of facts, providing *all* the facts are set forth, there can be no quarrel; but the process of selection and elimination together with interpretation of the facts is susceptible of many combinations and results depending upon the individual writer. The ideal, to be sure, is the laying down of all essential facts; then, no matter what conclusions and explanations may accompany them, each intelligent reader is in a position to form his own interpretation, which may be quite different from that reached by the author. But if he has reasonable confidence that no available essential details have been omitted or neglected, he can with no adequate grounds criticize the historian even though the reader and the writer reach conclusions as far apart as the poles. It is, further, unnecessary to state that history cannot be satisfactorily outlined if the writer starts with a premise, or if he is a partisan, avowed or silent. No one can possibly measure fully to the ideal, irrespective of his purity of purpose and honesty of intellectual endeavor; he cannot divest himself of innate tendencies, of unconscious or subconscious preconceptions ingrained by years of impinging influences, or of a multiplicity of mental attributes piled up through the years.

In estimating the historical value of such a work as this *History of the United States,* one has to bear in mind that Mr. Rhodes was a northerner, growing to manhood in a northern society during the years when the events leading to the war between the sections were relatively fresh in the minds of those with whom he came in daily contact, when the significance of the struggle for the north was yet keenly realized. The best intentioned and most honest northerner would be incapable of setting down the story from 1850 to 1877 as it would be told by a southerner equally well intentioned and honest. Moreover, aside from being a northerner Mr. Rhodes specifically states that "the historian whose sympathies are with the anti-slavery cause of 1850 — and it seems clear that he can most truly write the story —" cannot approve the whole of Webster's seventh of March speech (1:152). While this dictum comes in connection with one episode of the whole tale, it does, nevertheless, appear

to be Mr. Rhodes's point of view for the whole work: only a northerner can somewhat near satisfactorily write this chapter of our history. Obviously the dictum would not be accepted by anyone from south of Mason and Dixon's line; to him any account of this quarter century is bound to be warped and misinterpreted by anyone not a southerner.

It is necessary, then, at the outset to acknowledge that Mr. Rhodes was possessed of a certain *idée fixe*, an idea, however, which he would in all sincerity maintain was the result of the careful weighing of evidence after prolonged and rigorous investigation. Still, taking again our southerner who generally and in the concrete paid willing tribute to the essential fairness of Mr. Rhodes's intentions as the volumes came from the press, he would entirely reject the notion that Mr. Rhodes or anyone else with his cultural background could possibly give an unbiased account of the south's side of the question. So much, then, must be admitted from the start: it is a history written from the northern point of view by one who was willing to acknowledge just as far as in him lay the rights on the other side, but who saw in slavery a great moral evil which had corrupted the greater portion of a whole society.

Indeed, there was in Mr. Rhodes's mind no doubt attaching to the time-hallowed belief that in slavery one finds the explanation of practically all the main currents of American national history down to the close of reconstruction. To him other interpretations, which had already begun to receive attention even before his first volume was published, were apparently unknown or cast aside as not pertinent. The pioneer studies of Frederick Jackson Turner, the belief accepted by more and more students that perhaps there were other forces at least equally operative in guiding the destinies of the United States, find no place in the philosophy of this work. This is particularly obvious in the introductory chapter, wherein are sketched the, to Mr. Rhodes, salient factors of American history down to 1850. In all of this the influence of Hermann von Holst is easily traceable. One might say without exaggeration that the first chapter is a summary of the earlier portion of von Holst's *Constitutional history*. It is hardly fair to judge the whole work by this chapter, for it is obvious that there Mr. Rhodes relied primarily

upon secondary accounts and in it are none of those evidences of careful study of the sources themselves such as characterize the parts which form the main narrative. Nevertheless, it is not unfair to express a mild regret that in summarizing, for example, the acquisition of Texas, or the events leading to the Mexican war the same care was not exercised which entered into the preparation of those masterly accounts of the various campaigns of the civil war. It is unfortunate that no appreciation of the western pressure, under the influence of "manifest destiny," is shown; the story of Texas in its relation to the United States without even the mention of the name of Robert J. Walker seems like a de-Hamletized *Hamlet;* the story of the Wilmot proviso with no mention of the play of party politics therein leaves a feeling of emptiness.

Such ready acceptance of current opinions, however, is less in evidence when the real story begins in chapter 2 of the first volume. Nevertheless, the reader is unable to get away from the notion that a northern, one hundred per cent republican is telling the tale to the end.

From the standpoint of one who has realized something of the significance for the development of this country of the ever-expanding west one of the most serious defects of this history is the almost complete ignoring of that factor. Some occurrences west of the Alleghenies receive, of course, mention and in certain instances somewhat adequate treatment. Nevertheless, it is no exaggeration to say that Turner and all those who have been inspired by that man, to say nothing of the others who have independently delved into the study of western history in its relation to national development, were an unknown quantity to Mr. Rhodes, although it is possible that he assumed their work to be a mere passing fad, a possession soon to be relegated to the limbo with Weems's fantastic stories of Washington.

A few examples may serve to point out this characteristic. Take, for illustration, the subject of the public lands and the part they played in the period from 1850 to 1862. This falls distinctly within Mr. Rhodes's field; furthermore, virtually all the materials which have been and are being worked over were at hand and could have been used by Mr. Rhodes had he grasped their import. Preëmption, graduation, and distribution, words

to conjure with in the thirties and forties, had lost their potency by the time 1850 had rolled around. Homestead legislation, or the demand for it, had already come to the fore, and from 1850 to the final enactment of the law of 1862, that subject filled so many pages of the *Congressional globe* that only a man blinded to the obvious could possibly have passed it by without comment. Nevertheless, the sole references to it in the volumes embracing these years are found in the statements that in 1860 the republican platform contained a plank demanding such legislation (2: 420) and the bare assertion that in 1862 congress "passed a homestead law" (4:58).

The interrelation of public land legislation with sectional politics receives no mention. The long struggle culminating in the passage of the bill which President Buchanan vetoed in 1858 is passed over in silence. The paramount interest which a whole section of the country, with few notable exceptions, manifested so definitely and for so long a time is wholly ignored. One is forced to the conclusion that that chapter of the history of the United States remains to be written and that Mr. Rhodes's is far from being the last word.

Again, to take the public lands in another relation, attention may be called to the pressure to secure federal grants in aid of railroads and their construction. So prominently did the situation which produced the compromises of 1850 loom in Mr. Rhodes's mind that not even a passing mention of the discussion ending finally in the inauguration of a wide-reaching policy is to be found in the pages of volume 1. Indeed, land grants in aid of railroad-building call for no comment whatever until, among the facts noted for the year 1853, it is stated that "He [*President Pierce in his first annual message*] also recommended to Congress that it should aid by all constitutional means the construction of a railroad to the Pacific coast."

When one considers the true significance of all that interplay of politics, the log-rolling and the trading which eventually produced the first grant in aid of the Illinois Central railroad in 1850, when one recalls the importance of this, not alone for the political fortunes of prominent men like Douglas or Atchison or a dozen others, but for the whole sectional issue of the time, there can be no hesitation in stating that a reading of Mr.

Rhodes's volume alone must leave the student with a most one-sided and unbalanced account of the situation.

What is true of the account for 1850 is equally true of this topic for the story of the next dozen years. Alongside of the ever-increasing insistence that the federal government must lend a hand to bring into being a railroad which should span the continent was the constant iteration from every state where public lands existed of demands for grants to assist in the construction of roads which were far more than local in their potential importance. To read this *History of the United States* one would never guess that millions of acres had been granted to states and reserved for territories, and that these grants had a powerful influence in directing political currents.

To-day we are coming to realize that perhaps the most potent forces in the development of the United States were, first, the presence of an empire to be disposed of and, secondly, the method of that disposition. All this was a closed book to Mr. Rhodes in 1892. It remained sealed in 1919, when he attempted to tell the story after 1877, for there one has the feeling that one witnesses the gropings of a man in the dark. Down to the end of reconstruction the lamp which guided the historical feet of this writer was slavery and its influence upon American political development. When reconstruction closed, slavery and its consequences could no longer even by the widest stretch of imagination be taken as a keynote, and nothing had been found to take its place. The story of industrial growth and organization and the concomitant rise of labor struggles and labor organization is related by one who sadly shakes his head and laments that things are no longer what they used to be, and who apparently gives up trying to solve the enigma with a sigh that the times are generally out of joint. To have connected the absence of widespread internal industrial strife before the war and the presence of wide areas which could drain off the discontented, and the rise of bickerings which soon turned into downright contest with the exhaustion of a national resource, with the removal of the safety valve, seems never to have occurred to the venerable historian whose eyes sought without ceasing the landmarks of an age gone never to return.

Closely allied with his attitude toward this all-important sub-

ject is Mr. Rhodes's failure to grasp the significance of those agrarian upheavals which, to some at least, form an important portion of the history of this country since the civil war. The antimonopoly revolt, the granger movement, the alliance fever which culminated in populism, do not, it is true, pass without comment. But the attention paid these phenomena reveals the fact that their historian did not and probably could not penetrate the causes behind the patent manifestations. One feels that Mr. Rhodes would have been glad to know why people could act in such an insane manner, but one cannot admit that he had any essential realization of the case. To him the "soft money" craze, the free-silver mania, were incomprehensible expressions of a more or less perverted intelligence.

A rereading of the *History* confirms the impression that the spectacular always made an irresistible appeal to Mr. Rhodes. This remains true from beginning to end, from the account of the debate over the compromise resolutions in 1850 to the chapter devoted to the Molly McGuires in volume 8. A mere statement of the space allotted to episodes which had dramatic possibilities convinces the reader that Mr. Rhodes reveled in high lights and deep contrasts. No volume escapes this. It is, naturally, a temptation to dwell upon those incidents which permit of much colorful description, but the other side of the medal is an underrepresentation of many equally or more pertinent factors which are prosaic. The very interesting description of New Orleans in the grip of an epidemic of yellow fever covers eleven pages (1: 402-413). The fugitive slave rescues which followed the enactment of the new law of 1850 are detailed at length. Eleven pages are necessary to tell the story of the controversy over diplomatic costume (1: 501-512). The Sumner-Butler affair calls for nineteen pages (2: 87-106), while the Brown raid at Harper's Ferry needs thirty-two (2: 340-372). The draft riots in New York with their eleven pages are given five times the space devoted to the admission of Oregon and Minnesota, despite the importance of the latter in the developing sectional contest (4: 321-332). Instances might be multiplied to include the Johnson impeachment trial with its forty-two pages (6: 226-268), the description of various strikes from 1877 to and including 1894, or a dozen other cases. As a balanced narrative the story

unquestionably suffers from playing up so markedly so many episodes which relatively are of minor importance. To be sure, here again enters the personal equation; no two persons see all the varying details in exactly the same perspective. Nevertheless, few would concede the contention that such passing though dramatic scenes are as significant as many a commonplace occurrence which admits no brilliant pen picture.

The tendency to dramatize finds abundant outlet in the civil war itself. The maneuvers of armies, battles, retreats, and victories lend themselves surpassingly well to swift and incisive narrative. Of all the work no portion is better constructed, more delicately balanced, than those portions of volumes 3, 4, and 5 in which the military side of the history from 1861 to 1865 is so attractively portrayed. Not only is the story told in an able manner, but it is hard to believe that any one has ever searched so thoroughly the mass of material available for the student of the civil war. If any one knows that formidable compilation, the *Official records of the rebellion,* it is Mr. Rhodes. There is probably not a man anywhere who has delved into them so deeply and utilized them so completely. If there is any one portion of the story covered by this work which little needs retelling it is the military side of the war. To a slightly less degree the same is true of the naval side. When it comes to the other phases, however, no such positive statement is warranted.

On the diplomatic side the treatment is passable. Mr. Rhodes had access to the Adams papers so that he was able to incorporate some of the information which Charles Francis Adams later from time to time brought out in articles appearing in the *American historical review* or in the publications of the Massachusetts historical society. His "revision," however, takes no notice of the very enlightening results of Dr. F. A. Golder's investigations in the Russian archives. This results in continuing the fiction of an especially friendly interest as the actuating motive for certain acts of the Russian government; for instance, no change is made in the account of the reasons why the Russian fleet visited New York at a time when it appeared not only possible but probable that intervention by France and perhaps by England was on the cards. No intimation is given of the

situation in Europe which very largely explains why Russia was willing to have its fleet outside the Baltic. Furthermore, had a real revision taken place, it seems that some adequate acknowledgement of the information contained in *The education of Henry Adams* would have been incorporated.[1] Taking the complete diplomatic story, however, one can be reasonably content with it as an exposition of the case.

If military history and narration of the course of "politics" in the narrower sense fall within the scope of Mr. Rhodes's more adequate treatment, such is not the case when it comes to description of economic and social phenomena. The economic aspects of the period as well as the play of economic forces upon formal politics seem not to have engaged the whole-hearted interest which could be desired. There are several chapters scattered throughout the eight volumes wherein well-written and very readable summaries of general tendencies are found, but the integration of these factors with the account as a whole lacks much of perfection. Professor Fite's treatment of the social and economic forces of the civil war period could have been called upon to good advantage, to say nothing of monographs upon selected localities like Frederick Merk's excellent *Economic history of Wisconsin during the civil war decade.* These works, of course, were not at hand when the volumes covering the war were originally written, but the "revision" might conceivably have adverted to them. Some of the mistakes regarding the labor situation might through their use have been corrected; a more satisfactory discussion of the importance of various labor-saving devices which were forced into use by the disarrangement of the economic life of the north would undoubtedly have resulted. Even without these, however, it is strange that Mr. Rhodes failed to grasp the full import, not only for the ultimate northern success but for the effect upon the balance of trade, of such things as the various agricultural machines which made possible the raising and harvesting of heavy food crops.

It would be possible to continue at length the seeming neglect of economic factors which had their real part in the war, and

[1] To refer to a later date, the story of the purchase of Alaska in 1867 is told without even a note to hint of the subterranean influences connected with claims and possible advantage to certain interested individuals which were connected with the whole matter.

which necessarily should be included in a comprehensive history of the United States during the war period, but the conclusion would still remain the same: that Mr. Rhodes either was not interested in, or failed to grasp and understand, their significance.

On the financial side of the economic life governmental activity and politics enter largely; consequently the treatment is more complete and satisfactory. Even here one fears that the love of the spectacular led the writer into an undue emphasis, for instance, upon the excise, particularly upon distilled liquors, because that gave an opportunity to detail the story of the operation of the law with the resulting corruption and fraud. How the excise as a whole operated to affect life at the north draws forth little comment. The tariff is not explained in its relation to the excise, nor is there much elucidation of its general effects.

Delineation of personalities engages much of Mr. Rhodes's attention, and the results of these character studies are for the most part highly satisfactory. Careful study of numerous contemporary estimates brings clear-cut, living pen pictures of men like Scott, Webster, Calhoun, Clay, Lincoln, Seward, Chase. Not always does the reader feel that the characterization does complete justice to the subject, although the number of distorted portraits is small in comparison with the total aggregate. One or two instances where something akin to injustice is done to the man call for comment. Andrew Johnson is a notable example of such underestimation. While there is no such denunciation as figured in contemporary, and, indeed, in many later descriptions of this man, nevertheless there appears to be some of the general republican feeling which looked upon the president of reconstruction as little better than an ingrate and a betrayer of his party. After admitting the unfortunate traits in this "self-made" man — lack of tact, love of bombastic rhetoric, general crudeness and lack of social polish — later opinion has come to believe that Johnson was in an impossible position. Lincoln himself could not have survived the vindictive tendencies of the radical portion of his party, and even his infinite patience and toleration must have emerged from the struggle sadly tried. One is forced to believe that had Lincoln lived to carry on the

task of reconstruction of the union he would have met with insuperable difficulties and his fame would have come down to us a vastly different thing than our actual possession to-day. No one would claim for a minute that Johnson handled the Stanton affair, for instance, with the skill and tact which it demanded, but even so there is the accompanying feeling that he has not received exactly fair treatment in Mr. Rhodes's account. Acknowledgment of Johnson's conscientious efforts to carry out congress' reconstruction measures is made, but it is hard to reconcile the statement that General Sheridan was practically a failure as commandant of one of the military districts with the assertion that Johnson made a mistake in replacing him (6: 179, 189). Opinion to-day generally accords President Johnson a higher place than Mr. Rhodes was willing to concede at the time he depicted the struggle of 1866 and 1867.

Going back into the ante-bellum days, brief attention might be paid to Mr. Rhodes's estimate of Stephen A. Douglas. At the time the first volume was written, Professor Allen Johnson's *Life* was still in the future; the studies of such men as Professor Hodder had not been made. Nevertheless, most of the material upon which these works were based was at hand; it was a result of failure to comprehend the western situation as well as to estimate fairly a personality like that of Douglas which resulted in presenting a rather biased and one-sided picture of the "Little Giant." It was something more than southern demand for the opening of more territory to the "peculiar institution" that forced the organization of the region west of Missouri and Iowa. Nevertheless, nothing of this is gathered from the pages of the *History*. There is no intimation of the powerful pressure exerted upon members of congress by constituents in these and other western states for opening up fair agricultural lands across the Missouri river and in the country of the Platte. Not only land-hungry pioneers insisted that way be made for the advance of white men still farther into the plains, but there was the potent demand for railroad extension westward to the Pacific.

Again the local situation in Missouri, the strife between the Bentonites and the followers of Senator Atchison, calls for more extended account. All of these factors need to be weighed along

with the slavery issue adequately to portray the situation which led to the Kansas bill and the repeal of the Missouri compromise. Nowadays one is somewhat skeptical of the time-honored assertion that Douglas was willing to buy a possible nomination for the presidency by the application of the principle of squatter sovereignty to the Nebraska country. The attitude of the northwest must be taken into consideration; one must recall that there was in this frontier region no great interest in the slavery question as such, that to the average man of Illinois or Iowa or Missouri it was far more important that land be opened to settlement than that a more or less theoretical problem of slavery be allowed to put off what was felt to be a vital action. Moreover, most people of the northwest felt instinctively that slavery would never flourish in this disputed country, and the application of the principle of popular sovereignty meant an inevitable preponderance of free-state people. This conviction was strengthened by contemplation of Missouri, where slavery had never really paid and where it had been possible so long to keep such a man as Thomas H. Benton in the United States senate. Few would deny Douglas some of the attributes of a demagogue; neither could much support be brought to uphold a proposition that he was not ambitious for the presidency. But admitting all the counts against the Illinois senator it is going beyond the limits of calm and dispassionate assertion to state that his "ambition had wrecked himself and his party" (3:302).

The civil war and reconstruction gave ample scope to a historian who reveled in dramatic scenes and personalities; they also afforded much material for the student of constitutional development. Mr. Rhodes was no constitutional lawyer, yet he did not hesitate to attack the intricate problems raised by war and its aftermath; and, for the most part, his labors were attended with success. He did not attempt to produce a recondite constitutional treatise, following, as he did, the commonly accepted interpretation of the moot points, although fortifying himself by study of the sources as those appear in supreme court reports or opinions of eminent jurists. Occasionally, however, there is evidence that his devotion to the main theme of slavery caused him to overlook other aspects of a more lasting significance. Such, for example, is the case in the account of the four-

teenth amendment and its adoption. In some way he has managed to pass by the highly important "due process of law" clause except as it had a bearing upon the freedman. Reminiscences and personal letters which he used in constructing his story would have told him that this provision was calculated to have growing significance in the changing industrial life of the country and that the men who framed it knew this fact and had it in mind when they forced it upon the country. The difficulties which this amendment encountered in the south and the methods employed to secure its adoption are excellently told, but there is no hint of the opposition which it met in the loyal states or of the peculiar reasoning which helped to secure a sufficient number of affirmative votes to make it a part of the fundamental law.

One of the most interesting constitutional tangles produced by secession was that accompanying the admission of West Virginia with the corresponding anomalous position of the Pierpont government of Virginia. It would seem that this possessed not only sufficient intrinsic importance to merit a complete account, but dramatic possibilities as well; yet the space apportioned to it in the *History* shows that it did not so appeal to Mr. Rhodes, unfortunately for the balance of the story.

The part played by politics in producing the civil war has been emphasized by Henry Watterson in his recently published memoirs. "The men," says he (*Marse Henry,* 1: 70), "who between 1850 and 1861 might have saved the Union and averted the War of Sections were on either side professional politicians, with here and there an unselfish, far-seeing, patriotic man, whose admonitions were not heeded by the people ranging on opposing sides of party lines." And again (p. 72), "In a nation of undiscriminating voters the noise of the agitator is apt to drown the voice of the statesman." Not a little truth fell from the lips of "Marse Henry" when he penned these words. But to Mr. Rhodes "politics" seems to have been nearly the be-all and end-all of history. He watches the wheels go round and describes a portion of the machinery; too often, however, the reader is left to guess at the motive forces which supply the power.

Nowhere is the weakness of Mr. Rhodes's method more patent than in the last two volumes of the original portion of the work, and, especially, in the volume of 1919. As has already been

pointed out, the unifying influence of the slavery issue, whether that be artificial or real, served as a central crystallizing point for the earlier portion of the story. As that factor becomes weaker and finally dies away, nothing seems to have been found to take its place. The result is a degree of incoherence which makes the chapters, and even portions of chapters, appear like more or less isolated studies of episodes. All of them are interestingly delineated. Much valuable material is used and skillfully woven, but after all there persists the impression that almost any one of these chapters might have served as an essay or an article contributed to some historical periodical. Those lapses which allowed the author to slight or ignore what were vital influences in the early period are still more apparent in the story after 1877. The delight in the spectacular still lives; nothing but that prepossession can explain the disproportionate amount of space given to the Molly McGuires (8:52-87), the assassination of Garfield (146-152), the Haymarket riot and the subsequent trial of the anarchists (278-285), or the surgical operation on President Cleveland in 1893 (397-401).

Students of the last quarter of the nineteenth century are coming to look upon that time as one of the most interesting as well as most illuminating of the periods of our history. The intense devotion of the American people to the development of their country, the evolution of new devices of technic and organization to answer the ever-increasing demand for greater and more varied production, the integration and expansion of industry with concomitant rise of labor problems, the exhaustion of the public domain with the accompanying urban growth — a phenomenon likewise answering to growing industrialism — all this provides a veritable laboratory for the social sciences. Mr. Rhodes has not penetrated below the surface of things; underlying motives and forces were hidden from his gaze. Consequently his story can be nothing more than superficial.

In view of his consistent ignoring of the western factor in national development during the period to which he gave his greatest attention, it is not surprising that he pays little heed to such things as the alliance movement and the later populist uprising. It is more curious, however, that he has left untouched the post-bellum south. He, if any one, should have been struck

with the vast change which has come over that war-torn region. Its new industrial features, its peculiar political alignment, the whole story of the new south would, it seems, have made an irresistible appeal to one whose main thesis was so interwoven with that section under another dispensation. But not so. Politics in the simpler sense of the term and spectacular occurrences hold the center of the stage to the expulsion of nearly everything else.

In spite of the publishers' device of bringing out all the eight volumes in uniform dress and calling the complete work a history of the United States from 1850 to 1896, there will continue to be a feeling that one work ended with the seventh volume, and that an afterthought, an unfortunate one, added another tome of different merit and, indeed, a tome unworthy to be associated with the original endeavor.

When all criticisms have been made, when obvious defects and oversights have been noted, there remains a residuum of much merit. Mr. Rhodes's earlier work, with all its deficiencies, remains one of the major productions in the field of American history. His indefatigable industry, his painstaking research, will long remain an inspiration to other students and writers, and his production a monument of no small dignity.

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NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

Trudeau's Description of the Upper Missouri

The great war had its effect upon the archives of the government at Washington. In an inconceivably short while after the entry of the United States into the conflict, an extra clerical force made its appearance at the American capital. This force was disproportionately large because of presumable political exigencies. It was a time for the distribution of personal patronage and party spoils unprecedented in the annals of history. Not only swivel-chair men in uniform but likewise superfluous girl stenographers had to be housed in offices, conveniently, comfortably, well, and the archives of the nation suffered in consequence. Documents, so jealously guarded in the past that they were never easy of access to the investigator unless he were possessed of the golden senatorial key, were summarily dislodged from their accustomed repositories and dumped, literally dumped, into new quarters, mostly temporary structures. From the sacred precincts of that architectural monstrosity, the State, War, and Navy building, went records of priceless historical value, among them many of the very oldest of those yet accumulated by this great infant nation of the west. The destination of one portion of the evicted was the commodious Munitions building, constructed of concrete and supposedly fireproof, while that of another was a garage, huge and dusty.

The eviction was not without results. The ruthless process by which it was accomplished broke down old barriers, destroyed old wrappings, and laid bare the secrets of old filings. Among other things it brought to light a curious chest,[1] an old-fashioned

[1] Of the present whereabouts of the chest the writer is not exactly sure. It has been emptied of its contents and they are safe in a steel filing case. Quite probably the chest is the same as that mentioned in the following, which is an extract from a letter addressed to Nicollet by a friend in Nashville, August 12, 1834:

Mon cher Nicollet — Je viens de recevoir votre lettre du 27 juine imediatement apres la reception j'ai ecrit a Madame Stein, qui est a present a Louisville — Mr. Stein a Philada ou a le Nouvelle York — elle me vient de repondre, que Mr. Stein vous a attendu depuis le mois de Janvier — etant oblige de quitter la nouvelle Orleann

wooden box, painted dull green. This chest had ordinary iron handles and, withal, a very European look. It bore on one of its shorter sides the magical name of "Nicollet." As to its contents, it was a veritable museum; but those same contents, while various, proved scarcely so rich as anticipation painted. They did not include the long-lost Chouteau journal[2] nor the missing link[3] of the Trudeau journals nor that immense collection of source material of which Henry H. Sibley, in his "Memoir of Jean N. Nicollet," gives intimation.[4] They were well worth finding, nevertheless, for they did include some things of more than passing

quant la chaleur commence, il a mis la boite et vos lettres entre les mains de M. News President of the Commercial Bank qui rest toujour a la N. O. avec enjunction de s'informer de votre arrivee etc — de maniere que votres articles sont en bonnes mains mais il ceroint mieux dans les votre — et Mad. Stein va lui faire scavoir, de garder la caisse jusqu au mois de Novembre et ce que vous descrira a l'egard des lettres etc, mais je ne crois pas que Mr. Stein sera long tems avant Novembre a la N. O.—Nicollet chest collection.

[2] Concerning the purported loan of this journal to Nicollet, see "Chouteau's journal of the founding of St. Louis," in *Missouri historical society collections,* 3:336, note. That Nicollet got materials for his work from the Chouteau family is evidenced by an admission he made himself in his "Sketch of the early history of St. Louis," in *Senate reports,* 26 congress, 2 session, volume 5, part 2, number 237, p. 84. From the title of one of the fragmentary documents found in the Nicollet chest, the material would seem to have included "notes." The title to which reference is made is "Quelques détails sur l'Attaque du fort des Chicassas par Prudhomme; tirés des notes manuscrites de A. Chouteau."

[3] That part of the journal which some commentators think must necessarily have been written to cover the period from March 26, 1795, to May 24, 1795. The "First part" of Trudeau's journal, being that extending from June 7, 1794, to March 25, 1795, was discovered in the Archives of the Indies at Seville and edited under the title "Journal of Jean Baptiste Truteau on the upper Missouri, 'première partie,' June 7, 1794–March 26, 1895," for the *American historical review,* 19:299-333. The "Second part," from May 24, 1795, to July 20, 1795, is to be found among the Territorial papers of the state department, bound in volume 4 of the Claiborne correspondence, Bureau of rolls and library. It was translated a few years ago by Mrs. H. T. Beauregard of the Missouri historical society and was published in the society's *Collections,* 4:9-48. An account of both parts, together with a translation of the major portion of the "First part" and a reproduction of Mrs. Beauregard's edition of the "Second," appeared in the *South Dakota historical collections,* 7:403-474.

[4] *Minnesota historical collections,* 1: 191. The accuracy of Sibley's intimation is vouched for, to some extent, by the following letter from Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Abert to Nicollet, dated January 11, 1838, in Topographical bureau, Letters issued, 2: 450-451:

As it is really painful to me to keep you in this state of suspence in reference to the acquiring of the geographical matter which you have collected of the country west of the Mississippi, and also very inconvenient to the Office longer to delay the compiling of the map upon which it has been for some time engaged; and being, as I am yet, entirely without any knowledge of the geographical matter which you have collected and consequently without facts upon which a report to the Secretary could

value of which the very existence had apparently been forgotten. The yield comprised documents of both Nicollet and non-Nicollet authorship. Among the former was a scientific miscellany, astronomical observations, geological and botannical notes,[5] even a tiny herbarium, expedition journals[6] and fragments of journals, the rough draft, in French, of the "Sketch of the early history of St. Louis,"[7] and also what appears to be the rejected French original of the "Notes," which were intended to accompany or illustrate the famous Nicollet map. Among the latter were a "Fort Clark journal,"[8] kept by Francis A. Chardon of the Upper Missouri outfit, 1834-1839; a "Table of distances," prepared by James Mackay in 1797;[9] a narrative, entitled "Voi-

be founded; with a view of bringing the subject to some definite issue, I will submit a proposition to your consideration.

I therefore propose that you should state to me the extent and character of the Geographical information you possess, when I will without delay, after reference to the secretary, make a positive offer for the same.

I know that your attention has been devoted to more subjects than the one referred to in this letter, but as all we want at present, and all that we are authorized to obtain, is the geographical matter, you will please to understand my proposition is limited to information of that kind.

[5] No amplification of this idea can here be furnished, for only a very cursory reading of the notes has as yet been made. Suffice it to say that they are unmistakably scrappy and miscellaneous in character.

[6] A translation of the two journals that seem practically complete has been made and is ready for publication. They relate to the expeditions of 1838 and 1839.

[7] This promises to clear up the mystery surrounding the extent of Nicollet's literary indebtedness to Auguste Chouteau. It bears a close resemblance to the "Sketch of the early history of St. Louis," attributed to Nicollet and published in *Senate reports*, 26 congress, 2 session, volume 5, part 2, number 237, pp. 75-92, and likewise to the fragmentary Chouteau journal published in *Missouri historical society collections*, 3: 335-366. It is in what seems to be the handwriting of Nicollet; but the information is unquestionably largely of Chouteau origin.

[8] There cannot, certainly, be a difference of opinion as to the absorbing interest of this document. The facts which it records relative to the ravages of the smallpox epidemic of 1837-1838 among the upper Missouri river tribes are startling. It supplements *Forty years a fur trader on the upper Missouri; the personal narrative of Charles Larpenteur, 1833-1872*, edited by Elliot Coues (New York, 1898), and is a companion to "The Fort Tecumseh and Pierre journal," cited by Hiram M. Chittenden and published, in part and by way of illustration, in *The American fur trade of the far west; a history of the pioneer trading posts and early fur companies of the Missouri valley and the Rocky mountains and of the overland commerce with Santa Fe* (New York, 1902), 3: 975-983. An early publication of the "Fort Clark journal," so edited as to exhibit its importance for a more complete account of that earliest of frontier industries, is contemplated.

[9] This, it is hoped, will appear in a subsequent number of the MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW. Its possible relation to the map accompanying F. M. Perrin du Lac, *Voyage dans les deux Louisianes, et chez les nations sauvages du Missouri*

age de Regis Loisel dans le haut Missouri";[10] "Ramsay Crook's notes," being a history in brief of the American fur trade; and, finally, the document here edited, "Description du haut Missouri," from the pen of "Jean Baptiste Trudeau, voyageur."

The authenticity of this last-named narrative is scarcely to be questioned. Its vocabulary, its verb forms,[11] and many of its

(Paris, 1805), will be set forth, it being Frederick J. Teggart's opinion that the map is substantially of Mackay construction. "Notes supplementary to any edition of Lewis and Clark," in American historical association, *Annual report*, 1908 (Washington, 1909), 1: 189.

[10] From a penciled inscription on its outside page, the writer is led to infer that some earlier investigator has ventured the suggestion that this may be the so-called "Chouteau journal." It is the most extensive document in the whole Nicollet collection and, from certain points of view, the one of greatest value. The unnamed author was a trader, dwelling, for the time being, among the Arikara. He seems to have come originally from Montreal and was evidently attached in some capacity to the Loisel expedition of 1803-1804. It is of that expedition that he writes. May he not have been M. Sabeau, Loisel's "agent and man of affairs," whom he left with seven others "to continue the undertaking" which had, for the Spanish government, so great a political significance? See Loisel's memorial, May 28, 1804, in *The Spanish regime in Missouri*, edited by Louis Houck (Chicago, 1909), 2: 359-364. A translation *in extenso* of the document, entitled "Voiage de Regis Loisel dans le haut Missouri," is being made by Dr. Rose Abel Wright, the writer's sister, to whose linguistic skill the arduous task of text-deciphering may be safely intrusted.

[11] Concerning the philological, syntactical, orthographical, and other peculiarities of the manuscript, a former student of the writer's, Ethel M. Staley, now instructor in French at Smith college, offers some general observations. She has examined the translation critically and has collated the text here printed with a photostatic copy of the original manuscript. Her observations are thus elaborated:

This is an attempt to describe in a general way the characteristics of the manuscript. It is not an effort to draw scientific conclusions from the language used. The latter aim would necessitate a comparison of this work of Trudeau's with other documents written under similar conditions and such a study of other private journals has not been undertaken. A description of the penmanship, a comment on the orthography, and a few general remarks on the grammar will constitute the attempt.

Since the formation of the letters is, as a rule, exceedingly clear, any evident hesitancy or variation may be significant in raising the question as to whether this manuscript be in the handwriting of the composer. For example, there is frequent evidence of the letter *s* having been added after the word had been written; e. g. *sauvages nations*. Justification for doubting the originality of the manuscript may be further strengthened by citing the variations of the one word, *castor*. This word appears distinctly as *castore*, *caston*, and *castor*. In one instance, the final *n* of *caston* has been erased partially and an *r* substituted. The penman's lack of knowledge of the exact word seems a possibility. This type of characteristic is frequent enough to warrant attention, although it cannot be said to be over-abundant. The punctuation is weak in places; but it presents no real impediment to the interpretation of the thought. A too frequent use of capitals characterizes the document and the reader is at a loss to know why certain letters such as *B*, *P*, *C*, *E*, should be favorites for the extra flourish.

When we leave the consideration of the external form and begin to examine the French itself, the orthography claims our attention. Here the principle of modern phonetics is the key to the riddle, although there cannot be said to be any consistency in the spelling of the same word. The vowel combination, *oi*, is regularly used in

phrases are those of the Trudeau journals. Its chirography[12] has the peculiarities of the state department manuscript, the genuineness of which has never been disputed. So pronounced is the similarity that the theory, advanced as a working basis, that the "Description du haut Missouri" may conceivably be the "extracts"[13] that Jefferson made and transmitted to Meriwether Lewis seems quite untenable.

One other theory is not so easily dismissed. It is the theory that Trudeau prepared this general account of the upper Missouri region for the particular use of Perrin du Lac, who, in writing his *Voyage dans les deux Louisianes,* borrowed from it

verb forms; but not in words, like *français* and *anglais,* where a similar development prevailed. The latinisms, *c* and *s,* as in *scavent* and *isle,* while not unusual in the French of the time, are a trifle unexpected where the evolution of words has been so greatly sacrificed to their pronunciation. The inconsistency of spelling, as evidenced in the following many attempts to convey the modern *lieues*: *lieux, lieu, lieues, lieües, leües,* only shows to an exaggerated degree the instability of much of the spelling of Trudeau's day. One of the most interesting examples of an effort to adapt the French vocabulary to the New World need on the phonetic basis is *bled-dinde,* which is evidently an attempt to translate Indian corn as *ble'd'Inde.*

In its sacrifice of grammatical construction, the phonetic principle is certainly over-developed. Especially is this the case in agreements relating to gender and number. Here, too, there is no consistency, *autre bête fauve, autre bêtes fauve, autre bêtes fauves* all appearing. *Tout* and *tous, vienne, viennent* are indifferently used so that the grammatical knowledge of the writer is most certainly to be questioned, schoolmaster though he may have been. Certain adverbial phrases have become for him simple adverbs; for *alabrie, alafonte* are distinctly felt to be word units.

The style is decidedly barren. A literary framework recurs again and again, due probably to the inflexible French that has been used and to the very scanty vocabulary.

[12] The similarity of penmanship is especially noticeable in the formation of the letter *s,* both initial and final. In the two manuscripts the long *s* is used very commonly at the beginning of words and is so shaped as to be mistaken easily for a capital letter. The overcapitalization of the documents is not significant, since overcapitalization was a characteristic of the writing of the period. Texture of paper and size of sheet are the same, variation appearing in color only, the paper of the journal being blue, that of the general description, white. There are certain evidences of erasure in the war department document that point to the possibility of its being a copy that was critically passed upon by some one who professed to know more about French syntax and orthography than did the scribe.

[13] In connection with the press copy of Jefferson's letter to Lewis of November 16, 1803, in the Jefferson papers, series 1, volume 9, number 305, in the library of congress, there is this notation: "Extracts from the Journals of M. Truteau, Agent for the Illinois Trading Company, residing at the village of Ricara, up the Missouri." This would seem to warrant the idea that the "information," which Jefferson told Lewis he had himself "obtained from Printeau's journal in Ms.," was couched in the form of extracts, and to this Jefferson's letter of January 22, 1804, bears witness. See *Original journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition, 1804-1806,* edited by Reuben G. Thwaites (New York, 1904-1905), 7: 281, 292. Later on, Jefferson sent to Lewis "a translation of that journal in full," but with that, since the document under discussion is in French, we are not concerned.

largely and almost verbatim.[14] It was most certainly prepared subsequent to 1795; for it suggests, incidentally, where Trudeau was in the midsummer of that year.[15] Now Du Lac had with him on his memorable journey to the White river *"un ancien traiteur de la rivière des Illinois"* to whose papers he undoubtedly had liberal access.[16] That *ancien traiteur* was very likely Jean Baptiste Trudeau and not James Mackay as Teggart is persuaded.[17]

[14] The proof of this will appear, as occasion calls for it, in the later footnotes to the edited text.

[15] The complete ignorance on this matter has been commented upon thus: "The journal closes as abruptly as it began on July 20th. No record has been found of Trudeau's further operations on the Upper Missouri. It has been assumed that he remained with the Arickara in the summer of 1795 until the boats from St. Louis arrived, when he went to the Mandans and spent the winter with them." "Trudeau's journal," in *South Dakota historical collections*, 7: 410. In the "Second part" of his journal, Trudeau relates the unwillingness of the young Arikara braves to entertain thoughts of peace with the less well-known but pacifically-inclined tribes, the Kiowa and their neighbors, who dwelt in the country toward the southwest. Some Cheyenne chiefs had come with a message of peace and, when the young Arikara proved obstinate and obdurate, Trudeau himself proposed that he and Crazy Bear, a peaceable Arikara chief, should accompany the Cheyenne messengers on their return journey. His diary does not record that they actually went; but the "Description du haut Missouri" says, "Lorsque je fus en parol chez la nation Chaguienne dan le Cour de Leté mil sept Cent quatrevingt quinze ou je vis et parlai a plusieurs Chefs et considérés des nations Tocaninanbiche et Cayoouas." It is therefore certain that the trip to the Cheyenne country and beyond was made. Most probably it was followed by a visit of no short duration.

[16] In regard to the preparation for the river voyage, Du Lac has this to say:

Curieux tout à la fois de connoître par moimême les moeurs de ces nations non civiliseées et leur manière de traiter avec les Blancs; je chargeai une longue pirogue de tout ce qui pouvoit leur être utile, et pris à mon service un ancien traiteur de la rivière des Illinois, qui avoit des connoissances supérieures à celles qu'ont ordinairement les gens de cette espèce. Employé autrefois par la Compagnie du haut Missouri, il avoit remonté cette rivière plus haut qu'aucun autre dans le pays, et avoit passé plusieurs années au milieu de ces peuples, dont il avoit appris les divers dialectes. Il m'a communiqué, sur leurs moeurs, leurs usages et leurs cérémonies, des observations curieuses; et c'est à lui que je dois en grande partie les détails que je donnerai bientôt.

Ce fut pendant son séjour dans les postes les plus éloignés, que le roi d'Espagne promit des récompenses aux traiteurs qui lui donneroient, sur des nations jusqu'alors inconnues, les renseignemens les plus intéressans. Il redoubla d'activité et de travail pour mériter la confiance des autorités supérieures, présenta des mémoires d'une utilité réelle; mais ses peines ainsi que celles de tous ceux qui l'avoient imité, furent entièrement perdues. Ce gouvernement n'en a profité, ni pour l'amélioration de son commerce, ni pour l'instruction publique. Tous ces mémoires sont restés dans les archives, dont je les ai tirés moi-même pour en extraire les parties les plus essentielles. Peut-être cet extrait servira-t-il un jour au gouvernement François, à son commerce, au à l'homme qui aime à lire dans le grand livre de la Nature.—*Voyage dans les deux Louisianes*, 196-197.

[17] "Notes supplementary to any edition of Lewis and Clark," in American historical association, *Annual report*, 1908, volume 1, pp. 188-189. It can be stated with a certain degree of positiveness that there is nothing in Du Lac's reference to the *ancien traiteur* that would not apply equally well to Trudeau as to Mackay and, with

Du Lac's *ancien traiteur* knew the Illinois country as did Trudeau, who had come to St. Louis from Canada in 1774 [18] and who confessed, in 1795, that for over twenty-six years he had been making trips into the interior.[19] He could converse with various of the Indian tribes and knew even the Sioux tongue passably.[20] Mackay came to Missouri in 1793.[21] There is nothing in the Perrin du Lac narrative that resembles closely any known work of his. He was a man in his prime at the time Du Lac went up the Missouri, being a little past forty years of age. Trudeau was his senior by about ten years. Neither one of them was an old man; but the *ancien traiteur* was doubtless old only in experience.

Both Mackay and Trudeau were employees of the company that was formed,[22] in 1794, for the exploration and exclusive trade of the upper Missouri and both had certainly journeyed far up the stream. Mackay knew more than did Trudeau about the country beyond the Mandan. His knowledge of the Assiniboin was much more intimate and, while still a resident of Canada, he had made an expedition to the river Catapoi, a tributary of the Assiniboine.[23] This was in the early part of 1787. He had likewise journeyed southwestward from below the Missouri and,

the evidence of this new Trudeau manuscript brought into the argument, the case is much stronger for Trudeau than for Mackay.

[18] "Journal of Jean Baptiste Trudeau among the Arikara Indians in 1795," in *Missouri historical society collections*, 4: 15.

[19] "Trudeau's journal," in *South Dakota historical collections*, 7: 469.

[20] For evidence that he could converse with the Omaha, see *ibid.*, 434. The conduct of the Omaha for years past was no secret to him. He had visited the Sioux before 1794, the Yankton in particular, and some Sioux women recognized him as a trader they had known on the Des Moines, a circumstance that would account for his familiarity with their language. *Ibid.*, 416-417, 421, 425, 439.

[21] He is thought to have come to America from Scotland in 1776 and to Missouri from Canada in 1793. See "Journal of Trudeau," in *Missouri historical society collections*, 4: 20, note 22. The journey which he says he took in 1787 to the country of the Mandan had its start evidently in Canada. "Extracts from Capt. McKay's journal," edited by Milo M. Quaife, in Wisconsin historical society, *Proceedings*, 1915, p. 192. He was an employee of the Northwest company and might, it is conceded, have been one of those traders who went, under its auspices, "for trade in the region towards the Illinois and Mississippi rivers." Gordon C. Davidson, *The North West company* (University of California, *Publications in history*, volume 7 — Berkeley, 1918), 28, note 98.

[22] For the articles of incorporation and other matters relating to the organization, see *The Spanish regime in Missouri* (Houck, ed.), 2: 148-159.

[23] "Extracts from Capt. McKay's journal" (Quaife, ed.), in Wisconsin historical society, *Proceedings*, 1915, pp. 191-192.

on the Perrin du Lac map, his route thither in 1796 is plainly traced.[24] Du Lac's westward wanderings extended only to the White river and the data of his map[25] only to the Cheyenne, a comparatively short distance beyond. The French traveler does not say from whom he got his map. It was one that he evidently added to and corrected.[26] The *ancien traiteur* may have had nothing whatever to do with it and yet again he may have helped to furnish the material for the additions and corrections. Mackay's own map may have been the earliest,[27] depicting the region which he at the time had exclusively visited; but it was certainly not the only map of the upper Missouri country available when Jefferson sent Evans' map to Lewis,[28] and it, conjecturally, was not the only one when Du Lac started out in May of 1802.

One other thought is worth considering in connection with the rival claims of Mackay and Trudeau to traveling companionship with Du Lac. Mackay's position as an employee of the Company of the upper Missouri was presumably superior to Trudeau's; and Trudeau, the subordinate, the needy[29] school-

[24] It is principally upon this fact and upon that of the descriptive detail of the map, inclusive of the three posts that Mackay commanded, that Teggart's whole argument is based. "Notes supplementary to any edition of Lewis and Clark," in American historical association, *Annual report*, 1908, volume 1, p. 188. "Mackay's journal of a voyage up the Missouri toward the South sea, 1794," is published in *The Spanish regime in Missouri* (Houck, ed.), 2: 181-192.

[25] Du Lac's mention of his map is very circumstantial: "La carte que je joins ici et que j'ai rectifiée dans une distance de onze cents milles, fera connoître exactement le nombre des rivières qui viennent grossir ses eaux." *Voyage dans les deux Louisianes*, 198. "Je m'y livrai avec délice, et ne m'occupai que quelques heures par jour a rectifier mes notes, et à mettre au net la carte que j'avois corrigée et tracée dans plusieurs parties." *Ibid.*, 218.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] Mackay himself made large claims for his map, or plat. Note the following translation of a report to Don Charles Dehault Delassus:

James Mackey . . . has the honor to represent that during the years 1795 and 1796 he made (in consequence of the commission sent to him to this effect, by his excellency the Baron de Carondelet . . .) a voyage of discovery to the upper and unknown parts of Missouri, from which voyage he has brought memoirs, and particularly a map, such as never appeared before of this unknown part of the world. *American state papers: public lands*, 6: 718. In the translation given, the thing called in this a "map" is spoken of as a "plat." *Ibid.*, 8: 868.

[28] For exact citations and a full discussion of this matter, see Annie H. Abel, "A new Lewis and Clark map," in the *Geographical review*, 1: 340-341.

[29] The idea that Trudeau was a man of very moderate means is borne out by the fact that a relatively small debt of four hundred dollars which he owed to Governor Trudeau was not liquidated until the governor, about to leave St. Louis, executed a deed of gift to him in lieu of payment and in recognition of pedagogical services.

master, was far more likely to be in search of work to eke out a living than was Mackay, who, at the time of Du Lac's visit, was holding an appointment under the Spanish government, his duties being such as would keep him in St. Louis.

ANNIE HELOISE ABEL

DESCRIPTION DU HAUT MISSOURI

Contenant une Exate Relation des Rivieres les plus remarquable qui s'y dechargent depuis au dessus de la grande Riviere platte jusqu au dessus des nations Mandanne & gros Ventre, de leur nom & leur distance avec une idée générale des peuples Sauvages, nouvellement frequentés par les sujets de sa majesté Catholique, de leur meurs, religions, maximes, usages, commerce & autre remarque — tant de ceux qui habitent les Bord de cette grande Riviere que de ceux qui parcourent les pays circonvoisn à loccident.

Par Jean Bap^te^ Trudeau voyageur.

La Riviere des missouris, vient du ouest N. O. et du N. O. en quelque endroit, se jette dan le fleuve du Mississipi (ou Michacypy[a]) a Cinq lieu au dessus de St Louis des Illinois.

DESCRIPTION OF THE UPPER MISSOURI

Containing an exact account of the most remarkable rivers that empty there from above the great river Platte to above the Mandan and Gros Ventres nations, of their name and their distance with a general idea of the savage people recently visited by the subjects of his Catholic Majesty, of their customs, religions, maxims, usages, commerce and other remarks — as well of those who dwell upon the banks of this great river, as of those who wander over the neighboring countries to the westward.

By Jean Baptiste Trudeau,[30] *voyageur.*

The Missouri river comes from the west northwest and, in some places, from the northwest. It empties into the Mississippi river five leagues above St. Louis of the Illinois.

[30] Throughout this article, the spelling of the French-Canadian *voyageur's* name has been used as it is here given. A few years since, when at work on the identification of the Indian office map that was so obviously a part of the equipment of the Lewis and Clark expedition, the writer was much impressed by Mrs. Beauregard's assertion that the man himself always wrote it "Truteau" and that that was the Canadian usage, the pronunciation having been "softened" "in the South" "by the substitution of *d* for *t*." Philologically, of course, *d* and *t* are interchangeable. In the case of the only other Trudeau document that the writer has personally examined in manuscript form, the name is spelled as it is here; but that is admittedly

On n'apu encore savoir aujuste ou cette riviere prende sa source, on croit selon le raport des quelques sauvages qu'elle sort des grande montagne de Roche qui, disent il traversent ce vaste pays, encore inconnu aux nations policées, du nort au sude — les eaux du Missouris coulent jusqu'a l'embouchure de la Riviere platte, entre deux chaines de Côte escarpées qui serpentent Comme elle: et enquelques endroit, elles sont assé Eloignée a Lagrande Riviere
des Bords, qu'entre les Côtes & la rivierre, ilya de grande prairie basse dans les qu'elles on voit Communément des troupeaux de Boeuf sauvage[32] qui y paturent. au delà de Ces Cotes on decouvre de vaste prairies que s'etendent sans interruption jusqu'au pied des montagnes de Roches qui s elevent au Couchant, netant Coupées que par les defferentes rivieres qui les traversent, au bord des quelles, on ne voit que de petit Bois, menus & de Basse futaye.[33] Ces grandes prairies ou grande landes, sont

No one has been able to learn exactly where this river has its source. It is common belief, according to the report of some savages, that it comes from the great mountains of rock[31] which they say cross, from the north to the south, this vast country yet unknown to civilized nations. Up to the mouth of the river Platte, the waters of the Missouri flow between two chains of steep hills which wind as it winds. In some places, they are situated rather far from the great river.

On the banks, which are between the hills and the river, there are large low prairies on which one generally sees herds of the wild cattle[32] that pasture there. Beyond these hills are vast prairies which extend without interruption up to the foot of the mountains of rock which rise up in the west, being cut only by the several rivers which cross them, on the edge of which one sees only little woods, thin and of trees low. These large prairies, or great waste lands, are completely sterile;[34] scarcely grass grows there. Upon the banks of the Missouri, one finds, here and there, some wooded point,[35] narrow and short, supplied only

no indication of the *voyageur's* own spelling; for the instance cited is not that of a signature but that of an indorsement.

31 The Rocky mountains.

32 Buffalo. Thwaites says, "The buffaloes were usually called by the French hunters 'wild cows' or 'wild cattle,' a term often adopted by the English." *Original journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition*, 1: 246, note 3.

33 *Futaie.*

34 For dissent from this general reputation for sterility, see a letter from Meriwether Lewis to his mother, March 31, 1805, quoted at length in *Original journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition* (Thwaites, ed.), 7: 309-312.

35 The word "point" to indicate a small copse, or wooded promontory, became technical in the parlance of the interior. Chardon in his "Fort Clark journal" refers constantly to a certain "point," and Audubon in his "Missouri river jour-

tout afait Steril apeine L'herbe y croit-elle, on trouve Sur les Bord du Missouri de distence en distence quelque pointe de Bois etroite et peu longue fourni seulement en petit liard,[36] saules, et aussi menu bois. Cette Riviere est divisé par quantité d'isle Couverte darbres entrelassé de tant de vigne qu'on a peine à y-passer, elle a presque partout une demi lieu de largeur. Sont lit est moin profond que dan le bas, et il setrouve frequemment Couvert par des batures ou banc de sable fort large, qui forment plusieurs Cheneaux qui en rendent en certains endroits le Chemin dificile: mais il ya toujour assez d'eau en tout tems pour porter les plus grande pirogues; les petit Batteau plat, ou berges, seroient les voitures les plus convenable pour y naviguer.

On n'y rencontre en aucune endroit de ces amas de bois de derive que lon nomme en baras tel quel s'en trouvent Communement sur les bas de Cette Riviere et que lon ne franchit qu'avec risque et peine, on ny trouve non plus aucune bature dangereuse soit Coupée, soit en mauvois rapi-

with small cottonwoods, willows, and also thin woods. This river is diversified by a number of islands covered with trees that are so interlaced with vines that one can hardly pass. It is almost everywhere half a league in width. Its bed is less deep than is the case lower down and it is frequently found covered with sandbars,[37] or banks of sand, very extensive, which form several channels that make the way, in certain places, difficult; but there is always enough water at all times to carry the largest pirogues. The little flatboats, or barges, would be (however) the most suitable conveyances for traveling there.

In no place does one meet with those masses of driftwood that are named *enbaras* such as are commonly found upon the lower part of the river and overcome only with difficulty and danger.[38] Neither does one

nals'' notices the peculiar use of the term thus: ''We saw a patch of wood called in these regions a 'Point'.'' Maria R. Audubon and Elliott Coues, *Audubon and his journals* (London, 1898), 2: 80. It is rather amusing to find a contributor to *Dialect notes*, 5(3): 83, ignoring its French origin and making out its use to be peculiar to the great northwest.

[36] *Liard* was the popular French-Canadian name for the cottonwood. See *Journal of Larocque from the Assiniboine to the Yellowstone, 1805*, edited by Lawrence J. Burpee (*Publications of the Canadian archives*, number 3 — Ottawa, 1910), 28, note 1, and *Original journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition* (Thwaites, ed.), 6: 43.

[37] Many travelers in those early days had reason to comment upon the sandbars that impeded progress in the navigation of the Missouri. The as yet undetermined author of ''Voiage de Regis Loisel dans le haut Missouri'' enlarged at length upon the theme. For references to mention by members of the Lewis and Clark expedition, see *Original journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition* (Thwaites, ed.), 7: 324, 339.

[38] The wooded obstructions, found alone or in combination with the sandbars, were likewise occasion for frequent comment in travel narratives. Again the ''Voiage de Regis Loisel dans le haut Missouri'' and also the *Original journals of the*

quage,[39] plus on marche en remontan vers sa source et moins son Cour est rapide: la seul incommodité que l'on y soufre est de netrouver dan la saison des basses eaux au cun lieu propice pour y metre des pirogues alabrie des vents qui sont tres frequents et tres fougueux dan ce pays la et que l'on est souvent eontrain de decharger les pirogues des marchandises toutes les fois qu'il vente ce qui arrive presque tout les jours.

La grande riviere platte ce decharge dans le missouri a la Gauche en montant a deux cent lieux au dessus de lambouchure de ce dernier, a Cinquente lieu plus haut a la droite on trouve la petite riviere des Sioux

find any dangerous shoal, broken up or in otherwise bad conditions. The farther one ascends toward its beginning, the less rapid one finds its course; the only inconvenience suffered there is in not finding, in the time of low water, any place suitable for mooring the pirogues so that they may be sheltered from the winds which are very frequent and very high in this country and one is often compelled to unload the pirogues every time the wind blows which happens almost every day.

The great river Platte empties into the Missouri, on the left in ascending, two hundred leagues above the mouth of the latter.[40] At fifty leagues higher, on the right, one finds the little river of the Sioux[41]

Lewis and Clark expedition (Thwaites, ed.), especially volume 7, pages 309-310 of the latter, should be mentioned. From its use in the former work as well as in this "Description" of Trudeau's, the word *enbaras* seems almost to have acquired a technical character.

[39] Although the manuscript gives clearly the spelling *rapiquage,* the word has been interpreted as bearing some relation to the modern *repiquage* (Littré: "Terme de construction. Action d'enlever les pavés enfoncés ou cassés d'une chaussée pour le remplacer par d'autres pavés"), and "in a bad condition" seems a better rendering than the more exact "state of repair"; for the context gives no indication that there had previously been erected any artificial structure and surely such would have been anything but desirable since the author's complaint is that the river was naturally difficult of passage. *Repiquage* as a gardening term with the meaning of "transplanting" has likewise been discarded.

[40] The "First part" of the Trudeau journal is practically identical in its phraseology for a bit at this point. It repeats itself thus: "La riviere platte se décharge dans le missouris a deux cent lieux des illinois." *American historical review,* 19: 306. "La riverre platte se decharge dans le [Missouri(?)] a la gauche en montans." *Ibid.* The distance as given is almost that of the Lewis and Clark estimation. See *Original journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition* (Thwaites, ed.), 6: 38, 58; 7: 310, 314.

[41] Du Lac's *la première rivière des Sioux,* which he located at *vingt-six milles* above *un ancien fort bâti en 1792 par la compagnie du haut Missouri. Voyage dans les deux Louisianes,* 208. Trudeau's "First part" has this journal entry: "le dix huit jai campé a la petitte rivierre des sioux a cinquante lieux plus haut que la rivierre platte. nous trouvons ici les eaux plus basses, et les courants moins fort." *American historical review,* 19: 306.

qui n'est navigable quavec des Canot de chasse. Sa source est peu eloigne de sa sortie. trente lieu plus haut à la Gauche habite la nation mahas leur Cabanne sont baties à deux lieux de distence des bords du missouri. Ces Sauvages vont faire la chasse deté & ne revienne a leur village qu'en août, ontrouve a six lieux au dessus des mahas du Côté du nord lagrande Riviere des Sioux qui vient du N. E. N. elle n'est navigable quavec des petite pirogue. les nations Siouze qui frequente les riviere St Pierre & des moins vienne endefferent tems de lannée y faire la Chasse de Boeuf sauvages, & autre Bêtes fauve, a quarante Cinq lieu de Celle cy[45] du même Côté sort la riviere St. Jacque belle riviere tres abon-

which is navigable with hunting canoes only. Its source is not far from its outlet. Thirty leagues higher, on the left, dwells the Omaha nation. Their huts are built two leagues distant from the banks of the Missouri.[42] These savages go out to hunt in summer and return to their villages only in August. Six leagues above the Omaha, one finds, on the north bank, the great river of the Sioux[43] which comes from the north east north. It is navigable only with little pirogues. The Sioux nations that frequent the St. Pierre and Des Moines rivers come at different times of the year to hunt the buffalo and other wild animals.[44] Forty-five leagues from there, on the same side, goes out the river St. James,[46] a beautiful river,

[42] On the subject of the Omaha village, Du Lac would seem to have obtained his detail from Trudeau's "First part" rather than from his "Description." He says in his *Voyage dans les deux Louisianes*, 208, "A quatre-vingt-dix milles de la première rivière des Sioux, (735 milles au-dessus de l'embouchure du Missouri) est la rivière et le village des Mahas . . . . Leur village est situé dans une belle plaine, aux pieds d'un agréable coteau, à une lieue du Missouri." With the foregoing, compare the following from Trudeau's "First part": "Le village des mahas, est situé dans une belle prairie a environ une lieux de distance du missouris et a deux cent quatre vingt lieux des illinois." *American historical review*, 19: 307.

[43] "et je fus campé a la grand riviere des scioux a la droite du missourie (s)ix lieux plus haut que le villages des mahas.

"cette rivierre ne peut porter que des canots de chasse." *American historical review*, 19: 307. "A vingt milles de la rivière des Mahas, est la seconde des Sioux, qui n'est navigable qu'à quelques milles de son embouchure." Du Lac, *Voyage dans les deux Louisianes*, 210.

[44] For the wide range of the Sioux wanderings there is much to offer in evidence. For certain evidence taken from Trudeau alone, see *South Dakota historical collections*, 7: 419, 462, 463-464.

[45] "There." This evidently means the Omaha village, because, in his "First part," Trudeau has put the James river at forty-five leagues above the village of the Omaha. *American historical review*, 19: 307.

[46] An evident error, inadvertent, due to close association, perhaps, since elsewhere the name is given correctly. Loisel knew the river Jacques as the "Bois Blanc." *The Spanish regime in Missouri* (Houck, ed.), 2: 360.

dantes en Castor & autre Bête fauve; ell a selon le raport des Sauvages plus de Cent lieu de Cours, et vient aussi du nord: et il se decharge de dans plusieur autre petite rivierres, dont une est nommé la riviere a la pierre rouge, elle tire son nom dune cariere de cette pierre qui ce trouve sur ses bords. a vingt Cinq lieu au dessus de la riviere a Jacque a Gauche on trouve la riviere qui court, elle prend sa source dan la partie du O. S. O. et fort loin de son embouchure Selon le raport des Sauvages elle est la plus abondante en Castore et Loutre de toute les riviere Connu, mais elle Coule avec tant de rapidité et est si remplie de Cataracte qu'il est impossible dy ñaviguer soit en montant soit endessedent.—[48]

La nation ponças a ses habitations situé a deux lieux plus haut que son embouchure leur Cabanne sont batie sur une eminence au bord dune

very abundant in beaver and other wild animals. It has, according to the report of the savages, a course of more than a hundred leagues and comes also from the north. It disembogues into several other little rivers, one of which is named the river of the red stone.[47] It takes its name from a quarry of this stone that is found upon its banks. At twenty-five leagues above the James river, on the left, one finds the river Qui Court. It has its source in the west southwest and very far from its mouth. According to the report of the savages, it is the most abundant in beaver and otter of all the known rivers; but it flows with such swiftness and is so full of waterfalls that it is impossible to navigate it, either in ascending or in descending.

The Ponca nation has its habitations placed at two leagues higher than its mouth. Their huts are built upon a hill on the edge of a great plain

[47] Quite obviously Trudeau has here confounded the James, or Dakota, with the Big Sioux.

[48] Concerning the Qui Court, or Niobrara river, the "First part" has a passage most striking in its resemblance: "cette rivierre a la gauche De missouris est estimé a soixante et dix lieux du grand village des mahas, et ainsy éloignée de trois cent cinquante lieux de l'embouchure du missouri, selon le rapport des sauvages. elle est la plus abondante en castor et loutres de tout ce continant, mais elle roule ses eaux avec tant de force et de rapiditée, que l'on ne peut, soit disant, y navigué, ni en montant ne en descendant. le villages des poncas est situé a une lieux plus haut, prés du missourie." *American historical review*, 19: 308. Toward the end of his journal, Trudeau places the Ponca villages at about half a league from the Missouri. *Ibid.*, 332. Accompanying the manuscript here edited is a page, numbered 4½, which is seemingly in the handwriting of Nicollet. It reads as follows: "Ces os ont été trouvés sur le haut dela Rivière *Eau qui court*, à peu prés à 25 pieds au-dessus dela surface superieure des Bords pays flat prairie. des deux côtés des *Eau qui court* à 250 ou 300 miles au-dessus de la jonction au Missouri." In the "Extracts" from Mr. Evans' journal, edited by Milo M. Quaife, in Wisconsin historical society, *Proceedings*, 1915, p. 199, the Hay river is the one reputed to have "More Beaver and Otters than in any other part of the Continent."

Grande pleine eloigné d'environ une lieu du missouri, le Boeuf le Chevreuille[49] & Castore est Commun dans cette endroit — a trente Cinq lieux plus haut du même Côté sort une riviere nommé la riviere blanche les eaux en son blanche. Sa source est peu eloigne de son enbouchure.

a quinze lieux au dessus de cette riviere, le missouri fait un detoure de dix lieu, il se jette en cette endroit au S. O. & reprend son Cour ordinaire après dix lieux de detour.

a quinze leiu plus haut on trouve une riviere a la gauche en montant, nommé par les Sauvages l'eau tranquille & par les francais le petit missouri Cette riviere est peu considerable, l'eau ni coule qu'au printems

about a league from the Missouri. The buffalo, the deer, and beaver are common in this place. At thirty-five leagues higher, on the same side, there goes out a river named the White river. Its waters are white.[50] Its source is a little way from its mouth.

Fifteen leagues[51] above this river, the Missouri makes a detour of ten leagues. It turns in this place to the southwest and resumes its usual course after ten leagues of detour.[52]

Fifteen leagues higher, on the left in ascending, one finds a river, named by the savages Tranquil Water, and by the French, the Little Missouri. This river is small. The water runs only in the springtime at

[49] According to the *Journal of Larocque* (Burpee, ed.), 33, note 2, this was the specific French name for the roebuck. Larocque uses the word for fallow deer generally. *Ibid.*, 70.

[50] Whitehouse, in his journal, specifically asserted that "the current and coulour (of the White River) is like the Missouri R." *Original journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition* (Thwaites, ed.), 7: 58. There was never any question about the muddiness of the waters of the Missouri. Du Pratz says, "ses eaux sont limoneuses, troubles & chargées de nître; ce sont les eaux de cette Riviere qui rendent troubles celles du Fleuve S. Louis jusques à la Mer; car le Fleuve S. Louis est très clair au-dessus du confluent du Missouri." Le Page du Pratz, *Histoire de la Louisiane* (Paris, 1758), 1:323. The writer of the Loisel narrative grouped its tributaries with it. "Ses eaux," he wrote, "sont toujours aussi troubles qu'aux ilinois et ses dépots de même nature. Les sauvages ignorent eux mêmes si cette vase sort particulierement d'une de ses branches et dans leurs courses de guerre, aucun n'a été assez loin pour trouver les eaux claires — ce qui est certain que celles qui sortent des grandes riviéres qui se déchargent a la rive west, jusques chez Les ricaras, ne sont pas moins chargées de la même matiére."

[51] "de la rivierre Blanche au grand détour vingt lieux, dú grand detour au petit missourie vingt cinq lieux, du petit missourie au villages des Ricaras quinze lieux." Trudeau's "First part," in *American historical review*, 19: 316. Trudeau is no longer very sure of his calculations.

[52] Lewis estimates that "the big bend of the Missouri lies in a circular form, and is 30 miles around, while it is only one mile and a quarter across the gorge." *Original journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition* (Thwaites, ed.), 6:47.

alafonte des neiges, ou après quelqu'abondance de plui, car autrement on ni voit que quelque bassins deau qui n'a aucun cours, une ordre de Sioux appellée oconona, cy devant amis et alliez des aricaras, parcouroit habituelement les bords de cette riviere.
Les aricaras, appelés par abrigé les ris avoient leur habitation á dix lieux plus haut sur la rive gauche, qu'ils ont abandonné pendant ma residence

the melting of the snow or after some heavy rain. At other times one sees only some ponds of water without flow.[53] One branch of the Sioux, called the *Oconona*,[54] formerly friends and allies of the Arikara, wandered habitually along the banks of this stream.

The Arikara,[55] called for short the Ree, had their dwellings ten leagues higher upon the left bank. These they abandoned during my stay among

[53] Trudeau elsewhere said of this river that it "is very small. The water does not flow at this season of the year and we found it only in holes." Trudeau's "Second part," in *South Dakota historical collections*, 7: 420.

[54] Everything said by Trudeau of the *Oconona* seems to correspond with facts obtained from other authorities respecting a certain group of the Teton Sioux. It was because the Little Missouri was their habitat that Lewis and Clark rechristened it the Teton. *Original journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition* (Thwaites, ed.), 1: 163. Quite possibly the *Oconona* of Trudeau's "Description" were the same as the *Teton O-kan-dan-das* of Lewis and Clark, whose range was near the mouth of the Cheyenne and who were on fairly friendly terms with the Arikara. *Ibid.*, 6: 97. Trudeau does not mention the *Oconona* by name in his journal; but, in the "Second part," in *Missouri historical society collections*, 4: 43, he refers to a village of Sioux, friendly with the Arikara and separated territorially from other Sioux. They were apparently joined by another band of the same tribe, the *Chahony*. *Ibid.*, 47. All these wanderers together may have formed the Hunkpapa of a later day, the *Uncapapas* of some writers. *Handbook of American Indians north of Mexico*, edited by Frederick W. Hodge (Smithsonian institution, Bureau of American ethnology, *Bulletin* 30 — Washington, 1907), part 1, p. 579; Charles King, *Campaigning with Crook and stories of army life* (New York, 1890), 41. In 1825 the Hunkpapa were reported as friendly with the Arikara. *American state papers: Indian affairs*, 2: 607.

[55] "Les Ricaras, autrefois une des nations les plus nombreuses de l'Amerique septentrionale, ont eu jusqu'à trente-deux villages, détruits pour la plupart par les Sioux ou dépeuplés par la petite vérole. Le petit nombre qui a échappé à cette maladie, (laquelle a chez ces peuples des suites bien plus fâcheuses encore que chez nous), s'est réuni depuis quelques années en une seule peuplade, qui compte mille à douze cents guerriers. Ainsi que ceux qui se trouvent plus au nord et nord-ouest, ils n'ont eu jusqu'à présent que très-peu de communication avec les Blancs, et ont conservé, presque dans leur intégrité, les moeurs, les coutumes, les armes et les vêtemens de leurs ancêtres." Du Lac, *Voyage dans les deux Louisianes*, 257.

"In ancient times the Ricara nation was very large; it counted thirty-two populous villages, now depopulated and almost entirely destroyed by the small-pox which broke out among them three different times. . . . This nation formerly so numerous, and which, according to their reports, could turn out four thousand warriors, is now

chez eux, pour ce retirer au près des mandannes, ont fait nombre de Cinq Cent guerrier de cette nation.
a deux lieux au dessus des habitations des ris sort la riviere des chaguienne, que des chasseur ont nommé la fourche: Cette riviere est assé large mais peu profonde de sorte qu'on ne peut y naviguer quavec beaucoup de peine, elle prende ses sources fort loin de son embouchure, dans des Côtes de roches Escarpées, du côté du Soleil couchant elle se Separent en plusieurs fourches sur le haut, bien fournies en bois & tres abondantes en Castor.
a trente lieux environ de son Embouchure sur une de ses fourches, nommé la riviere au Cerize a Grappe, les Chaguiennes yont Batie quelque Caba-

them, in order to withdraw nearer to the Mandan.[56] One can count five hundred warriors of this nation.

Two leagues above the dwelling of the Ree issues forth the river of the Cheyenne which some hunters have named the Fork.[57] This river is rather wide but shallow so that one can navigate it only with much difficulty. It has its source very far from its mouth, in the hills of precipitous rocks, in the direction of the setting sun. In its upper part, it divides into many branches, well supplied with wood and very abundant in beaver.

About thirty leagues from its mouth, upon one of its tributaries, called the river of the Bunch of Cherries, the Cheyenne built there some per-

reduced to about five hundred fighting men." Trudeau's "Second part," in *Missouri historical society collections*, 4: 28-29.

[56] The bearing that this passage has upon the time of the Arikara departure, though slight, is not without interest. According to Trudeau's "First part," the Arikara had vanished from their old haunts before Trudeau reached them. *American historical review*, 19: 314, 318; *South Dakota historical collections*, 7: 423, 429, and notes 42, 43. To the men of the Lewis and Clark expedition, the villages near the mouth of the Cheyenne had the appearance of having been abandoned about five years. *Original journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition* (Thwaites, ed.), 1: 179, 204-205. In the "Second part" of his journal, Trudeau assigns another reason, decimation through smallpox, for the Arikara removal to the neighborhood of Grand river. *Missouri historical society collections*, 4: 28.

[57] In the Loisel narrative the river is never referred to otherwise than as the "Fourche," but in Loisel's own memorial as rendered by Houck in *The Spanish regime in Missouri*, 2: 361, this variation occurs: "Reascending the Misury to a distance of 450 leagues from San Luis, one comes to the River Chayennes, or as it is called, the Courche or Braso." A common Indian name for it, at least later on, was "Wakpa-Washte," or "Good river." On the map published with the reports of Raynolds and Maynadier, in *Senate executive documents*, 40 congress, 2 session, number 77, this name was applied to the river near its junction with the Missouri and "Big Shyenne" only after it had itself received the waters of Cherry creek. The "Big Shyenne" is represented as dividing into "Belle Fourche" and "South Fork," and "South Fork," in its turn, into many branches.

nes fixée, a lentour des quelles il cultivent des petits Chams de mays & de tabac, mais d'ailleur Cette nation qui est divisé en trois bandes ou hordres dont la plus considérable porte le nom de Chaguienne la deuxieme est appellees Ouisy & la troisiemme Chouta, Erre san cesse le Long de

manent huts, around which they cultivated little fields of maize[58] and tobacco; but, furthermore, this nation, which is divided into three bands, or hordes,[59] of which the largest bears the name of Cheyenne, the second is called Ouisy,[60] the third Chouta, wanders without cessation the length

[58] Considering that the Cheyenne, Arikara, Mandan, Gros Ventres, and other upper Missouri tribes were all agriculturists to a greater or less degree, it is rather interesting to observe that Henry R. Schoolcraft's information on this score was about as inaccurate as on many other subjects upon which he professed to give the first and the last word. He says of the cultivation of maize: "Indian corn was planted, to a limited extent, by the Atlantic and Mississippi Valley tribes; but no trader or traveller has ever noticed its cultivation among the interior and mountain tribes." *Historical and statistical information respecting the history condition and prospects of the Indian tribes of the United States* (Philadelphia, 1851-1857), 6: 562. In contradistinction to Schoolcraft's testimony note the following from Du Lac, *Voyage dans les deux Louisianes*, 339: "Les Sauvages du haut Missouri sont sédentaires ou errant. Les Sédentaires sont ceux qui, fixés dans des villages, ne s'en éloignent que pour chasser ou aller en guerre; taudis que les peuples errans suivent les animaux dont ils tirent leur subsistence, et emmènent avec eux tout ce qu'ils possèdent, sans s'inquiéter de la culture. Ils vivent de viande ou de fruits, lorsque la saison leur en offre, et font quelquefois avec les peuples sédentaires qui cultivent le maïs, le citronilles et le tabac, les échanges qui peuvent leur couvenir."

[59] The Cheyenne tribal divisions here given are identical with those in Du Lac, *Voyage dans les deux Louisianes*, 257-258. Du Lac, presumably borrowing at large from Trudeau, says: "Les Chaguyennes qui errent continuellement sur ses deux rives, à la recherche des boeufs sauvages, sont divisés en trois hordes, dont la plus nombreuse conserve le nom de Chaguyenne; la seconde s'appelle Ouisy, et la troisième Chousa. Non contens de chasser sur les bords de cette rivière, ils s'étendent dans d'immenses prairies à peu de distance de la rivière Plate. C'est au-delà de ces vastes prairies que se trouvent des lacs ou grands marais, tellement abondans en castors, pue ces peuples superstitieux prétendent qu'ils sont le séjour du père de tous les castors. L'histoire qu'ils racontent à ce sujet, peut donner une idée de leur simplicité et de leur excessive crédulité." Farther along Du Lac, still borrowing from Trudeau, adds thus to our information about the Cheyenne and their neighbors: "Les Chaguyennes, quoique errans la plus grande partie de l'année, sèment près de leur village du maïs et du tabac, qu'ils viennent récolter au commencement de l'automne. Ils sont généralement bons chasseurs, et tuent beaucoup de castors dont ils trafiquent avec les Sioux. Plusieurs peuples errans, mais qui sont alliés des Chaguyennes, chassent dans le même pays. Ces peuples sont les Cayouwas, les Tocaninambiches, les Tokiouakos et les Pitapahatos. L'on a appris d'eux qu'ayant formé, il y a quelques années." *Ibid.*, 259-260.

[60] In the manuscript here edited, the spelling of this name is unmistakably "Ouisy," the *s* being of the long variety. Du Lac also has so interpreted it; but the translator of Trudeau's "Second part" prefers "Ouify." *Missouri historical*

cette riviere, du haut en bas et traverses même plusieurs chaines de Côte qui separent a plusieurs rangs ces vaste Prairie, a la recherche des vaches sauvage, audela de ces differente Côte endeca de la grande riviere platte, setrouve plusieur petit Lac ou marai qui senble disent-il être les endroits dou son sortis tous les castors & les Loutres qui se sont repondu dans toutes les autres rivieres par la quantité et la grandeur enorme des cabanes que ses animeaux yont Construit et qu'il habitent. —
Plusieurs peuples sauvages non sedentaire parcourent ce pays tel que sont les Cayoouas, les Tocaninanbiche, les Tokiouako, les Pitapahato, tous alliez des Chaguiennes mais de langages different, les Chaguienne scavent très bien chasser aux Castors dont il troquent les peaux avec les Sioux pour des marchandises: et les autres ne manquroient pas d'en tuer aussi beaucoup s'il y etoit induits par des marchands qui le leur echangeroient pour des marchandises, la Grande nation des Pados qui parcoure les bords de la riviere platte, n'est eloignée du missouri a lendroit du territoire des aricaras que de dix jours de marche de Guerriers qui peuvent être evalué a soixante ou

of this river and crosses, in search of wild cows, even many chains of hills that separate, by several ranges, these vast prairies. On the other side of these various hills, on this side of the great river Platte, several little lakes, or bogs, are found, which seem, they say, by the quantity and the great size of the huts which these animals have built there and which they inhabit, to be the places whence have come all the beavers and the otters that are scattered in all the other rivers.

Several savage wandering peoples scour this country, such as are the Kiowa, the *Tocaninanbiche,*[61] the *Tokiouako,*[62] the *Pitapahato,*[63] all allies of the Cheyenne but speaking different languages. The Cheyenne know very well how to hunt the beaver, the skins of which they barter with the Sioux for merchandise; and the others would not fail likewise to kill many of them if they were led to it by traders who would take the skins in exchange for merchandise.

The great nation of the Comanche which roams along the banks of the river Platte is, at the place of the territory of the Arikara, only ten days' march by warriors from the Missouri river which distance can be esti-

society collections, 4: 38. The editor of the reproduction in the *South Dakota historical collections,* 7: 466, note 63, affirms that the village of the Ouisay has not been identified by him.

[61] The *Caminabiches* of the "Second part," better known as Arapaho.

[62] Omitted from the list of the "Second part."

[63] Concerning other renderings of this name, see "Journal of Trudeau," in *Missouri historical society collections,* 4: 31, note 32.

quatrevingt lieux Communes, les hahitannes ou Tête pelée peuple errant occupent tout le pays au dela de la grande riviere platte, jusque sur les bords de lariviere des arkansas; et setendant le long des grande montagnes qui separent le nouveaux mexique de cette partie de la merique meridional.

Lorsque je fus en parol [66] chez la nation Chaguienne dan le Cour de Leté mil sept Cent quatrevingt quinze ou je vis et parlai a plusieurs Chefs et considérés des nations Tocaninanbiche et Cayoouas: je m'informai atous

mated as sixty or eighty common leagues.[64] The *Hahitannes,* or wandering bald-headed people,[65] occupy all the country beyond the great river Platte as far as along the banks of the Arkansas river and extend themselves the length of the great mountains which separate New Mexico from this part of southern Mexico.

When I had dealings with the Cheyenne people, in the course of the summer of 1795,[67] where I saw and spoke to many chiefs and leading men of the *Tocaninanbiche* and Kiowa nations, I inquired of all if, in their

[64] "La grande nation des Padaws qui parcourent la rivière Plate, n'est éloignée de celle des Ricaras que d'environ dix journées de chasseur, que l'on peut estimer à vingt-cinq milles chacune. Les Halisanes ou Têtes pelées sont errans, chassent sur l'autre rive de la rivière Plate, jusques sur les bords de celle des Arkansas, et s'étendent aux pieds des montagnes du nouveau Mexique, dans un territoire abondant en toutes sortes d'animaux." Du Lac, *Voyage dans les deux Louisianes,* 261.

[65] The *Hahitannes,* or Têtes pelées, the writer cannot positively identify with any of the tribes enumerated by contemporary travelers. In the passage just quoted, Du Lac modifies the spelling to *Halisanes* and elsewhere (for example, on pages 309 and 337) to *Halitanes.* If Mackay were indeed the *ancien traiteur,* it seems odd that he nowhere refers to them under one of the three names. His *Othochita* were below the mouth of the Platte, and there are varieties of the Oto name that are slightly suggestive of Trudeau's appellation. "Mackay's journal of a voyage up the Missouri," in *The Spanish régime in Missouri* (Houck, ed.), 2: 183; *Handbook of American Indians* (Hodge, ed.), part 2, p. 166. The *Halitanes* are, however, in Du Lac's mind quite distinct from the *Ottotatoos. Voyage dans les deux Louisianes,* 309. The Têtes pelées listed by Hodge in *Handbook of American Indians,* part 2, p. 736, could scarcely have been those of whom Trudeau and Du Lac heard. Conceivably, Loisel's *Huapitones* were the *Hahitannes. The Spanish regime in Missouri* (Houck, ed.), 2: 363.

[66] *En parol* is, the writer is pretty well convinced, a technical expression, signifying a peace mission. Mackay uses it as such; so also does Du Lac. "Extracts from Capt. McKay's journal" (Quaife, ed.), in Wisconsin historical society, *Proceedings,* 1915, p. 192; Du Lac, *Voyage dans les deux Louisianes,* 320-321.

[67] "Journal of Trudeau," in *Missouri historical society collections,* 4: 38-41; "Trudeau's journal," in *South Dakota historical collections,* 7: 466-468. It is well to note that, in borrowing from this incident, Du Lac carefully conceals the hero's identity and refrains from giving the slightest clew as to the source of his own information.

si dans leur longuer courses de Guerre au dela des montagnes il naurois pas découvert quelque rivieres dont les eaux allassent au Soleil Couchant. Il me dirent qu'il y-avoit dux ans que les Chaguiennes et les Cayoouas leurs alliez avoit formé un partie de Guerre Considerable dont

long war marches beyond the mountains, they had not discovered some river the waters of which might possibly flow toward the setting sun.[68] They told me that two years before the Cheyenne and Kiowa, their allies, had formed a considerable war party[69] in which the great chief

[68] The search for the western sea had been going on intermittently for a long time. Concerning it, the Vérendryes questioned the Mandan, but without obtaining satisfaction. Charles E. DeLand, "The Verendrye explorations and discoveries," in *South Dakota historical collections*, 7: 180. It was one of the things given great prominence in the official instructions to Trudeau, November 25, 1794, and the very language of those instructions acquires a new significance in the light of the "Description du haut Missouri." "He shall attempt to have friendly relations with the Indians who live on the other side of the Rocky [mountain] Chain, on which there are numerous nations, known under the name Serpientes [*i. e., Snakes*], and to find out from them, if they have any knowledge of the Sea of the West [*Mar del Ouest*] and if the waters of the rivers on the other side of the Rocky [mountain] Chain flow westward." *The Spanish regime in Missouri* (Houck, ed.), 2: 166. Similar instructions must have been issued to Mackay, who had been interested in the search as far back as the days of his British service, and by him to Evans. "Mackay's journal of a voyage up the Missouri," in *The Spanish regime in Missouri* (Houck, ed.), 2: 192; "Journal of Trudeau," in *Missouri historical society collections*, 4: 20, note 22; "Extracts from Capt. McKay's journal" (Quaife, ed.), in Wisconsin historical society, *Proceedings*, 1915, p. 195. A special inducement toward the prosecution of the search was the promise of a monetary gift from the royal treasury upon accomplishment. "Journal of Trudeau," in *Missouri historical society collections*, 4:10.

[69] The Trudeau narrative, from this point on, furnished material wholesale to Du Lac. Indeed, if for other parts of his book Du Lac plagiarized as much as he did for this part, it can be safely said that there was scarcely anything in it that was his own. Narcisse E. Dionne, *Samuel Champlain* (Quebec, 1891), is the only thing comparable to it in the writer's experience. Du Lac's account of the Indians' recital is as follows, the quotation beginning where that ends:

L'on a appris d'eux qu'ayant formé, il y a quelques années, un grand parti de guerre et de chasse, ils traversèrent du côté du couchant des montagnes très-escarpées, au pied desquelles une belle rivière coule dans la même direction. Après l'avoir descendue plusieurs jours, ils rencontrèrent sept familles, qu'ils attaquèrent et défirent sans difficulté. Étant entré dans leurs cabanes, ils ne découvrirent rien qui pût faire présumer qu'ils eussent eu avec les Blancs la moindre communication. Leurs ustensiles étoient d'une forme extraordinaire. Leurs vêtemens, leur chaussure, les harnois de leurs chevaux, étoient de peaux de castors, de loutres, de renards, de loups, de lièvres ou autres animaux dont ce pays abonde. Leurs tentes étoient faites de nattes de joncs, à défaut de peaux de boeufs, dont ils paroissoient être privés. Un petit sac de maïs qu'ils trouvèrent dans le bagage, leur donna occasion de demander à quelques femmes prisonnières si leur nation en cultivoit; elles répondirent que non, mais qu'au bas de la rivière il y avoit un grand village où l'on récoltoit en quantité.

Ayant apperçu au cou et aux oreilles de ces femmes différens coquillages percés et enfilés dans de petits cordons de cuir, ils furent curieux de savoir d'où elles les avoient tirés; elles répondirent qu'à l'embouchure de la rivière il y avoit une grande

le grand chef des chaguiennes etoit partisent, lequ'el m'at rapporté lui même ce fait pour certain: — Quayant traversées les montagnes il avoient arrivé apres plusieurs jours de marches sur les bords dune rivierre large & profonde, bien fourni en bois, dont les eaux paroissoient aller aucouchant d'hiver que le long de cette rivierre quil avoient suivis en descendant ils avoient decouvert sept Cabanes de Sauvages inconnus; les ayant attaque et defait, ils n'ont trouvé dans leur butin aucuns des moindres effets provenants des hommes blanc tout leurs ustencilles étant de leur propre invention, leur Cabannes étoient composé de natte de jonc & de longue paille, les gros animeaux des peaux des quels les Sauvages ont Coutume de faire leur tente menquent absolument dans ce pays, leur vetements leurs chaussures et même les housses de leur cheveaux etoit de peaux de Castor, de Loutre, de Cabri de chevreuille, de Loup, de Renard de Lievre &c. ils ont comme tout les autres lusages de larc et de laflêche dont larmure est de pierre ou dos. un petit sac plin de bleddinde qu'il trouverent parmi leur bagage, leur donna occasion de demander a quelques femmes prisonnieres si leur nation Cultivoient cette plante? Elle repondire que non; mais que dans le bas de cette riviere

of the Cheyenne took part, who himself reported to me this fact for certain: — that, having crossed the mountains, they had come, after many days' journey, to the banks of a wide and deep river, well timbered, the waters of which appeared to go in the direction of the winter sunset; that, along this river which they had followed in descending, they had discovered seven huts of unknown savages; having attacked them and defeated them, they found in their booty none of the small effects coming from white men, all of their utensils being of their own invention. Their huts were made of rush matting and of long straw. The large animals of the skins of which the savages are accustomed to make their tents are absolutely wanting in this country. Their garments, their shoes, and even the saddlecloths were of skins of beaver, of otter, of kid, of deer, of wolf, of fox, of hare, and so forth. They have, as all the others, the use of the bow and arrow, the armor of which is of stone or bone. A little bag full of Indian corn, which they found among their baggage, gave them occasion to inquire of some women prisoners if their nation cultivated that plant. They answered no; but that in the lower part of this river there was a large village of savages

quantité d'eau, qui s'étendoit assez loin pour qu'on ne pût découvrir la rive opposée; que cette eau montoit et se retiroit alternativement en certain temps du jour et de la nuit; que les peuples voisins attchoient au bout de longs cordons des morceaux de viande, qu'ils jetoient pendant les hautes eaux et qu'ils retiroient dans les eaux basses; et que les coquillages dont elles se paroient, se trouvoient en grand nombre collés â la viande dont elles les détachoient.—Du Lac, *Voyage dans les deux Louisianes,* 260-261.

il y-avoit un grand village de Sauvage qui en receuilloient une grande quantité Ces femmes avoient pendu au col et aux oreillas des Coquillages de differente espece & forme, percé et enfillé dans des petit cordons de cuir; il leur demanderent dou elle tenoient ces espece de rassade, elle repondirent qu'a l'entré de cette riviere paroissoit une Grande etendu d'eau dont on nevoyoit pas lautre Rive que leau y'montoit et rebaissoit Considerablement en certain tems du jour et de la nuit; que les Sauvages qui faisoient leur residence aux environs, attachoient, au bout d'une longue Corde, des gros morceaux de viande, qu'il jetoient dans l'eau haute et retiroint lors qu'elle perdoit; que quantité de ces Coquillages setrouvoient Collés à ces pieces de viande et que les ayant detaché, il les percais et se les pendoit ainsi au col et aux oreilles pour parures.

Le Missouri au dessus de la riviere des Chaguienne detourne au N. E. lespace de quatre ou Cinq lieu & ensuite il retourne a L. O. jusqu'au mandanne, il ne recoit du Côté du nord depuis là jusqu'aux nations gros ventre qu'une seul riviere, qui sort a soixante lieux environ audessus de l'embouchure de cette riviere des chaguienne a louest du missouri on trouve Cinq riviere peu Considerable, on estime le village mandanne eloigné de cent lieues de lentré de cette riviere des Chaguienne.

who sowed and reaped a great quantity of it. These women had hung around their neck and ears some shells of various kinds and shapes, pierced and threaded on little strings of leather. They asked them where they obtained this kind of glass bead. They answered that at the mouth of this river appeared a large body of water, the other bank of which was not visible; that the water rose and fell considerably at certain times of the day and night; that the savages that had their homes about there attached to the end of a long line large pieces of meat which they threw into the water when deep and drew out when it ebbed; that a quantity of these shells were found adhering to these pieces of meat; and that, having detached them, they pierced them and hung them thus around the neck and ears for ornament.

The Missouri, above the river of the Cheyenne, turns to the northeast the distance of four or five leagues and, afterwards, it turns again to the west as far as the Mandan. On the north side from there up to the Gros Ventres, it receives only a single river, which issues forth about sixty leagues above the mouth of this river of the Cheyenne. On the west side of the Missouri there are five rivers all of inconsiderable size. It is estimated that the Mandan village is distant one hundred leagues from the entrance of this river of the Cheyenne.

Les Mandannes ne comptent que trois cent Guerriers cette nation est divisé en trois Villages dont le plus grand est situé sur la partie occidentale du missouri est les deux autres plus petit, sur lautre rive a l'opposite les uns des autres toute au pres de cette riviere.
Les Gros Ventres sont plus nombreux, ils peuvent metre sur pied huit Cent Guerriers, Il sont partagés en deux villages situé sur le bord du missouri à la Gauche en montant à environ deux lieuës au dessus des

The Mandan[70] count only three hundred warriors.[71] This nation is divided into three villages, the largest of which is situated on the western side of the Missouri and the two smaller ones upon the other bank opposite, quite near this river.[72]

The Gros Ventres[73] are more numerous. They can put upon foot eight hundred warriors.[74] They are divided into two[75] villages situated upon the bank of the Missouri on the left in ascending, about two leagues

[70] "Les Mandanes étoient autrefois très-nombreux, mais ils ont été tellement maltraités par les peuplades qui habitent le nord du Missouri, et la petite vérole a fait chez eux de si terribles ravages, qu'à peine comptent-ils aujourd'hui trois cents querriers. Ils sont divisés en trois villages, dont le plus considérable est sur la rive occidentale, et les deux autres sur la rive orientale." Du Lac, *Voyage dans les deux Louisianes,* 262-263.

[71] In 1804, two years after Du Lac borrowed his information from Trudeau, the estimate was 350. *Original journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition* (Thwaites, ed.), 1: 220.

[72] Mackay reported "The Mandaines, jointly with the Manitouris (Minitaree) and Wattasoons live in five Villages, which are almost in sight of one another, three of those Villages are on the South Side of the Missouri and two on the North Side." "Extracts from Capt. McKay's journal" (Quaife, ed.), in Wisconsin historical society, *Proceedings,* 1915, p. 192. Compare this account with the Lewis and Clark account in *Original journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition* (Thwaites, ed), 1: chapter 5, and with the Maximilian account in *Early western travels, 1748-1846,* edited by Reuben G. Thwaites (Cleveland, 1904-1907), 22: 344, 350. The explanation of the discrepancy, if any there be in reality, may be found, perhaps, in the fact that the Mandan, too, had changed their location. *Original journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition* (Thwaites, ed.), 1: 205.

[73] "Les Gros-ventres, qui ne sont éloignés des villages Mandanes que de quelques milles, peuvent mettre sur pied huit cents guerriers. Ils ont deux villages, d'où ils ne sortent que par bandes, pour aller en guerre ou pour chasser le boeuf sauvage." Du Lac, *Voyage dans les deux Louisianes,* 263. For some unaccountable reason, the English translation of Du Lac's work omits mention of the Gros Ventres.

[74] The Lewis and Clark estimate of the number of Gros Ventres, or *Minitarees,* was 600 or 650. *Original journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition* (Thwaites, ed.), 1: 220.

[75] Trudeau seems to have confused the number of the Mandan villages with that of the Gros Ventres. The occupied villages at about the close of the century were apparently two of the former and three of the latter. See "Journal of Trudeau on the upper Missouri," in *American historical review,* 19: 302, note 1.

mandannes ils sont tous fixés dans leurs habitations dou il ne Sortent que par Brigades soit pour la Guerre soit pour faire la chasse des Boeuf sauvage

Aupres des Villages Mandannes & Gros ventres les Bois du Missouri sont plus épais et de grosse et haute futaies que sur le Bas de cette rivierre, cest adire depuis l'embouchure de la grande riviere platte en remontan jusqu'à ce lieu.

Les assiboines, nation Errante au nord au missouri chez la qu'elle les marchand anglais du Canada Et de la Bai D'hudson font le trafique des pelleteries, frequentent les mandannes & les Gros ventres, dou il

above the Mandan. They are all settled in their dwellings, which they leave only by brigades either for war or to hunt the buffalo.

Near the villages of the Mandan and Gros Ventres, the woods of the Missouri are thicker and of larger full-grown trees than upon the lower part of this river; that is to say, from the mouth of the great river Platte in ascending to this place.

The Assiniboin,[76] a wandering nation to the north of the Missouri, with whom the English[77] traders of Canada and of Hudson bay traffic in peltries, visit the Mandan and the Gros Ventres, from whom they

[76] "Les Asseniboines, nation errante au nord du Missouri, fréquentent les Mandanes et les Gros-ventres, auxquels ils fournissent quelques fusils, de la poudre, du plomb et quelques autres marchandises de peu de conséquence; ils en reçoivent en échange des chevaux, du maïs et du tabac." Du Lac, *Voyage dans les deux Louisianes*, 263.

[77] Du Lac very adroitly eliminates the allusion to the "English traders" but, in another connection (page 219) he gives due weight to the surpassingly great energy of the islanders particularly when displayed in North America. Employees of Spain were especially envious of the success with which the Hudson's Bay company conducted a strictly mercantile intercourse with the native tribes. It is evident in all the literature of the period. A prime reason for their success was offered by Mackay, who, having been a British trader once himself, though of the less reputable Northwest company, could speak with assurance. "Mackay's journal of a voyage up the Missouri," in *The Spanish regime in Missouri*, 2: 185. The reason was the same that the investigator occasionally finds assigned in subsequent years when the British and the Americans had become competitors. The former early established a reputation for business honesty and maintained it unswervingly through periods of great vicissitude. The enterprising spirit of the English was something to cause the lackadaisical Spaniard great anxiety as it eventually did the American. See Larocque's references to Lewis and Clark in L. R. Masson, *Les bourgeois de la compagnie du nord-ouest* (Quebec, 1889), volume 1. Though Mackay personally may not have viewed the American with equal apprehension, there was one Spanish agent who did, and that was Carondelet. A report of his made in 1793 characterizes the American as the indefatigable expansionist. *The Spanish regime in Missouri* (Houck, ed.), 2: 9-17.

tirent des cheveaux du mays Et du tabac, en échange de fusils et autre marchandises qu'il y-aportent. —
a Cinquente lieuës au dessus des Gros ventres a loccident du Missouri, se decharge une grande riviere nommée la Rivierre au roches jaunes, qui est aussi large et aussi profonde a peu de chause près que le Missouri cette Grande rivierre prend sa source dans des montagnes de roches dans la partie O. Ses bords sont bien fournis en bois, il si trouvent des sapins — des pins, des Epinettes, des Bouleaux des cédres Et de toute autre bois, le Boeuf et autre Bêtes fauves courent par troupeau le long de ses bords; plusieurs petite rivierres qui se jettent de dans sont abondante en castor au delà de toute Croyance, la nation du Corbeau peuple nombreu habite ses bords, et plus haut en remontant vers sa source sont situé plusieurs autres nations sauvages qui nous sont encore inconnues. les Sauvages m'ont assure qu'elle etoit très profonde fort loin de son

obtain horses, corn, and tobacco in exchange for guns and other merchandise that they bring there.

At fifty leagues above the Gros Ventres, to the west of the Missouri,[78] there discharges a large river, called the river of the Yellowstone,[79] which is almost as broad and deep as the Missouri. This great river has its source in the mountains of rocks in the western part. Its banks are well supplied with wood.[80] There are found firs, pines, North American firs, birches, cedars, and every other tree.[81] The buffalo and other wild animals rove in herds along its banks. Many little rivers that flow into it abound in beaver beyond all belief.[82] The nation of the Crow, a numerous people, dwells along its banks and, higher up, in ascending toward its source, are situated several other savage nations that are still unknown to us. The savages assured me that it was very deep a long

[78] "A cent cinquante milles à l'ouest du Missouri, au-dessus de la nation des Gros-ventres, se trouve l'embouchure d'une grande rivière, appelée la *Roche jaune.* Ses bords abondent en boeufs sauvages, ainsi qu'en toutes sortes de bêtes fauves; elle est habitée par la nation du Corbeau, nombreuse, mais encore peu connue." Du Lac, *Voyage dans les deux Louisianes,* 263.

[79] Called also "river a la Biche," because of the elk there. *Journal of Larocque* (Burpee, ed.), 55.

[80] "There is more timber in the neighbourhood of the junction of these rivers, and on the Missouri as far below as the White-earth river, than there is on any part of the Missouri above the entrance of the Chyenne river to this place." *Original journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition* (Thwaites, ed.), 1: 337.

[81] The botanical knowledge of Lewis and Clark was far more adequate to the occasion than was that of Trudeau, as is evidenced by their wealth contrasted with his meagerness of detail. *Ibid.,* 337-338.

[82] *Ibid.,* 343. Presumably, one chief object of Larocque's journey of 1805 from the Assiniboine to the Yellowstone was to determine whether the beaver were there as reported. *Journal of Larocque* (Burpee, ed.), 45.

embouchure: un Canadien nommé menard qui depuis seise années fait sa residence au mandannes, ou il est venut par le nord, et qui a été plusieurs fois chez la nation du Corbeau de Compagnie avec les gros ventres leurs alliés m'at assuré que cette rivierre etoit navigable avec de Grande pirogues aplus de cent cinquente lieuës au dessus de son embouchure, san quil s'y rencontrent aucunes chutes ni Rapides, il mettent ordinairement quinze à vingt jours d'une marche lante par terre pour se rendre des mandannes à la nation du corbeau, un fort Bâti à l'entré de cette rivierre seroit fort aventague pour ouvrire un grand commerce de pelleteries non seulement avec les nations situés sur les bords de cette belle rivierre mais encore avec celle qui parcourent les Bords du missouri au dessus de sa sortie, tel sont les Chiouitounes et la nation du Serpent, dont nous n'avons que de foible Connoissence, une

distance from its mouth. A Canadian, named Menard,[83] who, for sixteen years has made his home with the Mandan, whither he came from the north, and who has been several times among the nation of the Crows in company with the Gros Ventres, their allies, has assured me that this river was navigable with large pirogues more than a hundred and fifty leagues above its mouth,[84] without meeting any falls or rapids. They take usually fifteen or twenty days of a slow march on land to go from the Mandan to the Crow nation. A fort built at the entrance of this river would be very profitable[85] for the opening up of a large trade in peltries, not only with the nations situated upon the banks of this beautiful river, but likewise with those that roam the banks of the Missouri above its outlet. Such are the *Chiouitounes*[86] and the Snake

[83] Trudeau, in his "Second part," in *Missouri historical society collections*, 4: 36-37, records sending a letter "to Menard and Jussaume who were living among the Mandans." It is supposed that this Menard was the same man, a Canadian, for whom Larocque reports a residence of forty years on the upper Missouri, and the same as he of the name who was murdered by Assiniboin in 1803. *Journal of Larocque* (Burpee, ed.), 17. Alexander Henry stated the facts of his untimely death and Lewis and Clark heard rumors of it when on their way to the Mandan in 1804. *Original journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition* (Thwaites, ed.), 1: 205.

[84] On the navigability of the Yellowstone, see John F. Finerty, *War-path and bivouac, or the conquest of the Sioux, a narrative of stirring personal experiences and adventures in the Big Horn and Yellowstone expedition of 1876, and in the campaign on the British border, in 1879* (Chicago [1890]), 230, and King, *Campaigning with Crook*, 90. In the Sheridan-Sherman inspection report, the Yellowstone is remarked upon as seeming to be, for almost a hundred miles, fully as large as the Missouri. *Ibid.*, 27.

[85] For the attempts of which this was an early forecast, see Chittenden, *The American fur trade of the far west*, 3: 957-958.

[86] Shoshoni.

Grande parties de la nation assiboine qui parcourre les terre Septentrional du missouri auroit bien plus près de venir trafiquer ses pelleteries a ce fort que non pas de les porter au fort des anglais de la riviere Rouge. —

Lapartie occidentale et Septentrionale du missouri de puis la Rivierre blanche trante cinq lieuës audessus des poncas jusqu'a cette rivierre que jai dit se jetter dan le missouri soixante leues au dessus de la rivierre des Chaguiennes n'est frequente que par les nations Siouse, appelés tithons, qui sont divisés en quatre peuplades Errantes; ils traversent aussi sur la partie occidentale de cette rivierre pour y faire la chasse des Boeuf sauvages et des Castorqui s'y trouvent en plus grand nombre que sur lautre partie. Les nations Siouse sont celles qui font le plus de chasse aux Castors et autre bonne pelleteries du haut missouri, il parcourent

nation of which we have only slight knowledge.[87] A large part of the Assiniboin nation, which roams[88] over the land north of the Missouri, would have a much shorter distance to come to trade its peltries at this fort than to carry them to the English fort on the Red river.[89]

The western and northern part of the Missouri, from the White river[90] thirty-five leagues above the Ponca up to this river that I have said flows into the Missouri sixty leagues above the Cheyenne river, is visited only by the Sioux nations, called Teton, who are divided into four wandering tribes;[91] they roam also over the west side of this river in order to hunt the buffalo and the beaver which are found there in greater numbers than upon the other side. The Sioux tribes are those who hunt most for the beaver and other good peltries of the upper Missouri. They scour

[87] It was to be a long while before any other report than that of profound ignorance was to be made. Alexander Ross was, of the prominent and influential Canadian traders, the one most appreciative of the potentialities of the Snake country. See Ross, *The fur hunters of the far west; a narrative of adventure in the Oregon and Rocky mountains* (London, 1855).

[88] "Les Assiboins," wrote Chateaubriand, "errent, sous divers noms, depuis les sources septentrionales du Missouri jusqu'à la grande rivière Rouge, qui se jette dans le baie d'Hudson." *Oeuvres complètes*, 12: 266.

[89] The Hudson's Bay company traders had penetrated to the Red river district about 1788. Davidson, *The North West company*, 69.

[90] "Depuis la rivière Blanche qui se jette dans le Missouri, à deux cent quarante milles plus bas que celle des Chaguyennes, jusqu'à une autre dont le nom est encore inconnu, à cent quatre-vingt milles au-dessus, toute la rive orientale est occupée par les Sioux ou Thons, divisés en quatre peuplades errantes. Souvent ils viennent sur la partie occidentale chasser les loutres et les castors, qui y sont en plus grand nombre que sur celle qu'ils habitent." Du Lac, *Voyage dans les deux Louisianes*, 262.

[91] Compare with a similar account as to the number in the Teton group. *Original journals of the Lewis and Clark expedition* (Thwaites, ed.), 1: 133; 6: 97-98.

toutes les rivierres et les Ruisseaux sans craindre personne. Ils en elêvent tous les printems une Grande quantité de notre territoire qu'il vont echanger pour des marchandises avec les autres peuplades Siouse situé sur la Rivierre St. Pierre et des moins frequanté par les march[d] de Canada, il seroit facile d'établire sur le missouri des magazin de marchandises pour leur fournire leur besoin et avoir le Commerce de leur pelleteries.

Les Sioux s'eloignent des bord du missouri au commencement du mois d'avril et y reviennent ordinairem[t]. dans le Cour du mois de juillet & août, qu'ils parcourent des deux Coté jusqu'au printems, ces le seul tems ou on pouroit passer les endroits qu'ils ont Coutûme de frequenter avec quelque sureté pour parvenire chez les nations situées sur le haut missouri. —

Tout les peuples sauvages dont jai fait mention dan cette description, c'est-adire ceux qui habitent à l'occident du missouri, sont les plus doux et les plus humains pour nous de tout les peuples de l'univers. Ils ont

all the rivers and the streams without fearing any one. They carry away every springtime, from out of our territory,[92] a great number of them, which they exchange for merchandise with the other Sioux, situated on the St. Peter's and Des Moines rivers, frequented by the traders of Canada. It would be easy to establish upon the Missouri storehouses of merchandise to provide for their needs and to secure the trade of their peltries.[93]

At the beginning of the month of April, the Sioux wander far from the banks of the Missouri[94] and usually return in the course of the months of July and August and scour its two banks until springtime; for this is the only time when one can pass the places which they are accustomed to visit with any safety in order to come among the nations situated on the upper Missouri.

All the savage peoples which I have mentioned in this description, that is to say, those which dwell on the west of the Missouri, are the mildest and the most humane toward us[95] of all the people of the universe.

[92] The very similar statement in Trudeau's "Second part" is interesting. *South Dakota historical collections,* 7: 462. The additional detail, which Du Lac gives here as elsewhere and which is frequently to be found in one part or the other of Trudeau's journals, suggests the possibility of his acquaintance with one and all of Trudeau's productions.

[93] A reference to the great object of the various expeditions of the time conducted under Spanish auspices — Mackay's, Trudeau's, and Evans'.

[94] "Trudeau's journal," in *South Dakota historical collections,* 7: 463-464.

[95] In the "Second part" this excellence of character is most unaccountably ascribed to the Arikara and to them alone. *Ibid.,* 455. But, inasmuch as a reputa-

un grand respect et une Grande vénèration pour tout les hommes blancs en Général qu'il mettent au rang de la divinitee, et tous ce qui provient deux est regardés par ces mêmes peuples comme des Chause miraculeuse. Il ne scavent point faire la distinction des nations policées, anglaise, francaise, Espagnoles &c. qu'ils nomment tous indifferemment hommes Blanc ou Esprits. —
le Commerce ce fait chez-eux tres paisibliment celui qui ne trouve pas assez de ce qu'on lui donne en echange de sa pelleteries la remporte sen

They have a great respect and a great veneration for all white men[96] in general, whom they put in the rank of divinity, and all that which comes from them is regarded by these same people as miraculous. They do not know how to distinguish among civilized nations, English, French, Spanish, et cetera, whom they call indifferently white men or spirits.[97]

Trade is carried on with them very peaceably. He who does not think what is given him in exchange for his peltries is enough carries it

tion for gentleness of disposition would be so completely out of accord with known facts told of the Ree by travelers then and long afterwards, the commentator is fain to assume that Trudeau unwittingly made a mistake when he wrote his journal and, realizing as much later on, availed himself of the earliest opportunity to correct it. As a matter of fact, there was never much difference of opinion among traders and travelers respecting the shortcomings of the Arikara. They were universally hated. The writer of the Loisel narrative sojourned among them, as did Trudeau, for a brief space, and his testimony swells the great mass of condemnation. It was quite otherwise with the Mandan. They won the approval, sometimes, at least, deservedly, of many visitors, a few of whom, like Catlin, went so far as to sentimentalize over them. Henry despised them; so also did Chardon, who spent many a long year in close daily intercourse with them. Although somewhat prejudiced, no doubt, he knew thoroughly well whereof he spoke.

[96] Were it possible to print here, in facsimile, illustrative pages of the journals and of the "Description" in order to attest the similarity in penmanship and in subject matter, this particular passage would be one to select. The corresponding passage on page 4 of the "Second part" (compare the manuscript in the state department) is strikingly like it.

[97] "Les Sauvages qui habitent la rive occidentale du Missouri, sont doux et humains avec les Blancs, pour lesquels ils ont une grande vénération, et qu'ils désignent indifféremment sous e nom d'Esprits. Le commerce se fait avec eux sûrement et paisiblement. L'on peut regarder comme règle certaine, que moins les Indiens ont eu de communications avec les peuples policés, plus ils sont bons, généreux, et bienfaisans à leur égard." Du Lac, *Voyage dans les deux Louisianes*, 263-264. "The Panis Ricaras are of a rather gentle nature; they respect and defer to the White Men. (I will hereafter make use of these words in the continuation of these *memoires* to designate civilized people; as the Indians of this country do not know any distinction between the French, Spanish, English, etc., calling them all indifferently White Men or Spirits.)" "Second part," in *Missouri historical society collections*, 4: 24. "Those Indians who have had little or no intercourse with us are more civil, kinder, and more humane than those whom we habitually visit." *Ibid.*, 25

murmure ni menace. Enfin jedirai quayant moimême fréquenté toutes les nations sauvages situées a l'orient et a l'occident du missisipy et toutes celles qui habitent le bas missouri, jenai jamais trouvé aucunes qui approchent celle cy en douceur et en Bonne façon pour nous, il-y-a autan de difference des uns au autres que du jour a la nuit. —

away, nevertheless, without murmur or threat. I would say, finally, that, having myself visited all the savage nations situated on the east and west of the Mississippi and all those who dwell on the lower Missouri, I have never found any who approach these in kindness and good will toward us. There is as great difference between them as between day and night.[98]

[98] "He who is not satisfied with what is offered him in exchange for his peltries carries them away without a murmur or threat. Indeed, I will say that having frequented all of the Indian nations living East and West of the Mississippi as well as those living on the lower Missouri, I have found none who approach these in gentleness and kindness towards us. There is as much difference between these and the others as there is between day and night." "Second part," in *Missouri historical society collections*, 4: 24-25; *South Dakota historical collections*, 7: 456. It will be noted that in the above Trudeau is still referring, although erroneously, to the Arikara, the antecedent of "these." The "others" are indeterminate. The writer is inclined to the opinion that the even greater vagueness of reference in the "Description" is due to the fact that some of the context is gone. Trudeau was probably adapting certain portions of his journals to new purposes and was not entirely sure of his own facts.

BOOK REVIEWS

Edited by Lester B. Shippee

Since the civil war. By Charles Ramsdell Lingley. (New York: The Century company, 1920. 635 p. $2.65)

The difficulties attending the presentation in an orderly and logical form of the facts of recent American history are well known to anyone who has attempted to give a course to a group of college or university students. Even more embarrassed is the individual who tries to condense into the limits of a single volume the multifarious events which have taken place within the past half century. Those who believe that a work, particularly when intended to be used as a textbook, should be something more than a chronicle, a series of annals, can sympathize with Professor Lingley's perplexities in struggling with the mass of materials available for use, yet so far little digested, which make up the sources of contemporary history. Time has not sifted the relevant from the irrelevant, the truly important from the ephemeral. No working and reworking has weeded the field to leave the fruitful plants and eliminate the hampering but rank growths which sometimes hide the real crop from the casual eye. Nevertheless, there must come the pioneers who subdue the soil before later tillers can garner abundant harvests. Professor Lingley is one of the pioneers, and what he has done will make somewhat easier the task of those who follow. To criticize, then, is not to condemn the work of the earlier toiler, but to point out untouched places, to call attention to oversights or what appear to be such in order that others who follow may profit.

In the first place, the outstanding lack in this book would seem to lie in the absence of any distinct unifying motive or line of thought which runs through and colors the lasting factors in the history of the American people since the civil war. There is no slavery issue, nor is there much left of the equally important factor of the frontier, tied as that was with the existence of a vast public domain to be occupied and brought under the control of man. Nevertheless, as time goes on, there does appear to be emerging a dominant theme which persists through the past fifty years, and this theme is the economic or industrial revolution and its modifying influences on the development of the United States. At times this fact seems to be recognized in the work under consideration, but only fleetingly, for it ever and anon becomes merged with a mass of detail strung together in more or less chronological order. That the full effect of the industrial revolution — or "secondary" revolution, as the

economists sometimes choose to call it — was interwoven with the disappearance of the frontier is coming to be realized more and more by students of later history. One does not, however, feel that Professor Lingley felt its full force.

Notably is this the case in the treatment of the whole agrarian movement which, after the war, manifested itself in the antimonopoly agitation and persisted through the granger movement, the alliance movement and populism, and appeared still later in the nonpartisan revolt. Not only does the book give inadequate consideration to the alliances, but it fails sufficiently to show how they ripened into populism, or to bring out how significant the later movement was in molding American development. Furthermore, the part which it played in the south both as a local and a national force is practically ignored. While speaking of this matter the question might well be raised as to why the participation of the populists in the election of 1908 is mentioned when the struggle within the party in 1896 and the wide open split with the resulting middle-of-the-road faction of 1900 pass without comment.

Another theme, the treatment of which may be questioned, is that of foreign relations beginning in the nineties. The Spanish-American war, aside from the interest of Americans in Cuba, calls for at least a reference to the distinctly truculent attitude on the part of a vocal portion of the American people which existed all through the second administration of Cleveland, which responded to the call in Olney's Venezuela note, and which sated itself in the battle of San Juan hill and the destruction of Cevera's fleet. Furthermore, there seems to be no slight connection between a growing interest in international affairs and the development of an industrial America which was perforce turning from agriculture as the predominant economic fact to manufacturing, the integration of industry, large-scale organization, and the concomitant necessity of ever-broadening markets and sources of supply. The acquisition of a canal site, the greater concern about what occurred in the West Indies and in central and northern South America, on the one hand, and the retention of the Philippines, the open door, and a changing attitude toward Japan, on the other are not isolated events but were vitally connected with what was going on and with what had already occurred within the United States. This is hinted at in some places in Professor Lingley's book, but it is much to be doubted whether the fact would be grasped by the ordinary student or by a casual reader without further explanation and interpretation.

Again, it is a commonly accepted fact that the prevalence of labor agitation which has been particularly noticeable since about 1877 is but the reverse of the picture of big business. To a degree this fact is recognized. Nevertheless when one comes across such a statement as this:

"Although a radical, socialistic element broke away [*from regularly organized labor*] in 1905 and formed the Industrial Workers of the World, yet the defection was not immediately serious and in general schisms have been avoided," and then seeks in vain for further reference to the I. W. W. and what that whole movement signifies, one wonders if one's own perspective has been completely distorted.

In general it may be said that the portion of the book dealing with the period before about 1896 is much more satisfactory than that which follows, for in the earlier portion the sense of disjointed enumeration of a multiplicity of facts is much less pronounced than in the later.

But after all is said and specific criticisms have been made to a much greater length than above, it remains to be stated that this is the most satisfactory (or least unsatisfactory) of the several works which have so far been produced to cover the period of the past half century. Each chapter has a bibliographical note which contains many useful references, although there might be suggested additions which would allow a somewhat broader interpretation. The index is fair but exasperating at times.

Alexander Hamilton. By Henry Jones Ford. Figures from American history. (New York: Charles Scribner's sons, 1920. 373 p. $2.00)

Hamilton's life was so largely made up of political strife that his earlier biographers fell quite naturally into the error of assuming that full justice could be done to his reputation only by blackening indiscriminately the characters of all his political enemies. Professor Ford's little book is highly valuable because he wrote it without a chip on his shoulder, because he has given the reader the fruits of accurate historical research in his examination of the facts of Hamilton's life, and because he has interpreted those facts with a breadth and wisdom well calculated to lead to a clearer appreciation of the true measure of Hamilton's statesmanship.

New light is thrown upon Hamilton's relations with the other great men of his time. Professor Ford shows, for instance, that during the convention of 1787 there was no substantial difference between the political views of Hamilton and those of Madison. The English constitutional system was the model for each. But much stress is laid upon the later desertion of Madison and the disastrous results of it. The original plan of the federalist leaders was to establish an intimacy between congress and the executive branch through the channel of the treasury department. Madison's influence was responsible for denying Hamilton, as secretary of the treasury, the right to defend his financial proposals in congress and thus was set the precedent for the wide gap between executive and legislative power which constitutes so serious a defect in

our present constitutional system. Professor Ford believes that Hamilton and Jefferson differed in their fundamental political principles much less than is commonly thought and he makes clear that the open breach between them did not occur until questions of foreign policy became critical. He finds one of the great blemishes on Hamilton's reputation in his willingness, after retiring from the cabinet, to continue in the private and irresponsible direction of public affairs, a direction "incompatible with any sort of constitutional government." With Adams retaining Washington's cabinet, a group which still recognized Hamilton's influence and authority, a quarrel between the two men was inevitable. But the feud was due in part to Adams' character and, while not excusing Hamilton for his final attack on Adams, the author is disposed to lay less blame on Hamilton than most historians have done. It is questionable whether Professor Ford's characterization of Adams as "a vain, irascible, garrulous pedant," does full justice to the man. Burr, on the other hand, emerges as a much less villainous figure than the admirers of Hamilton have heretofore been willing to admit. After declaring that Burr fully realized the ideal portrayed in Chesterfield's *Letters,* the author gives evidence to show that Hamilton was guilty of a continued and malicious persecution of Burr which under the customs of the day amply warranted the challenge to duel.

In Professor Ford's judgment the charges that Hamilton's political views were aristocratic or monarchial are wholly unsound. He believes him to have been far in advance of his age in recognizing and adhering to the essential principles of real democratic government. He believed in manhood suffrage and representative government. "His constitutional ideal . . . may be fairly described as plenary power in the administration, subject to direct and continuous accountability to the people, maintained by a representative assembly, broadly democratic in its character."

ROBERT EUGENE CUSHMAN

Jonathan Trumbull. Governor of Connecticut. 1769-1784. By his great-great-grandson, Jonathan Trumbull. (Boston: Little, Brown, and company, 1919. xiii, 362 p.)

Among the "war governors" of the American revolution, there is no more picturesque figure than that of Jonathan Trumbull, the sturdy Puritan whig who took his place at the head of the Connecticut government on the death of his predecessor in 1768 and held it, by repeated annual elections, for more than fifteen years. His services to his own state and to the common cause of independence were great and are naturally recalled with satisfaction in this book by one of his descendants. Unfortunately, the author did not live to see the work through the press.

This is not the first attempt at a biography of Governor Trumbull.

In 1849, Isaac W. Stuart published a voluminous work quite uncritical in its approach to the subject and expanded to an inordinate length by a diffuse and highly rhetorical style. The reader of this new biography will be grateful to its author for telling the story in about half the space required by his predecessor and in a plain, straightforward style. Mr. Trumbull has used some new material, though in the main his sources are the same as those used by Stuart. He has also been conscientiously on his guard against the pitfalls which beset a family biography. Of most direct interest to most readers of this journal are the chapters dealing with the Wyoming controversy.

Notwithstanding its solid virtues, the book leaves something to be desired, whether from a literary or a scientific point of view. There are too many long quotations from formal documents, some of which add comparatively little to the information of the reader. Wider reading of recent books on the genesis of the revolution would have saved the writer from some errors and would have enabled him to give a more adequate setting for the old governor's career. Notwithstanding his obvious effort to be fair, he could not quite escape the prepossessions of his family connection and his state patriotism. There is a little too much impatience with inconsiderate disturbers of pleasant Connecticut traditions; after all, we are reminded, they may be as good as much that passes for history, comparatively little of which "can be proved by direct evidence, such as seems to be called for to prove the authenticity of our Brother Jonathan tradition." E. B. G.

A short history of the British commonwealth. Volume I. By Ramsay Muir. (London: George Philip and son, limited, 1920. 824 p.)

This first volume extends to the year 1763 and a second volume bringing the narrative down to the present time is soon to follow. Mr. Muir has not followed the traditional perspective of English history, for his object is to tell how the present British empire came into being and how it works. The whole treatment of the subject is subordinated to this larger concept. Naturally in this volume we have to do with the beginnings, but more pages than ordinary are devoted to Scotland, Wales, and Ireland as starting points in the great expansion. The account of the American colonies and of the East India company to 1763 is very satisfactory, both being treated from the imperial point of view. American students will find Mr. Muir's interpretation of the eighteenth century, in its local and imperial aspects, illuminating, although he is not acquainted with some important contributions to the interpretation of this period that have been made by American scholars.

C. W. A.

War costs and their financing. A study of the financing of the war and the after-war problems of debt and taxation. By Ernest Ludlow Bogart. With an introduction by Russell C. Leffingwell. (New York: D. Appleton and company, 1921. 510 p. $3.00)

The people of the United States, if not of the entire world, and especially students of public finance and international relations, are greatly indebted to Professor Bogart for this timely and readable presentation of the financing of the world war. Professor Bogart was peculiarly fitted to undertake this work by his long and intimate familiarity with economic and financial history, by his participation in the work of the war trade board and the department of state during and immediately following the war, by his contact with a large number of the public problems and officials with whom his work was directly and indirectly connected, and especially and immediately by the results of his investigations which were published in 1919 by the Carnegie endowment for international peace under the title *Direct and indirect costs of the great world war.*

As one would naturally expect, the book under review is primarily a financial history, a record of facts which serve as a basis for the discussion of principles. The facts do not hold such predominance over principles in this volume as in the one published by the Carnegie endowment. After a few preliminary chapters on the basis of national and international credit, financial readjustments at the outbreak of the war, and the rôle of the United States as a neutral, Professor Bogart discusses war expenditures, paper money and bank credit, loans and taxes in each of the belligerent countries, and after-war financial problems.

The unduly great reliance upon credit rather than upon taxes on the part of all the belligerents except the United States and possibly Great Britain is especially emphasized throughout the book, as is also Germany's premeditation in all plans connected with the war and the deception of its own people as well as of the world regarding the extent of its floating indebtedness.

A judicially minded neutral would probably feel that not all of Professor Bogart's comparisons of the acts and policies of Germany with those of its enemies were quite fair to the former. A partisan of the central powers could certainly point out some near parallels in enemy practice and policy, but it is probable that the bias of most readers will be such that little objection will be made to these comparisons and their implications. The entire work hardly touches upon issues of American party politics, but with reference to United States war finance some will think it somewhat apologetic for the policies of Mr. Wilson's secretaries of the treasury. The flavor of this is much stronger in the introduction than elsewhere, but it is apparent in several places. A citizen of almost

any country other than the United States might say there was a persistent flavor of American self-commendation, also, although the author's temperament and training have kept this within bounds not common to the unscholarly.

Unfortunately lack of space prevents the discussion of practically all the points and passages noted for comment. With some of these of minor importance the reviewer would disagree; many others he would heartily commend and emphasize. He wishes every citizen, especially every serious-minded student and leader of public affairs, would read this volume for the grasp it would give him upon fundamental American and world problems, present and future.

ROY G. BLAKEY

A history of the constitution of Minnesota. By William Anderson. In collaboration with Albert J. Lobb. [Research publications of the University of Minnesota. Studies in the social sciences, number 15] (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1921. 323 p. $1.75)

The spirited style and careful workmanship of this volume would indicate that the author thoroughly appreciated the humor and enjoyed the novelty of writing the history of a constitution of which there are two originals, each in eight distinct handwritings, differing widely in punctuation and capitalization, and enrolled in one night after two rival conventions and a conference committee had spent weeks in partisan bickering and political chicanery. Mr. Anderson makes it entirely clear why Minnesota is probably the only state in the union in the predicament of having a constitution with two original versions of equal validity, "no court having as yet decided which document shall be referred to."

The author is entitled to the distinction of exploring a field of historical research which may result in important changes in writing the history of the United States. In the past historians have relied mainly upon congressional proceedings and documents more or less national in character. Mr. Anderson's book is a powerful reminder that the history of the United States is the history of commonwealths as well as of sections, classes and interests.

The historian's interest in the volume centers largely in the pages devoted to an illuminating discussion of the historical setting of the movement for statehood. The constitution of Minnesota was framed and adopted when two great issues were agitating the public mind: slavery and know-nothingism. When the constitutional convention met, party feeling over the extension of slavery was at white heat and certain individuals were bringing into play every device known to the political game to cover up their tracks lest it be discovered that they led to the inmost recesses of a know-nothing lodge — a most unfortunate revelation

in a state harboring a considerable number of German, Irish, and Scandinavian immigrants. A searching examination of the newspaper files of territorial days reveals the intense feeling between the democrats and the radical, libertarian republicans who were not wedded to the existing order of things. In Minnesota, as in every state and territory where the political power of the foreign born had to be reckoned with, the republicans were the targets for democratic sneers about abolitionists, know-nothings, prohibitionists, revolutionists, and disunionists. The Swedes in the large Chisago county settlement voted solidly republican in the election of delegates to the constitutional convention, the Maine law and other radical proposals of the militant republicans having no terrors for them. The Germans, on the other hand, were not ready to sacrifice the pleasures of the tavern by sending republican know-nothings and prohibitionists to frame the state constitution. Likewise republican oratory was wasted on the Irish. A study of the available material has resulted in the presentation of interesting tentative deductions relative to the nativity, occupations, and political experience of the members of the two conventions. A study of similar material in other states would no doubt throw strong light on this interesting phase of party history.

The human, geographical, economic, and political elements in the constitutional development of the state stand out boldly. Beginning with a chapter on the preterritorial period, in which the complicated question of boundaries is considered at some length, the constitutional history of the state is traced from the organization of the territory, when the population of the capital numbered less than one thousand, down to the present time. The chapter on the preliminaries of statehood is a lucid account of the forces which accelerated the movement for statehood: (1) the willingness of members of congress who received scanty political returns on the constantly increasing appropriations for the benefit of the politically impotent residents of the western territories; (2) the heavy immigration and material progress in the territory following hard upon the opening of the Chicago and Rock Island railroad; (3) the conflict between the agricultural, mining, and lumbering interests; (4) the contest over the division of the state and the location of the capital, which assumed the character of a struggle between the "Moccasin Democracy" in the St. Paul region and the "Black Republicanism" of the inhabitants in the southern part of the state; and (5) the urgent need of railroads and the prospects of a congressional land grant.

The election of members to the convention, the organization of the convention, the proceedings of the rival bodies and of the conference committee, and the results of their deliberations have been skillfully

reported, mainly from the two substantial volumes of debates and proceedings, newspapers, and session laws. In preparing the verified text of the constitution the author was put to endless pains in comparing the two originals, standardizing capitalization and punctuation, and preparing a table showing the differences between the versions and including every provision "which at any time has been or which now is a part of the constitution." The value of the volume is further enhanced by a table of proposed amendments, a classified bibliography, and an excellent index. A series of maps illustrates the evolution of boundaries, rival plans for statehood, and the results of the election of delegates.

Almost every page has taxed the judgment and historical honesty of the writer, who had to tread warily through a maze of material — some of it highly controversial — consisting of newspapers, court decisions, statutes, the *Congressional globe,* the debates and proceedings of the conventions, manuscripts, and statistics. The lack of documents has left some interesting questions unanswered, and to the credit of the author it must be said that he is cautious in his conclusions.

GEORGE M. STEPHENSON

Histoire du Canada. Cinquième edition. Revue, annotée et publiée avec une introduction et des appendices par son petit-fils, Hector Garneau. Volume II. (Paris: Librairie Felix Alcan, 1920. 744 p.)

The first volume of this new edition appeared in 1914 and was reviewed in volume 1 (page 300) of this REVIEW. The appearance of this second volume was delayed by the war. What the present writer said in his review of the earlier volume is true of this. The grandson has shown great learning in his annotations and his revision and has produced a very usable work. The reviewer still thinks, however, that an entirely new book by the grandson without the limitations of his grandfather's production would have been more valuable. Still, when we obtain such an interesting narrative as this of the Garneau family, perhaps we should not be too critical.

C. W. A.

Journal of a fur-trading expedition on the upper Missouri. 1812-1813. By John C. Luttig, clerk of the Missouri fur company. Edited by Stella M. Drumm. (St. Louis: Missouri historical society, 1920)

This edition of an expedition up the Missouri is limited to 365 numbered copies. The journal has come down to us without the name of the author, but Miss Drumm has succeeded in identifying the particular trader who wrote it by the comparison of handwritings of possible candidates. John C. Luttig was a German merchant in Baltimore who came to St. Louis sometime before July, 1809.

The Missouri fur company was the older St. Louis-Missouri fur com-

pany which was reorganized during the war of 1812. The moving spirit in the company was Manuel Lisa, and it was with him that Luttig journeyed in the office of clerk. The expedition was stopped at the Mandan fort by the hostilities of the Indians, who had been stirred up by the British traders.

The journal is of interest as a record of a fur-trader, but it adds little to what is already known on the subject. The notes by Miss Drumm are numerous, full, and valuable. In an appendix are printed three letters from Christian Wilt to Luttig with some longer biographical notes.

C. W. A.

E. I. Dupont de Nemours and company. A history. 1802-1902. By B. G. Dupont. (New York: Houghton Mifflin company, 1920. 195 p. $3.00)

This is a family history of a remarkable family business that was continued for an even century before losing its identity in corporate organization. It contains little information throwing light upon the controverted aspects of the munitions industry, but much upon the history of the great American industrial family, that of Du Pont de Nemours. The founder of the family was a student of Lavoisier, and was brought up in a French government powder plant; he turned to the same trade in America when he had become a political emigrant. Through all the wars of the United States after 1800 the Du Ponts did their work in providing the government with explosives, but the story stops short of the date at which it would have to record the entry into the by-product manufactures. The growing use of explosives for industry is properly stressed.

F. L. P.

The Quaker colonies. A chronicle of the proprietors of the Delaware. By Sydney G. Fisher. [The chronicles of America. Edited by Allen Johnson under the supervision of the committee on publications of the Yale university council] (New Haven: Yale university press, 1919. 244 p. $3.50)

The *Chronicles of America,* of which Mr. Fisher's book is the eighth in a series of fifty volumes, is an enterprise designed to present the history of our country from colonial days to the present "in the living form of a series of short narratives." Each volume has a unity of its own and all are so related as to give a connected vision and knowledge of the length and breadth of our history. The appeal is primarily to "those of our citizens who are not in the habit of reading history"— a most laudable undertaking, for it is certain that the company of those who do not have the habit is large. Judging from Mr. Fisher's little book on the *Quaker colonies,* the average citizen will find the narratives instructive and entertaining. It is written in a lively, picturesque, and inter-

esting way, and all through it there is the note of human interest. At the same time it is good history. The author brings to the task not only a lively pen and imagination, but also a fund of information, anecdote, and knowledge.

Mr. Fisher, having studied and written on Quaker history for some years, knows his subject. He is sympathetic with Quakerism, but not unduly so. He is least sure when he comes to the people of non-Quaker stock who settled in interior Pennsylvania. In his account of the Germans he overstresses the pietist sects and barely mentions the Lutherans and Calvinists who were far more numerous and were not lacking in a certain aggressiveness. There is also too little attention given to the European backgrounds of settlement on the Delaware. What is said of the reasons for the coming of the people is slight and unsatisfactory. Likewise there is insufficient treatment of the external relations of the Quaker colonies, their connection with England and their trade overseas. The author's geography is at fault when he places York and Gettysburg over in the Cumberland valley. But all in all it is a readable and interesting narrative of Pennsylvania, the Jerseys, and little Delaware.

The book is short enough not to weary the reader, the sort of book one can read comfortably in an evening. The pages are not burdened with learned footnotes, and a brief bibliography is appended to invite the reader to go further if he is so inclined. The volumes are models of bookmaking, a delight in binding, paper, and type. But the price per volume, three and a half dollars, at once counteracts the laudable effort to develop the popular habit of reading history. The appeal must also be to the pocketbook, for the people generally have neither the habit of reading history nor the habit of paying much for books.

W. T. Root

The outline of history. Being a plain history of life and mankind. 2 volumes. By H. G. Wells. (New York: Macmillan company, 1920. 648, 676 p.)

Mr. Wells in writing of the sectaries that sprang out of the protestant reformation declares: "But the human reason is an obstinate thing and will criticize and select in spite of its own resolutions. The bulk of these new Bible students took what their consciences approved from the Bible and ignored its riddles and contradictions." These two sentences describe with great exactness Mr. Wells's historical method, provided the word "Bible" is changed to "history." Having started, like his "new Bible students," with a belief, he has found throughout the whole development of humanity its justification. Where there arose in his pathway an insurmountable and stubborn fact, he has, like the Pharisee, passed

by on the other side. Riddles and contradictions do not arouse his sympathies.

The reviewer has read many criticisms of this work by specialists in many fields. Each of these has declared that in his own particular specialty Mr. Wells has displayed his ignorance, but that many other chapters have proved interesting and illuminating. Following their example, the present writer may declare at once that Mr. Wells's knowledge of American history is about equal to that of the good freshman student after taking the introductory course in one of our universities. It so happened that at one time in his career the reviewer was a specialist in medieval European history and gave advanced courses in Greek and Roman history. The reading of the pages covering these periods revived his memory of past studies and even in these fields of human achievement Mr. Wells's knowledge appeared to be unmistakably superficial. The references in his footnotes are for the most part to textbooks and articles in the *Encyclopædia Britannica,* particularly in the second volume, such being the unstable basis of his historical knowledge. It is a pleasure to Americans to discover that so many worthy textbooks that have inspired this man of letters have been written by their compatriots.

If this work were only the ordinary compilation of easily obtainable facts like so many world histories, it would not be worthy of more than a notice in the "News and comments" section of this REVIEW. But it is much more than that; it is Mr. Wells's philosophy of history and is therefore well worth reading. The average historian of to-day has no philosophy of history worthy of mention, for, having made a serious and intensive study of some field, he has come forth somewhat of a cynic and is ready to accept the statement of Henry Adams that all is chaos and immoral. But Mr. Wells, not having become a specialist and not even knowing much of historical speculation, has no fears. He has projected his soul far into the future and from this vantage ground — unoccupied by historians — he can look back over all the past and see society slowly developing toward the future where he stands. He sees the nomadic "communities of wills" struggling for existence and supremacy with the settled "communities of faith and obedience"; and he can see out of that struggle slowly but surely emerging the future "community of knowledge and will."

This is extremely optimistic and because of its optimism it is to be hoped that many, many thousands will read the work. Mr. Wells's broad toleration, his sympathetic attitude toward opponents, and his criticism of the modern nationalistic emotion are teachings of great value to the modern world. The average historian would not have written such a book, but the books of the average historian are not read. This world history is being studied by many and in so far as Mr. Wells has been

able to raise his readers toward the plane of his own intellectual view — and he will do it to a certain extent — he has performed a valuable service, even if he has not made a contribution to historical knowledge.

C. W. A.

Literary culture in early New England. 1620 to 1730. By Thomas Goddard Wright. (New Haven: Yale university press, 1920. 326 p. $6.00)

This study lies chiefly in the domain of history; only incidentally does it fall within the field of literary criticism. Its purpose is not primarily to weigh and assess colonial New England literature. It is rather to describe the culture of the people in one cultural area, with Boston as the center, through one century and to see how that culture was mirrored in the literature they produced. Chronologically the period is divided into three parts, one of fifty years following the settlement of Plymouth, the others of about thirty years each. The division is more or less arbitrary, yet it may be said that each period has distinct markings of its own. Within each period the author discusses education, libraries both public and private, the desire and ability to obtain books, the number and character of books and pamphlets bought or published, the circulation and appreciation of books, and the literary and cultural relations between the two Englands, Old and New.

Dr. Wright's book is an expression of a fine type of scholarship. There is every evidence of fullness, fairness, and detachment of treatment in it. The author has examined a multitude of very scattered sources. There are many and explicit citations to sustain his points. Scattered through the text are many well-chosen quotations from the sources to illustrate the use of and familiarity with books, as also long lists to show the number, variety, and character of books that the colonial fathers possessed. An appendix of seventy-five pages gives abundant illustrations of the extent to which books circulated, invoices showing what books came from England to the booksellers of New England, the multitudinous references to books in Increase Mather's writings, and lists of books in the libraries of Harvard and of William Brewster. There is a very good bibliography.

The narrative is simple and clear. It is a work which will make its chief appeal to the student of the period whether in history or in literature. It is a work not to be ignored by either. And on the other hand, it is a book which has an interest for the intelligent lay reader.

Two points in the work impress one forcibly. One is the high cultural standard and the persistent intellectual eagerness of the colonial New England leaders. The other is the close cultural and literary relations between Old and New England. In the latter respect the volume is in

line with other recent works which have done much to destroy the insularity usually ascribed by older writers to the colonial era. In bringing out the relationships between the two Englands the study shows the greatest originality. Altogether it ranks high as an attempt to cover the cultural history of colonial New England.

W. T. Root

Freedom of speech. By Zechariah Chaffee, Jr. Professor of law in Harvard university. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920. 431 p. $3.50)

This book well deserves a note in a magazine devoted to the history of the middle west. It is indeed a very distinct contribution to the history of the theory and application in a democracy of freedom of speech. In no part of the country was the test more severe than in the middle west during the world war. It is a chastening experience for those who take a just pride in the war record of this section to look on the darker side that is presented when one turns the pages of this scholarly lawyer's account of war legislation and its enforcement. Many explanations and justifications may be offered by a historian who has seen how easily war hysteria submerges all judgment in a matter the metes and bounds of which are so debatable as free speech. But no thoughtful citizen who knows that the value he sets on one of the most precious things guarded by the first amendment is measured by his willingness to defend it for others can be quite easy in his mind about the safety of free speech after he reads this book. The record of the courts was reasonably good; that of the federal attorney-general's office under Mr. Gregory and his special assistant, Mr. O'Brian, was excellent in view of all the circumstances Unfortunately it was not until 1919 that any cases were passed upon by the supreme court under the first amendment. In the meantime the courts of first instance had gone unguided and unchecked. It must be added with regret that even Justice Holmes in delivering the opinions limited his expressions so that there is even now no full and rounded and authoritative judicial interpretation of the first amendment.

Most of the federal activity in war times was under the espionage act of June, 1917, and the old internment statute of 1798. The power this gave the postmaster-general to exercise a practically unreviewable authority in excluding material from the mails was its most unfortunate feature. The sedition act of May, 1918, was copied from a loosely drawn Montana statute and opened the door for indiscriminate actions. When one adds to this the abnormal strain on the federal courts and legal officers, all the legislation by the states, the hysteria that led weak governors, zealous defense councils, excited and suspicious communities, and amateur detectives to indefensible harshness, the wonder is that the record is not darker.

The book is severely critical, but it is soundly scholarly, and throughout the author works for a constructive and sane formula and not without a really valuable result. His narrative account of the chief trials is excellent. The bibliography of the whole subject of freedom of speech is no small contribution. If any smug complacency survives the reading of the text it certainly cannot be saved from reflection if it examines the dates and summaries of state legislation on sedition, much of it dated 1919, and pauses to reflect how often in war times similar legislation was used to punish as disloyalty opinions and expressions that arose purely from agrarian or industrial discontent. If there be those who are prepared to write new chapters in the history of intolerance it is well that this one has been ably and vigorously written. Those who with good or bad consciences, with muddled brains or clear, would limit freedom of speech must reckon with a book that has put them permanently on the defensive.

The life of Joseph Hodges Choate. As gathered chiefly from his letters. Including his own story of his boyhood and youth. By Edward Sandford Martin. 2 volumes. (New York: Charles Scribner's sons, 1921. 471, 439 p. $10.00)

A combination of Theron G. Strong's *Joseph H. Choate,* brought out in 1917, and the two volumes compiled by Mr. Martin present a fairly comprehensive account of one of the foremost Americans of his time. As the earlier work laid emphasis on Mr. Choate's career as a lawyer, picturing him in the capacities of advocate and, for the four years in which he represented the United States near the Court of St. James, as ambassador, the newer volumes are devoted largely to the man, particularly in his personal relations with his family and his friends. As indicated in the subtitle, the bulk of the material is from letters written by Mr. Choate himself. To these are added excerpts from his speeches, illustrative newspaper clippings, and, occasionally, letters written to him. The author has submerged himself almost completely and has furnished only enough narrative to bind together the mass of documents. He has allowed one of the most interesting portions of the whole production, the story Mr. Choate wrote of his early life, to form the introductory chapter. One regrets that Mr. Choate had not the time and the inclination to bring this autobiographical sketch down to a later date.

From these two volumes alone the reader would be able to make only by inference a very clear picture of the part actually played in American affairs by Mr. Choate, but, on the other hand, nothing could better bring out the personality of one who lighted his way through a long, active, and eventful life with unfailing good humor and ready wit.

From the character of the correspondence reproduced there could not be

expected very much that would illuminate the more technical side of the life of a lawyer who took a prominent part in such noted cases as that involving constitutionality of the federal income-tax law of 1894, the one-time famous Sage-Laidlow episode, or the Standard Oil companies in many of their repeated efforts to resist legislative aggressions. Even the long chapter (covering more than 220 pages) which deals with the four years which Mr. Choate spent as ambassador in England has but little to indicate the real character of the services rendered by the American representative. Now and then are found slight references to the Alaska boundary affair, or to such delicate questions as those bound to come before a neutral representative on the occasion of the Boer war, or to the Russo-Japanese war, but for the most part one reads of the social side of a popular diplomat's round; for official correspondence the reader must seek elsewhere.

It is not a comprehensive, balanced account of Mr. Choate's career, nor was it intended to be that. Taken for what it is and for what it purports to be, the work is a welcome addition to the biographical literature covering the past half century.

The United States in the world war. 1918-1920. By J. B. McMaster. (New York: D. Appleton and company, 1920. 510 p. $3.00)

The second volume of Professor McMaster's history of the United States in the war covers the period from the spring of 1918 to the rejection of the treaty of Versailles by the senate in March, 1920. The account is apparently built up from the careful study of newspaper files, the whole piled together from the day-to-day accounts, rumor followed by contradictory fact as it came. In reading the book one thinks back again to the days when we rushed out into the streets to buy the latest extra, to scan the lines of fact and alleged fact, always trying to pierce the veil, wondering what was really going on, anxious, a little uncertain, but still trusting our chosen leaders.

We sit down with Professor McMaster's volume in the hope that these questions will be answered. But we close the book with most of them still unanswered. It is not the same account, the errors have been eliminated, but the veil still remains. We are left wondering still and must perforce turn to other books to find the answer to our ever-recurring "why?"

Professor McMaster succeeded brilliantly in constructing a history of the American people from 1783 to 1860 from newspapers and speeches. But those materials hardly suffice for an account of the war period. Far too much real history lies behind the statements of newspaper correspondents and the utterances of statesmen. Much of this history is unattainable, much more is only a matter of conjecture. But one feels that

the historian of the war must attempt a solution of these problems, even if the results of his efforts be but meager.

"War is policy carried on by other means," said Clausewitz. This policy of the United States and its grapples with the policy of the other nations, whether during the war or at the peace conference, finds little reflection in Professor McMaster's pages. We read again the words of Wilson, but we fail to learn how Wilson strove to square those words with the facts of this wicked world; how far he succeeded, where he failed. And yet the definitive history of the United States in the world war must answer these questions, if it is really to enlighten us as to our share in the struggle.

One of the toughest problems in policy which we encountered in 1918 and 1919 was our relations with Russia. And yet the author dismisses it in half a dozen paragraphs, which, by their condensation, are somewhat misleading. Our whole position toward the near east during the war needs more space than is given to it.

One might proceed on this line of criticism through the chapters on the peace conference down to a clear explanation of why Lodge and Johnson spoke and voted as they did. No one would deny that Professor McMaster's volume has sound merit. It is a good handbook of the known facts regarding our participation in the war. A history of the United States in the war it is not, for it gives us merely the surface eddies and leaves unsounded many of the deeper currents which give direction to the stream.

MASON W. TYLER

The American engineers in France. By William Barclay Parsons, late colonel Eleventh U. S. engineers. (New York: D. Appleton and company, 1920. 429 p. $4.00 net)

The preface of Colonel Parsons' book limits its field to the nine regiments of engineers numbered eleventh to nineteenth which were raised at the outbreak of our war with Germany, and which were assigned especial tasks of construction, railroad operation, et cetera, behind the lines in France. Their story is told in twenty-seven chapters, the last of which is a compilation of statistics regarding their activities. The civilian will probably have most interest in a series of chapters dealing with the organization of lines of communication and the establishment of supply depots in France, although the fact that in these chapters Colonel Parsons ignores altogether the use of English ports will make his narrative somewhat misleading. The lay reader will probably be a little disappointed at the lack of thrills in the account of the doings of the American engineers in the "rot" at Cambrai. A good part of Colonel Parsons' experience seems to have been with the British, and British

usages are emphasized. One is inclined to question whether the inter-allied system of map-reading and point-designation was used quite so generally throughout the American forces as he implies. His chapters on the various activities of the engineers in forestry service and water supply, chemical warfare, camouflage, map supply, artillery ranging, light railway roads, building trenches, and trench warfare afford an introduction to the various activities indicated. Some of them, such as those on map services and water supply, praise the later achievements of the engineers in these lines and totally ignore the partial breakdown of the map service and the total lack of any system of water supply throughout the Marne offensive. The chapter on trenches and trench warfare, written in the general style of popular military manuals of 1917, deals in great detail with the various units of trench systems and ignores altogether the essential principles of defense which control such a system. Certainly after July of 1918, the American army in active sectors did not face the enemy in such trench systems as those described (page 318). One feels that the laudation of British and French fighting units at the implied expense of the Americans was not quite necessary.

THEODORE C. PEASE

The history of educational legislation in Ohio from 1803 to 1850. By Edward Alanson Miller, Ph.D. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1920. 248 p. $2.00)

One of the most interesting facts connected with the history of the early west is the cession of land by the national government for purposes of education. From the very beginning of the history of the Northwest territory, section 16 was set aside for schools. Curiosity is naturally aroused by this fact. What became of these lands? How did the state make use of its rich heritage? Mr. Miller has answered these questions very well in this detailed study of educational legislation in Ohio previous to 1850. It is an interesting story and a significant commentary on the administration of the early school lands when the state auditor, as early as 1840, could report that the relatively small school fund then annually at the disposal of the state had been accumulated at the sacrifice of lands "which, if they had been judiciously held, would have now given us at least ten times that amount and constituted a revenue sufficient to educate every child in the state" (page 74). Yet, as Mr. Miller points out, this condition was due not to corruption on the part of officials but rather to a lack of appreciation of the real value of the lands, the difficulty of leasing or selling them to advantage, and the want of a proper administrative system.

Mr. Miller traces the origin of the school system of Ohio to New England influence; hence the district system, which soon called for reforms

similar to those of Horace Mann in Massachusetts. The gradual evolution of this system and the later efforts to correct it are painstakingly traced through all the legislation of the period. A very valuable classified list of all laws dealing in any way with schools is to be found in the appendix, together with a complete index of all the session laws on the subject of education. The work includes also a very interesting chapter on "Secondary and higher education," and shorter chapters on "The education of defectives, dependents and delinquents," "The training of teachers," and "Supplementary educational agencies."

An examination of the session laws is all that this study professes to attempt, although the reader can scarcely help being curious about public sentiment on the matter of this legislation as reflected in newspapers, letters, and other sources which have not been examined, nor can he help wondering what might have been the motives of the various religious bodies which founded a large part of the forty-four institutions of higher learning. Within these limitations, however, which the author has set for himself, the work has been carefully done.

C. J. Attig

Publications of the Nebraska state historical society. Volume xix. Edited by Albert Watkins. (Lincoln: Nebraska state historical society, 1919. 328 p.)

Bacon quotes Queen Isabella to the effect that the well-dressed man carries continual letters of recommendation. If good binding, excellent paper, and attractive make-up constitute the dress of a book, the volume before the reviewer is most fortunate. The introduction in this case, however, proves to be unfortunate: the contents continually remind the reader of the dress — they are so different.

According to the preface, the bound volumes published by the society are reserved for the more important historical papers, while the contents of the society's magazine "are designedly of a more popular nature than the papers contained in the books, and are largely notes of current historical incidents not appropriate for the more expensive and less freqently issued bound books."

The "more important historical papers" contained in this volume consist largely of reminiscences of pioneers, seasoned with papers more or less historical dealing with the beginnings and early development of Nebraska. The most important contribution, according to length (131 pages), appears to be composed of excerpts from the official record of a contested election in 1859, reprinted from the *House reports* and the *House miscellaneous documents* of the thirty-sixth congress. The editor has sensed the importance of giving wide circulation through this volume to the "very useful and interesting information about the population of the frontier counties of the territory and the manner of conducting

elections in them," rather than allowing it to rest in peace within the musty, secluded, original volumes.

The writers of the papers and reminiscences are impressed with the importance of establishing on the printed page the fifty-seven varieties of historical "firsts." Thanks to Mrs. E. Anderson, we are no longer in doubt about the identity of the first person ever baptized in the Nebraska river. Professor Alexis, unfortunately, has been unable to determine the exact time when the first Swede set foot on Nebraska soil. More successful and skillful in research has been Professor Hrbkova, who gives the names of the first and second Bohemians in America, although she is rather less certain about the first individual of that nationality in Nebraska. The first white woman to settle in Nemaha county, the first native white child of Richardson county, and the first irrigators of land in Scotts Bluff county have been summoned to the bar of history; but the reader must wait the appearance of later volumes to satisfy his curiosity relative to the first irrigation of land by the first native white. More important, if possible, than these "firsts" is the publication of a scrap of paper, in private keeping for thirty-four years, which "was the first move made in proceedings which ended in the impeachment and removal from office of the state of Nebraska's first governor." The pioneer's taste for cheese is clearly established, the first lawsuit in Nebraska having been brought by a hotel landlord to bring to justice the culprit who robbed him of half a cheese. That the first Nebraska land speculators shared the unscrupulousness of the brethren in the faith in other states appears in the story of a turkey advertised to have been killed on a certain town site, the truth of the matter being that the fowl was killed in Iowa and sent to the speculator by a friend.

It is to be hoped that succeeding *Publications* of the society will continue the high standard of "firsts"—so high that all other historical societies will abandon that fruitful field, leaving Nebraska preëminent.

GEORGE M. STEPHENSON

The relation of the judiciary to the constitution. By William M. Meigs. (Philadelphia: William J. Campbell, 1919. 248 p.)

"In my opinion, the evidence accessible today is a demonstration, only less certain than those of astronomy and mathematics, that the Judiciary was plainly pointed out by our history for the vast function it has exercised, and that it was expected and intended, both by the Federal Convention and the opinion of publicists of the day, to exercise that function." This sentence from the introduction of Mr. Meigs's monograph on the judiciary may be taken as the keynote of his work. He starts with an examination of colonial precedents and traces through the years before the adoption of the constitution the persistence of some-

thing of the notion which comes to us to-day as the doctrine of judicial review, or the function of the federal courts to pronounce upon the constitutionality both of state and of national statutes.

The first six chapters deal with the growth of the idea down to 1787, and the author concludes that the idea of the legitimate power of the court to test statutory law by fundamental law, whether it was an act of parliament, a colonial charter, or, after the revolution, a state constitution, was a well-established and recognized fact; that there was no innovation in Justice Marshall's much-heralded opinion in Marbury *v.* Madison, but merely a continuing along fairly well-defined lines.

Chapter 7 discusses the question of this function of the judiciary in the federal convention, while the three remaining chapters briefly trace the rapid spread of the doctrine during the national period. That this doctrine has been immovably rooted in our system Mr. Meigs does not contend. He ends his study, indeed, with a doubt: "It still remains to the future to show whether gradual historical growth has established the doctrine of Judicial Supremacy in our country, or whether, with the immense power of our Executive . . . the older doctrine will not crop up again, and the essential weakness of the Judiciary result in a complete denial to them of any Supremacy, or even the occasional refusal to allow the enforcement of specific decrees entered by them."

Purely legalistic in tone, with no attempt to estimate the various forces which have operated behind the courts, this little book is a very usable volume, containing as it does a summary of most of the available information upon the subject under discussion.

The debates in the federal convention of 1787 which framed the constitution of the United States of America. Reported by James Madison, a delegate from Virginia. International edition. Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott, editors. (New York: Oxford university press, 1920. 731 p. $4.00)

One's first reaction to this title is a question as to why there should be added to the texts of Madison's notes already available still another. This question may be answered in more than one way. In the first place no one of the previous printings seems to have been collated so painstakingly with the original manuscript and the Payne transcript. All variations between the original manuscript, the Payne transcript, the text in the *Documentary history,* and Professor Farrand's *Records of the federal convention* have been noted. While, as Mr. Hunt in his introductory note states, no reproduction can hope to be absolutely unquestionable, nevertheless this probably comes as near to being so as is likely to be obtained. A second reason which justifies the printing of this book lies in the convenience of having in one volume not only Madison's notes

but also the essential documents bearing on the events leading to the convention, as well as those having to do with the submission of the constitution to the states and its ratification therein. The title of Mr. Scott's introductory note, "The federal convention of 1787 an international conference," may help serve to explain why the Carnegie endowment brings out this volume at this particular time.

Napoleon's navigation system. By Frank Edgar Melvin, Ph.D. (New York: D. Appleton and company, 1919. 449 p. $2.50)

Any centralized and autocratic government sooner or later thinks it necessary to control a nation's intellectual life and its public opinion, its religious faith and its economic life. Napoleon's empire was no exception to this and the vain struggle it carried on was projected by reason of his conquests beyond the borders of France. It became gigantic and its failures became colossal. In no field was this struggle against impalpable and irrepressible forces more catastrophic than in the field of economic life. The continental system so much discussed and so little studied is by general agreement Napoleon's great failure and the one about which least is known. Incidental discussions such as Mahan's and Rose's, occasional brief monographs, and the single volume in Sorel's *L'Europe et la revolution française* represent most of what is in any sense worth while on the literature of a subject where detailed study was necessary to break the circle of oft-repeated generalities.

Under the title *Napoleon's navigation system,* a subject broader than the continental system, Dr. Melvin has done a very fundamental piece of work in this dissertation submitted at Pennsylvania. In his exploitation of French and English archives and of a very extensive literature he has brought together the best study yet produced in any language on this fundamental phase of Napoleon's administrative and political system. The inevitable trees and a good deal of underbrush sometimes obstruct the reader's view of the forest, but hard reading and rereading are relatively small effort in comparison to the patient and exacting labor that lies back of the monograph.

The navigation system meant tariffs, a merchant marine, colonial trade, a fleet, harbors, depots, in addition to the blockade against English commerce. It had a background of policy inherited and developed between 1786 and 1806. The sketch of this is all too brief. When Napoleon failed his was not wholly a personal failure. In a brief decade, in the midst of war, no one man could make the French into a nation equal to the Dutch as navigators and to the English as merchants. When the French lacked the daring and the enterprise to develop their own coastal trade, a continental system even with military power behind it seemed only wind-blown imperialism.

After the Berlin and Milan decrees, Napoleon found his government, like many another, between the conflicting interests of consumer and producer. Excepting for Danish and Algierian trade, the pressure of agricultural interests and the hint given by the English led to the development of the license trade. Napoleon wanted his system; he must keep it, but he must escape its disadvantages. Neutrals were not supposed to exist, but they persisted. A guarded license trade seemed safe, but it was a snare. Economic crises in France and England forced both powers to subterranean negotiations for relief and the evidence of these is one of Dr. Melvin's contributions.

Step by step, decree by decree, stage by stage the whole complex development is followed through to the final collapse. Incidentally, the part played by the United States as the chief neutral trader is brought out and there is presented the first adequate discussion of the administrative machinery and of the part played by Napoleon's subordinates.

As has been suggested, the treatment makes hard reading but the analytical table of contents is very helpful. The index is satisfactory and the thirty-five pages of critical bibliographical notes are a valuable addendum.

G. S. F.

Some problems of the peace conference. By Charles Homer Haskins and Robert Howard Lord. (Cambridge: Harvard university press, 1920. 306 p. $3.00)

The peace negotiations. A personal narrative. By Robert Lansing. (New York: Houghton Mifflin company, 1921. 328 p. $3.00)

Great men and great days. By Stephane Lauzanne. Editor of *Le Matin.* Member of the French mission to the United States. Introduction by Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia university. Translated by John L. B. Williams. (New York: D. Appleton and company, 1921. 263 p. $3.00)

American interest in the events of the peace conference has been stimulated and satisfied of late by a number of books. The three volumes listed above represent three types. The first is a study of the problems confronting the conference and the settlement made in each case; the second is an account of the major shows at Paris by one who played a leading part in them; the third is a series of studies, by an eminent and well-informed journalist, of the leading men of the war period. All three have pronounced, although possibly unequal, merits and have great value for American students of the recent history of Europe and of our own country.

The first volume on the list is introductory to the other two. No study of the conference is possible without a thoroughgoing understanding of the problems which the conference tried to settle. This task has been

undertaken by the two authors of this work. It is probably unnecessary to urge their qualifications for such a study, both as historians and as advisers to the American peace commission. Simply and graphically they outline these problems, describe the way in which the conference dealt with them, and, generally add a qualified defense of the settlement. Especially valuable is the first chapter by Professor Haskins, which describes the organization of the conference; it is probably the best general account in English. Professor Haskins' treatment of the Saar valley and Professor Lord's treatment of Poland are the work of men defending settlements in which they took a considerable part, but are by no means the work of blind partisans. Less valuable, perhaps, are the treatments of the problems in which the authors were not directly concerned, such as the Balkans; but even here is the same clarity of expression, the same careful analysis. The book contributes no bits of "inside" information; both authors keep carefully within the limits of diplomatic propriety; but as a general introduction to the problems of the conference this book cannot be too highly praised. Students will be especially thankful, also, for the excellent brief bibliographies that follow each chapter. All told, it is a book that no one interested in the peace conference or its problems can afford to be without.

Around the second volume on this list much controversy has raged and will, probably, continue to rage for some time to come. The propriety of its publication and the highly controversial nature of its contents have been themes for many reviewers. Into much of this the present reviewer does not wish to enter. Mr. Lansing's book is avowedly a work of self-defense, a statement of his differences with President Wilson and the reasons which led him to take the position that he did. The author quotes extensively from his diary and from state papers to justify his thesis, and the book, therefore, abounds in "revelations" of varying value and importance. The scope of this new material is somewhat limited by the fact that Mr. Lansing sticks to his last and goes into none of the problems in which he did not differ from his chief. Transparent through it all is Mr. Lansing's fundamental honesty, for he gives the facts which tell against himself as well as those which tell in his favor. The result is a cross between the defense of a statesman for his policy and the account of the mental and spiritual difficulties of a man in a difficult situation. One has the impression that the author has honestly tried to tell all the truth and to be fair to his opponents — or opponent — but it would be a difficult task for an angel writing under such circumstances literally to fulfill this task. Students will have to weigh Mr. Lansing's impressions against other evidence, and in view of the present amount of our knowledge that is an almost impossible task. They will, however, welcome, as students of the period, Mr. Lansing's

volume. It lifts a corner of the curtain on the deliberations of the conference and for this reason, at least, can be counted as one of the indispensable volumes for this period.

Mr. Stephane Lauzanne has been for many years one of the better-known French journalists and the editor of the *Matin.* As in the case of his fellow worker, Andre Tardieu, formerly of the *Temps,* the French government has availed itself of his services as member of diplomatic missions, and he was in the United States as member of the French mission during the war. In the third volume of this list M. Lauzanne has drawn on his great knowledge of French politics of the past to give pen pictures of a row of French statesmen. To these he has added a group of American statesmen more superficially drawn, a pen portrait of Lloyd-George, and several chapters on America during the war. The best chapters are those devoted to the French statesmen, especially the ones devoted to Delcasse, Poincare, and Clemenceau. The latter is written in a thoroughly critical vein, for M. Lauzanne is a French imperialist who is not in sympathy with the kind of peace which the "Tiger" gave to France. The greatest value of the book for American students lies in the bits of hitherto unpublished information which are scattered through the volume. The policy of Delcasse is placed in a new light, and students of recent history will need to study the criticism of Clemenceau in view of the facts presented. It is a book, perhaps, to be skimmed rather than read, but it certainly deserves attention.

Literature on the peace conference and the European settlement is increasing rapidly and it has long since become necessary to pick and choose. In these three volumes three types of mind look at these events and give their verdicts, each in its fashion: those of the expert, the diplomat, the well-informed Frenchman. As a psychological study as well as because of the facts presented these three works may be commended to the American student.

MASON W. TYLER

Select British documents of the Canadian war of 1812. Edited, with an introduction, by William Wood. In 3 volumes. Volume I. (Toronto: The Champlain society, 1920. 678 p.)

After an interval of four years, the Champlain society has resumed publication of its very valuable series of historical texts relating to the history of Canada. One may properly take advantage of the occasion to recall that, since its organization some fourteen year ago, the society has published thirteen volumes, including Grant and Biggar's edition of Lescarbot's *History of New France*; Ganong's editions of Denys' *Description and natural history of the coasts of North America* and of Le Clercq's *New relation of Gaspesia*; Munro's *Documents relating to the seigniorial tenure in Canada;* Wood's *Logs of the conquest of*

Canada; Doughty's edition of Knox's *Historical journal of the campaigns in North America*; and Tyrrell's editions of Hearne's *Journey from Hudson's bay to the northern ocean*, and *Thompson's narrative of his explorations in western America.* Conditions arising out of the war, and particularly the impossibility of getting the paper which the society required, made it impossible to publish anything between 1916 and 1920. The society then had on hand several important volumes, or the material for them, ready for publication, but it was decided to give first place to William Wood's *Select British documents of the Canadian war of 1812.* This is to be in three volumes, the first of which is now published.

One need not remind students of American history — interpreting "American" in the broad sense — that up to a comparatively short time ago the only histories of the war of 1812, from either the United States or the Canadian standpoint, were hopelessly inaccurate as to their facts and equally biased in their interpretation of those facts. These were in fact not so much histories as partisan arguments, based almost entirely upon secondary authorities, and they described not what actually happened but rather what the writer would like to have had happen. Within the last decade or two we have had several contributions, by both Canadian and American historians, to the history of the war of 1812 that represent an entirely different point of view. These books either present the original documentary material upon which history must be based, with such editorial equipment as will make them of the greatest possible service to students, or they represent the scholarly and impartial interpretation of those documents in the form of history. Examples of this kind of historical writing, on the Canadian side, are General Cruikshank's *Documentary history of the campaign on the Niagara frontier;* Lucas' *Canadian war of 1812;* Egerton's *Historical geography of Canada,* chapter 7 of which deals with the war of 1812; and the book now under review.

Obviously it would be impracticable, or at any rate undesirable, to attempt to bring together in printed form all the documents relating to the war of 1812, from either the American or the Canadian standpoint. What Colonel Wood has attempted to do has been to select from the immense body of material, chiefly in the Canadian archives at Ottawa, those documents that are really vital to a clear understanding of the various movements on the long frontier in the years 1812, 1813, and 1814. Colonel Wood does not, of course, attempt to give the corresponding American documents, except in a few cases where the thread of the narrative might otherwise be lost.

There probably would be differences of opinion among competent scholars as to which one of several available documents relating to a

particular episode in the war of 1812 would be most useful to students, or would most clearly reveal the sequence of events; and it is therefore not to be expected that every one competent to express an opinion will agree that Colonel Wood has in every case made an ideal selection. It is not at all too much to say, however, that, so far as his work may be judged by this first volume, the selection has been made with discrimination and with a keen appreciation of the relative values and interrelationships of the many factors entering into this small but by no means unimportant war.

While this book does not pretend to be a history of the war of 1812, being rather "a contribution towards the original evidence on which true history must be based," Colonel Wood has, nevertheless, provided in an introduction of some 132 pages a really admirable sketch of such a history — scholarly, accurate, carefully balanced, and concisely expressed, in the same unusually attractive style which we have learned to expect from the author of *The fight for Canada* and *The logs of the conquest of Canada*. This introduction is, of course, to the work as a whole. So far as the documents are concerned, volume I includes groups 1 and 2 of the narrative documents, the period of military and naval preparation, 1801-1812, and the events of 1812 on the Niagara, Detroit, and Montreal frontiers and in the west. There are eleven illustrations, including several portraits of Brock and a facsimile of a curious letter from Wellington, written after Prevost's disgraceful failure at Plattsburg and suggesting that the great field marshal might himself come out to Canada and take command. One is tempted to speculate what might have been the result, both in America and in Europe, if Wellington had opened a campaign on this side in 1815 and Waterloo had been fought without his guiding hand.

L. J. B.

Lincoln, the world emancipator. By John Drinkwater. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin company, 1920. 118 p. $1.50)

If one were to pass judgment upon this little volume with the ordinary tests of this REVIEW, the answer would come quickly: *pas d'histoire.* But Mr. Drinkwater makes no claim to historical recognition. One may not, perhaps, find in this disclaimer justification for overlooking his readiness to accept the reference of "an American of pure national strain" to the "meddlesome German potentate" of 1776 as an explanation of the unpleasantness of that date. In the rôle of the artist he seeks "to make spiritual inferences from history already written and vital projections of this or that theme lying unmoulded in the historian's page" (page 93). His hope is that, "rightly envisaged in the universal imagination," Lincoln may well become the emancipator of the world. To him Lincoln stands as a fitting and sufficient symbol through which

Anglo-Saxon coöperation may, on the basis of the principles of "Liberty" and "E pluribus unum," work out the salvation of the world. Mr. Drinkwater finds historical reasons for inviting us to go crusading with our British kin to clean up "the woeful untidiness into which civilization has fallen." He is willing to let the spirit of Lincoln define the goal, to act as a concrete symbol around which concrete aspirations can take shape.

As one follows the mysteries of Mr. Drinkwater's symbolism, it almost seems that his aim is Anglo-Saxon union first and foremost, and then world emancipation. There is much vagueness in the invitation to crusade; he vouchsafes only the suggestion that our freedom is being threatened "by greedy or revengeful plutocrats and Prussianized militarists on the one hand and the mere delirium of anarchy on the other." It is a stimulating bit of propaganda — one hopes that by this time this word has lost its sinister connotation — to bring better understanding between the English-speaking peoples. In the idealism of his message may be found the best reason for commending it to an American public. Mr. Drinkwater seems himself a bit confused by his chasing the will-o'-the-wisp of Lincoln symbolism. He turns to more solid ground in two nearly independent essays on "History and art" and "Lincoln and the artists" and closes with a brief epilogue symbolically introducing the figures of Shakespeare and Lincoln as the best products of their respective nationalities.

Arthur C. Cole

Organized labor in American history. By Frank Tracy Carlton. (New York: D. Appleton and company, 1920. 313 p.)

This volume, as the title indicates, is a history not of organized labor but of the contribution made by the organized wage-earners of the nation to American social progress. An introductory chapter presents the author's philosophy of history and clears the way for the story of how organized labor has established a right to the claim of being an efficient conservator of American democracy. Mr. Carlton realizes that the wage-earner's influence has been limited by an ever-westward-moving frontier which has tended in a large measure to prevent the growth of class consciousness. Yet he finds that in the three distinctly American movements to secure a greater measure of democracy — manhood suffrage, universal and compulsory free public education, and free homesteads for actual settlers —"the wage-earners of the nation have played a leading part" and he expects the influence of labor to increase in importance now that the frontier is a thing of the past. This work has not attempted to penetrate the vast store of unexploited source material bearing on industrial history that lies scattered far and wide through the land. There is still room for and need for patient monographic work in this

whole field. Probably the best portions of the volume are those regarded by the average reader as least historical in character — chapters on the ideals of the wage-earner, on recent pre-war tendencies, on the war and after. In view of the hesitancy of the regular historical student to attempt the interpretation of the recent past, it is fortunate, indeed, that men as capable as Mr. Carlton can be induced to turn from their usual fields to break the way for the historian.

ARTHUR C. COLE

Collected legal papers. By Oliver Wendell Holmes. (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920. 316 p. $2.50)

Students of law and history should be grateful for this collection of Mr. Justice Holmes's miscellaneous writings in the field of law and legal history. The twenty-seven papers extend chronologically from the essay on "Early English equity," which appeared in 1885, to the brief paragraphs on "Natural law," printed thirty-three years later. The collection contains also the famous address on "The path of the law" delivered in 1897.

The papers fall into three general groups. First, there are several substantial articles, including those just mentioned, which deal with difficult problems of the law from the standpoint of legal history. Here, for instance, are papers on agency, executors, et cetera. In these is an undercurrent of protest against a blind adherence to legal rules which rest on bases now obsolete and voice a desire to expose the antiquities of the law to the test of practical utility. "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past" (p. 187). Secondly, there appears a larger group of "occasional" papers, mostly speeches before law schools, bar associations, or other gatherings of lawyers. These deal primarily with the law as a profession and are replete with expressions of the high ideals which should actuate those who engage in it. One finds here the expected emphasis upon legal scholarship as the basis of any real success at the bar as well as the prerequisite for carrying on the reforms of which the law stands in need. Finally, there are a few biographical sketches, the most important of which is the essay upon Montesquieu which appeared as the introduction to a reprint of *Esprit des Lois* in 1900. Marshall and Maitland are touched upon in briefer fashion.

While the varying circumstances under which these papers originally appeared make them seem diversified and sometimes fragmentary, they nevertheless reflect a well-defined and unified philosophy in respect to the law in its relation to history and to life. They preach the necessity for

and themselves exemplify the use of the scientific method in order to bring the law into harmony with the facts of present-day human experience.

ROBERT EUGENE CUSHMAN

Pioneers of the old southwest. A chronicle of the dark and bloody ground. By Constance L. Skinner. [The chronicles of America. Edited by Allen Johnson under the supervision of the committee on publications of the Yale university council] (New Haven: Yale university press, 1919. 304 p. $3.50)

It is the widely heralded purpose of the projectors of the *Chronicles of America* series to issue only volumes marked by vivid style and exhibiting narrative skill to a high degree. If this volume be a criterion, a true sample of the other volumes, then the prospectus has fulfilled its promise (how few ever do!). For this volume is the work of a talented and graceful writer — deft, imaginative, appealing. She has the pictorializing fancy — which is not quite the same thing as dramatic skill — in unusual measure; and this volume is a bright procession of pretty films — not the narrative of a series of dramatic historic situations. With an eye for character, she has enlivened her pages with many a human touch; and we are never conscious that history is other than a human complex of interwoven events.

Equal commendation cannot be bestowed upon the historical value of the book, over against its literary charm. From the strictly historical standpoint, let us say, this is one of those books which need not have been written. There is a chapter on "Folkways" which almost justifies the book, and the account of Priler, his bizarre personality and singular career, is executed with unusual literary dexterity. The impression left upon the historical critic by the remainder of the book is that of secondary inspiration and derivative quality. The author does not venture outside the customary avenues of approach to the subject, and there is no evidence that she has had access to any primary sources whatever. One feels that, properly equipped with adequate secondary authorities, she could doubtless write an equally good book on almost any subject. The book is singularly free of errors; the author has followed the soundest of secondary authorities. But it is also singularly free of interpretation— of the sort of intepretation which makes the reader feel that the writer has seen the whole era anew and, as it were, left upon those events somewhat of the stamp of his own personality.

In fine, this is not the work of a historian — it is the work rather of a novelist, who should make a success in writing scenarios for the "movies." All the more praise, then, to Mr. Glasgow for his insight, his successful evocation in this particular case of history written like a novel. This

might well stand as the exemplar, the norm, for the series. Few of the volumes will equal this, the reviewer predicts, in fictive or dramatic qualities — none perhaps save those written by the professional story-teller, the practicing novelist.

ARCHIBALD HENDERSON

The industrial state. 1870-1893. By Ernest Ludlow Bogart and Charles Manfred Thompson. [Centennial history of Illinois, volume IV] (Springfield: Illinois centennial commission, 1920. 553 p.)

The fourth volume of the *Centennial history of Illinois* covers the period from 1870 to 1893, a period in which powerful influences brought about significant political, social, and economic changes. Agriculture had previously characterized the state, but now the utilization of other resources became prominent. The building of railroads made possible a large increase in trade, commerce, manufactures, and mining, and stimulated the growth of cities, particularly Chicago, as social and manufacturing centers, while the problem of rates and management seriously affected politics.

The well-known disadvantages of coöperative writing are conspicuous in this work, which comes from the hands of five authors. The first half of the volume, which deals with the political phases, is the work of Mr. Thompson; the latter half, which deals with the economic phases, is the work of Mr. Bogart; while Mr. Henry B. Fuller, Miss Nellie O. Barrett, and Mrs. Agnes Wright Dennis are the authors of respective chapters, the latter having achieved further distinction by giving final form to the chapters of political history.

Of particular value among the pages written by Mr. Thompson is the chapter on the constitutional convention, which sets forth the constructive work, including minority representation and railroad regulations, of a body torn by political, sectional, and class interests. It is not certain that the author is fully aware of the rôle played by the third parties during the period. From the politicians' point of view, third parties in the United States have ever been failures, but in considering the results of these movements, such as their influence on the old parties and the enactment of railroad and warehouse legislation, their significance is grasped.

As history the latter half of the work is disappointing. Overburdened with statistics, it is made up of more or less disconnected chapters on agriculture, animal husbandry, business, finance, transportation, trade, commerce, and manufactures, with two good chapters on labor. The question arises, has the busy reader the stomach to digest tabulated percentages and census returns without the aid of interpretation on the part of the historian? The author has placed many tables in the ap-

pendixes, which form an important part of the book. In spite of the defects the work is of considerable value to the student.

The chapter on mining by Miss Barrett in the latter half of the book is subject to the same criticism. Mr. Fuller's chapter, "The development of arts and letters," while not brilliant, is well done.

The most brilliant and penetrating work of the volume is the account, from the pen of Mrs. Agnes Wright Dennis, of the labor difficulties culminating in the Haymarket riot of 1886 and the subsequent pardoning of the convicted anarchists by Governor Altgeld. The trial and conviction of the accused without evidence of their personal participation in the riot leads Mrs. Dennis to the conclusion that they were the victims given to appease the mob, and that Governor Altgeld in pardoning them acted justly, but ruined his own political future. It seems quite probable that it is Mrs. Dennis' work on the first half of the book that is responsible for many of its virtues.

A searching examination of newspaper files has enabled the authors to do a large piece of research that needs to be done in many fields of American history. It is to be hoped that the *Centennial history of Illinois* will be the forerunner of notable activity in the field of state history.

JOHN D. BARNHART, JR.

The college and new America. By Jay William Hudson. (New York: D. Appleton and company, 1920)

The war and the mobilization of colleges in the Students' army training corps upset the established curricular routine of our higher institutions. It only disturbed and irritated most of the members of the faculties, and, though there has been much talk about needed readjustments, there have been no results so striking and thoroughgoing as those represented by the break in educational forms and university traditions in England, for instance. Those teachers who without any extended consideration have hastened back to curricular "normalcy" offer themselves the comfort that no extensive changes were needed and they have the excellent record made by American college men and university trained specialists as supporting evidence. Others, less certain that things educational can go on much as ever will welcome thoughtful discussion, especially when it comes from one in academic life who knows the strength and ideals of the existing colleges as well as their deficiencies and the very human limitations of the men who compose them.

The academic mind was never more sympathetically exposed and explained than in this little volume; how professors educate and do not educate, how our hit-or-miss departmentalizing of knowledge in terms of professional specialties ignores the correlations that make study a vivid reality to those we call students, how the victims find ready refuge in

"student activities" that never by any chance include study, are all set forth simply, pointedly, dispassionately, and constructively by Mr. Hudson. What he is seeking is a new all-embracing aim that, to use a word he avoids, will "motivate" American college education and transmute it into something that prepares the student to enter and act a part in the American social order. His ultimate hope is in the college professor himself. Reading such a thoughtful analysis and constructive attempt at definition should have some part in giving our highly specialized and individualistic faculties something of the social consciousness that must precede reform. It is this want of social consciousness which the author feels is the chief hindrance to the consideration of his views or of any other distinct educational change.

G. S. F.

The diary of a forty-niner. Edited by Chauncey L. Canfield. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin company. 253 p. $3.50)

"A stout, leather-bound book of some three hundred pages, containing a jumble of accounts and records of happenings and incidents ranging from the cost of provisions and supplies to notes of doings of mining chums and neighbors," bearing on the "inside of the front cover the name of Alfred T. Jackson, Norfolk, Litchfield County, Conn., October 10, 1849," when reproduced in this attractive little book fully bears out the statement of the editor in his preface, where he says that "here at last was a truthful, unadorned, veracious chronicle of the placer mining days of the foothills, a narrative of events as they occurred."

The first pages of this diary appear to have been lost, and the story begins with the entry of May 19, 1850, and the last entry is that of June 13, 1852. Between these two dates the diarist kept a pretty faithful record of what he did and what he thought, although the editor is not far from the truth when he opines that the "naive confessions do not always give the real state of his mind or the true reasons for his actions," for "it is reasonable to believe that he entertained a lurking idea that it [*the diary*] might see the light."

Not alone to the student of the history of California in the days of the gold fever is the diary worth perusing, for very few works of fiction hold the attention as does this day-by-day narrative with, what is unusual in such a contribution, the thread of a love story running in and out the tale of prospecting, digging, baking "sourdough," or taking occasional trips to San Francisco or the mountains. Altogether this diary forms a valuable addition to the source material already available for one of the most interesting episodes of American history.

Labor problems and labor administration in the United States during the world war. Part I. Nature and analysis of problem. By Gordon S. Watkins. [University of Illinois, Studies in the social sciences] (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1920. 119 p. $1.00)

Labor problems and labor administration in the United States during the world war. Part II. The development of war labor administration. By Gordon S. Watkins. [University of Illinois, Studies in the social sciences] (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1920. 121 p. $1.00)

A heavy load was thrown suddenly on our industrial machine by the war, and the resulting strain tested the strength of the machine and searched out its weaknesses. The symptoms which thus developed hold great interest for the economic diagnostician. It is from the standpoint of seeking to know what is wrong with our industrial organization and to prescribe a remedy if possible that Mr. Watkins has approached the study of labor problems and labor administration during the war. His conclusions are expressed in the final chapter of his second volume, after he has made a record of the disturbances and dislocations of industry that were revealed by the war or that developed during it and after he has catalogued their apparent causes and has told what measures were taken by the government to meet them. He is led to favor "increased activity by the state as a party to industry," which, he says, "does not mean nor express a tendency toward collective ownership and operation of the instruments of production." The trend of Mr. Watkins' thinking is hopeful. He finds promise of better conditions in the activities of the war labor board, the war labor policies board, and the other public agencies which were set up during the war, and he thinks it "unfortunate" that congress has not seen fit to make permanent such "excellent agencies." "It was folly to abandon this new labor administration," he says bluntly. The author believes firmly in organization of workers. "The radical labor movement," he says, "is gaining strength among the unorganized." "If America is to avoid the spread of Bolshevism and other forms of anarchistic radicalism . . . a co-equal voice in the government of industry is a necessary prerequisite." Labor must also have a "just share in the division of the product." He hopes to see these things accomplished by "the new spirit which is being generated in industry."

H. E. G.

The despoilers. Stories of the North Dakota grain fields. By J. Edmund Buttree. (Boston: Christopher publishing house, 1920. 314 p. $2.00)

Those among the reading public who are interested in the nonpartisan league will take up with pleasurable anticipation this latest book dealing with the league; they will probably lay it down, however, with a feeling of

disappointment. The title indicates the attitude of the writer toward the movement; he is, in fact, opposed to the league, both its principles and its practices. His book arouses a keener interest on that account, for it is to be contrasted with the two books favorable to the league which have appeared within the past year — *The nonpartisan league,* by Herbert E. Gaston, and *The story of the nonpartisan league,* by Charles Edward Russell.

Mr. Buttree has not chosen to make his book a complete story of the nonpartisan league. Rather, he has written a collection of comments on, and criticisms of, various phases of the league. Even for one who is fairly well versed in the subject, this method of procedure makes for some incoherence; one who reads the book with no previous knowledge of the league will fail to gain any adequate conception either of the background of the movement or of its scope and accomplishments.

The book is popular in tone; the author writes in an informal, familiar style which sometimes lacks polish and finish. His greatest sin, however, is perhaps irrelevance, for he frequently yields to the temptation to make this a book of reminiscences and homely philosophizing. In fact, the first half of the book is largely given over to this, the nonpartisan league figuring in the story only indirectly.

The main thesis of the book is a sincere plea addressed to the North Dakota farmer to think clearly for himself, instead of allowing himself to be further misled by the organizers of the nonpartisan league. It is Mr. Buttree's conviction that "they [*the farmers of North Dakota*] are going ahead rampant, allowing a propaganda of hatred of all other classes and sympathy for imaginary evils to arouse their pessimistic emotions and they have ceased to reason" (page 27).

Mr. Buttree has dealt with many of the points on which criticism of the league has been the most severe; and there is no doubt of his sincerity. Nevertheless, the reader cannot escape the conviction that for the opposition to the nonpartisan league there is still lacking an adequate treatment which is at least as satisfactory as Mr. Gaston's or Mr. Russell's treatment of the case for the league.

Minnesota geographic names. By Warren Upham. [Minnesota historical collections, volume XVII] (St. Paul: Minnesota historical society, 1920. 735 p.)

More things are concealed in a name, oftentimes, than the passing observer ever dreams of. The writer was once familiar with a city, which shall be nameless here, wherein a certain official with an instinct for reform undertook, in the interests of supposed logic, a wholesale renaming of the city streets. There ensued such an orgy of street-naming as never was seen before and, let us hope, never will be witnessed again.

Strong men were known to weep when the news was broken to them that the historic street on which they had lived from infancy had become overnight by might of official fiat "Avenue Twenty-three," or some similar designation dear to the heart of the logician. But their grief was as nothing compared to that of the supposed historical experts whose aid was invoked to supply the hundreds of new names needed. For the particular scheme which had been evolved turned on the initial letters of the names to be given, so that while five *A* streets, let us say, were needed, thirty names beginning with *K* must be supplied. Gentle reader, if this task sounds easy to you, take your pen in hand and try it. You think of "Kossuth" and "Casey," but investigation reveals that the first is already applied to a street in another section of the city, while the second does not, as you had hastily assumed, answer the requirement of beginning with the tenth letter of the alphabet. At the price of infinite mental travail you finally compile a list of half a dozen names beginning with *K* which you apologetically present to your reforming friend, with the excuse that had he only asked for thirty *B* or thirty *T* streets the list of names would have been forthcoming; whereat he promptly demonstrates the superiority of the logical mind to the historical by lifting from your column of *T's* the name of "Taylor" and with a stroke of the pen transforming it into "Kaylor." Thus easily the trick is done, and although future generations of citizens may seek in vain for the historical significance of the name borne by "Kaylor street," the requirements of logic have been satisfied.

Leaving the reformer out of account, place names oftentimes conceal a history which only vigorous digging will lay bare. What traveler on the upper Mississippi would ever guess the evolution which the Iowa town of Capoli has undergone? The early French *voyageurs* named the bold headland which juts into the river at this point "Cap à L'Ail," or "Cape Garlic," from its fancied resemblance to an onion. This the American pioneers turned into "Cap o' Lie," and later settlers completed the transformation into modern "Capoli." So, too, the town of Damascus in the Maumee valley, far from indicating the presence of some wandering son of the lost ten tribes, or even registering the pious sentiment of some early Yankee settler, represents merely the pioneer's ignorance of the French language; "Prairie du Masque"— so named by the early *voyageur* because of the fancied resemblance of the river bank at this point to the form of a reclining woman — became at their hands the modern "Damascus."

Illustrations of this sort might be multiplied almost indefinitely. A somewhat different factor underlies the disappearance from modern terminology of such picturesque and meaningful place names as "Old Snake," "Two-Whistles-for-Milk," and "Shake-Rag-under-the-Hill,"

which formerly graced the map of Wisconsin. That these names should disappear is probably desirable on the whole, even as it was desirable that ancient "Pig's Eye" should give place to modern "St. Paul." But generally speaking we have little sympathy with the prevailing lack of reverence for our place names in America. He who has the industry and devotion to scholarship requisite for elucidating the geographic names of an entire state deserves well of his country; for such a laborer can anticipate no meed of popular appreciation and must expect to find his reward solely in the satisfaction which follows upon the performance of a worthy piece of work. No other person could bring to the discussion of Minnesota geographic names the wealth of knowledge which Mr. Upham by forty years of painstaking labor has acquired. It is therefore most fitting that he should perform this task for the society with which he has so long been connected. The general arrangement of the book is alphabetical by counties. An extensive index renders the contents of the volume instantly available to the reader.

Alsea texts and myths. By Leo J. Frachtenberg. [Smithsonian institution, bureau of American ethnology, Bulletin 67] (Washington: Government printing office,)

The bureau of ethnology is to be congratulated on some marked improvements in the style of this publication over preceding ones. The first is in the "alphabet," or explanation of the characters used in the text; illustrations of the sounds are given that any ordinary reader can understand, such as that the sounds of unmarked *a, e, i,* and *o,* are as in "shall," "helmet," "it," and "sort." But why abandon the regular bureau rule, promulgated many years ago by Major Powell, for the purpose of promoting uniformity, according to which these sounds were all indicated by "short" marks, and the unmarked vowels had their continental forces, as in "far," "they," "pique," "note," and "rule"?

There is still room for improvement, however, as witnessed by the statement that *q* represents "velar *k*"; that *s* is a "palatal spirant, like Polish *s*"; and that *ts* is a "palatal affricative surd, like Polish *c*." Comparatively few Americans are familiar with Polish. Even more indeterminate is the information that *ou* is pronounced as "the diphthong *ou*." Two sounds of that diphthong are eliminated by information that long *u* represents the sound of *oo* in "too"; and *au* represents the sound of "*ou* in mouth." But there remain a variety of sounds to choose between, as shown in the words "although," "cough," "dough," "dour," "enough," "hough," "lough," "mourn," "nought," "pour," "poultry," "rough," "shoulder," "stough," "stour," "tough," "young," and "youth."

Another improvement is that in the first fifty-four pages the English

translation of each word is printed directly under the word, which is absolutely essential to any real understanding of Indian languages because of the basic differences between their grammar and English grammar. It is evident, however, that in many cases the translation is not exact. For example, in most Indian languages the subject pronoun, whether expressed or not, is always implied by the form of the verb, as in Latin; and in transitive verbs the object pronoun is also implied by the verb form. Thus, if the sentence were "John strikes James," the Indian verb, of itself, would mean "he strikes him." This is apparently the rule in Alsea, as is shown by examples in lines 6, 7, and 14 on page 24 of the text; but in most cases the pronouns are not included in the translations, which are presumably not complete to that extent.

There is other lack of uniformity. On page 26, in note 7, it is stated that a crossed *l* indicates the first person plural; and it is generally used in such verbal forms in the text. But, on page 24, in lines 14 and 18, it is used in verbs that are translated by the third person, in both the plural and the singular. It would be more illuminating if there were consistency in the use of the signs; but one cannot expect Rome to be rebuilt in a day; and so for the progress that has been made, we may thank God, and take fresh courage.

J. P. Dunn

The rise of Methodism in the west. By William Warren Sweet. (New York: The Methodist book concern, 1920. 207 p.)

The subtitle of this volume indicates its nature: "Being the journal of the western conference 1800-1811, edited with notes and introduction." The publication of these records fills a gap in the printed sources of American Methodist history. Aside from its value for questions of technical or antiquarian interest, the journal gives illustrations of many customs and ideals of the early circuit riders. Regarding slavery the cases of Adget McGuir (page 100), Benjamin Wofford (page 114), and Benjamin McReynolds (page 194) are interesting. The first mentioned was accused of saying that masters ought not to correct their slaves and was found not guilty; the second was required to emancipate; and the third was not admitted to the conference because he had not emancipated. On the other hand, Samuel Sellars was given permission to hold a negro boy until the young slave should reach the age of twenty-two (page 203). The feeling toward "worldly amusements" is reflected in the appeal of Thomas Scott, charged with attending a "Berbecue in the Town of Chilecothe," and his case was referred back to the quarterly meeting which had disciplined him (pages 160, 194). The prejudice against marriage of the clergy is illustrated by the cases of Benjamin Lakin and Jesse Walker (page 87). The former was not allowed a deficiency in 1803 because the circuit had supported his wife and the deficiency

claimed by the latter for the support of his children was also disallowed. Evidently the conference disregarded the rules made in 1784 for the support of wife and children. In 1807 the conference voted not to allow double quarterage to preachers marrying between sessions (page 127).

Mr. Sweet's notes are drawn almost entirely from Asbury's *Journal.* His introduction covers in four chapters the advent of the circuit riders into the west, a general sketch of the conference from 1800 to 1811, the economic limitations and the theological disputes of the circuit riders, and their influence on society. While these matters are treated sympathetically and also scholarly, exceptions must be taken to a few statements. James McGready, the Presbyterian, was not the sole originator of the camp meeting (page 21). John McGee and Daniel Asbury, Methodist pioneers in the piedmont region of North Carolina, had made the acquaintance of the institution, if such it may be called, about 1790 and McGree and his brother William, a Presbyterian, jointly introduced the camp meeting into Tennessee in 1799. Nor is it true as intimated (page 69) that there were no Methodist magazines or periodicals until long after 1800, for in 1789 the *Arminian magazine* was founded, which lasted two years, and in 1797 the *Methodist magazine* was established, which likewise lasted for two years. Finally, it is not at all certain that Bethel academy in Kentucky was "the second institution of learning founded by Methodists in the United States." Writing on April 23, 1793, Asbury speaks of "Bethel,— the place intended for a school," while in that year Cokesbury school on the Yadkin was in operation. Therefore it is likely that Cokesbury was the second school of American Methodism.

William K. Boyd

NEWS AND COMMENTS

Edited by Lester B. Shippee

The department of historical research in the Carnegie institution of Washington is collecting the material for an edition, in several volumes, of the correspondence of Andrew Jackson, to be edited by Professor John S. Bassett of Smith college, Jackson's biographer. All persons who possess letters of General Jackson or important letters to him, or who know where there are collections of his correspondence, or even single letters, would confer a favor by writing to Dr. J. F. Jameson, director of the department named, 1140 Woodward building, Washington, D. C.

The Honorable Walter B. Douglas, late vice president of the Missouri historical society and long actively interested in the work of that organization, died on November 7, 1920.

Beginning on June 2, Professor J. A. James, dean of the graduate school and professor of history at Northwestern university, gave a series of ten lectures on "The development of American political institutions" at the University of Prague.

The *Indiana magazine of history* for December, 1920, presents an article by George R. Wilson called "Hindostan, Greenwich and Mt. Pleasant"; "A pioneer wedding," by Esther McNitt; and "The pocket in Indiana history," by T. J. de la Hunt. The Women's club of Madison contributes a "History of Madison."

For those interested in the great war, in the part of America therein, and in certain after effects of the war, two articles in the January, 1921, number of *Social hygiene* are informative. These are "The social hygiene program of the army," by Percy M. Ashmun, and "The work of the United States interdepartmental social hygiene board, 1919-1920."

The *American political science review* for February, 1921, has, in addition to its regular features, an article by Quincy Wright on "The control of foreign relations," a survey of "Political and social reconstruction in France," by Raymond L. Buell, and "Constitutional law in 1919-1920," by Edward S. Corwin.

The *Virginia magazine of history and biography* for October, 1920, prints as usual a number of original documents bearing on colonial and revolutionary Virginia. Accompanying "Documents relating to the boundaries of the Northern Neck" is reproduced a map made upon the basis of surveys made in 1736-1737.

The issues of the *Bulletin des recherches historiques* for January, February, and March, 1921, contain a number of articles dealing with various episodes of Canadian, and particularly Quebec, history. The American colonial historian will find in the "Journal de ma campagne de Louisbourg," written by M. de Bqishébert in 1758, some interesting comments; this document appears in the February issue.

In the *Pahasapa quarterly* for February, 1921, published by the South Dakota School of mines, there is an article of interest to the student of Mississippi valley history in "Some early pictures of the Black hills country," prepared by C. C. O'Harra, president of the School of mines. The other contributions in this issue are more technical and make their principal appeal to students of mining engineering.

In the *Journal of negro history* for January appears an article by Carter G. Woodson, "Fifty years of negro citizenship as qualified by the United States supreme court," one by Charles H. Wesley on "Remy Ollier, a Mauritian journalist and patriot," and one by J. Fred Rippy on "A negro colonization project in Mexico, 1895." The proceedings of the annual meeting of the association for the study of negro life and history are included in this number.

Dr. Louis B. Schmidt, professor of history in the Iowa state college of agriculture and mechanic arts, has prepared in connection with a course of lectures on the economic history of American agriculture a syllabus entitled *Topical studies and references on the economic history of American agriculture* (The McKinley publishing company, Philadelphia). An introduction outlining the development of the subject is followed by a series of topics each of which is accompanied by a selected list of readings.

The *Magazine of history* (extra number — number 69, 1920) is a Lincoln number. It contains articles by John W. Tarbox, "Abraham Lincoln, the nation's martyr," reprinted from the *New era* of July 25, 1865, by Allan Forman, "President Lincoln's unlucky pass," written thirty-three years ago for the *Magazine of American history*, and seven other specimens of Lincolniana reprinted from a variety of sources or prepared for this periodical.

The *Political science quarterly* for March, 1921, in addition to contributions calculated to interest primarily students of government and politics, has several articles which should command the attention of the historian. Particularly should there be noted Professor Shotwell's "Democracy and political morality," "Social evolution during war and revolution," by E. Lederer, "France and the Vatican," by Raymond L. Buell, and "England and the Egyptian problem.'

"The Brendan problem," prepared by Joseph Dunn, with a partial bibliography, occupies the leading place in the January issue of the *Catholic historical review.* Father Gilday contributes an account of "The sacred congregation *de propaganda fide.*" A document from the Archives of propaganda, "Ragguaglio dello stato della religione cattolica nelle colonie iglesi d'America," reproduces one of the earliest accounts of the Catholic religion in the English colonies of America.

"The Louisiana background of the colonization of Texas, 1763-1803," by Mattie Austin Hatcher is the leading article in the January issue of the *Southwestern historical quarterly.* Other articles are "Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar," by A. K. Christian and "A ray of light on the Gadsden treaty," by J. Fred Rippy. Altogether this is an interesting and valuable number; particularly anything that throws light on the obscurity which surrounds the second acquisition of territory from Mexico is gratefully received by the historian.

The *Tennessee historical magazine* for July, 1920, contains an article by W. A. Henderson on "The adventures of de Sota"; a reprint from the Mississippi Valley Historical Review of December, 1918, of Professor Sioussat's "Andrew Johnson and the early phases of the homestead bill"; an account of "The North Carolina–Tennessee boundary line survey, 1799," by Samuel C. Williams; "Marriage records of Knox county, Tennessee" (continued from the previous number), by Miss Kate White; as well as general historical news and comments and a number of items from the minutes of the Tennessee historical society.

The annual meeting of the Historic landmarks association of Canada was held at Victoria museum, Ottawa, on Thursday, May 19, at 4 p. m. His excellency the governor general unveiled a sundial which the association placed on Parliament hill to replace one which stood on the same spot many years ago and which had been put there by Colonel By of the Royal engineers when the Rideau canal was in course of construction. The new sundial was a gift from Thomas Ritchie of Belleville, one of the life members of the association. Colonel By was, in a sense, one of the founders of Ottawa, as the place was at that time a very small village and was named Bytown in his honor.

The *Register of the Kentucky state historical society* for January, 1921, contains a miscellany including a sketch of the society, an account of "The Turner family," by Jozie Mae Turner Matthews, a brief article on Lieutenant governor Thruston Ballard (the present incumbent), an account of "William Marcus Linney," by Mrs. D. M. Hutton, the story of the old Innes fort on Elkhorn creek under the title "A relic of Indian days," by George A. Lewis, and the fourth installment of the "History

of Woodford county," by William E. Bailey. The latter follows the usual type of county history wherein there is made an attempt to bring in the name of about every person who in any way can be connected with the county.

The February, 1921, number of the *Hispanic American historical review* has a discussion of the "Causes of the collapse of the Brazilian empire," by Percy Alvin Martin, and an article on "Joseph Lancaster, James Thompson, and the Lancastrian system of mutual instruction, with special reference to Hispanic America," by Webster E. Browning. The bibliographical section is particularly full in this issue; the third part of C. K. Jones's "Hispanic American bibiliographies," Tomás Thayer Ojeda's "La sección de manuscritos de la Biblioteca nacional de Chile," and I. A. Wright's "The publications of the history section, faculty of philosophy and letters, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina," together comprise nearly half of the whole number.

The *Michigan history magazine* appears in another fat, although not double, number for October, 1920. The program is a varied one, including a paper by Alvah L. Sawyer on "Our society: how help it to serve," a description of the plant and work of the Minnesota historical society by its superintendent, Solon J. Buck, "Aid to education by the national government," by Jonathan L. Snyder, "The war record of Hillsdale college," by Mahlon H. Buell, "War patriotism in a Michigan prison," by James Russell, and an account of Michigan war legislation by Charles H. Landrum. The outline of Michigan history, prepared by the Michigan state teachers' association, is printed in full. In addition to the foregoing there are descriptive articles of two pageants, that at Marquette and that at the "Soo."

The Missouri historical society has recently received two important collections of manuscripts. The first consists of the private and official papers of Theodore Hunt of the United States navy, an early resident of St. Louis; among the papers is a memorandum book of the Pacific fur company containing articles of association, letters, reports, and agreements, 1810-1813. The book probably belonged to Wilson Price Hunt, one of the Astorians. The other collection, comprising the personal journals, pay rolls, box-holders' book, letters, et cetera, of George B. Berrell, once official prompter and later stage manager of the Grand opera house and Olympic theater in St. Louis, together with about five hundred "prompt books" of plays given in that city, makes in all an interesting and rather complete history of the stage in St. Louis.

The *Wisconsin magazine of history* for March, 1921, maintains its reputation as a well-edited periodical supplied with worth-while material.

The leading article is by Colonel Arthur L. Conger on "The military education of Grant as general." Other contributions are "Doctor William Beaumont: his life in Mackinac and Wisconsin, 1820-1834," by Deborah Beaumont Martin; "Historic spots in Wisconsin" (the sixth study, the subtitle of which is "Meeme, a frontier settlement that developed strong men"), by W. A. Titus; "Chronicles of early Watertown," by William F. Whyte; "An historical museum" (being a statement of how to establish such an institution), by Carl R. Fish; and a continuation of the "Letters of a Badger boy in blue: into the southland." "Historical fragments" contain notes on several topics bearing directly or remotely on Wisconsin.

Students of economic phases of history will find in the March, 1921, number of the *American economic review* several studies which throw light upon recent historical problems. Herbert J. Davenport discusses "The post-war outlook," and O. M. W. Sprague has an article on the "Discount policy of federal reserve banks." The papers and proceedings of the thirty-third annual meeting of the American economic association are published in a *Supplement* to the March number. Most of the papers are technical in content but many of them contain information and suggestions which will be of value to the student of American history whose interest lies in the more recent period, as, for instance, in John H. Williams' "Foreign trade balance of the United States since the armistice," several articles on the bituminous coal industry, and in "Federal taxation of income and profits," by Fred Rogers Fairchild.

Mr. Samuel M. Wilson has, in a pamphlet entitled *A review of "Isaac Shelby and the Genêt mission" by Dr. Archibald Henderson* (Lexington, Kentucky, 1920. 52p.), submitted to critical analysis Mr. Henderson article which appeared in the Mississippi Valley Historical Review for March, 1920 (6:451-469). The keynote of the review may perhaps best be stated in the writer's words: "The chief fault the writer has to find with the article in question is with certain comments and conclusions or characterizations, and not with those facts narrated, which are based upon indisputable records." Mr. Wilson is of the opinion that Shelby has suffered unduly at the hands of most commentators. Incidentally it may be noticed that in this review one finds a pretty complete bibliography of material bearing upon the whole Genêt-Shelby-Clark episode.

The revived *Quarterly historical magazine* of William and Mary college made its appearance in January under the editorship of J. A. C. Chandler and E. G. Swem. The leading article is an address by Alton B. Parker, chancellor of the Sulgrave institute, entitled "The foundations of Virginia." The other contributions are scattered over a wide field

and include several documents hitherto unprinted bearing on various phases of Virginia history. The second number, that of April, has an address delivered by J. Herbert Claiborne before the Maryland society of New York, entitled "William Claiborne of Kent island," and an account of Christopher Robinson's home, "Hewick on the Rappahannock." Robinson was one of the first trustees of William and Mary college. Nearly all the rest of the issue is given up to documents, mostly of the colonial period. The college of William and Mary is to be congratulated on the scholarly periodical, which is a worthy successor to the series long conducted by Dr. Lyon G. Tyler.

The March issue of the *Historical outlook* contains an interesting sketch entitled "Europe revisited," by Professor Lynn Thorndike. Other articles in this number are "Russia — cheering and disheartening," by C. C. Eckhardt; "Why study far eastern history — and how?" by Professor E. Griffin; "The slave in ancient Attica," by Chloe M. Hardy; and a "Geographical content of history textbooks," by Superintendent R. H. Snyder. The April number is opened by a review of "Historical studies in English universities," by E. B. Schmidt, an account of "Research work in the historical branch of the general staff," by Colonel O. L. Spaulding, Jr., and the "Report of the committee on history and education for citizenship: III. Syllabus for ninth grade study of American industries," by Miss Frances Morehouse of the department of social science in the University of Minnesota high school. Miss Morehousis during the current year lecturer in American history in the University of Manchester, England. Comments on the committee's report are furnished by Daniel C. Knowlton, Edmund S. Noyes, and Irving H. Hart.

Horace Kephart's *Our southern highlanders* has just been revised by the Macmillan company. This is still regarded as one of the best accounts that has been written of these peculiar people.

Hamlin Garland's *Ulysses S. Grant, his life and character,* originally published by the Macmillan company in 1898, has been reissued without change.

The following account of the English historical meeting at Cambridge is furnished by Professor J. Howard Robinson of Carleton college.

Several members of the Mississippi valley historical association (as well as their wives) who are on sabbatical leave and are spending the winter in London recently had the very pleasant experience of attending the annual meeting of the Historical association. The fifteenth annual general meeting was held at Cambridge from January 6 to 10. The

Christmas vacation was not yet over and therefore the colleges were able to afford ample accommodation for the visitors.

No finer place could have been chosen, at least from the point of view of American guests, for Cambridge has a peculiar attraction in its numerous colleges with their long record of scholastic activity. Sooner or later during the meetings nearly all the colleges entertained the association at lunch or tea or dinner or in the evening. Professor J. Holland Rose invited the guests of Cambridge to tea in Christ's college on Thursday and in the evening Vice Chancellor Giles opened Emmanuel to the visitors. On Friday the association had tea at Caius' and attended a reception in the evening at St. John's. Saturday there was lunch at Trinity and, for the Americans, tea at Corpus. Sunday noon Peterhouse was the host of the association; the master, Sir A. W. Ward, proved a charming host. In addition, visits were made to various other colleges where in many cases the master took the pains to indicate points of interest.

But in spite of the high living there was much plain thinking. The program of addresses, though not so full as we are accustomed to in America, was particularly interesting. The annual address, on Thursday, was given by G. P. Gooch. This well-known scholar summarized the diplomatic development of Europe before the war, bringing to light a number of interesting facts that recent publications have made known. Mr. Gooch has an exceptionally clear way of presenting his ideas. Friday morning there were two short addresses. Sir Geoffrey Butler, who was with the Balfour mission and who proudly wears the Phi Beta Kappa key given him while in America, spoke on the libraries of Cambridge, while Dr. Cranage revealed by word and picture the "Architectural history of Cambridge." At 5:30 on the same day C. G. Coulton, rich in his knowledge of medieval life and legend, dealt with "Just price and interest in the middle ages."

On Saturday morning, Mr. C. R. Fay of Christ's, who was most active in making the meetings a success, discussed very effectively the social phases of nineteenth century history. In the afternoon of the same day a paper was read by the master of Jesus' college, Arthur Gray, on "The beginnings of colleges." The American visitors will remember him and his college with especial clearness, since they were conducted through the buildings of Jesus' college by the master and saw, under unrivaled conditions, the evidences of its antiquity. Jesus' college is the outgrowth of the older nunnery of St. Radegund, and evidences of the earlier buildings have been found in numerous places.

Not the least of the pleasures that the Americans appreciated was the immunity from long and trying business sessions. Yet the Historical association is doing an important work for the teachers of history in the

secondary schools of England. Professor Grant of Leeds proved an exceptionally good chairman of the meetings. Others whose names are familiar to American scholars and who have taken an important part in the conferences are Professor Pollard and Professor Newton of the University of London, Professor Tout of Manchester, C. H. K. Marten, history master at Eton, Dr. Morris of Bedford, F. S. Marvin, author of the *Living past*, besides many others. The editorial board is doing excellent work in the publication of that valuable new journal known by the name of *History*, for the editorship of which I believe Professor Pollard is largely responsible.

The American visitors returned to London very much the richer for the sojourn in Cambridge — richer in inspiration, in acquaintanceship, in a knowledge of one of the great university centers of the world.

The *Proceedings and transactions of the Royal society of Canada* (Third series, volume XIII, meeting of May, 1919 — Ottawa, 1920), contains, as usual, studies in the sciences and in general literature as well as those within the field to which this magazine is devoted. In the French section Benjamin Sulte presents an article on Pierre Ducalvet. "Un hydrographi du roi à Québec; Jean Baptiste Louis Franquelin," by Pierre-Georges Roy, "Louis Rouer de Villeray, premier conseiller au conseil soverain de la Nouvelle France," by the same author, and "Jacques Cartier, etait-il nobile?" by Regis Roy, are other articles of interest to the historian in this section. In the English section may be noted "The overland argonauts of 1862," by Judge F. W. Hovey; "A contemporary account of the Navy island episode," by William R. Riddell; "A radical and a loyalist; a biographical sketch of Elias Hardy, barrister at law at Saint John, 1784-1799," by Archdeacon W. O. Raymond; "The significance for Canadian history of the work of the board of historical publications," by Adam Shortt; and "David Ramsay and Long Point in legend and history," by James H. Coyne. The last-named article presents a most illuminating illustration of the processes whereby folklore, myth, and popular rumor become, in course of time, inextricably mingled in the popular mind as valid local history. Anyone who may be inclined to sympathize with the idea conveyed by the phrase "Tradition strong as Holy Writ" would find it profitable to discover, by a reading of this study, the process by which popular tradition comes into being.

The members of the program and nominating committees for the next annual meeting of the Mississippi valley historical association are as follows:

Nominating committee: chairman, Christopher B. Coleman, Meadville,

Pennsylvania; Charles W. Ramsdell, Austin, Texas; Isaac J. Cox, Evanston, Illinois.

Program committee: chairman, George N. Fuller, Michigan historical commission, Lansing; William Spencer Robertson, University of Illinois, Urbana; Eugene C. Barker, University of Texas, Austin; George M. Stephenson, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis; Archibald Henderson, University of North Carolina; John C. Parish, Iowa City, Iowa.

The chairman of the local committee on arrangements is Benjamin F. Shambaugh, Iowa City, Iowa.

The Roosevelt memorial association is collecting all available material on the life of Colonel Roosevelt. Readers of this magazine who have letters from him or interesting memories of him are requested to communicate with the association. The address is 1, Madison Avenue, New York City.

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THE CONTROL OF MANUFACTURING BY THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT *

The only manufactures over which the confederate government sought control were those which directly supplied the needs of the army. These were of two classes: (1) arms and munitions, which were under charge of the ordnance bureau; and (2) a more diverse group which included clothing, blankets, tents, shoes, wagons, saddles and harness, which for the most part were provided by the quartermaster's bureau. Because of the limitations of space it has been necessary to restrict this paper to the consideration of the manufacture of certain items of the second group, namely clothing and shoes.

It is well known that manufactures of any kind had developed only to a very limited extent in the south before 1861. Textile factories had made a beginning, but they contributed but a small part of the cloth annually consumed. When the war came, the people at home revived the ancient household arts of spinning and weaving while the government was left to uncertain resources for the material with which to clothe and shelter the men it called to service in its armies. As no civil machinery existed for handling this problem, and the task of providing these supplies for the army devolved almost entirely upon the quartermaster's bureau of the war department, it is with the activities of that organization that we shall be chiefly concerned.

Under the first act of congress that provided for a volunteer army, each soldier was required to furnish his own clothing,

* This paper was read at a joint session of the American historical association and the Mississippi valley historical association held in Washington, December 29, 1920.

for which he was to be paid.[1] This was soon followed by a system of commutation by which the private soldier or noncommissioned officer was allowed a stated sum for the purchase of clothing.[2] Somewhat later, the secretary of war was required to provide clothing whenever the soldier was unable or unwilling to supply himself by means of the commutation.[3] This alternative system lasted for a little more than a year, until commutation was abolished by the act of October 8, 1862.[4] From this time on the war department was required to furnish all clothing to privates and noncommissioned officers. It had now become almost impossible for the soldier to provide his own clothing.

With the first establishment of army camps, quartermaster's supply depots were set up at convenient points for the reception, storage, and distribution of shoes, clothing, blankets, tents, and other necessities. Some of these articles were bought by the government, while others were contributed by the families of the soldiers or by patriotic organizations. Ready-made clothing was not then a market staple; therefore, when the quartermaster purchased cloth he must turn it over to some band of patriotic women who would volunteer to make it up into clothing or else he must hire sewing-women to do the work. The first method proved unsatisfactory, and by the fall of 1861 army clothing was being made almost exclusively in the quartermaster's depots under military supervision. This was plainly due to the absence of adequate privately owned facilities. As the depots were located in the larger towns where the cost of living was rising rapidly, it was easy to get plenty of labor, and thousands of women and girls sought employment in the clothing shops. In some depots, as at Richmond and at Columbus, Georgia, shoe shops were set up beside the garment shops. In these the operatives were men.

These government shoe and clothing shops, usually referred

[1] "An act to provide for the public defense," approved March 6, 1861, *Statutes at large of the provisional government of the confederate states of America*, 1 session, chapter 26, sections 3, 4.

[2] "An act concerning transportation, etc.," approved May 21, 1861, *ibid.*, 2 session, chapter 39. The sum allowed was at first twenty-one dollars every six months. Later it was made twenty-five dollars.

[3] Act of August 30, 1861, *ibid.*, 3 session, chapter 51.

[4] *Ibid.*, 1 congress, 2 session, chapter 30.

to officially as "factories," continued operations until the end of the war, except where destroyed or withdrawn before the union armies, and in them were made practically all army shoes and clothing, except such as came through the blockade or were captured or were furnished by certain of the states to their own troops. Several of the shops were conspicuously well managed, especially those at Richmond, Augusta, Atlanta, and Columbus. Others were less successful, sometimes because of the inexperience of the officials in charge, sometimes because of the difficulties inherent in their location, in a few cases perhaps because of dishonesty. The officers in charge were subjected to many discouraging difficulties: irregular and insufficient supplies of materials and funds; frequent interference — by conscription, enrolling officers, and congressional inquiries — with their male operatives, foremen, agents, and officers; lack of proper direction from the quartermaster general's office; and the general confusion and demoralization in the service in districts remote from Richmond.

The proper equipment of the shops was retarded by the great scarcity not only of the requisite machinery but also of the means of making it. By an act of October 8, 1862, the congress authorized the president to import free of duty machinery or materials for the manufacture of clothing and shoes for the army. The privileges of the act might be extended to companies or individuals under regulations prescribed by the president.[5] Under this act some machinery was brought in for the government; but that a much larger quantity was imported for the privately owned cloth and yarn mills is clearly indicated by their rapid increase, although this development was aided very much by the state governments, notably by that of North Carolina.

The army had been supplied with clothing during the first year of the war by various means, more or less fortuitous. The quartermaster general had come to rely for his supply of cloth upon the private cotton and woolen mills, all of which were small. By the summer of 1862 he found it necessary to enlarge his contracts with the factories. The factory owners had just

[5] "An act to encourage the manufacture of clothing and shoes for the army," *ibid.*, chapter 31.

begun to realize what a boon a war may be to business men. Before secession their establishments had led a precarious existence because of the stifling competition of the great northern and English mills.[6] The war had cut off that competition, there was a strong demand for more than they could turn out, and prices were rising rapidly. But this behavior of prices deranged all estimates of the purchasing officers, ate rapidly into the appropriations, and was the subject of constant complaint on the part of the quartermaster general. The underlying causes of this phenomenon are so familiar that they need not be detailed here. A contributing cause was the faulty purchasing organization which resulted in frequent competition between representatives of the different depots. Another, and very obvious one, was that the general stock of cloth on hand in the south in the spring of 1861 was about exhausted. Although competitive bidding between government agents was corrected to some extent by confining the contracts of each depot to a specified territory,[7] competition by the general public was not eliminated. The manufacturers in many cases were finding larger profits in the rising public markets than in contracts with the quartermasters, and either hesitated or declined outright to bind themselves to long term agreements at fixed prices. Those who refused to contract were sometimes threatened with the impressment of their goods; but this mode of procuring supplies was distasteful to the higher authorities in these early days of the war and it does not appear that impressment of cloth was resorted to at this time. Many of the factory owners, to be sure, willingly continued to sell to the government a large portion of their products. For the others a means of coercion was preparing.

The first confederate conscription act, approved April 16, 1862, made no provision for the exemption of any person embraced by its terms; but it was followed five days later by an act which exempted directly several classes of persons and

[6] See William Bailey to Governor John Milton, Tallahassee, June 15, 1864, in *War of the rebellion: a compilation of the official records of the union and confederate armies* (Washington, 1880-1901), series 4, vol. 3, p. 500.

[7] A. C. Myers to M. G. Harmon, December 30, 1861, to V. K. Stevenson, January 4, 1862. Letter books, quartermaster general's office, in the confederate archives, United States war department, Washington, 3: 50, 76.

in addition "superintendents and operatives in wool and cotton factories, who may be exempted by the Secretary of War."[8] Although the discretionary power conferred upon the secretary by this act clearly gave him the means of bringing pressure to bear upon the manufacturers to force them to contract with the government, exemptions seem to have been allowed so liberally that the situation was altered but little.[9]

The second conscription act, September 27, 1862, extended the military age to include men from thirty-five to forty-five years of age. It was followed by the second exemption act, October 11, 1862, which repealed the previous one and substituted a much more detailed list of persons to be exempted under certain conditions. Among these were shoemakers, tanners, wagonmakers, and other mechanics, and "superintendents and operators in wool and cotton factories, paper mills and superintendents and managers of wool carding machines, who may be exempted by the Secretary of War; *Provided,* the profits of such establishments shall not exceed seventy-five per centum upon the cost of production, to be determined upon oath of the parties"—subject, upon proof of violation to the secretary of war, to cancellation of the exemptions and the refusal of any whatsoever in the future.[10]

The provision which restricted profits derived from the labor of exempted persons to seventy-five per cent, on condition of the grant of exemption, was plainly an effort to check extortion and profiteering rather than to assist the quartermaster general, for it applied to goods sold to civilians as well as those sold to the army. It is significant that such a large profit was conceded. The southern people had always opposed in principle any direct interference by the government with legitimate private business, but feeling against the greedy extortioner who was blamed for the high prices and consequent privations, was so intense that all theoretical considerations were lost sight of.

[8] "An act to exempt certain persons, etc.," *Confederate statutes at large,* 1 congress, 1 session, chapter 74.

[9] There is some evidence that the conscription act for a time reduced factory production and embarrassed the quartermaster general by checking the flow of supplies to the army. See Myers to G. W. Randolph, May 23, 1862, in *Rebellion records,* series 4, vol. 1, p. 1127.

[10] *Confederate statutes at large,* 1 congress, 2 session, chapter 45.

The exemption provisions were put into effect by general orders from the war department in November, 1862, which provided that each application for exemption should be accompanied by affidavit and be returned to the local commandant of conscription, and that the exemptions should be granted or refused by the enrolling officer.[11] This part of the law remained in effect until February, 1864. As far as providing for the labor needs of the factories was concerned, it seems to have worked fairly well for a while. Late in 1863 the pressure for men for the army made it harder to convince the enrolling officers of the necessity for the exemptions. The factories were so dependent upon this labor that they rarely dared to refuse to make contracts with some department of the government. When a disagreement arose the threat to enroll their "exempts" was usually enough to bring them to terms.[12] It came to be felt that the profit allowed was too high, especially in view of the rapid turnover and of the hardships and misery of the people. Again, the system worked badly because there was no incentive to the manufacturer to keep down costs; on the contrary he was tempted to increase them. There was much suspicion that cost accounts were padded; but there was as yet no adequate method of inspecting them, and the penalties were rarely imposed.

These considerations may have had some weight in the passage of the conscription act of February 17, 1864, but the main reason for that stringent law was the stern necessity of filling the ranks of the depleted army. By this measure the conscription age limits were extended to seventeen and fifty years, while all exemptions, except for religious opinions, were repealed, and a new and shorter list was substituted. Workers in factories were no longer exempted, but the president might grant details either from persons between forty-five and fifty years of age who had been enrolled but not yet called into the ranks, or from the army in the field.[13] Under the general orders which put this law into effect the granting of the details was

[11] General orders no. 82," adjutant and inspector general's office, November 3, 1862. ¶ 8, "Provisions against extortion," in *Rebellion records*, series 4, vol. 2, pp. 160-168.

[12] A. C. Myers to W. E. Jackson, March 26, 1863, Letter books, quartermaster general's office, 6: 172.

[13] *Confederate statutes at large*, 1 congress, 4 session, chapter 45, sections 10, 11.

virtually placed in the hands of the local enrolling officer, who could make the grant for no longer than sixty days. At the end of that time the contractor must make a new application.[14]

Nothing was said in this act about the seventy-five per cent profit, and if it had not already ceased to be regarded as a proper one, it soon afterwards was abandoned. Perhaps General Lawton, who became quartermaster general in August, 1863, was a keener business man than Myers; at any rate, although the cost plus plan was continued, the profits allowed in 1864 were usually about thirty-three and one-third per cent, and sometimes they ran as low as twenty-five per cent.[15] It was usually stipulated in the new contracts that the factory should sell at least two-thirds of its cotton goods and all its woolens to the quartermaster's bureau; and that the quartermaster general in turn should endeavor to procure from the secretary of war enough details to provide the necessary labor for the factory. It does not appear that the manufacturer was placed under any restriction as to the prices he should charge in the public market. Lawton gradually adopted a rigorous policy with his contractors and insisted upon the right to examine the books of any concern whose cost estimates were suspicious.[16]

In the spring of 1864 the affairs of the bureau were in such confusion in the gulf states that General Lawton put the whole business of contracting with the cloth factories of that region into the hands of Major Cunningham, who had distinguished himself by his efficient conduct of the depot and shops of Atlanta.[17] Within two months Cunningham was able to report

[14] "General orders no. 26," adjutant general's office, March 1, 1864, in *Rebellion records*, series 4, vol. 3, pp. 178-183; also Circular no. 8, bureau of conscription, March 18, 1864, *ibid.*, 217-224.

[15] W. G. Ferguson to A. F. Cone, April 13, 1864, "Letters received," quartermaster general's office; A. R. Lawton to G. W. Cunningham, July 9, 1864, to W. G. Ferguson, September 12, 1864, Letter books, quartermaster general's office, 8: 341, 9: 96.

[16] Report on cost of production at Logan factory, Richmond, July 1, 1864, "Citizen's vouchers," quartermaster general's office; Lawton to Whitehead and Broocks (proprietors of above factory), July —,1864, *ibid.;* Lawton to Cone, August 19, 1864, Letter books, quartermaster general's office, 9: 2. This last is with reference to an investigation of the Manchester (Virginia) and Petersburg factories.

[17] Lawton to Cunningham, April 9, 1864, *ibid.*, 8: 186; also circular issued by Lawton, April 23, 1864, a copy of which is in "Personal papers" of Cunningham, confederate archives, United States war department.

a considerable increase in government receipts from the factories in Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina. Some factories had refused to make contracts with him on the ground that they had contracts, though small ones, with other bureaus or departments. "In such exceptional cases," he wrote, "I am much embarrassed for want of proper orders by which to control the detail of their men, as they have but to contract with some other Department and I am without remedy."[18] This was already a grievance with Lawton. The bureau of subsistence, the bureau of ordnance, and the navy department all had use for cloth of one sort or another; and each had obtained factory contracts. The contracts were usually small, but the factories by means of them had obtained the coveted and necessary details, and refused to make contracts with Lawton. They could dispose of their surplus product to better advantage than to the government. Lawton thereupon tried to induce the other bureaus and the secretary of the navy to transfer their contracts to him on condition that they receive the same amount of cloth as before. By getting control of the details, he could exact a larger part of the factory output. They agreed, but Colonel Northrop, the commissary general, insisted upon so much more cloth than Lawton could promise that the transfer was never completed.[19] The secretary of the navy, however, consented to turn over to the quartermaster general his contract with the very important Vaucluse factory in South Carolina, which had been selling to the navy department only one tenth of its goods. It had refused to contract with the army because "independent in the matter of details." The transfer, said Lawton, would secure to the navy its regular supply of material, and "will enable this Bureau to increase the production at Government account by subjecting all Factories to a uniform system."[20]

The bureau of conscription, which by order of the secretary

[18] Cunningham to Lawton, May 12, 1864, *ibid.*

[19] Lawton to S. P. Moore, March 31, 1864, to L. B. Northrop, to J. Gorgas, to A. L. Rives, April 1, 1864, to Cunningham, June 4, September 9, 1864. Letter books, quartermaster general's office, 8: 139-141, 269, 9: 163. Lawton from Gorgas, April 4, 1864, from John de Bree, April 16, 1864, from Northrop, April —, 1864. "Letters received," quartermaster general's office.

[20] Lawton to Stephen R. Mallory, September 3, 1864, to Cunningham, September 29, 1864. Letter books, quartermaster general's office, 9: 53, 163.

of war had been charged with the granting of details for factory labor, insisted upon a very stringent supervision of the business of the contractors. Doubtless this was because the conscription officers wished to make a good showing in keeping men in the army, but the effect was to strengthen control over the factories. In one case, which seems to have been typical, the enrolling officer refused a petition for a detail to a cotton factory in South Carolina unless the proprietors would agree to sell their surplus to the people at the same rate as to the government. The superintendent of conscription on appeal sustained the enrolling officer and explained that in order to stimulate production the earlier supervision had not imposed restrictions upon prices to the public; but now that production was probably at its maximum, it was proposed "to extend the supervision to the rates charged and to insist as a condition to the detail upon the disposal at reasonable rates of the articles manufactured." The thirty-three and one third per cent profit allowed by the quartermaster's bureau would be adopted as the rule. "The books of the concern should at all times be open to the inspection of the Enrolling Officer," and limiting the details to specific periods would result in frequent inspections and guard against the abuses of the cost plus plan.[21]

The conscription bureau was abolished by law in March, 1865, and its duties devolved upon the general officers commanding the reserves in each state. But the confederacy was in dissolution, and in the confusion of the break-up which followed there is little likelihood that any new policy towards the factories was instituted.

Through the virtual control of raw materials the quartermaster's bureau obtained another line of control over the textile factories. Raw cotton was plentiful in the southern tier of states until the end of the war; but after the quartermaster general had established a close supervision over the traffic of the railways and had put into force a system of priorities for army supplies, such as food and munitions, the feeble railways

[21] C. B. Duffield to the secretary of war, January 16, 1865, "Letters received," quartermaster general's office. This is an endorsement on the petition of W. A. Finger to be detailed as superintendent of Valley Falls cotton factory. The first endorsement is by Lieutenant G. N. Marshall, enrolling officer.

were so clogged that there was little opportunity for factories to get cotton, except locally, unless the quartermasters consented to its transportation. The Virginia factories came to this situation by the end of 1863; in 1864 even those in the cotton states were dependent upon the quartermaster general for a large portion of their supplies. When the raw material must be brought, under military orders, over an army-controlled railroad to a factory operating with labor detailed from the army, there was no way for the manufacturer to avoid selling to the government as much of his product as was demanded.[22]

Wool became scarce at the very beginning of the war. In fact, the south produced but a small part of the wool it consumed, and within a little more than a year some of the most productive regions were in the hands of the union armies. Agents were sent out early in 1862 into all the wool growing sections under orders to purchase all that was on the market at reasonable prices and to impress the rest. Great expectations of the Texas crop were cherished, but the clip of 1862 was sold before the government agents were in the field, and the major part of the clip of 1863 did not reach the Mississippi river in time to cross before the taking of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. The tax in kind, from which much had been expected, yielded little. Importations, through the blockade, from England, though helpful and important, still left a serious shortage. In 1864 a large proportion of the trousers sent to the army were entirely of cotton. In 1863 the government bureaus had obtained a virtual monopoly of the wool on the market — some escaped by clandestine exchange — and were able to require the woolen factories to make up the whole of it for government account. This monopoly was maintained for the rest of the war.

Thus far nothing has been said of the relations of the several state governments to the factories and of the consequences to the business of the confederate officials. North Carolina was the only state whose policies in this respect will be noted here. In the early days of the war when commutation was allowed the soldier who provided himself with clothing, the general assembly adopted a resolution that the state should furnish its sol-

[22] Lawton to W. G. Ferguson, September 12, 1864, Letter books, quartermaster general's office, 9: 96. For a discussion of the confederate railway problem, see the *American historical review*, 22: 794-810.

diers with clothing, shoes, and blankets and receive in payment the commutation money allowed by the war department.[23] This was agreed to by the war department, and, though it seems to have been unsatisfactory to some of the North Carolina troops in the field and proved a source of confusion in the quartermaster's bureau, the plan continued in force even after the abolition of the commutation in October, 1862.[24] Thereafter the state sold the clothing to the confederate quartermasters on the condition that it was to be issued to North Carolina troops exclusively. The state, of course, obtained these supplies either by contract with the factories within its borders, or by purchase abroad. "Exempts" and details were evidently allowed to these factories by the war department as well as to those contracting with the quartermaster general. General Myers, who had previously endeavored without success to persuade the North Carolina authorities to cancel the agreement, took the position that the abolition of commutation had itself abrogated the arrangement with the state. He therefore renewed his appeals that North Carolina place herself on the same basis as other states by surrendering to the quartermaster's bureau her contracts with the cloth factories and tanneries — from which the confederate officials were virtually excluded — thus allowing troops from other states less fortunately supplied with such factories to share their products. The state authorities — Vance was now governor — steadily refused.[25]

This situation lasted for nearly two years. Early in 1864 when the clothing situation was desperate, Quartermaster General Lawton instructed the post quartermaster at Raleigh to endeavor to get contracts for the bureau with the factories of North Carolina, if it could be done without coming into conflict with the state authorities.[26] This quartermaster, Major Peirce,

[23] *Public laws of the state of North Carolina passed by the general assembly at its extra session, 1861,* pp. 129-130. The resolution was adopted September 20, 1861.

[24] Myers to J. G. Martin, adjutant and inspector general of North Carolina, May 22, June 5, 1862, Letter books, quartermaster general's office, 4: 230, 275.

[25] Myers to Governor H. T. Clark, June 12, 1862, Letter books, quartermaster general's office, 4: 292, to Zebulon B. Vance, September 17, December 8, 1862, Vance's letter books, 1: 8, 68; Vance to Myers, October 14, 1862, *ibid.,* 25.

[26] Lawton to W. W. Peirce, February 25, 1864, Letter books, quartermaster general's office, 8: 50.

first tried again to induce the state authorities to agree to allow their contracts to be taken over by the confederacy in order that troops from other states might share in the clothing. Again the reply, by direction of Vance, was flat refusal to allow any of the North Carolina clothing to go to other troops until the governor should first satisfy himself that there was a surplus.[27] Lawton next inquired whether the state would object to the quartermaster's bureau making contracts on its own account with the North Carolina factories. He was informed that, owing to the scarcity of wool, the product of the woolen mills would not be shared, but that the confederate government was at liberty to make contracts with the cotton factories, since but few furnished the state more than one third of their output.[28]

Lee's men were ragged and barefoot; the needs of the army would admit of no further dalliance. Lawton now determined to move directly upon the factories themselves. More than one third of the whole number of textile factories within the entire confederacy east of the Mississippi were in North Carolina, and among these were also the largest and best equipped.[29] Though exact figures are lacking, it seems probable that the factories of North Carolina from which the confederate government hitherto had been in effect excluded, were producing half of all the cloth in the confederacy in 1864.

In August, 1864, Lawton gave instructions that careful investigation be made of the prices at which cotton and woolen goods, including yarns, could be had in North Carolina; also that a list of all the factories be made, with a report on the capacity of each, what part of its product was contracted to the state, and whether it would make a contract with the confederate government.[30] The factories seemed reluctant to send in written state-

[27] Peirce to Lawton, with enclosures, March 17, 1864, "Letters received," quartermaster general's office.

[28] Peirce to Lawton, with enclosures, April 2, 1864; Gatlin to Peirce, April 14, 1864. "Letters received," quartermaster general's office.

[29] See the statement of Lawton to James A. Seddon, September 28, 1864, in *Rebellion records*, series 4, vol. 3, p. 691. There are lists of the factories in the report of Major James Sloan to W. B. B. Cross of the quartermaster general's office, September 1, 1864, in "Letters received," quartermaster general's office, and in "Cash book," quartermaster general's department of North Carolina, in the archives of the North Carolina historical commission, in Raleigh, p. 1.

[30] Lawton to Major L. R. Chisman, August 2, 1864, Letter books, quartermaster general's office, 8: 385.

ments, and an agent had to visit them. It developed that although the state received only about one third of the product on the average, the factory owners were unwilling to contract any more of it to the confederate authorities, alleging that what was left was needed to barter for raw materials and labor, as the currency was valueless.[31] Just at the time the agent of the quartermaster general was making the round of the factories and hearing their several reasons for their inability to enter into contracts, the bureau of conscription began calling in the details whose services the factories had been enjoying.

"This," wrote Lawton's agent, "looks to the factories as if everything was arranged in Richmond with special reference to forcing them into measures, and they so express themselves. It is not very material whether they are correct or not; but if they think so it makes it easier for me to make contracts."[32] Although Lawton almost certainly had nothing to do with the the action of the conscript bureau, which in fact was calling in details in other states as well and interfering seriously with his activities, Governor Vance shared the suspicions of the factories, his wrath blazed up, and he seized the opportunity for exercising his favorite recreation of "trying a tilt with the Confederate government." He charged heatedly that Lawton was trying to break up the state's business with the factories in order to seize it all for his own department, and he demanded impetuously to know whether the confederate administration was giving countenance to the nefarious scheme. Lawton, with some asperity, denied the charge, and recounted the history of the troubles over the North Carolina factories, the growing scarcity of supplies available for the troops of other states, and the injustice and ill-consequences of the selfish policy followed by the state authorities.[33]

[31] Circular of Chisman to factory owners, August 15, 1864; Major Sloan to Cross, August 24, September 1, 1864. "Letters received," quartermaster general's office. See also Lawton to Sloan, August 19, 1864, to William A. Miller, September 2, 28, 1864, in Letter books, quartermaster general's office, 9: 2, 48, 158; and reports of Miller to Lawton, September 12, 17, 1864, in "Letters received," quartermaster general's office.

[32] Miller to Lawton, September 19, 1864, *ibid.*

[33] Vance to Seddon, September 19, 1864, in *Rebellion records*, series 4, vol. 3, vol. 3, p. 671; Lawton to Seddon, September 28, 1864, *ibid.*, 690-692. See also Vance to General Holmes, October 25, 1864, *ibid.*, 746.

Unfortunately the records thus far available do not disclose much concerning the consequences of this controversy. That the state continued to send large amounts of shoes, clothing, and blankets to its troops in the field is clear from examination of its account with the confederate government, month by month, from September 30, 1864, to January 31, 1865.[34] That the stores of shoes and clothing in the quartermaster's depots in Virginia and the Carolinas increased considerably is indicated by frequent statements of Lawton in December, 1864, and January, 1865, that plenty was on hand.[35] As it is unlikely that large importations could have come into Wilmington, where the blockade was tightening rapidly, one might infer that the North Carolina factories had supplied the increase, were it not for a tabulated report in February, 1865, by the bureau of conscription of persons detailed for labor in the various states. North Carolina shows a total of 261, against 387 for South Carolina, 797 for Georgia, and 927 for Virginia. There were no details shown for contractors with the quartermaster's bureau in North Carolina.[36]

The experiences of the government bureaus in procuring leather call for a separate account. By far the greatest consumer of leather was the quartermaster's bureau, which furnished shoes for the army and harness for baggage trains. The ordnance bureau also used leather for artillery harness and saddles. It was not until the early spring of 1862 that leather became noticeably scarce. In June, post quartermasters were instructed to make a special effort to procure shoes either by

[34] For September, 1864, $674,094; for October, $562,722.50; for November, $467,133; for December, $852,844; for January, 1865, $456,518. Manuscripts in the archives of the North Carolina historical commission. Even when allowance is made for higher prices, these figures show much larger sales than for any previous period of equal length, if it may be assumed that the earlier accounts are in full.

[35] Lawton to Lieutenant Colonel J. L. Corley, December 12, 1864, to A. B. Bragg, January 3, 1865, in *Rebellion records*, series 1, vol. 42, part 3, p. 1268, and vol. 46, part 2, p. 1009; to Miller and others, committee of the house of representatives, December 12, 1864, Letter books, quartermaster general's office, 9: 345; to Miller, January 27, 1865, in *Rebellion records*, series 4, vol. 3, pp. 1039-1041. Against Lawton's optimistic statements in the last citation above may be set one from Cunningham to Lawton, March 17, 1865, deploring the scarcity of cotton goods for shirts and underwear, his inability to pay contractors, and the suffering in the armies for each of these articles. "Miscellaneous letters received," quartermaster general's office.

[36] *Rebellion records*, series 4, vol. 3, pp. 1099-1109.

purchase or by having them made by workmen under their own supervision.[37] In July the supply was so short that experiments were made with canvas topped shoes, and not infrequently afterwards these cloth shoes were used. The tanneries everywhere reported a shortage in the supply of hides and raised their prices. This resulted in an order of the secretary of war fixing prices for the several grades of leather and authorizing impressment when these prices were not accepted.[38] The commissary officers who killed beeves for the army were directed to turn over all hides to the quartermasters. Although agents were sent out in search for them, only a small proportion of the hides which the country afforded was obtained. The indifference and carelessness of the commissary officers, who allowed the green hides to spoil for lack of a little attention, the unwillingness of farmers to give up their only chance to obtain leather for their own use, and the preference of the tanners for the greater profit in private traffic combined to defeat the expectations of the quartermaster general.[39]

As in the case of the cloth factories, the quartermasters began to press the advantage given them by the conscription acts. Tanners who found themselves or their hands liable to conscription were glad to make contracts which would enable them to stay out of the army and keep their business going. The contract usually provided that the tanner should receive one third of the leather made from the hides furnished by the government. He was usually required to furnish bond to cover the value of the hides, and, frequently, to sell to the government his third of the leather at a fixed price.[40] The post quartermaster of

[37] Myers to Captain F. W. Dillard, June 11, 1862, to Madison McAfee, Roland Rhett, and others, June 12, 1862, to Major T. F. Washington, June 19, 1862, to Major J. L. Calhoun, June 23, 1862. Letter books, quartermaster general's office, 4: 290, 294, 320, 329.

[38] W. S. Downer and J. B. Ferguson to Larkin Smith, July 28, 1862, "Letters received," quartermaster general's office, and the orders endorsed thereon by the secretary of war.

[39] "General orders no. 101," adjutant general's office, December 9, 1862, in *Rebellion records*, series 4, vol. 2, p. 232. See also Smith to Dillard, July 18, 1862, Letter books, quartermaster general's office, 4: 400; J. J. Smylie to R. P. Waller, October 17, 1862, "Letters received," quartermaster general's office.

[40] A contract, a printed form filled in, made by J. M. Hackett and A. B. Smith, High Point, North Carolina, with Major Waller, quartermaster at Richmond, November 1, 1862, may be found, *ibid.*

each larger district was given exclusive control over contracts within his district.

As soon as the bureau began to obtain leather it set up its own shops for the making of shoes. By an act of congress of October 9, 1862, the president was authorized, on requisition of the quartermaster general, to detail from the army persons skilled in the manufacture of shoes, not to exceed two thousand; and it was made the duty of the quartermaster general to place them at suitable points in shops, under regulations prescribed by himself, to make shoes for the army. These details were allowed extra pay.[41] The most conspicuous and successful of these government shoe shops was that at Columbus, Georgia, under charge of Major F. W. Dillard. Others of importance were at Richmond, at Atlanta, and somewhat later at Montgomery. These government shops had tanneries attached, but received a good part of their leather from private tanneries under contract. In some parts of the country, as in the Carolinas, private shoe factories continued in operation for a time and but few government shops were established. Due in part to the greater economy effected by concentration, a consolidation of the government shoe factories began in the summer of 1863,[42] and was carried further in 1864.

The visible supply of leather, and therefore of shoes, harness, and saddles, was declining rapidly.[43] Although the blockade runners continued to bring in both leather and shoes, so many cargoes were destroyed that the relief furnished was wholly

[41] *Confederate statutes at large,* 1 congress, 2 session, chapter 37. See also W. W. Lester and William J. Bromwell, *Digest of the military and naval laws of the confederate states of America* (Columbia, S. C., 1864), 93.

[42] For instance the Atlanta shops were transferred to Columbus and there consolidated with Dillard's; the Danville workers were sent to Knoxville. See Myers to Cunningham, April 25, 1863, to W. G. Sutherlin, May 13, 1863, in Letter books, quartermaster general's office, 6: 316, 379. Several shoe shops at other points in Alabama were consolidated, first at Selma, later at Montgomery. Inspection report, Lieutenant Colonel E. E. McLean to A. R. Lawton, December 6, 1863, in "Personal papers" of McLean, in the confederate archives; A. R. Lawton to Gillaspie, June 23, 1864, Letter books, quartermaster general's office, 8: 305.

[43] During the battle of Gettysburg, General Lee's quartermaster telegraphed a requisition for 20,000 pairs of shoes. Myers' reply is significant: "I have been in anticipation of receiving stores from you and not to supply you." Myers to Corley, July 3, 1863, Letter books, quartermaster general's office, 6: 539.

inadequate.[44] The loss of the Mississippi river sharply reduced the number of beef cattle that had been crossing from Texas and western Louisiana. The best cattle regions east of the Mississippi were now overrun by the enemy or were being subjected to destructive raids. There can be no doubt that the number of cattle within the confederate lines east of the Mississippi fell off rapidly. A situation which was bad enough was made worse by the frequent gross carelessness or inefficiency of the officers and agents charged with preserving, collecting and shipping the hides, by the refusal of commissaries, who desired to make purchases with hides, to turn them over to the quartermasters,[45] and, as demoralization grew, by the absence of proper control over distant quartermasters and agents, and by downright theft. Thousands of hides were kept out of the hands of the government by speculators, and evidence is not lacking that some minor officials themselves carried on private speculation in this much sought after commodity. The system of collecting hides had become so demoralized that in August, 1864, Major Dillard, whose success with his shoe factory at Columbus has already been mentioned, was given supreme control over the business in all the region south of North Carolina and Tennessee and over contracts for tanning as well.[46]

The arrangements for tanning were also in need of revision. As the supply of hides fell off, fewer tanneries were needed. The constant pressure for the return of details to the army, and the difficulty of safeguarding the interests of the government in out-of-the-way places made it clearly advisable to reduce the number of government contractors and return the unnecessary details.[47] Under instructions from the quarter-

[44] Lawton to General Robert E. Lee, January 20, 1864, to General Joseph E. Johnston, February 9, 1864. *Ibid.*, 7: 554, 8: 15.

[45] There are numerous instances of this. Dillard from J. F. Cummings, November 16, 1864, from J. L. Locke, November 28, 1864, A. Myers to Goodman, December 27, 1864, Goodman to Lawton, January 9, 1865. "Letters received," quartermaster general's office.

[46] Circular of Quartermaster General Lawton, September 19, 1864, personal papers of F. W. Dillard, in the confederate archives.

[47] "The facilities for tanning are so ample throughout the whole country that there would be no difficulty in tanning for money and on reasonable rates ten times the number of hides that can be obtained." Lawton to Major J. C. Green, August 24, 1864, Letter books, quartermaster general's office, 9: 13.

master general the number of contract-tanneries in Virginia was reduced in October, 1864, from one hundred and twenty-five to about a dozen. In South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama, Major Dillard reported a total reduction of from two hundred to sixty-seven, which was thought still too many.[48] The tanneries which were retained were required to work entirely for the government — since the quartermaster's bureau was taking all the hides whether on the market or in private storage — and to tan at a fixed money rate instead of taking pay in leather.

The business of making shoes for the army was now monopolized by the government shops through their control of hides and leather and their lower cost of production.[49] Moreover, they could easily make up all of the scanty supply of leather available. But even the government's own establishments were not free from business worries. The uncertain supply of raw materials was perplexing; but the interference of the conscription bureau with their details of workmen was even more annoying. The records of the quartermaster general's office show graphically how closely the service was combed for men to fill the ranks in the field. Every list of workers or officers was scrutinized with care lest some able-bodied man should slip through. The complaint of Captain W. M. Gillaspie, in charge of the shoe factory at Montgomery, must have described the experiences of others in similar positions. "It takes fully one half of the time of one of my clerks and about as much of my own to attend to the detailing of men. I no sooner have a man trained and somewhat efficient than he is ordered to report to camp, and then after considerable delay I have his services replaced by a new one and an invalid, in most cases, who is one half the time in the Hospital and the other half not able to do much work."[50]

So scanty are the records of their activities during the last months of the war that little can be said of the condition of the

[48] Lawton to W. G. Ferguson, October 12, 1864, to Dillard, October 21, 1864. *Ibid.*, 195, 223. Dillard to Lawton, October 22, November 2, 1864, "Letters received," quartermaster general's office.

[49] A. U. Davis to Governor M. L. Bonham, July 25, 1863, *ibid.*

[50] Gillaspie to Cross, assistant quartermaster general, November 4, 1864, *ibid.* The Richmond shoe factory was required to give up to the army 66 out of 171 employees in January, 1865.

factories or of their relations with the government. Some were destroyed by Sherman and other raiders; some closed down for want of material, or labor, or funds; some continued to the end. Though no change in the general policy of the government is discoverable, there is some indication that in the weakness and confusion which preceded dissolution, the system of control, once so rigid, relaxed.

It seems significant that the confederate government never devised nor even attempted to devise any civil machinery for the control or regulation of the factories upon whose production so much depended. The reason is clear: the supply of the army was regarded as solely a military problem. It was an army affair; leave it to the war department! Though an urgent, it was a temporary problem which would be over with the coming of peace. Perhaps the southerners disliked the idea of a permanent arrangement for interfering with private property rights; but probably they never thought of that at all. The military control which was gradually established was rigid, but partial, uneven, short-sighted. The sole purpose was to get supplies for the army at as reasonable a cost as possible — to exploit the factories, not to develop them for the benefit of the community at large. After all, these things were inevitable under a government struggling for bare existence and dependent upon undeveloped and inadequate resources.

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GEORGE ROGERS CLARK'S SERVICE OF SUPPLY[1]

In any study of the western struggle during the revolution one is impressed with a peculiar sense of contrast. If one thinks of the casual way in which the expedition into the northwest began, of the meagre forces involved, of the insignificance of the engagements — if the surrender of small garrisons to a few companies of backwoodsmen could be called engagements — or if one thinks of the slight attention which the eastern leaders of the revolution bestowed upon these remote westerners, the impression is something like that made by an actor who steps upon the stage in a minor role, and retires after speaking a few unimportant lines. If, however, one reflects upon the stakes for which the game was played, the international bearings of the struggle, and the consequences of the backwoodsmen's victory, the conflict takes on the dimensions of a considerable episode in the drama of world politics. To the historian the struggle presents a complexity of factors. Anyone who adequately treats the operations in the "Illinois country" must bring within the range of his researches the interplay of diplomacy and force which characterized the British occupation, the shortsighted neglect of a feeble continental congress, the administrative helplessness of a Virginian governor and council, the friendly neutrality and later the active support of the Spanish colonial forces, the wavering attitude of bewildered French inhabitants tossed about in the struggle for empire, the capable but self-

[1] This paper was read at the fourteenth annual meeting of the Mississippi valley historical association in Madison, April 15, 1921.

In the preparation of this paper, the author has found the assistance of various friends most helpful. Professor J. A. James, of Northwestern university, whose edition of the Clark papers served as the author's most useful guide, offered many valuable criticisms upon the first draft of his manuscript, and Dr. H. J. Eckenrode of Richmond, Virginia, gave substantial aid (including numerous detailed suggestions) in connection with Virginia's relation to the Clark scheme. The author is also indebted to Mr. M. P. Robinson, state archivist of Virginia, Mr. E. G. Swem, librarian of William and Mary college, and Dr. H. R. McIlwaine, state librarian of Virginia. These men facilitated his searches among the unpublished Clark records at Richmond. To Miss Louise P. Kellog he is indebted for assistance in the examination of original material at Madison.

centered conduct of strenuous American pioneers, and, not least in importance, the behavior of the Indians, whose friendship must be sought but whose treacherous hostility was a constant menace.

It is only a modest task, however, which this paper contemplates — that of presenting a close-up view of some of the every day problems of the man who was at once the originator and the supreme leader of this pioneer adventure. The military features of George Rogers Clark's campaigns have been often discussed. But what about the daily administrative problems which he faced in procuring, transporting, preserving, and distributing the provisions and equipment which his undertaking required? Because of the primitive conditions involved, this subject seems, to the writer at least, to offer some points of special interest.

In moving against Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and Vincennes in 1778-1779, and in his larger project for attacking Detroit, General Clark was acting primarily for Virginia, whose commission he bore. The energies of the old dominion, however, were fully absorbed — overstrained, in fact — in the more vital operations in the eastern campaigns, and Clark was of necessity thrown upon his own resources.[2]

The problem of food supply was perhaps the most imperative

[2] Western writers usually approach the problem of Virginia's relation to the Clark campaigns from the wrong angle. Forgetting the difficulties under which Virginia labored, they uniformly blame the state authorities for not giving Clark greater assistance. The heavy burden of the war resting upon Virginia, especially from 1776 to 1780, should not be overlooked. Enormous quantities of arms and provisions were shipped to Washington's army, leaving little for the state to devote to a private enterprise such as Clark's. Even assuming that the supplies had been available, the transportation difficulties were very formidable. The only practical route was the Ohio river, and the danger of Indian attack would have placed the boats under heavy hazards, to mention only one of the problems involved in maintaining such a line of supply transportation. Though Clark's men were without clothing, it is also true that Virginia's state troops and militiamen were in rags. Clark's financial difficulties were no greater than those of the state authorities themselves. Specie was so scarce and the depreciation of paper money so serious that the government had to be subsisted and the army supplied by requisitioning and by tithes on foodstuffs and tobacco. Clerks were partly paid in necessaries of life, and at one time it seemed that the Virginian government would have to cease functioning from sheer poverty. During the latter part of the war the state treasury was practically bankrupt. In spite of all this, however, toward the close of the struggle the Virginian government did make substantial efforts to supply

of all. Troops had to be maintained while on the march through wild country, and men in the garrisons of the frontier posts had to be subsisted during long periods of inactivity. More than once the food shortage became acute. The account in Bowman's journal of the ever-famous march upon Vincennes in February, 1779, makes frequent mention of the lack of food, and Clark himself refers to his men as half-starved and says he would have given a great deal for a day's provisions. The men at the falls of the Ohio were more than once reported to be in a starving condition, and Fort Jefferson had to be evacuated in 1781 because no supplies were available.

In the matter of food alone, Clark's needs included, as an irreducible minimum, bread, meat, and drink for the men, and fodder for the horses. The drink was usually of the stronger sort, such as whisky, rum, or taffia (a kind of rum obtained in the West Indes), all of which were invariably entered as "necessaries." For bread, reliance was placed upon wheat flour and corn, or as it was sometimes called, "Indian meal." The meat was of a rather varied character, obtained in part from the inhabitants, and in part by hunting. Hunting forays were a regular part of the routine, the larger game consisting usually of deer, elks, buffaloes, bears, and wild hogs. After the nimrods had bagged their game, its safe transportation and preservation presented no small problem. Often their luck was bad, as for instance when a party of nine hunters who were bringing home in a boat the fruits of a winter's hunt were struck by a gale which sent to the bottom the whole precious cargo, consisting of fifty-four buffaloes, four elks, and two wild hogs.[3] If

Clark. William Davis of the Virginia war office wrote to Clark, April 6, 1782, saying that he had procured "2 light brass three-pounders, 150 coats, 100 pair overalls, 200 shirts, about the same number of stockings, and a parcel of hats." Many of the articles were to be collected on the road from Richmond to Redstone near Pittsburgh. Clark manuscripts, in the possession of the Wisconsin historical society (Draper manuscripts, J), 52: 12. When all the factors involved are duly weighed, the wonder will be that Virginia was able to extend any aid at all. See *Calendar of Virginia state papers,* 1781, *passim;* Hamilton J. Eckenrode, *The revolution in Virginia* (Boston and New York, 1916); F. Z. Ripley, *The financial history of Virginia (Columbia university studies in history, economics, and public law,* volume 4, no. 1). The above details and comments were kindly contributed by Dr. H. J. Eckenrode of Richmond.

[3] *George Rogers Clark papers,* edited by James A. James (*Illinois historical collections,* volume 8), 533. See also pp. 506, 528, 532.

the supply of barrels failed, or if salt was lacking, or if the chief pickler was captured by Indians, the meat obtained at so great sacrifice was left to spoil. As the commissary preferred that the fighting morale of the men should be confined to the enemy, he learned from bitter experience to refrain from serving doubtful meat, even though large supplies of whisky were usually at hand for washing it down.

The problem of salt was indeed a serious one. Without salt, hunters would not be sent out, and on one occasion the lack of this article caused two-thirds of the men at Vincennes to be "incapable of duty."[4] Taking it all in all, Clark's food problem was a veritable struggle for existence.

In materials other than food, Clark's needs were by no means simple. He required boats of various types, large quantities of tar, pitch, and oakum, powder for hunting and for supplying the Indians as well as for fighting, cannon, swivels, rifles, pistols, knives, wagons, horses, paint, blankets, cordage, tobacco, liquor, furniture, seeds, material for forts, and numerous other necessaries. The varied nature of Clark's commissary demands is well shown in a study of his itemized disbursements. Selecting the items at random we find the following: $237 for ten men for bringing boats from Wheeling to Redstone; $10 for four pair handcuffs; $237 for ten beeves; $340 for 142 pounds gunpowder; $36 for storage and cartage of merchandise at Missere in the Spanish country; $59.20 to an armorer for 37 days' work; $30 for a boat anchor; $10 for ferriages over the Mississippi; $224 for 56 gallons of taffia delivered to Indians at sundry councils and treaties; $3.40 for one-half gallon rum for fatigue party loading boats; $20 for sundry necessaries for the hospital; $9 for two men for three days' search after public horses; $76.60 to Charles Caderon for provisions and other necessaries furnished Captain Bowman's company on their march to Illinois. There are many other items of this sort, and among them we find mention of materials unfamiliar to the frontier, such as "linen for boat covers," "flags for Indians," and "a large copper kettle."[5]

[4] *Ibid.*, 370.

[5] A considerable mass of Clark papers, long buried among the obsolete records of the Virginia state auditor, has been recovered through the efforts of Mr. E. G. Swem, formerly assistant state librarian, and these papers are now to be found, flat-

As to clothing Clark's resources were scant. Thomas Jefferson understated the case when he instructed Clark that the supply of clothing from Virginia would be "precarious," and advised him to provide the clothes in his own quarter "as far as skins would enable [him] to do it."[6] The men under Clark, like those under Washington at Valley Forge, were often barefoot, and at times almost naked.[7]

Paper, sorely needed for administrative records as well as for important correspondence, was hard to find, and was obtainable only at a high price. Some of the irregular shreds found in the Clark papers now preserved at Richmond resemble bits of wood pulp rather than real paper. Often the paper is so brown and the ink so poor that the writing is illegible.

The industrial operations incidental to Clark's campaigns called for a variety of material. These operations included boat-making, building of cannon carriages, construction of block houses and dwellings, repairing of guns, and other enterprises involving real craftsmanship and technical skill. An abstract of the work done by artificers at Fort Jefferson in 1780-1781 includes construction work on a garrison, covering two bastions, making three gates, erecting three store houses and five dwellings, building three block houses, putting up a number of huts for the soldiery, preparing a carriage for a six-pounder, fashioning 176 oars, and making 38 coffins for those of the little band who had died within the year. The blacksmith who kept the "public smith house" at the falls of the Ohio was a busy man if we may judge by the large number of orders upon him for making nails, repairing rifles, supplying axes, hardening the steel in guns, and mending saddles.[8] For all this construction and manufacture a varied equipment was required.

It should be remembered that the demands upon Clark were

filed in about sixty boxes, in the Virginia state archives at Richmond. They include routine commissary orders, vouchers, provision returns, letters, books of account, and a variety of memoranda. An examination of this material affords an intimate view of Clark's administrative problems. For an itemized statement of Clark's disbursements, see *House reports*, 30 congress, 1 session, no. 216.

[6] Jefferson to Clark, January 29, 1780, in *Clark papers* (James, ed.), 389.

[7] In a letter dated at Fort Nelson, August 5, 1782, Clark referred to distress among his officers for want of clothing. Clark papers, in Virginia state archives, "Aud. 53."

[8] *Ibid.*, "Aud. 44," "Aud. 42."

not confined to the support of his troops. Widows and others in distress were provided for, and, in addition, gifts and supplies had to be constantly furnished to the Indians, whose good will Clark was careful to cultivate. To prepare for an Indian council meant to assemble many gallons of "taffia," whisky, or other strong drink, and to accumulate ample stores of tobacco, vermilion, tape, ribbon, linen, blankets, leggings, and such things. Among the commissary and quartermaster's orders one finds frequent mention of items furnished to the Kickapoo, Piankashaw, Ottawa, Potawatami, and other of the Illinois tribes, all fantastically misspelled in the most approved backwoods fashion. In many cases the goods furnished to individual Indians were in payment for services, while in other cases they were in the nature of gifts. An essential part of Clark's personnel was a goodly number of Indian agents and Indian interpreters.[9]

To meet all these material demands in an unsettled frontier country, in the absence of adequate governmental support, with little or no money, and in the face of British intrigue, was a task that called for the highest statesmanship and involved an exacting amount of administrative and clerical work. When Clark left Williamsburg in January, 1778, after his preliminary conference with Governor Patrick Henry and the Virginia council, he was supplied with £1200 in paper currency.[10] After his plans began to be crowned with success he obtained various sums from well-disposed citizens who advanced money to him on the credit of the state of Virginia, but his treasury was usually low.

Hard money was almost entirely lacking,[11] and the common medium of exchange was Virginia currency. Not only was this a depreciated form of money but its scale of depreciation fluctuated so continually that its use was a never-ending source of

[9] A statement by Clark of articles delivered to Potawatomi Indians "when in council with me" includes "3 qts. taffia, 2 gals. ditto, 6 qts. ditto, 1 lb. vermillion, 7 lbs. tobacco, 10 yds. tape, 2 yds. linen, 1 yd. blue ribbon," and numerous other articles. Moses Henry, Indian agent for Clark, issued orders from time to time upon the commissary for supplies. *Ibid.*, "Aud. 53." (Many details regarding supplies to Indians are found in these records.)

[10] Clark's "Memoir," in *Clark's papers* (James, ed.), 219. The original is in the Draper manuscripts.

[11] For an account of the scarcity of hard money in Virginia, see Ripley, *Financial history of Virginia*, 108 ff.

vexation. At Kaskaskia in June, 1779, the ratio between silver dollars and Virginia paper stood at about one to six, though at Vincennes and Cahokia widely different rates prevailed. By November the ratio at Kaskaskia had declined to a scale of one to thirty while in 1781 the rate on money newly issued in Virginia appears to have been about one to forty.[12] The low credit of the state produced great irritation on the part of the inhabitants in the Illinois country, who complained loudly of the cheap paper in which they were paid; and at times it was necessary to conduct transactions on the basis of barter. County Lieutenant Todd, for instance, at one time accumulated a large supply of peltries to be used in paying for provisions.[13]

It may be said that Clark's three principal methods of paying for supplies were: (1) in Virginia paper currency; (2) in drafts upon the state of Virginia; and (3) in drafts upon Pollock, the commercial agent at New Orleans, of whom more will be said later. The financial and other support furnished by the continental congress was of relatively slight importance.[14]

Clark's commissary department seems to have been fairly well organized with an efficient man, William Shannon, in charge as commissary general. An approved form of commissary routine was observed.[15] Contracts were made with responsible

[12] Clark was able to keep the Virginia paper currency in circulation at a higher ratio than that prevailing at home. In 1781 new notes were issued by Virginia with the understanding that they were to be redeemed in Spanish milled dollars at the rate of one to forty. By 1782 the ratio fell as low as one to one hundred William W. Hening, *The statutes-at-large, being a collection of all the laws of Virginia (1619-1792)* (Philadelphia and New York, 1823), 10: 399.

[13] Peltries served as a sort of currency in the Illinois country at this time. Their use to provide the army with provisions is referred to in a letter of Jonathan Clark to his brother George Rogers Clark, December 12, 1791. Clark manuscripts (Draper manuscripts, J), 53: 91. Much evidence covering this subject is to be found in the Clark papers in the Virginia state archives, "Aud. 73." See also *Clark papers* (James, ed.), 328.

[14] Clark occasionally refers to supplies issued from the "continental stores." Describing the very outset of his first expedition in his "Memoir" he says: "taking in my stores at Pittsburgh and weling I proceeded Down the River." Referring to the same time in the Mason letter he writes: "I set out from RedStone the 12th of May [1778] . . . General Hand . . . furnished me with every necessary I wanted." *Ibid.*, 220, 117. Washington, writing to the board of war, April 20, 1781, mentioned certain military stores at Fort Pitt which Clark was to use in his attack upon Detroit. *Ibid.*, 535.

[15] Abuses in Clark's commissary department (in which Clark himself was blameless) are hinted at in the communications sent to Clark from the Virginia war

parties for the furnishing of specified provisions, and supply bases, as for instance at the falls of the Ohio, were established for the accumulation of stores. Receipts were taken for moneys paid; supplies were duly acknowledged; properly authorized officers presented orders on the commissary or quartermaster countersigned by Clark when they needed supplies; provision returns were kept for each company; and, for the smallest article, an issuing voucher was made out.

Though seemingly the driest of documents, these vouchers and other routine orders possess a certain human interest, and with the exercise of some imagination they may sometimes be made to tell quite a story. The following examples are sufficient to suggest the character of these routine documents: Issue such and such provisions to the bearer (an Indian) "for services done in relieving a prisoner taken on the Cherokee river;" "Received of Major George Slaughter $1290 for the use of my pack horses for eight days to carry his men's baggage over the Alleghany Mountains;" "Issue to that squaw who furnished our men with provisions on our way to attack Governor Hamilton one bushel of corn and five pounds of pork;" "Received of William Harrison $540 for 12 days' work at boating flour from Georges Creek to Pittsburg;" "Issue 93 gallons of taffia to that number of men at this garrison [Fort Jefferson];" "Please pay to Mr. A. Birch 4000 livres for one horse, bridle and saddle bought of him for use of United States at Kaskaskia."[16] There are thousands of these papers, and while such trivial things would usually be passed over, yet the unrecorded acts which some of these orders and vouchers suggest cannot fail to arouse the historian's curiosity.

In the search for supplies the most obvious recourse was to the local inhabitants. At times this means of supply proved fruitful as in the case of the people of Cahokia in the summer of 1779, whom Bowman enthusiastically praised for generously supplying him with a fifth of their cattle and horses.[17] While

office in Richmond in the spring of 1782. Clark is enjoined to issue pointed instructions to restrain his subordinate officers, widely scattered at various posts. He is asked to insist that nothing be drawn from the stores except what is absolutely necessary, and that a very strict accounting be kept. Clark manuscripts (Draper manuscripts, J), 53: 12 ff.

[16] Clark papers, in Virginia state archives, *passim.*

[17] *Clark papers* (James, ed.), 327.

at Kaskaskia in 1778, Clark was largely dependent upon the French inhabitants for supplies. In this matter he was ably assisted by the Spanish merchant, Francis Vigo, who furnished large supplies out of his own stores, and who also advanced money to the local inhabitants for the goods which they furnished to the troops. Without Vigo's ready cash, it is doubtful whether the inhabitants would willingly have parted with their provisions.[18] The papers of Clark and his commissary officers include a long list of individuals who were paid for furnishing goods for his use. At times, however, the temper of the inhabitants was sullen, and they refused the most urgent applications, so that the soldiers were pinched with hunger in a fairly prosperous country. The inhabitants had, it is true, their grievances, as for instance when their cattle were seized, or when the bills in which they were paid proved to be irredeemable; and their resentment was intensified by the adverse influence of various disaffected and disloyal characters. Besides, the supplies which they were capable of furnishing were necessarily limited.

Other sources therefore had to be developed, and far-reaching lines of supply transportation had to be created. A considerable portion of all of Clark's supplies came from New Orleans by way of the Mississippi. Through the never-tiring efforts of the American and Virginian agent at New Orleans, boats were kept plying, often under Spanish colors, for the Illinois country. The presence of the British sloops of war on the river, the menacing guns of the British at Natchez, the danger of Indian attack, and the perils of up-stream navigation made this method of communication very hazardous. Sometimes the Mississippi overflowed, and valuable provisions were lost. Once a batteau of supplies had to be stopped after its departure up the river on account of a Tory plot to capture the cargo. Only the most resolute men were chosen to man the north-bound boats. Such men were scarce, and their wages high. Yet rather than discharge sailors and batteau men, the American agent retained them on pay during periods of idleness, although this proved to be an expensive process.[19]

In these important operations *via* the Mississippi, as well as

[18] Report regarding Vigo's claim, *House reports*, 30 congress, 1 session, no. 216.

[19] Oliver Pollock to the commercial committee of the continental congress, May 20, 1778. Letters and papers of Oliver Pollock, in the Library of congress, volume 1.

in general administrative matters, there is one man who stands out as Clark's main support. This man was Oliver Pollock, a wealthy merchant of New Orleans, who served Clark in much the same way that Robert Morris, the financier of the revolution, served Washington.[20] Having lived for a time at Havana and having become later associated with the Spanish governor of Louisiana, and being in addition an able business man and a patriot of unusual devotion, he was well qualified for the difficult position which he held at New Orleans during the revolution. Pollock acted in a double capacity. He was at the same time agent of the state of Virginia, and commercial agent of the United States at New Orleans, which was then a Spanish port. An extensive correspondence was conducted between Pollock and the commercial committee of the continental congress, of which Robert Morris was the leading member. Pollock was instructed to supply all possible assistance to Clark's expedition, to purchase goods on the best terms, to charter vessels or buy them if necessary, to employ the crews, to be responsible for the safe the arrival of cargoes, and to see that the goods were paid for. He was directed to keep his accounts for the goods furnished to Clark separate from his other transactions, and to charge all the advances for the "Illinois department" to the state of Virginia. At the very outset of his first expedition Clark was indebted to Pollock, who had sent to Pittsburg the goods which General Hand supplied out of the continental stores.[21] In the following months his ammunition came in large part from Pollock, and the same may be said of clothing, sugar, liquor, and many other articles.

Pollock at New Orleans was thus the "good angel" of the

[20] The writer's chief sources for Pollock are: *Clark papers* (James, ed.); Clark manuscripts, in the Virginia state archives; Letters and papers of Oliver Pollock, in the Papers of the continental congress, Library of congress; Rev. Horace E. Hayden, *A biographical sketch of Oliver Pollock, esq., of Carlisle, Pennsylvania, United States commercial agent at New Orleans and Havana, 1776-1784, with genealogical notes of his descendants* (Harrisburgh, Pennsylvania, 1883); *House reports*, 30 congress, 1 session, no. 216; Report of the commissioner of revolutionary claims, *Journal of the house of delegates of Virginia*, 1835-1836, appendix, document no. 6.

[21] "When in 1778, General George Rogers Clarke [*sic*] was dispatched . . . with a small force to reduce the English posts at Vincennes and Kaskaskia, Pollock had already forwarded to Fort Pitt by Colonel Gibson, a large quantity of gunpowder obtained from the King's stores, part of which furnished Clarke with his ammunition." Hayden, *Pollock genealogy*, 10. (See *ante*, n. 14).

Clark campaigns. Not only did he furnish a service of essential supplies by way of the Mississippi and the Ohio, but he contributed what was equally important — namely, credit. Clark's remittances for articles obtained in his vicinity frequently took the form of drafts upon Pollock. It was in this way that he paid the ordinary bills of his commissary department. Clark looked up to Pollock in somewhat the same way that the continental congress looked to Franklin, as a sort of financial wizard — one whose name on a bill of exchange was almost the same as money itself. In this piling-up of paper obligations the war financiers of the period often forgot that if paper obligations are not ultimately redeemed in hard money, the only alternative is repudiation.

Not only did Clark continually issue drafts upon Pollock in large sums, but many of his officers assumed the same privilege. A curious bit of backwoods finance is found in the action of Captain Robert George in command at Fort Jefferson in 1781. Because of the dire need of his troops, he drew bills of exchange upon Pollock for $237,320 in order to pay for a cargo of liquor and dry goods. He admitted that he was "taking a liberty" in so doing; that he intended the bills to be paid in current money, not specie; that in spite of this the bills expressly directed payment to be made in gold and silver; that he was "unacquainted with the nature of bills of exchange;" that he later recognized that he had been imposed upon, and that he was glad finally to learn that the bills had been protested, since it was never his intention to have drawn for so enormous a sum to be paid in specie.[22]

It should be noted that Clark's bills on Pollock were for hard money. "All bills which were drawn by me on New Orleans," he said, "were passed at the rate of a hard dollar for every one named in the bill." Those drawn on Virginia, he added, were for depreciated paper dollars. This statement of Clark's is corroborated by other evidence which shows that the bills drawn by the Virginia officers in the Illinois country upon Pollock were paid for at par in specie.

One naturally asks, how did Pollock meet all these obliga-

[22] *Journal of the house of delegates of Virginia*, 1835-1836, appendix, document no. 6.

tions? The answer is: Theoretically, by advances upon the state of Virginia; practically, out of his own pocket. The status of Virginia's credit in Louisiana in 1779 is illustrated by the fact that when a Mr. Lindsay appeared in New Orleans in 1779 with a bill of credit for $10,000 supplied by Governor Patrick Henry with which to procure supplies for Clark, none of the merchants of the place could be prevailed upon to supply the goods on such a basis. Again, Pollock drew upon Virginia's account with a firm of French financiers only to find that these bills to the extent of $65,000 came back under protest. Pollock once remarked as to his relations with Virginia that he was "an agent indeed but that was all." In August, 1779, he wrote to County Lieutenant Todd, "I have never yet been honored with a line from the executive power of the state of Virginia," and in March, 1780, he stated that since the commencement of the war he had received no communications from the Virginian council.

Disappointed in his expectation of funds from the Virginia treasury, and constantly pressed to supply Clark's emergency demands, Pollock drew upon his own private resources. He did not stop until he had exhausted his fortune. Realizing, as he says, that the posts in the Illinois country would inevitably fall without his support, he borrowed money in his own name, mortgaged his property, and sold his slaves far under their value in order to obtain funds. He even paid batteau men and traders silver in exchange for paper currency, dollar for dollar, in order to encourage the traders to carry up their goods and at the same time to keep up the credit of the paper. His total advances to Virginia and the United States exceeded $300,000, for all of which his own credit was pledged.

The time came when Pollock could do no more. In February, 1779, he wrote, "How Colonel Clark and the state of Virginia expect such heavy sums to be paid by me without money is a mystery which time only can point out." It soon became necessary for Pollock to protest Clark's bills, and this bitter news, indicating the failure of Clark's most trusted source of credit, proved a grievous disappointment to him.

Pollock's generosity spelt his own ruin. His creditors closed in upon him, and in 1783 he was imprisoned by the Spanish

authorities at Havana for debt, being detained in custody for eighteen months. His account with Virginia was ultimately assumed by the United States, and in 1782 Alexander Hamilton handed him a treasury warrant for $108,605.[23] This was, however, only a partial settlement.

The supplies furnished to Clark gave rise to many post-war claims, and in order to adjudicate them the Virginia government appointed a board of "western commissioners." The work of this body, however, was unsatisfactory. Its rules of evidence were strict, its place of meeting shifted frequently, and many of the claimants either did not know about the board or felt that the uncertain result would not justify the costly effort of prosecuting a claim before it. As a part of the settlement with the United States arising out of the Northwest cession, Virginia was paid the lump sum of $500,000 to cover the expenses of acquiring the western territory. It was understood that disbursements would be made from this sum for the satisfaction of the individual claimants, and the "commissioner of revolutionary claims for the state of Virginia" inherited from the "western commissioners" the duty of making the necessary adjustments.[24]

By this time Clark had made his accounting to the state, and his financial records were given over to the auditor for safekeeping. It appears that many of the ledgers and books of account in the auditor's office were destroyed, and some of the Clark papers may have suffered in this way. Such as remained lay in confused heaps in the Virginia state capitol, until recently the state archivist acquired them. Now they are flat-filed and suitably arranged for historical study.[25]

Claims arising out of Clark's operations have at times been presented to the federal government. Oliver Pollock was allowed the expense of his confinement at Havana, in addition to the

[23] Hayden, *Pollock genealogy*, 15.

[24] Typical reports on claims connected with Clark's expeditions are to be found in *House reports*, 30 congress, 1 session, no. 216, and *Journal of the house of delegates of Virginia*, 1835-1836, appendix, document no. 6. Complete references to such material in Virginia state publications are to be found in Earl G. Swem, *A bibliography of Virginia* (Richmond, 1916-1917), part 2.

[25] See *ante*, n. 5. These records will appear in Professor James's additional volume of Clark papers, to be published in the *Illinois historical collections*.

$108,000 previously mentioned, and Francis Vigo was reimbursed by the United States for various claims.

The historian of today who seeks to estimate Clark's place in history will profit by an intimate study of his daily administrative problems. It is only by visualizing the magnitude of his tasks in comparison with the inadequacy of the means at his disposal that one can measure the personality of the man Clark, — the man to whom the middle west owes its existence as an American community.

James G. Randall

University of Illinois
Urbana

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

A Letter on the Illinois Country to Alexander Hamilton, 1792 [1]

The following letter describing the Illinois country is interesting principally because of the emphasis which the writer lays on the trade being carried from Canada into the northwest. The information in it is not particularly novel and does not differ very much from that which Governor St. Clair himself reported after he had visited the villages of Illinois. However, the contemporary information about this distant country is so meagre that the letter has its value.

Nothing has been learned of the personality or the business of the writer, but many men were then investigating this country with a view to investments and it is probable that Mitchell may have been traveling in the interest of some company.

E. G. Swem

Sir:

Having been employed in the Illinois Country last Autumn, beg leave to lay before You some information which I acquired relative to the commerce of that country. perhaps it woud be nessesary first to give you some Idea of the Number of Inhabitants of several places, since they differ very materialy from the account given by Hutchins description of that country[2]— I shall begin with St. Louis on the Spanish side — it contains about 300 good stone houses — has a small garison — a strong Castle, and a tolerable wall nearly around the town — the no. of Militia is computed at 500 — it is one of the finest inland towns I ever saw, the situation is delightful — it is nine miles below the confluence of the Missouri and Missisippi. St. Genevieve is 60 miles below St. Louis is an inconsiderable Town only famous for its Salt Works. KaskasKias opposite St. Genevieve, it contains about 80 stone buildings and a small church about one hundred men and a Large Proportion of

[1] From the Hamilton manuscripts, in the Library of congress.

[2] Thomas Hutchins, *Topographical description of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland and North Carolina, reprinted from the original edition of 1778*, edited by F. C. Hicks (Cleveland, 1904).

Negroes. St. Phillips is of little consequence at present, Fort Chartres has been declining, very few inhabitants. Cahokia is a fine Town it is situated 3 mile below St. Louis on the opposite side, it contains 100 stone houses about the same no. of Inhabitants capable of bearing arms. Belle Fountaine lies 26 miles from the Mississippi East from Cahokia. it is composed of americans, about 30 Families.

The commerce of this Country is immense, when we consider the no. of Inhabitants. It is the opinion of Mr. John Edgar[3] at Kaskaskias, that the consumtion of English property alone amounts to 250,000 £ annually The Missouri is navigated near 1200 miles among various Tribes of savages — it employs annually from 50 to 100 boats. The whole of the Mississippi from the Natches to its source is supply'd by Canadian merchts.

Ouisconsing & Illinois Rivers at this moment have an immense quantity of British merchandize on their Banks. The Traders were impressed with the Idea that St. Clair's arms were Terrible. They in Consequence of it, pushed large quantities of goods on the Illinois to supply those who might retreat there from the fury of the incensed eagle when we consider the vast no. of Savages on the Banks of those great Rivers, that are supply'd from Canada and the baneful influence they never fail to gain, whereever they are permitted to have a commercial intercourse I think every man interested for his country woud wish to put a check to their progress, and turn the channel of commerce, trifling as it may appear, to the advantage of the Revenue of the United States or at least to the citizens of America. I shall next endeavour to show you my method which I beg leave to propose for putting an effectual stop to a contraband trade between canada and the Mississippi River, as there is only two places by which they can possibly advance into that country — one by the Illinois and the other by the Ouiscansing both have 12 Miles Land cariage, an armed boat in each with a small tender to run in shallow water woud in my opinion be a sufficient force to put a final stop to British Influence in that part of America. Michlamackinac a flourishing Town at the head of Lake Michigan must be intirely ruined — and shoud a Town be erected at the mouth of Illinois, no doubt woud transfer their property to it.

The Boats that will be necessary to answer every purpose for succeeding in an enterprise of the Kind I lay before you must be light Keel Boats manned with 18 men & 16 oars — plenty of canvass — two [— ?] swivels a few Blunderbusses and each man a rifle; There must be a cover made for the Men to row under bullet proof — the men must

[3] John Edgar had been in Kaskaskia for several years and had become one of the most important citizens of the village.

be chosen among the best — aproved courage & Fidelity — such men can be had for 8 Dollars P Month. A small light rowing skiff with four oars & a cockswain to run in Shallow water where a larger boat cant swim. A man must be acquainted with inland navigation to be capable of traversing the Mississippi — it is a very dangerous River to those not acquainted with it. There must be a block house built on an Island in each river to prevent being cut off or surprized. I hope Sir that you'l not be offended at the bold Language which I make use of — I woud only wish to be understood, as humbly offering my opinion to the first character in America, from whose benevolence many have experienced the smiles of Fortune, that you may long live to enjoy the confidence of your country is

the Sincere wish of Your
humble Servt.

N. Mitchell

Alex. Hamilton, Esq.
Secretary of the Treasury
Philadelphia
Feby. 9th 1792.

N. B. All dry goods consumed in Illinois country are at present brot from canada the expense of a voyge (being 3 months) and from New Orleans to St. Louis is very considerable and are as high at New Orleans as Ft. Pitt.

A Rare Abolitionist Document

In the second quarter of the nineteenth century the Honorable Timothy Jenkins was one of the leading citizens of the village of Oneida Castle, in Oneida county, New York. Jenkins was born at Barre, Massachussetts, in 1799, and was admitted to the bar in 1824. He settled in the village of Vernon, in the town of the same name, Oneida county, and practiced there until about 1832, when he removed to Oneida Castle, in the same town. For a while he served as postmaster and from 1839 to 1845 he was district attorney for Oneida county. From this office he entered the twenty-ninth congress as a democratic representative. After serving through the thirtieth congress, he was defeated for the thirty-first, but was reëlected to the thirty-second. He died at Martinsburg, New York, in 1859, leaving a considerable library, mainly of government publications.

The town of Vernon adjoins that of Kirkland, in which, at the village of Clinton, is located Hamilton college. Recently Jen-

kins' daughter presented her father's library to the college. Among the books is one of unique interest. Not even the Library of congress has a copy of this edition, though it possesses one of an earlier edition.

An appropriate name for the little volume would be "The answer to the proslavery argument," except that it was published several years before that pronouncement. It is a duodecimo volume of 220 pages, bound in figured purple cloth, and entitled *The liberty minstrel,*[1] by George W. Clark. Copyrighted originally in 1844, the Hamilton college copy belongs to the sixth edition, published by the author in New York in 1846. The Library of congress copy belongs to the first edition. According to the Library of congress, "the work is unique as an Anti-slavery publication, and for its rarity."

The preface explains the purpose of the book, on the basis that "all creation is musical — all nature speaks the language of song." After reënforcing this statement with poetical quotations, the author proceeds: "Who does not desire to see the day when music in this country, *cultivated and practiced by ALL* — music of a chaste, refined and elevating style, shall go forth with its angel voice, like a spirit of love upon the wind, exerting upon all classes of society a rich and healthful moral influence. When its wonderful power shall be made to subserve every righteous cause — to aid every humane effort the promotion of man's social, civil and religious well-being." (Apparently the author thought more of prosody than of syntax). Accordingly, "an ardent love of humanity — a deep consciousness of the injustice of slavery — a heart full of sympathy for the oppressed, and a due appreciation of the blessings of freedom, has given birth to the poetry comprising this volume." Mr. Clark wishes to see these sentiments of "love, of sympathy, of justice and humanity" expressed in such poetry, "embalmed in sweet music; so that *all the people* may sing of the wrongs of slavery, and the blessings of liberty" until the influence of these sentiments shall " 'undo the heavy burdens and let the oppressed go free.' " He has long been contemplating the publication of such a work, he tells us, modestly adding that

[1] The writer is indebted to Professor Joseph D. Ibbotson, librarian of Hamilton college, for bringing this work to his attention.

"many have been impatiently waiting its appearance." Associations of singers "having the love of liberty in their hearts" should be formed immediately in all communities to learn these melodies and spread them abroad. "To all true friends of universal freedom, the LIBERTY MINSTREL is respectfully dedicated."

Whittier's "Gone, Sold and Gone" is the first song, with appropriately doleful music by Mr. Clark. Indeed, most of the music is of his composition, and in several cases, the initials "G. W. C." indicate that he is the author of the words also. Several other of Whittier's poems are included, adapted to various tunes; notably, "The Yankee girl," with music by Clark; and "Our countrymen in chains" to the tune of "Beatitude." Longfellow's "Quadroon girl" is set to an air of Clark's, and his "Slave singing at midnight" to a Bavarian air. Two of Cowper's poems, two of Mrs. Sigourney's, one of Mrs. Hemans' and one of Burns's appear. Next to Whittier, who has six contributions, is Miss M. E. Chandler, with five. She was, of course, the Quakeress abolitionist poet, the friend of Lundy and Birney. Burns's "A man's a man for a' that" is set to the tune of "Our warrior's heart," while the tune of "Scots wha ha'e wi' Wallace bled" is borrowed for an election song. Lowell's "Are ye truly free?" is adapted to the air "Martyn," while N. P. Willis' "Pleasant land we love" is given the air "Carrier dove."

As in a hymnal, several songs are adapted to the same air; thus "Ye heralds of freedom" and "I would not live alway" are both arranged to music by Kingsley.

Familiar airs are used freely. Some of the best known are: "Oft in the stilly night," (set to a parody by Clark); the Marseillaise; "Dan Tucker;" "Rosin the bow;" "Bonnie Doon;" "Yankee Doodle;" "America;" "Watchman, what of the night;" "Zion;" "Greenland's icy mountains;" "My faith looks up to thee;" "Sweet Afton;" and "Calvary."

"The song of the Coffle gang" is stated to be the actual lament of negroes in the hands of the slave-dealer. The music is by Clark. "Stolen we were" is said to be by "a colored man." Strange to say, only two songs are specifically credited

to Garrison's *Liberator,* though doubtless others were culled from it. These two are: "O pity the slave mother," to the air of "Araby's daughter;" and "The bondman," to the air of "The troubador"— of which it is a parody.

Naturally, not all these songs were written or set to music at one time, or just for publication in this collection. Presumably some were prepared for the presidential election of 1840, when James G. Birney first ran as the candidate of the liberal party; others, perhaps, for his race in 1884. Several of the songs refer to Birney. Two are set to the tune of "The warrior's heart," namely, "The liberty battle song" and "Birney and liberty." An "Ode to James G. Birney," by Elizur Wright, Jr., was harmonized by Clark, while "We're for freedom through the land," by J. E. Robinson, has for its refrain, "We will vote for Birney." Other campaign songs are "The liberty party" and "The liberty voter's songs," both by Wright; "The ballot," by J. E. Dow, to the tune of "Bonnie Doon," and "The ballot-box," to an "air from 'Lincoln.' "

The last thirty pages of the book constitute "The liberty appendix," though why "appendix" it is hard to say, for neither subjects, tunes, authors, nor composers differ materially from the rest of the work.

A few selections from this repertoire will show its nature better than further comment. Set to the tune of "When I can read my title clear," is "Come join the abolitionists," of which the first stanza gives a fair notion:

> Come join the Abolitionists,
> Ye young men, bold and strong,
> And with a warm and cheerful zeal
> Come help the cause along;
> Come help the cause along;
> Come help the cause along;
> And with a warm and cheerful zeal
> Come help the cause along.

Fearsome indeed is "A vision," with words by Creary, music by Clark. A footnote informs the reader that it is a "scene in the nether world—purporting to be a conversation between the departed [*sic*] ghost of a departed southern slaveholding

clergyman, and the devil!" The author stationed himself near the infernal portals and heard someone salute Satan thus:

"Hail, Prince of Darkness, ever hail,
Adored by each infernal,
I come among your gang to wail
And taste of death eternal."

"Where are you from?" the fiend demands,
"What makes you look so frantic?
Are you from Carolina's strand,
Just west of the Atlantic?
Are you the man of blood and birth,
Devoid of human feeling,
The wretch, I saw, when last on earth,
In human cattle dealing?"

After five similar stanzas, the cheerful ditty concludes:

Our ghost stood trembling all the while —
He saw the scene transpiring;
With soul aghast and visage sad,
All hope was now retiring.
The Demon cried, on vengeance bent,
"I say, in haste, retire!
And you shall have a negro sent
To attend and punch the fire."

Can one imagine a more depressing experience than to listen to a group of sincere but humorless fanatics chanting such words to funereal tunes?

The "Ode to Birney" begins thus:

We hail thee, Birney, just and true,
The calm and fearless, staunch and tried,
The bravest of the valiant few,
Our country's hope, our country's pride!
In freedom's battle take the van;
We hail thee as an honest man.

Parodies are numerous, of which the following will suffice. "For the election" is, of course, a parody on Bannockburn, of which this is the first stanza:

Ye who know and do the right,
Ye who cherish honor bright,

Ye who worship love and light,
Choose your side today.
Succor Freedom, now you can,
Voting for an honest man;
Let not slavery's blight and ban
On your ballot lay.

To the tune of America three poems were sung. The longest begins:

My country, 'tis for thee,
Dark land of slavery,
For thee I weep;
Land where the slave has sighed,
And where he toiled and died
To serve a tyrant's pride —
For thee I weep.

Perhaps the best parody is one on Alexander Selkirk, to the air of "Old de Fleury."

I am monarch of nought I survey,
My wrongs there are none to dispute;
My master conveys me away.
His whims or caprices to suit.
O slavery, where are the charms
That "patriarchs" have seen in thy face?
I dwell in the midst of alarms,
And serve in a horrible place.

One song deserves quotation in full. This is the "Slaveholder's lament": words by L. P. Judsen; music arranged from "Lucy Neal" by G. W. C.

"What shall we do?" slaveholders cry,
Overwhelmed with dreadful grief;
"Slavery we fear, must quickly die,
Unless we find relief.
Fanatics labor, night and day,
The North is in a blaze,
While in the South, young Cassius Clay
Fears not his voice to raise.

"We preach and print in every mood,
And rob the 'negro pen'
Railroad and stages through the wood
Take '*things*' and make them '*men.*'

But worst of all, the Birney crew
Seem reckless of our fate —
Of all the acts you've seen them do
The *vote's* the thing we hate.

"These are our fears and this our dread,
They're based on grounds too true,
That slavery soon must yield its head
And vanish like the dew;
The old 'North Star' we've *voted down,*
And told him not to shine,
But still he gives Victoria's crown
These *'things'* from Southern clime.

"We've worked and toiled and raved and foamed
And hoped to keep them down
But prayers to Congress snugly room'd,
Unread, referr'd or known;
We've robbed the mail and taken lives,
And then to fright the rest,
We've brandished rifles, bowie-knives,
'Cold steel and Dupont's best.'

"What shall we do? O what, say what!
Our foes increase and rise,
Old slavery reels! the fever's hot —
She pants — she gasps — she dies,
What shall we do? We'll give it up,
And with the North agree,
To take the draught from freedom's cup
LET ALL MANKIND BE FREE."

Evidently this collection was supposed to furnish inspiration to both political and religious gatherings of abolitionists. Sincerity, but the sincerity of the narrow zealot, breathes from every page. Despite the fact of the six editions (if not more), the "Minstrel" could not have had a very wide vogue or a great influence. The writer has been unable to find a single reference to it in the biographies of the abolitionist leaders, the most pretentious histories, such contemporary periodicals as *Nile's register,* the *North American review,* the *New Englander,* or the histories of American literature. Nor is George W. Clark mentioned in the biographical dictionaries or the works of reference

on musical history. It is obvious that he was both a composer and a versifier; probably he was a teacher of music also, as well as an antislavery agitator. A footnote to "A tribute to departed worth," one of the "Minstrel's" collection, reads: "As sung by G. W. C. at the erection of the monument to the memory of Myron Holley, Mount Hope, Rochester. It may be sung as a dirge." Evidently Mr. Clark was also a singer — perhaps a concert singer. Myron Holley, who died in 1841, was a lawyer and editor of Rochester, New York, who took a prominent part in the anti-Masonic and antislavery movements.

It is interesting to note that in 1854, Myron Holley Clark was elected governor of New York by a fusion of antislavery whigs and democrats, prohibitionists and independents, who called themselves "republicans." He was the son of the Reverend Joseph Clark, who may have been a relative of George W. Clark.

Perhaps the moral to be drawn from the accidental reappearance of this little volume is the need for greater attention to local history.

Milledge L. Bonham, Jr.

BOOK REVIEWS

Edited by Lester B. Shippee

Modern democracies. In two volumes. By James Bryce (Viscount Bryce) (New York: The Macmillan company, 1921. 508, 676 p.)

The author was born in 1838, and in 1862, the second year of our civil war, at the age of twenty-four, he published *The holy Roman empire.* At the age of fifty he gave us *The American commonwealth,* and now, in the late autumn of his life, we are again deeply indebted to him, this time for the masterly summing up of his political wisdom and of his knowledge of political democracy contained in these two splendid volumes. His equipment for writing this particular work has not been excelled, perhaps, in our times. The accumulated observations of many years of travel to the very ends of the earth, unusually wide reading in history, politics, and philosophy, over forty years of practical political experience as a leader in the old liberal party, unquenchable hopefulness, a Celtic sense of humor, a fine ability to write clear, expressive English, sanity, and a ripe judgment — all these and more are his. The result is a book which is a permanent contribution to the best literature of political science.

Democracy, as Bryce defines it, is "that form of government in which the ruling power of a state is legally vested, not in any particular class or classes, but in the members of the community as a whole" (1:20). Putting aside all irrelevant subjects and materials, the author concentrates his attention upon the problems of democracy as such. Politics is everywhere given the chief emphasis; constitutional law, governmental organization, administrative problems, and the social and economic movements which to-day agitate the political waters in all democracies are touched upon only in passing. They are the light curtain upon which is thrown the silhouetted figure of democracy.

In fifteen introductory chapters the author considers the more important problems common to all democracies, such as liberty, equality, education, religion, the press, parties, local self-government, and public opinion. From these he passes to Athens, as typical of ancient republics, and thence to the pseudo-democracies of South and Central America, which he discusses sketchily before taking up a group of actual democracies of to-day: France, Switzerland, Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. Of the six, Canada receives the shortest

and the United States the longest treatment (52 and 165 pages respectively). In twenty-three closing chapters the author has given us his ripe observations on the workings of democracy, dealing with the decline of legislatures, the executive in a democracy, direct legislation, the money power in politics, democratic political leadership, and kindred topics. Everywhere he knows and faces the facts, and everywhere in his treatment of them he is sympathetic toward the people under discussion.

The discussion of our own democratic institutions is new, although it is perfectly possible to trace back many of the observations to *The American commonwealth.* Bryce is fully aware that many changes have been made in our political life in the past forty years, and by numerous deft touches he shows that he has not failed to note and to examine them. The perversions of the party system, the inefficiency and corruption in municipalities, the lax enforcement of criminal law, the fumbling incapacity of congress, and other defects are commented upon as fully as space will permit, and yet everywhere the author is sympathetic rather than caustic, and gives reasons why affairs are not better managed than they are. He rejoices at every sign of improvement, but withal the picture of democracy in operation is everywhere somber enough.

What is then the conclusion? Has democracy failed? The author appears to be disappointedly hopeful, almost apologetic. Affairs are not as near perfection as he and other early and ardent friends of democracy had hoped they would be — but of course they expected too much. No, speaking generally, "the experiment has not failed, for the world is after all a better place than it was under other kinds of government, and the faith that it may be made still survives. . . . Hope, often disappointed but always renewed, is the anchor by which the ship that carries democracy and its fortunes will have to ride out this latest storm as it has ridden out many storms before."

WILLIAM ANDERSON

Woodrow Wilson and his work. By William E. Dodd. (New York: Doubleday, Page and company, 1920. XIV, 369 p.)

It is gratifying to those who admire Woodrow Wilson and a challenge to his critics for an historian with Mr. Dodd's reputation to assert that "the career of President Wilson and his services to his country and to mankind in general are so well defined and fairly rounded out that historians may not long postpone their estimate of both the man and his work." That this estimate is to be a very high one in the opinion of Mr. Dodd no one can doubt who reads his work. "Of purposes and ideals," he writes, "no man has ever spoken more plainly or written

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more accurately than Woodrow Wilson what he believed and what he thought the country ought to adopt as its programme." Mr. Dodd may well be criticized for placing a label of greatness upon a man whom time has not yet judged historically, and he anticipates just such criticism and grants the privilege of correction "if the account errs." Yet he boldly takes his stand upon the assertion that "as to the main facts there cannot be widely different judgments."

Difficult as it is to write a biography of a contemporary while he yet lives, when judgment is too frequently swayed by personal emotion, Mr. Dodd has conscientiously written this defense of Wilson "while his bitterest opponents occupy the centre of the public stage." It is at once a challenge to critics of Wilson and a fearless defiance of the methods by which the public was swayed through misinformation to repudiate the man who carried this country to a position of prestige never before attained.

Mr. Dodd in setting forth the incentives which directed President Wilson in his policies has with clearness shown that they were the logical and inevitable result of his early training and his own educational development as expressed throughout his writings during the years in which he practised law, held a chair of political science, and served as president of Princeton and governor of New Jersey. His early life was spent in a solemn and serious enviroment, filled with the presence of the Presbyterian deity and the belief of most religiously minded Americans of that time that "the world was a vale of tears, a place of preparation in sweat and blood for that other world to which all must surely go." His father, a minister, "gentle and warm hearted, a believer in the value of human leadership and suggestion as well as in the stern will of God handed down through the ages" was his best and constant teacher, the leader and maker of the future president. The environment of this early formative period cannot be overlooked. Born in 1856, he received in his boyhood years the impress of the harrowing conditions in the south — the soldiers going to war, the burial of the dead, the industrial life making deadly weapons. He stood at the side of Robert E. Lee and felt the thrill of admiration for a great leader. With all the horrors of the reconstruction period deeply implanted in his mind and heart Woodrow Wilson went to college. At Princeton the atmosphere was not unlike that of his early training; the professors bore the earnest character of Christian ministers; the sermons and revivals taught that to go astray must be by set purpose, not by accident.

It was in this early period that possibly we find record of the first manifestations of the stamina that has so marked Wilson in his position of president. His refusal to debate when it fell to his lot to defend pro-

tective tariff as against the principle of free trade, preferring to have his society lose the prize and himself the highest honor of his college course rather than defend what he considered an immoral thing, is but founded in the principle that made him while president stand silent amidst all sorts of abuse and criticism rather than to protect himself by using official documents which would have vindicated him, and that gave him the courage to follow his convictions of what he felt was right regardless of consequences to himself personally. Mr. Dodd tell us that as early as 1879, years before the test of 1914-1920, we can find expression of the germ of President Wilson's later political reforms in the United States in his advocacy of a responsible president. At that time he attacked the secret committee system of congress as a source of the shameless scandals and found the cause in "the absence of responsible leadership and the failure to apply open methods in laying tariffs and fixing taxes." He further indicted congressional government and strongly advocated cabinet government. In other words, he believed that the president of the United States must "shape and guide legislation and stand or fall with the people according to the measure of success attained," and that "the shirking of responsibility through the division of authority, house, senate, and supreme court must cease." This was his conception of democracy as it should be and such as the American system was defeating. Here, then, we have Mr. Wilson's policy; it demands "a responsible leadership if men are to arrive at results and make reforms," or, to use his own words, "large powers and unhampered discretion seem to me indispensable conditions of responbility. There is no danger in power if it be not irresponsible." He laments the hit and miss methods of congress, the failure of American presidents to outline policies and to guide legislation. From this period on until he became president, his many articles on government and politics show him a gifted critic capable of leadership in public affairs, and during his presidency his state papers have been considered masterpieces of statesmanship.

Mr. Dodd's book not only sheds clear and forceful light on the life and career of Mr. Wilson but it also is a very clear discussion of economic and political conditions in the United States during the years covered. For those who are puzzled by the happenings in the political game Mr. Dodd will furnish ample explanation. The average voter will find in his pages something to think about. A very potent comment was made on the book by an intelligent reader who said that "it made clear in such a satisfactory way many points in public affairs during the past eight years which had been so confusingly presented by our newspapers and periodicals."

Those who are opposed to Mr. Wilson and even some who admire him will feel that Mr. Dodd's admiration has made it impossible for him to see any defects in his hero's administration; but no one who reads the book can fail to realize that Mr. Dodd has gathered his facts carefully, that he has conscientiously tried to base his interpretation on facts and not on his personal opinion, and that he has presented a lucid exposition of conditions in America. So true is this that even if Woodrow Wilson were omitted, the work still would be a valuable book.

The founding of New England. By James Truslow Adams. (Boston: Atlantic monthly press, 1921. 482 p.)

Here we have an excellent example of historical writing by a master of the English language. In a sense it is not a monograph based on wide original research. Instead Mr. Adams — he is not a member of the famous family and is not even a New Englander — has mastered the available and well-known material and has placed upon it a new interpretation.

The book is the product of the new imperialistic school of American historians. In the eyes of the author, New England formed part of an empire and was not merely a group of colonies held in bondage but potentially independent, a point of view from which so many American historians have written of our early history. This change of emphasis limits the research to contemporary events and compels the presentation of an interpretation of the happenings within their own environment, instead of being illuminated by the effulgence of a future millenium.

Mr. Adam's attitude toward the Puritan social, political, and religious leadership reminds one very forcibly of that of Brooks Adams in his *Emancipation of Massachusetts*, but the later historian is less impassioned, more objective, and for that very reason he carries greater conviction to the mind of his readers. He is constantly preparing them for his judgments of events by laying before them the principles that have governed him in writing. Such paragraphs as the following (page 73) are common:

"Hence the Puritans were but a small majority, both of the clergy and of the laity. The instinct of fair play, which leads a man to side with the under-dog, without stopping to consider whether the upper-dog may be not only upper, but justified, induces us to lay great stress on the rights of the minorities, on the theory that a majority can take care of itself. Minorities, however, are usually vocal, organized, and zealous, while the majority is dumb, unwieldy, and but little inclined constantly to resist the attacks of all the various minorities in the field. If there is reason to condemn the Church of England for requiring the Puritan minority to conform, then the Puritans themselves must be con-

demned just as strictly for their oppression of the minorites in New England. There cannot be two canons of judgment for the same act; and, in fact, as we shall see later, the Puritans there in power were, if anything, the more guilty of the two."

Mr. Adams' book is somewhat limited in scope. He is interested in the relation of New England to the empire, to its neighbors, and to those citizens who dissented from the Puritan state. In treating these aspects of his subjects, he has probably brought into too high relief the disagreeable elements of Yankee life. The Puritan in his home had many genial qualities. Also, greater emphasis could have been placed on those local institutions of New England which formed the structure upon which later generations were to build a democratic state. Mr. Adams has possibly thought that he has met the latter criticism by writing (page 84): "It is a fallacy, however to believe, because certain results have followed certain causes, that, therefore, those results were striven for by the men who endeavored to put those causes into motion, for the purpose, perhaps, of securing results of quite another sort. The Puritan, at least, was no more a believer in the political rights of an individual as such, or in democracy, than in religious toleration, and the leaders in Massachusetts denounced both with equal vehemence."

Mr. Adams takes a broader view than is usual of the emigration of Englishmen during the years generally assigned exclusively to the Puritan westward movement. By a study of emigration he finds that while sixteen thousand emigrants were settling in New England, forty-six thousand had made their homes in other parts of the British over-sea territory. "If, in addition, we recall the fact that, approximately, not more than one in five of the adult males who went to Massachusetts was sufficiently in sympathy with the religious ideas there prevalent to become a church member, though disfranchised for not doing so, we find that in the 'great migration' the Puritan element, in the sense of New England church-membership, amounted to only about four thousand persons out of about sixty-five thousand." He therefore concludes that there were other motives than religious ones for the migration.

In a short review it is impossible even to indicate the contents of this most interesting work. Mr. Adams has, on the whole, followed the usual sequence of events in the early colonial history of New England, so that the potential reader will find no surprises; but the author has placed on these events his own interpretation and the impress of his own personality; and it is all done with a sprightliness of style that charms, illuminates, and convinces.

Welfare campaigns in Iowa. By Marcus L. Hansen. [Chronicles of the world war. Edited by Benjamin F. Shambaugh] (Iowa City: State historical society of Iowa, 1920. 297 p. $2.00)

This book is an account of the financial campaigns in Iowa for welfare activities connected with the world war. The seven "recognized" welfare organizations are considered: the Young Men's Christian association, the Young Women's Christian association, the Knights of Columbus, the Jewish Welfare board, the Salvation army, the War Camp Community service, and the American Library association. The Red Cross is mentioned only incidentally; although there are undoubtedly good reasons for this omission, a more complete explanation of these reasons might well have been presented.

Local newspapers, bulletins, letters, and personal interviews are used as the principal sources of information. Thus a great wealth of material which would soon be lost is organized and made accessible.

In general these financial campaigns proceeded from the conventional pre-war tactics used in the first Y. M. C. A. drive in 1917 to a method which was virtually taxation at the last. The chairman of one of the financial committees issued the following proclamation to those who had not made proper response to the requests for funds for welfare purposes: "Unless you make a trip to Marengo and straighten the same up the sheriff will call and give you a free ride to Marengo, but it will not be a return passage. We further desire to give the public notice that the time we make returns to headquarters at Marengo we will publish in the local paper a list of all those who fail to make their full quota. Take notice and govern yourself accordingly" (page 234). It is surprising that so little opposition to this method of arbitrary apportionment and big-stick methods of enforcement of giving was produced. But the question is raised: Why not have a real tax for welfare purposes rather than this system which is virtual taxation?

The author discusses in a conclusion some of the "features" of the campaigns: the great number of persons engaged, the large sums raised, the absence of the ordinary "charity" attitude, the development toward a system of taxation, and the value of the financial campaigns for educational purposes. He could have added to this list a thing which is implicit in his whole book: the significance of the feeling of loyalty and social solidarity, for the significant thing about these campaigns was not the machinery that was used, but the attitudes of the people.

E. H. Sutherland

Our democracy and the American Indian. A comprehensive representation of the Indian situation as it is today. By Laura Cornelius Kellogg. (Kansas City, Missouri: The Burton publishing company, 1920. 152 p. $2.00)

Mrs. Kellogg has written a remarkable book. It is certainly time that someone familiar with Indian affairs presented in concrete form a remedy for existing evils. We have had much sentiment, but little of value in the way of constructive policy.

Mrs. Kellogg's book is a plea for the establishment of a Lolomi among Indians. It is a Hopi term — "perfect goodness be upon you." The author speaks for the educated Indians as well as for the equally intelligent old full-bloods when she recites the long, familiar story of expensive investigations, hearings before congressional committees, widespread graft, frequent changes in the Indian service personnel, inefficiency, and so forth. It is common knowledge in Washington that our management of Indian affairs has been a disgrace and a scandal for eighty years.

The Lolomi as proposed by Mrs. Kellogg might not be perfect, yet it certainly would be a vast improvement over what we have now. Briefly, the assets of tribes and individuals would be pooled in a general organization acting under federal authority. The Indians would be enrolled as members of this coöperative body and would be entitled to one vote each, regardless of the number of shares held. A central authority would administer generally, but local communities would be in charge of their affairs. The author makes a point of how this would safeguard the Indian from the horde of white grafters now the bane of Indian existence. Indians would be free from many present ills. Their property, if held in common, would be sufficient for education, health and commercial development expenses. The huge sums paid white people — mostly political "lame ducks" — would be paid the Indians themselves. The scheme is well worked out and is certainly worthy of trial. There are hundreds of able, educated Indians who could be intrusted with the management of the affairs of their own people. The reviewer hopes that all good Americans who desire a square deal for the Indian may read Mrs. Kellogg's book.

Warren K. Moorehead

The Arikara narrative of the campaign against the hostile Dakotas, June, 1867. Edited by O. G. Libby. [Collections of the State historical society of North Dakota, 1920] (Bismarck: State historical society of North Dakota, 1920. 276 p.)

It is a relief to find a volume devoted to Indian affairs which presents the point of view of the Indians themselves. Professor Libby has ren-

dered a good service in curtailing his own observations and presenting those of the Indians in complete detail. The introduction summarizes briefly the famous campaign preceding the death of General Custer and many men of the Seventh cavalry. Following this appear the statements of the following Arikara scouts who acted with Custer and Reno: Sitting Bear, Young Hawk, Red Bear, Red Star, Soldier, Strikes Two, Running Wolf, and others.

The interpreter was Peter Beauchamp, a Hampton institute graduate, who appears to have been a good interpreter, with sufficient intelligence to get the Indian point of view, which is frequently lacking in the narratives. One or two other interpreters appear, such as Reuben Duckett. It is perfectly clear from the testimony, which is presented in so interesting and entertaining a manner that the book is to be highly commended to the general reader, that Reno should have come to the support of General Custer; furthermore, that Custer, on seeing the village, might have saved his command had he swung about and joined forces with Reno, who was two and one-half or three miles from the scene of the fight. The combined forces of Benteen and Reno numbered seven companies, whereas Custer had but five. It would appear that Custer would have had time at the beginning of the fight to have cut his way back to Reno and Benteen, and with a total of twelve companies the Seventh cavalry might have turned defeat into victory.

The Indians told the reviewer at Pine Ridge, some ten years ago, that they could have defeated the entire combined Seventh cavalry and that the only reason that they did not destroy Reno was that their scouts reported reënforcements coming from the Yellowstone.

The Indian narratives are explicit, present many interesting facts, and should set at rest the imputation that the Arikara scouts were cowardly. They were not. They were employed to scout and to steal the Sioux pony herd. They attempted to accomplish the latter object, but were driven back by a superior number of mounted Sioux warriors. Mr. Libby makes it perfectly clear by scout testimony that the famous character Curley was not the sole survivor of the Custer fight. He says that the other Crow scouts look upon him with contempt.

Some of the scouts' narratives are so vivid that one can follow them through the entire campaign. The descriptions of the sun-dance lodges and the sand paintings are extremely interesting. The scouts informed the army officers that the Sioux had made "powerful medicine." One scout attributes the peculiar designs of the sun paintings to Sitting Bull. In fact, the scouts went into action believing that the Sioux medicine was so strong that Custer would be defeated. This throws some inter-

esting side light on the attitude of the Indian auxiliaries. It is safe to assume that Custer's defeat was due to overconfidence on his part.

WARREN K. MOOREHEAD

A tour through Indiana in 1840. The diary of John Parsons of Petersburg, Virginia. Edited by Kate Milner Rabb. (New York, 1920)

This book is a clever bit of historical fiction masquerading as a genuine diary. The title-page states that within is a diary of a certain John Parsons, *edited* by a certain Kate Milner Rabb; and facing the title-page is a picture of Parsons, the supposed author of the diary, "taken from a daguerreotype." It would seem that the hero of this Indiana tour was a relative of the supposed editor, and that he actually did make a journey through Indiana in 1840; but aside from this there is no basis, or very little basis, for this feat in editing. There is no diary of John Parsons, other than that which exists in the fertile imagination of the supposed editor; but she inserts footnotes, gathered from reliable historical sources, and otherwise proceeds according to the best style in editing historical manuscripts.

The material in the book first appeared in a series of articles published in the Sunday edition of the *Indianapolis Star,* where they aroused considerable interest throughout Hoosierdom. Thus advertised, the book has likewise had a wide reading and so clever is the deceit that very few have discovered the spuriousness of the "diary." The reviewer could find little fault with the book if the author had simply announced somewhere — perhaps in the preface — the truth, but unfortunately this was not done and undoubtedly the book has been selling under false pretenses. The book itself is extremely interesting and has historical value.

The author has undoubtedly made extensive researches into the history of Indiana for the year 1840 and she tells her story in a charming manner. Her description of the capital city of Indiana, Indianapolis, in 1840 and the various people prominent in the state at that time is admirably done. She has her hero visit the more important towns in the state, as Madison, Greenfield, Logansport, Delphi, Lafayette, Crawfordsville, Terre Haute, Vincennes, and Greencastle, and during his stay in these towns he has a wonderful facility of meeting the best-known citizens in each place, to most of whom he carries letters of introduction. In fact, this young Virginian must have had a mail sack full of such letters of introduction, for there seem to have been few men of importance in Indiana in 1840 whom he did not meet through this medium. He also manifests a lively interest in everything and everybody. He attends political meetings, camp meetings, is invited to parties, visits

the colleges and engages in lengthy comparisons of the curricula of these frontier colleges with that of his own University of Virginia. He meets preachers, lawyers, merchants, politicians, judges, pretty maidens, and stately dames, and his comments on all of them are clever and instructive. In a piece of fiction there must, of course, be a love story and so the "editor" arranges that this young, handsome Virginian shall fall in love with a beautiful young lady whom he meets on his travels, and finally the "tour" is crowned with the announcement of his betrothal. But alas and alack, the young Mr. Parsons dies on his way home to Virginia and so ends abruptly this "tour through Indiana."

Educational legislation and administration in the state of New York from 1777-1850. By Elsie Garland Hobson. (Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1920. 264 p. $1.60)

This treatise, professing to be "little more than a chronicle of legislation and an exposition of results," presents a complete calendar of educational legislation in New York between 1777 and 1850. As a chronicle it is highly successful; it is accurate and very readable. As "an exposition of results" it falls short of completion because the author made no study of local sources. For example, the author summarizes the provisions of the act of April 9, 1795, and then remarks that "this attempt to establish common schools was not a success." This important enactment deserves more extended consideration. It represents New York's first attempt to establish a system of common schools throughout the state. It clearly indicated the organization of a district system and placed in the hands of the people the responsibility for the administration of the schools. The chief "results" of this statute, or of any statute, are the practices established by it, and these can be ascertained only by an examination of local source material.

Precision is lacking in a few statements. The expression, "Hollanders formed the first settlements at New York," should be corrected to read, "Hollanders formed the first settlements at New Amsterdam." In another instance the author says, "Huguenots, after the Edict of Nantes, found a refuge at New Rochelle, New Platz [*sic!*], and New York City." True enough; but they did not find this "refuge" until some years "after the Edict of Nantes," the date of which was 1598. But such statements are too few to detract, in any significant sense, from the value of the monograph.

The author has done a successful piece of pioneer work. She has put together in compact form, and with interesting comment, a great deal of hitherto scattered material. It constitutes, with its concise appendixes, a valuable reference volume.

Robert Francis Seybolt

The political philosophy of Robert M. La Follette. As revealed in his speeches and writings. Compiled by Ellen Torelle (Mrs. L. B. Nagler) (Madison: The Robert M. La Follette company, 1920. 426 p. $2.00)

The work of compilation resulting in this book has been well done. Gathered under twenty-eight chapter headings are brief extracts that set forth the gist of Mr. La Follette's opinions upon as many subjects. And no study of the politico-economic problems of the last quarter-century would be complete without reference to the views and work of the senior senator from Wisconsin. Whether one agrees with any or with none of his convictions, his influence upon public opinion and upon state and national legislation cannot be ignored.

Among the subjects listed are: primary elections, taxation, railroad regulation, labor, trusts, the tariff, money and banking, direct legislation, war, profiteering, the league of nations, agriculture, education, conservation, the press. The extracts under these headings are drawn from Mr. La Follette's public addresses, his messages as governor, his autobiography, his speeches in the senate, and from *La Follette's magazine.*

The struggle for primary elections began in Wisconsin as early as 1897. There followed within a few years the bitter fight resulting in the physical valuation and adequate taxation of railroads. These were the pioneer days and deeds of the progressive movement. The breach in the republican party of Wisconsin caused by these campaigns has not yet been healed.

Mr. La Follette regards these battles as merely the beginning of a fundamental struggle to maintain popular government. He said in 1913, "The fundamental problem as to which shall rule, men or property, is still unsettled." Again, he said in the senate in 1919, "In 20 years this government has not been representative of the public interests. I think this Government has been representing the interests of combinations and trusts and great aggregations of capital." Indeed, his view is so focused upon this problem that he sees all history through it. "There has, in my opinion, been only one great issue in all the history of the world. That issue has been between those who labor and those who would control, through slavery in one form or another, the laborers" (1919).

It was through this medium also that Mr. La Follette viewed the issues connected with the world war. He said in March, 1917, that the clamor for war in this country was "instigated and sustained by the money power and the subjugated press." He demanded that "we enforce our rights against Great Britain as we have enforced our rights

against Germany," or "withdraw our commerce from both" (April 4, 1917). In May, 1920, he said, "The declaration that we were fighting for democracy was the baldest, most wicked lie ever imposed upon a people. . . . This was a war of big business for bigger business. . . . It was a mean, sordid, mercenary war."

Mr. La Follette's campaign for reëlection in 1922 will doubtless attract attention throughout the country. For those who wish to make an examination of his opinions, this volume will be an excellent guide.

ALBERT H. SANFORD

What really happened at Paris. The story of the peace conference, 1918-1919. By American delegates. Edited by E. M. House and Charles Seymour. (New York: Charles Scribner's sons, 1921. $4.50)

In the winter of 1920-1921 a group of citizens of Philadelphia arranged a series of lectures by members of the American delegation at the peace conference. These lectures dealt with the history of the Paris conference and with the problems surrounding the restoration of peace. Syndicated by a group of newspapers, they were given wide publicity throughout the country and aroused much discussion. The present volume is a reprint of these lectures with some revisions and additions.

Each one of the lecturers took that problem with which he was especially intrusted at Paris. The result is a series of discussions by experts of the various European problems of the settlement and of the new arrangements in the former Turkish empire. To these are added chapters on the preparations for peace, on the organization of the conference, on the labor clauses of the treaty, on disarmament, and on the making of the league of nations. The chapter on the Atlantic fleet in the war, while interesting and valuable, is more military than diplomatic.

It is not too much to say that this is one of the few indispensable books for students of this latest phase of American policy or of recent world history. The account does not teem with "revelations," but that does not greatly hamper its usefulness. For many of these "revelations" hitherto given out have proved to be but isolated bits, torn from the context that makes them really valuable. What this book does give is a clear and sober analysis of the problem of peace, of the spirit and aims of the American delegation, and of its difficulties, failures, and successes. It is only through such a general account as this that the "inside history" of the conference can be approached with any security.

One general thread seems to run through all the chapters. The treaty of Versailles is not an ideal peace — indeed many, if not all, of the

experts find themselves in disagreement with some phases of the settlement — but it is the best possible peace under the circumstances. A certain amount of compromise, all the authors insist, was necessary if peace was to be secured, but these compromises did not go far enough to ruin the main lines of the American plan. Generous treatment is given to the views of those who opposed this plan and the bases of the opposition which it met in Paris are fully stated. Only after this European point of view has been fully understood and considered has one the right to criticise the results of the American effort at Paris, granted that it is then possible.

As the reader follows the various experts through their discussions of their problems his respect for their ability grows. Not without grounds has European opinion given high praise to the American delegation. Many of us, perhaps unwisely, would differ on points of detail, but the cumulative argument is very convincing.

By no means less in value to the text is the stenographic report of questions addressed to the lecturers and the answers given. In this free play of question and answer much came out that was new and interesting. The questions seem to have been answered squarely and fully.

The reader leaves the book with a few questions still unanswered. How far was "What really happened at Paris" due to the situation arising after the armistice or to Bolshevism in Russia? Some answer is given to this question, but hardly enough to satisfy. The absence of any discussion of the far eastern problem is to be regretted.

The format of the book and the index leave little to be desired. The few maps given are clear, but the student will need access to an atlas while he reads, especially to a good relief map. With this at his side he is in a position to learn much regarding the Paris conference.

MASON W. TYLER

The states of South America. The land of opportunity. A complete geographical, descriptive, economic, and commerical survey. By Charles Domville-Fife. Late correspondent of the *Times.* With illustrations and maps. (New York: The Macmillan company, 1920. 287 p.)

Mr. Domville-Fife has added another volume to his list of books dealing with Hispanic America. The second and enlarged edition of a work concerning South America, this volume considers all the states of that continent. The geographic, economic, and commercial conditions in each of the republics of South America are considered separately in a chapter or two. The last chapter discusses foreign commerce with South Amer-

ica. Scattered through the book are numerous photographs of South American scenes and buildings. In an appendix are printed the respective rules and regulations concerning commercial agents from foreign countries who may be doing business in a particular republic. Maps are printed of northern and southern South America of the present time. Written by a former correspondent of the *Times*, the book is somewhat journalistic in character. It contains a large amount of informative data. It should make an appeal to the general reader and to the increasing number of American and English business men who are becoming interested in the land of the southern cross.

WILLIAM SPENCE ROBERTSON

Mexico and the Caribbean. Clark University addresses. Edited by George H. Blakeslee. Professor of history and international relations, Clark university. (New York: G. E. Stechert and company, 1920. 363 p. $4.00)

This volume is a collection of addresses made at the seventh conference upon international relations held at Clark university. The papers upon Mexico are arranged in groups under the following topics: fundamental factors, specific problems, recent conditions, the new Mexican régime, and the policy of the United States toward Mexico. The papers upon the Caribbean nations are concerned with these topics: the Caribbean policy of the United States, American interventions in the West Indies, the republics of Central America and their problems, and the problem of Porto Rico. As these papers were mostly read either by Latin Americans or by teachers and business men of the United States who are specially qualified to speak, they contain illuminating commentaries upon conditions in Mexico and the Caribbean countries. Among outstanding articles are those by Messrs. Starr, Schoenrich, and Shepherd, which are respectively entitled "The Mexican people," "The present American intervention in Santo Domingo and Haiti," and "The Caribbean policy of the United States." The book should prove interesting to the general reader and useful as supplementary reading to college classes engaged in the study of Latin-American history.

WILLIAM SPENCE ROBERTSON

Congregational work of Minnesota. 1832-1920. By many contributors. Edited and partly written by Warren Upham. (Minneapolis: Congregational conference of Minnesota, 1921. 606 p.)

It is a worthy but difficult task to write the history of the missionaries and pioneer ministers who toiled on the frontier of our country and of their work as it helped to produce the life of to-day. The historian must not only tell their story, but he must also weave into it the politi-

cal, economic, and social background of their work. He must be very critical of his sources because of the intangibleness of much of the influence of religion, the undying optimism of the clergy, and the continued neglect of the sources of this phase of history. Many state church histories have been written, but few deserve to be called history. As a class they are uncritical, biographical, and annalistic. Moreover, it is obviously a mistake to confine a church history to the limits of a state, the boundaries of which are political rather than religious.

The present work, a collection of essays, memoirs, and statistics, giving portions of Minnesota Congregational history, escapes in some degree the usual faults only to be caught in other serious deficiencies. The defects of composite authorship are exaggerated, and particularly does the book lack unity. Much of it is of little value. The chapter on "Planting new churches in northern Minnesota and North Dakota," by Edwin H. Stickney, is of more interest, while Walter M. Patton's chapter on Carleton college is perhaps the best. Chapters on Sunday schools, women's work, charities, the iron ranges, and the world war show the more modern point of view of the editor.

It is to be regretted that the editor or some of his more able contributors did not work over the material and produce either a source book or a history of the Congregational church in the northwest. The more valuable sources of this present work could have been published in appendixes.

John D. Barnhart, Jr.

NEWS AND COMMENTS

Edited by Lester B. Shippee

Students of western history find in P. W. Bidwell's "Agricultural revolution in New England," in the *American historical review* for July, 1921, many illuminating points bearing on western economic development during the two decades which preceded the civil war.

The April and July, 1921, issues of the *Virginia magazine of history and biography* have some valuable "Documents relating to a proposed Swiss and German colony in the western part of Virginia," which should interest students of the history of the early Ohio valley. The other contributions to these numbers deal with matters relating to Virginia proper.

The conclusion of John E. Iglehart's "Methodism in southwestern Indiana" is found in the June, 1921, number of the *Indiana magazine of history*. Logan Esarey contributes a discussion of teaching problems under the title of "The approach to history," and Charles H. Money begins a study of "The fugitive slave law in Indiana," of which the first installment deals with the situation before the act of 1850, the attitude of Hoosiers on the compromise law, and something of the operation of the act within the state.

The Royal society of Canada in its *Proceedings and transactions* (Third series, volume 14 — Toronto, 1920), in addition to giving an account of the May, 1920, meeting, details of business, and so forth, presents a number of papers on various subjects, historical and scientific. Little of direct application to the western history of the United States is found except some items occurring in an article entitled "Jean Joliet et ses enfants," written by Monseigneur Amédée Gosselin.

The *Pennsylvania magazine of history and biography* has been bringing out a valuable series of documents in the form of letters written by Thomas Rodney, who was judge and commissioner of the then newly organized Mississippi territory. Nearly all the letters were addressed to the judge's son, Cæsar A. Rodney, and they contain a mass of information on all sorts of topics relating to the new southwest. The October, 1920, number of the magazine, the latest issue received, brings the communications down into 1806.

The *Palimpsest* has been devoting some attention to community schemes which have touched Iowa's history at one point or another. In the April, 1921, number, Ruth A. Gallaher's "Icaria and the Icarians" occupies more than half the pages; and Bertha M. Shambaugh's "Amana" fills the entire July issue. Mrs. Shambaugh's vivid story of the communist organization in Iowa County, which is in part taken from her book, *Amana: the community of true inspiration,* published in 1908, has a peculiar timeliness.

In the *Political science quarterly* for September, 1921, V. Rosewater produces "A curious chapter in constitution changing," a brief study of Nebraska's experiments in constitution tinkering since its admission to the union. In the *Supplement* to this number Harry J. Carman and Elmer D. Graper put forth a "Record of political events from July 1, 1920, to June 30, 1921." This "Record" is a convenient handbook of reference for all who have occasion to look up political happenings in America, Asia, or Europe for the twelvemonth.

H. G. Wells' *Outline of history* continues to bring out comments, reviews and criticisms. Two in particular should be read to sample the reactions of historians to this tremendous essay: D. S. Muzzey's "Mr. Wells' utopian pessimism," in the *Political science quarterly* for June, 1921, and Carl Becker's "Mr. Wells and the new history," in the *American historical review* of July, 1921. Incidentally those who have dipped into the *Outline* and have followed some of the reviews will be interested in Mr. Wells' article in the *Yale review* for July, in which he writes, not an apology nor quite an explanation, but a statement of his reasons for doing what he did.

The Indiana historical society has brought out, as number 7 of volume 7 of its *Publications,* the journal of Henry Hay, under the title, "Fort Wayne in 1790." The journal was originally edited and printed by M. M. Quaife in the *Proceedings* of the Wisconsin historical society for 1914 as "A narrative of life on the old frontier." The present pamphlet, with an explanatory introduction by Mr. Quaife, affords a convenient access to an interesting and valuable document dealing with the old northwest at a time when few white men except trappers and fur traders were to be found north of the Ohio.

The *American economic review* for June, 1921, contains several articles of interest to the student of contemporary problems in western development. Directly applicable to the study of the west are James E. Boyle's "Marketing of agricultural products," Asher Hobson's "Farmers' co-operative associations," and H. Bruce Price's "Grain

standardization." More general fields are covered by the "Federal reserve policy," presented by A. C. Miller, "Criteria of marketing efficiency," by Fred E. Clark, and "Stabilization of prices," by B. H. Hibbard. The September issue has a discussion of "Recent developments in the federal farm loan system," by George E. Putnam.

The *Tennessee historical magazine* dated October, 1920, but bearing under the date the statement "Issued August, 1921," has a long review of *The autobiography of Martin Van Buren, by* W. E. Beard. In addition to this, A. V. Goodpasture discusses "Pepys and the proprietors of Carolina," Robert S. Henry has a paper on "The extension of the northern boundary line of Tennessee — the Matthews line," and there is reprinted from the *North Carolina booklet* an article on "Andrew Jackson a member of the Guilford (N. C.) bar." Two documents — one on "Aboriginal remains in Tennessee," the other a letter relating to William C. C. Claiborne — the last installment of Miss Kate White's "Marriage record of Knox county, Tennessee," and notes and news complete the number.

Those concerned with the teaching of history to college students will find matter for thought in Ralph H. Gabriel's "General course in United States history and the liberal arts college," which is printed in the October *Historical outlook*. This paper tells about a pedagogical experiment at Yale. The same issue of the *Outlook* contains a summary of the report of the committee of the Mississippi valley historical association on standardizing library work and library equipment in secondary schools. The summary is printed from the *School review* of February, 1921. The full report, including the questionnaire, appeared in the *Proceedings* of the association for 1919-1920.

Something of the scope of the remarkable war collection now being gathered for Stanford university is indicated by a pamphlet issued from the Stanford press (1921) by Professor E. D. Adams — *The Hoover war collection at Stanford university, California: a report and an analysis*. The collection is made possible by a gift from Mr. Herbert Hoover, who, on the suggestion of Professor Adams, began while in Europe at work on the Belgian relief to gather such materials as he might. Later the enterprise assumed a more pretentious scope. During and since the war, agents, giving all or part of their time, have been scouring Europe for all sorts of historical material and have already secured a notable collection.

In the *Western Pennsylvania historical magazine* for July, 1921, are to be found several different articles bearing distinctly on the his-

tory of the Mississippi valley. "The operation of the fugitive slave law in western Pennsylvania, from 1850 to 1860," by Irene E. Williams, adds some new facts and gathers into a rounded narrative others bearing on this controversial legislation and its working. The Reverend S. J. Fisher, D.D., from personal recollection and from published sources, gives a lively sketch of Jane Grey Swisshelm. Other contributions to this number are an account of "Half a century of the Allegheny county bar association," the story of "A visit to Economy in the spring of 1840," by Reverend William A. Passavant, and a continuation of the history of "The Pittsburgh Blues," by Captain John H. Niebaum.

Father Charles H. Metzger, S.J., has published in the January, April, and July numbers of the *Illinois Catholic historical review* an account of Sebastien Louis Meurin, S.J., an early worker in the Illinois field. The Reverend John Rothensteiner carries on his study of "The northeastern part of the diocese of St. Louis under Bishop Rosati." The April number contains the story of "The Sisters of Mercy: Chicago's pioneer nurses and teachers — 1846-1921," written by a "Sister of the community," and a beginning of the transcript of "The first Chicago church records," prepared by Joseph J. Thompson, which, with comments supplied by the editor, is continued in the July issue. The latter number also present a sketch of "The Ancient order of Hibernians," by the Reverend Frank L. Reynolds, and "An American martyrology," by Joseph J. Thompson.

Tuberculosis among the Nebraska Winnebago: a social study on an Indian reservation (Lincoln: Nebraska state historical society, 1921. 48 p.) is a useful study made by Dr. Margaret W. Koenig among the Indians of a reservation in Thurston county, Nebraska. The first chapter gives a brief summary of the early history of this branch of the Winnebago and its establishment upon this small reservation, together with information about the present general condition of the tribe. The last two chapters discuss the subject indicated in the title. The reader is impressed with the fact that, despite the expenditure of millions of dollars, the government of the United States has had little real success in its handling of the problem of a primitive race.

"The family trail through American history," by Cyril A. Herrick, is the leading article in the *Minnesota history bulletin* for November, 1920. Mr. Herrick shows how an interest in one's ancestors and a curiosity about them leads to many bypaths and even highways of history. Theodore C. Blegen contributes another of his Scandinavian studies under the title "The early Norwegian press in America." This number of the *Bulletin* announces the acquisition by the Minnesota historical soci-

ety of much material of interest and value. From the office of the secretary of state has come a generous file now made accessible to the student. Papers of the Reverend Moses N. Adams, an early missionary, and of Captain Henry A. Castle, who came to Minnesota in 1866, and some of the papers of General William G. LeDuc, one time United States commissioner of agriculture, are among the more extensive additions to manuscript materials.

The Indiana historical commission brings out as a volume of the *Indiana historical collections* the first volume of Indiana world war records — the *Gold star honor roll: a record of Indiana men and women who died in the service of the United States and the allied nations in the world war* (Indianapolis: The Indiana historical commission, 1921. 750 p.) The work consists of portraits accompanied by brief biographical notes of all those who gave their lives, either on the field of battle or elsewhere, while in the service. Except for the names of the man first killed in battle and the naval officer and the military officer highest in rank among the dead from Indiana, the names are grouped under counties arranged alphabetically. This work will undoubtedly be sought by the family of every man who lost his life directly or indirectly as a result of his war service, but its usefulness from a historical point of view is not very great.

The *Southwestern historical review* continues to bring out its valuable contributions to the history of Texas and the southwest. In the April, 1921, issue, A. K. Christian completes his study of "Mirabeau Buonaparte Lamar," and J. Fred Rippy presents a discussion of "Some precedents of the Pershing expedition into Mexico." The April number also has the first of two papers by Miss Annie Middleton dealing with the steps taken by Texas in completion of the annexation to the United States. The title of the installment in the April number is "Donelson's mission to Texas in behalf of annexation," and that of the contribution to the July issue, "The Texas convention of 1845." The July *Review* has also a study of "The annexation of Texas and the Mississippi democrats," by James E. Winston, as well as the opening portion of an interesting journal, written by Lewis Birdsall Harris, 1836-1848. The portion of the journal brought out in the July issue tells about Harris' trip from New York state to New Orleans while he was on his way to Texas to "fight the Mexicans."

Two of a series of three articles on "The internal grain trade of the United States, 1860-1890," by Professor Louis B. Schmidt of Iowa state college, appear in the April and July (1921) numbers of the *Iowa journal of history and politics.* In the April issue Marcus L.

Hansen has an article on the "Official encouragement of immigration to Iowa." This number also contains a transcript of twenty-one letters, written in 1845 by Governor John Chambers, dealing principally with Indian affairs. The editor's explanatory note states that these letters form undoubtedly "a fragment of the official record," the remainder of which seems to have disappeared completely. One letter, addressed to President Polk, gives a sidelight on the boundary dispute between Iowa and Missouri. The July issue presents "Iowa and the diplomatic service," and "Kasson and the first international postal conference," both by John E. Briggs, and a study of "Mechanics' institutions," by Charles Ray Aurner. Both numbers have detailed comment about historical activities in the state.

A "symposium" on the Kensington rune stone, participated in by L. M. Larson, H. R. Holand, and R. B. Anderson, appears in the June issue of the *Wisconsin magazine of history,* and, according to the editorial comment at the end "closes the discussion of the rune stone question, on its present basis, in this magazine." The same number has a sketch of "Rufus King: soldier, editor and statesman," by General Charles King, an article by John S. Roeseler on "The evangelical association on Lomira circuit," Louise P. Kellogg's "First missionary in Wisconsin," (Father René Ménard), and a note on two early settlers in the state by W. A. Titus under the heading "Two graves in a rural Wisconsin cemetery." The "Letters of a Badger boy in blue" give Chauncey H. Cooke's impressions of the Vicksburg campaign, and the installment in the September number tells what he saw and felt in the Atlanta campaign. The September *Magazine* has also four contributed articles: "How Wisconsin women won the ballot," by Theodora W. Youmans, "Jean Brunet, Chippewa valley pioneer," by William W. Bartlett, "Wisconsin's first literary magazine," (*The garland of the west, and Wisconsin monthly magazine*), and another of W. A. Titus' descriptions of historic spots, "Ceresco, a pioneer communist settlement."

The first installments of William E. Bailey's historical and biographical sketch of Woodford county, Kentucky, are found in the May and September issues of the *Register of the Kentucky state historical society.* In the May number there is an anonymous article on "The religious development of early Kentucky," for the views of which, it is stated in an editorial note, the *Register* assumes no responsibility. The article rounds up many interesting facts connected with the development of Kentucky down to about 1830. A collection of letters written by James T. Eubank describes the siege of Fort Meigs in the war of 1812. An effort is being made to purchase the Bardstown county homestead of

John Rowan, where Stephen C. Foster wrote the words and composed the air of "My old Kentucky home;" and an article by Willard Rouse Jillson, director and state geologist of the Kentucky geological survey, is included in the May number to call attention to the campaign to raise funds. The September number of the *Register* contains a copy of the Fayette county tax list for the year 1788, and a diary, written by Colonel C. M. Taylor, in which there is a description of the Cardenas expedition of Narciso Lopez in 1850. Dr. Jillson presents "A history of the Kentucky geological survey (1838-1921)."

In the *Ohio archaeological and historical quarterly* for January, 1921, are reprinted the minutes of the meeting of the legislature of the Northwest territory held in Cincinnati in 1795. The record of this assembly was published in the *Centinel of the Northwest Territory,* but since there is only one known file of this paper for that year, the reprint is very useful. B. F. Prince has an account of "Early journeys to Ohio." Other features of the January number are a letter written by James R. Morris in 1897 describing the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, a paper on "The Indian's head," by Henry Bannon, and a reprint of the *Review of reviews* descriptive of the battle of Picardy. The October, 1920, issue of this quarterly is given up largely to an account of the thirty-fifth annual meeting of the society, although the concluding portion of Celeron's journal and a brief account of the lead plate found at the mouth of the Muskingum river find a place. In an effort to concentrate attention on Ohio's need for increased support of its historical activities, comment on what is being done elsewhere discusses how much further some of the newer states have gone; illustrations show buildings erected within the past few years in Wisconsin, Minnesota, and New Hampshire, and these are contrasted with the facilities in Ohio.

Valume 24 of the *Publications of the Buffalo historical society,* edited by the secretary of the society, Mr. Frank H. Severance (Buffalo, New York: Buffalo historical society, 1920) contains a document, "Memoranda of a military tour commenced at Brownsville on Sunday the 30th of May 1819, to several posts and garrisons on the waters of the western lakes," prepared by Captain Roger Jones, who accompanied General Jacob Brown, the district commander, on the tour, which penetrated as far west as the eastern end of Lake Superior. The manuscript of this report is in the Library of congress and has never heretofore been published. Another document tells of early travel on Lake Erie. Frederick Houghton's "History of the Buffalo creek reservation" is a topographical, archaeological, and historical study of the region settled by refugee Seneca. Some account of the unsuccessful attempt to remove the Indians to Wisconsin territory is given. The editor of the

volume, Mr. Severance, gives "The story of Phinney's Western almanack," the publication of which began in Buffalo in 1850, but which had appeared for half a century before from Cooperstown or, for a brief space, from Otsego.

A double number the *Michigan history magazine,* January-April, 1921, has in addition to a generous collection of "Historical news, notes and comments," the eighth annual *Report* of the Michigan historical commission, a list of donations to the Pioneer museum, and several contributed articles. The latter include "Romance and adventure on the Ontonagon," by H. M. Powers, "New England men in Michigan history," by William Stocking, "Recollections of Zachariah Chandler," by O. E. McCutcheon, "A brief history of the Cleveland-Cliffs iron company," by J. E. Jopling, "Laura Smith Haviland," by Caroline R. Humphrey, "Michigan's memorial and historical building," by Murray MacKay, "A sketch of some institutional beginnings in Michigan," by W. O. Hedrick, "Early days in Petoskey," by Henry McConnell, "Public schools of Battle Creek," by W. G. Coburn, and a summary of "Michigan war legislation, 1919," by Charles Landrum. According to the annual *Report* the Michigan historical commission has in preparation a notable collection of publications:

"The bibliography of Michigan history, comprising published and manuscript material on Michigan's resources, development and growth, is ready for the press, excepting the index. Well along in preparation is a volume of *Readings* on Michigan history for schools; a volume of biographies of public men of Michigan including state officers; a volume of the records of the judges and governors of Michigan territory; *The history of the women's clubs of Michigan;* and the *Autobiography of Hon. John Ball,* early pioneer of the Grand river valley. Plans are progressing for the series of *Papers and messages of the governors of Michigan."*

Some 25,000 manuscripts, 3,000 newspapers, and 660 books and pamphlets, ranging in date from 1776 to 1892, have been found by Mr. H. A. Kellar in Rockbridge county, Virginia, and acquired by the McCormick agricultural library. Among the manuscripts are papers of James McDowell, who took a prominent part in public life in Virginia between 1800-1840, of his son James McDowell, governor of Virginia in the forties, of "Honest" John Letcher, civil war governor of Virginia, and of Alexander H. H. Stuart, secretary of the interior under President Fillmore, and sixty journals and accounts of merchants of Rockbridge county covering the years 1776-1860. The newspapers are issues of the *Gazette* and *Valley Star* of Lexington, the *Spectator* and *Vindicator* of Staunton, the *Advocate* of Buena Vista, and the *Republi-*

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THE RELATION OF PHILIP PHILLIPS TO THE REPEAL OF THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE IN 1854[1]

Here and there in the annals of American history several rather casual references may be found to a lawyer and publicist who died in Washington, D. C., on January 14, 1884, almost thirty-eight years ago. To Philip Phillips, known familiarly to his friends in the fifties of the last century as "Colonel" Phillips, the bar of the supreme court of the United States paid tribute in February following his death; and simple resolutions to his honorable memory as a man and a lawyer were duly recorded in the files of that court at the request of George F. Edmunds, republican senator from Vermont.[2] In the course of the tributes there were a few suggestions of days then long past when as a democratic representative from the Mobile district of Alabama Colonel Phillips, sitting in the sessions of the thirty-third congress, had taken part in activities and counsels associated with the troubled passage to law in May, 1854, of the Kansas-Nebraska bill. Bitterness of feeling and acrimony over that act which once divided parties and aroused the heat of the slavery issue north and south into a hot flame have, it may be assumed to-day, passed away long since. But problems still difficult and perhaps impossible of precise solution which arose out of the situation are likely for some time to come to interest students of history. On one of these problems the following considerations may throw a side light.

As far back as 1874 Henry Wilson, in his work on the *History*

[1] This paper was read at a meeting of the American historical association held in St. Louis, December 29, 1921.

[2] *In memoriam. Proceedings of the supreme court of the United States on the death of Philip Phillips and the action of the court thereon* (Washington, 1884).

of the rise and fall of the slave power in America, referred casually to Philip Phillips.[3] More recently Mr. Ray, in his study of the questions of the origin and authorship of the repeal of the Missouri compromise, has shown that he was aware of Colonel Phillips' special interest in the repeal, like that of many another southerner.[4] And John Bach McMaster, in the eighth volume of his history published in 1913, cited in a footnote a passage from Phillips' autobiography, a copy of which he found in the manuscript collections of the Library of congress.[5] No one, however, has yet taken the trouble to examine Phillips' work during January, 1854, while the Nebraska bill was undergoing a process of change. The problem of considering Phillips' contribution to that process is simplified by the fact that all essential changes in the bill appear to have occurred between January 4 and February 7.

The chief author of the Kansas-Nebraska bill was Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois. Addressing Douglas in the senate on February 23, 1855 — just a year after the leading events which come within the range of this consideration — Senator Wade of Ohio burst out in this wise: "I ask the gentleman if his Nebraska bill was not concocted by a secret conclave, in the night time?" "No, sir," answered Douglas, "the Nebraska bill was not concocted in any conclave, night or day. It was written by myself, at my own house, with no man present."[6] In making this direct reply the senator from Illinois was thinking of hours of labor put by him on the amended Nebraska bill which as chairman of the senate committee on territories he had reported to the senate on Wednesday, January 4, 1854. Probably he recalled at the same time, a little vaguely, the special report which accompanied on that momentous day the amended bill. Could he, it may fairly be asked, have wholly forgotten the leading circumstances which forced, in January days following, the process of altera-

[3] (Boston, 1872-1877), 2:383.

[4] P. Orman Ray, *The repeal of the Missouri compromise. Its origin and authorship* (Cleveland, 1909), 213, 214; compare Ray, "The genesis of the Kansas-Nebraska act," in American historical association, *Annual report*, 1914 (Washington, 1916), 1:267.

[5] *A history of the people of the United States* (New York, 1885-1913), 8:195.

[6] *Congressional globe*, 33 congress, 2 session, appendix, 216.

tion and change of which at the time, in 1854, he must have been fully cognizant? We know now that the repeal of the Missouri compromise — the most significant feature of the matured bill which became law on May 30, 1854 — was worked into Douglas' bill between January 4 and February 7. The writer will try to show what Colonel Philip Phillips, then a representative from Alabama, had to do with this particular feature of the bill.

For several years prior to 1854 efforts had been made to organize a government for Nebraska territory, a vast region containing almost half a million square miles of land inhabited by a few hundred white settlers and by scattered tribes of Indians. The region was all that was left of the Louisiana purchase; it extended northward from the Arkansas river and New Mexico to the Canadian border, and westward from Missouri to the Rocky mountains; it included the present states of Kansas, Nebraska, North and South Dakota, Montana, Wyoming, and a part of Colorado. It was a veritable empire, almost unknown in character, but promising future developments tempting in political, social, and industrial directions. A comparatively recent attempt to organize its government had failed at the close of the thirty-second congress in March, 1853. In December following, soon after the opening of the first session of the thirty-third congress, Senator Dodge of Iowa reintroduced the old measure. It was this bill elaborated and revised which Douglas brought forward on January 4, accompanied by a special report.

Observe that the Douglas bill contained on January 4 no reference to the Missouri compromise. Only two sections of the bill, sections 14 and 21, touched upon slavery. The important one of these declared among other things that, so far as the question of slavery was concerned, the bill was designed to carry into practical operation the principles established by the compromise measures of 1850; "all questions," it said, "pertaining to slavery in the Territories, and in the new states to be formed therefrom, are to be left to the decision of the people residing therein, through their appropriate representatives."[7]

The special report went into sundry details and was explanatory of the bill. It quoted exactly the well-known eighth section of the act admitting Missouri as a state in 1820 — a section which

[7] Section 21.

excluded slavery forever from the region of the Louisiana purchase north of 36° 30′. It gave evidence that Douglas or his committee had taken carefully into the reckoning the controversy between north and south that might arise over the question of slavery in the Nebraska region. But it recommended neither an affirmation nor a repeal of the eighth section of the old Missouri act. "Your committee," said the report, "do not feel themselves called upon to enter into the discussion of these controverted questions. They involve the same grave issues which produced the agitation, the sectional strife, and the fearful struggle of 1850."[8]

Considered together, the revised bill and the special report are evidence sufficient to account for the prompt arousing of controversy, for neither the bill nor the special report left a clear impression. Intended as an interpretation of the bill, the report was especially startling in at least three respects: (1) It forced into a general principle phraseology drawn from the compromise measures of 1850 and hitherto considered applicable only to Utah and New Mexico, so far as slavery was concerned. Referring to this aspect of Douglas' position, the *Washington Daily Union* said: "He plants himself resolutely upon the compromise of 1850 as a final settlement — not final merely as to the Territories then in dispute, but final as to all future legislation for territorial governments."[9] Again, (2) it voiced the views of a northern democrat from Illinois, easily the leader in the senate of his party — a party which had won its presidential victory largely on the ground of promising peace, if not silence, on the slavery issue. Finally, (3) it called attention to the conflict of opinion existing in the country over the question of the constitutional validity of the Missouri act of 1820. In this aspect of the report the *New York Tribune* was quick to detect trouble. "An overt attempt is set on foot," it declared, "in Mr. Douglas's Nebraska bill to override the Missouri Compromise." Then, after quoting exactly the language of the well-known eighth section of the Missouri act, it continued: "This plain and unequivocal declaration that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall

[8] *Senate reports*, 33 congress, 1 session, no. 15, 1:30. Printed also in the *Washington Daily Union*, January 6, 1854, and in the *National Intelligencer* (Washington, D. C.), January 7.

[9] January 5, 1854.

ever exist in our Northwest Territories is unceremoniously hustled aside by Mr. Douglas, who makes the Compromise measures of 1850 the scapegoat for his sin in doing it.'' [10]

Hardly more than a week elapsed after the appearance of the bill and the special report before the newspapers north and south were commenting on the question of the repeal of the Missouri compromise. Had that repeal been contemplated, it was asked, by the makers of the Nebraska bill? By the following February 7 the bill had been elaborated and so altered that its language was perfectly clear in respect to the doubtful point. In other words, Douglas' final amendment offered to the senate on that day declared the eighth section of the act of March 6, 1820, to be ''inoperative and void.'' And this language went unchanged into the law.[11]

The first attempt publicly to bring about the repeal of the Missouri compromise by the introduction of an amendment to that effect into the language of the Nebraska bill was made by a southern whig, Senator Archibald Dixon, a Kentucky slaveholder. Brought to the attention of the senate on Monday, January 16, the Dixon amendment was designed to be the concluding section — section 22 — of the bill in its then existent form. The amendment called for the withdrawal of the eighth section of the old Missouri act of 1820 from application to the Nebraska territory and permitted citizens of all states and territories ''to take and hold their slaves within any of the territories of the United States, or of the States to be formed therefrom, as if the said act . . . had never been passed.'' That the injection of the Dixon amendment into the situation greatly disturbed Douglas there is good ground for believing.[12] But that the incident probably tended toward quickening the process of reshaping the bill of January 4 is likewise clear.

Although it is true that the Dixon amendment as such never

[10] January 6, 1854.

[11] In tracing the course of the Nebraska bill — known as S. 22 and H. R. 236 — the writer has depended upon the original printed files of bills to be found in the Library of congress and known as *Senate bills*, 33 congress, 1 session (1853-1854) and House of representatives, *Bills and resolutions*, for the same congress. The Kansas-Nebraska act, signed by President Pierce on May 30, 1854, is in United States, *Statutes at large*, 10:277-290.

[12] Archibald Dixon to Henry S. Foote, September 30, 1858, in H. M. Flint, *Life of Stephen A. Douglas* (New York, 1860), 172-173.

became law, it had the effect promptly to bring out and sharply to define the issue. The tumult of popular discussion, already loud, became louder. During the week following January 16 politicians in the national capital became extraordinarily active. Among leaders and their following there was much discussion over the possible repeal of a time-honored measure. Sharp editorials appeared on the Nebraska question. Judging from them and from some variety of letters written by Washington correspondents, it was evident that the attitude of the administration, that is to say, of President Pierce and his cabinet advisers, was frequently a matter of serious doubt and grave question. In brief, the mere proposal of the Dixon amendment helped markedly toward a reopening of the question of slavery extension. That, it appeared, was the real issue of the day.

It is at this point in the consideration that the figure of Colonel Philip Phillips of Alabama should be brought into view. It was about this time — in January, 1854 — that as a member of the house committee on territories he formulated in writing an amendment which was designed, like Dixon's, to repeal the Missouri compromise. Unlike Dixon's, what may be called the Phillips amendment was never given publicity either at the time of its formulation or later. In the long course of debates in congress there was no reference made to it. Its language, so far as the writer can discover, has never been printed. To-day it is to be found only on a copy of the original print of the bill of January 4 — presumably Colonel Phillips' own copy used at the time that the bill was pending in the senate committee — and in a slightly different form on a loose sheet of blue letter paper on which it was probably first drafted. Both drafts are in a collection of family papers which were deposited several years ago by Mr. P. Lee Phillips, Colonel Phillips' son, in the Library of congress. That the Phillips amendment was known to Senator Douglas and to a few other leading members of the thirty-third congress is certain. Abundant evidence, although largely circumstantial and indirect, reveals Colonel Phillips as an active worker for the repeal. If he worked often behind the scenes, in caucus or conference or conclave (as he undoubtedly did work), he had, nevertheless, a part in the general process that

after January 4 was making for the reshaping of the Nebraska bill. What Dixon attempted to accomplish in a public way Colonel Phillips attempted to bring about quietly and unobtrusively. While neither Dixon nor Phillips can be considered the author of the repeal, both men worked for the consummation of the repeal in the language of the law and helped forward the process by means of which it was clearly set in the statute of May 30.

Philip Phillips served for only a single term in the national house of representatives, from December, 1853, to March, 1855, and retired at his own request. Political position and preferment were merely incidents in his long life. His chief work was that of a lawyer who took rank before his death in January, 1884, as a jurist of unusual distinction. From the close of the civil war he made his home in Washington, D. C. There as a member of a group of lawyers known in those days as "the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States" he served lawyers outside that group after the manner of a barrister. Before the supreme court he presented or argued hundreds of cases after 1865. He was born in Charleston, South Carolina, in December, 1807. He was partly educated there and as a youth was sent to New England to continue his studies at the famous academy of Captain Alden Partridge,[13] where, from 1823 to 1826, he must have known as a fellow student for a year or so Gideon Welles, later secretary of the navy under Presidents Lincoln and Johnson. He was admitted to the bar of South Carolina in 1828. Four years later he was a member of the South Carolina constitutional convention, in which he opposed the doctrine of nullification. He served for a short time in the South Carolina legislature. He was not thirty years old when he decided to remove to Mobile. From there he was twice sent to the Alabama state legislature. In 1852 he appeared as a delegate at the Baltimore convention which nominated Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire as the democratic candidate for the presidency. At the very outset of his term in the thirty-third congress he was put upon the house committee on territories. As a member of this committee he felt called upon to work for what he con-

[13] For a sketch of Partridge and his influence, see Henry B. Learned, "Captain Alden Partridge," in the *Nation*, 90:554-555.

ceived to be the true interests of his party and his section of the south — the repeal of the Missouri compromise.[14]

The Phillips amendment read as follows: "That the people of the Territory through their Territorial legislature may legislate upon the subject of slavery in any manner they may think proper not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, and all laws or parts of laws inconsistent with this authority or right shall, from and after the passage of this act, become inoperative, void and of no force and effect."[15]

We are without contemporary evidence as to the time at which Colonel Phillips felt called upon to formulate this proposition. Referring to the subject rather more than six years later — on August 24, 1860 — he said that he had formulated it "a few days after the introduction of the bill" of January 4.[16] At any rate, he wrote it into an original printed copy of that bill, as it already has been stated. And from the time of the appearance of that particular form of the bill he can probably be reckoned as among those observers who regarded the Douglas draft of the Nebraska bill as lacking in clearness on the subject of slavery in the territory. The Dixon amendment, it will be remembered, was put in strong language and called directly for a repeal of the eighth section of the Missouri act of 1820. Phillips' proposition, by comparison, was designed to accomplish in the end the same thing, for it too would have made the old law, so far as it applied

[14] For this account the writer has relied largely on a careful sketch of Philip Phillips to be found in William A. Ellis, *Norwich university, 1819-1911: her history, her graduates, her roll of honor* (Montpelier, Vermont, 1911), 2:199-200.

[15] Copied from a scrap of blue paper in Phillips' handwriting. The slightly different formulation of the amendment, also in Phillips' handwriting, on the original printed copy of the bill as presented on January 4, shows that Phillips intended that his amendment should be inserted in section 1 of that bill. This second formulation reads: "And that the people of said Territory through the territorial Legislature hereafter provided may legislate upon the subject of Slavery in any manner they may think proper not inconsistent with the principles of the Constitution of the U. S. — And all laws or parts of laws inconsistent with this authority or right shall, from and after the passage of this act, be and become inoperative, void, and of no force and effect." To this he adds a comment: "This is a proposition of my own submitted to Senator Hunter and others. [*initialed*] P. P."

[16] See Phillips' letter entitled "The repeal of the Missouri act," dated August 24, 1860, at Washington, D. C., and printed the next day in the *Constitution* (Washington, D. C.). In this letter the writer recalled interviews with Douglas and President Pierce in 1854.

to the Nebraska region, void and inoperative. But its language was less direct. It was probably formulated a few days after Dixon's amendment of January 16. Near that time it was submitted to Senator Hunter of Virginia and to a few others actively interested in having the Missouri compromise repealed. That is as much as can now be said.

Referring in 1860 to the Douglas first draft of the Nebraska bill, Phillips wrote that he remembered that the bill "contained the same provision as had been engrafted on the acts of 1850 for organizing New Mexico and Utah, to wit: 'That when admitted as a State the said Territory shall be received into the Union with or without slavery, as their constitutions may prescribe at the time of their admission.' " He continued in this wise: "The consideration of this subject was presented to my mind as a member of the House committee specially charged with it, and believing that the provision referred to could not work out the equality and fairness which on its face it promised, while a statute existed which completely excluded slaveholders from settling in the Territory up to the very period of inaugurating the State constitution, I submitted to a distinguished southern Senator . . . a written proposition for the repeal of this 8th section. . . . In the meantime Mr. Dixon of Kentucky, a southern Whig, had given notice in the Senate that he would propose the repeal." [17]

It may be at once remarked that, in assuming in 1860 that his proposition of 1854 involved a direct repeal of the eighth section of the Missouri act, Phillips went rather too far and claimed too much. But that he was active and probably influential in helping to shape the ultimate form of the repeal is, the writer thinks, true.

An unusual occurrence on Sunday, January 22, 1854, caught the attention of several Washington correspondents: a conference or conclave, doubtless intended to be kept secret, was held on that day at the White House. It was held just the day before Senator Douglas submitted for the second time to the senate his Nebraska bill markedly altered and including provisions for the organization of two territories, Nebraska and Kansas, and expressly "superseding" the eighth section of the

[17] *Constitution*, August 25, 1860.

Missouri act of 1820 — declared "inoperative" — by the principles of the compromise measures of 1850. Naturally this conference at the White House was looked upon as an incident of peculiar interest and, in quarters hostile to the administration, with great suspicion. It was assumed, generally speaking, that this secret meeting established or fixed the attitude of the president and his cabinet, hitherto considered to be doubtful, as in favor of the new form of the bill; in other words, as in favor of the doctrine of "superseding" the troublesome section of the Missouri act by the more recent law of 1850. Although the word "repeal" did not occur in the language of the bill, nevertheless the bill was understood to involve the design of a repeal.

There are several accounts of this White House meeting of January 22. The Washington correspondent of the *New York Herald* wrote a letter regarding it on the next day, January 23, which appeared in print on Tuesday, January 24. He had gathered impressions from some unknown source, impressions which sounded as though he had gained them from a participant; and his story, told with considerable detail, appeared to be plausible. Twenty-five years later, in September, 1879, Jefferson Davis wrote for Mrs. Archibald Dixon an account of the meeting as he remembered it.[18] In June, 1876, Philip Phillips, a participant at the meeting, set down recollections of it in the course of a fragmentary autobiography intended for his children. It is quite the most explicit record of the meeting now known to exist.

According to all accounts, the meeting was held for the purpose of obtaining President Pierce's approval of the new form of the Nebraska bill with its startling and novel doctrine of "superseding" one law by another. This approval, it is agreed, was then and there obtained. In brief, the administration became committed to a formulation — at the moment, to be sure, in process of development toward a more definite and final formulation — that after February 7 made fairly secure the actual repeal of the Missouri compromise restricting line, if the bill became law.

[18] Mrs. Archibald Dixon, *The true history of the Missouri compromise and its repeal* (Cincinnati, 1899), 458. Compare Jefferson Davis, *The rise and fall of the confederate government* (New York, 1881), 1:27-28.

No quite definite conclusion can be reached at present as to the time at which the meeting took place. Davis' record makes it appear to have been held on Sunday morning, perhaps before the hour of church. The account in the *Herald* set no time. Phillips' record asserts that the meeting, prearranged by Senator Douglas, occurred soon after nine o'clock in the evening.

Who took part in the conference? According to Jefferson Davis, at the time President Pierce's secretary of war, he arranged for the meeting and was present. Phillips, on the other hand, makes no reference to Davis. Besides himself, Phillips says that the president saw at the conference Senators Douglas, Atchison of Missouri, R. M. T. Hunter and James M. Mason of Virginia, and Representatives William O. Goode of Virginia and John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky. In respect to steps taken preliminary to the conference, he names also Senator A. P. Butler of South Carolina as having a share. The correspondent of the *Herald* thought that Senator Jesse D. Bright of Indiana was present — like Douglas a northern Democrat. From Phillips' record it would appear that Atchison and Douglas acted as the leaders of the group.

Phillips related that shortly after January 4, moved by his conviction that the Douglas bill of that date was confusing rather than clear on the question of slavery extension in the Nebraska territory, he first expressed this thought to his friend, Senator Hunter, and to a few others. Somewhat later in the month he sought out David Atchison, then acting president of the senate by reason of the death in April, 1853, of Vice President William R. King of Alabama, and confided to him his view of the Douglas measure. A brief conference followed, perhaps on the next day — a conference in which Atchison, Douglas, and Phillips took part. On Thursday, we are told — presumably January 19, three days after the Dixon amendment had been brought to public attention — Senator Douglas and Representative Breckinridge called on Phillips; on this occasion, at the request of Douglas, Phillips drafted his form of amendment already quoted.[19] Soon after this, probably on the next day (Friday), a conference "in the rear of the Patent Office" was held between him and a few leading politicians, mostly senators; and this

[19] See *ante*, p. 310.

group, apparently in sympathy with Phillips' thought, agreed to the form of his proposed amendment and authorized Phillips to communicate their conclusion to Douglas. This was done by Phillips on Saturday, January 21. That same day, according to Phillips' recollection, Douglas arranged with President Pierce for the White House conference that took place on Sunday, perhaps in the evening.[20]

It is worth observing that in these secret arrangements Douglas appears to have been the only man of the senate committee on territories taking any part, and that Philip Phillips was the single member of the house committee who is mentioned. Yet the probabilities are that others, not named and not present, knew what was going on. In any such matter heavy with consequences Douglas would have taken merely the lead, fortified as he was by Atchison's approval and presence, to say nothing of that of the others.

While it is true that the details of any such meeting as that which took place on Sunday, January 22, 1854, can never be exactly known, we need be in no great doubt as to its essential object in the light of such circumstances as can be verified. Referring to President Pierce on that Sunday, Jefferson Davis, whose account can probably be trusted on this aspect of the matter, wrote: "When the bill had been fully explained to him, its text, its intent, and its purpose, he, as anticipated, declared his opinion in its favor, and the gentlemen left him with the assurance they came to obtain before testing the question of their bill before the two Houses of Congress."[21] According to Phillips' statement, President Pierce met the committee "in the library" of the White House. Douglas and Atchison, having driven there ahead of the others, were with the president. "I was struck," wrote Phillips, "by the cold formality which seemed to prevail. The subject was soon entered upon; but I do not propose to repeat what occurred, further than this: the President said, 'Gentlemen, you are entering a serious under-

[20] Details of a more or less picturesque kind can be found in the manuscript fragment of Phillips' autobiography. The writer has examined the Marcy papers for additional light, but without result. When the papers of Caleb Cushing or those of John C. Breckinridge become available to the investigator, perhaps several questions now unanswerable will then be solved.

[21] Dixon, *History of the Missouri compromise and its repeal*, 458.

taking, and the ground should be well surveyed before the first step is taken.' The result of this conference is found," he added, "in the act, May 30, 1854."[22]

The text of the revised Nebraska bill, submitted to the senate by Douglas on the following day, Monday, January 23, satisfied Senator Dixon, as is well enough known. Probably it also satisfied Phillips. Both men were eager to obtain, by the doctrine of "superseding" one law by another or otherwise, the abrogation of the famous eighth section of the act of 1820.[23] But both men were better satisfied, it is reasonable to conclude, when Douglas, abandoning this peculiar doctrine on or about February 7, acknowledged that congress should not be permitted to intervene in either states or territories, so far as slavery was concerned, and put forward his last amendment to that effect on that day, thus making the old eighth section "inoperative and void." The doubts of the democrats, particularly of the southern slaveholders, slowly but surely vanished as the great series of debates proceeded. And on May 30, with the approval of the administration, the Missouri compromise had gone into the limbo of doctrinaire legislation, never to be revived.

We obtain just a glimpse of Phillips' thought on the subject in his autobiography, when he refers to his amendment as follows: "When I made this proposition, I was well satisfied that slavery could never be established in the high latitude of those territories [*i. e. Nebraska and Kansas*]. I was actuated by what I then regarded as a *theoretical right.* If the bill had organized the territories without referring to the question of slavery, I should probably have said nothing. But in the form in which it was presented [*i. e. on January 4*], I regarded it as

[22] Autobiography in manuscript.

[23] Douglas argued that the eighth section of the Missouri act of 1820 had been "superseded" by the compromise measures of 1850. The novel and startling aspect of this doctrine of supersession, which Douglas advocated as early as January 23, was due to the fact that, so far as the writer can discover, no such doctrine had ever been suggested between the legislation of the compromise of 1850 and the Nebraska bill of January, 1854. The eighth section of the Missouri act of 1820 remained, according to the usual opinion in 1850, undisturbed. Of course new legislation is not infrequently designed to supersede earlier laws. Douglas, however, soon abandoned his theory and felt forced by February 7 to go straight to the point and declare in so many words that the old section of 1820 was "inoperative and void."

delusive. That this measure increased the slavery agitation and hastened the crisis of 1861 is very probable."

On Friday, February 10, there was printed in the *Washington Union* what would appear to have been an inspired editorial in that organ, well known to be in the closest touch with President Pierce and his cabinet. It was entitled "The administration and the Nebraska question," and a part of it read as follows:

Without seeking to interfere with the action of Congress, the President has frankly and unreservedly expressed his conviction in favor of the principle of congressional non-intervention to all who have sought his opinions. As to the form of the proposition, he has not cared to interpose his preference; but as to the substance of the proposition, he has consulted freely and anxiously. It is an entire mistake to suppose that the senators and representatives who have had the subject under their charge have not sought the benefit of his consultations, and have not secured the approval of his judgment in maturing a subject of so much moment. We make this remark with emphasis. . . . The bill, as proposed to be amended by Mr. Douglas, declaring the Missouri Compromise inoperative and void, because it is inconsistent with the principles of the Compromise of 1850, and securing to the inhabitants of the Territory the right to regulate the subject of slavery for themselves . . . cannot fail, when passed, to meet his ready approval.

Here was a reflection probably made by some one who knew the facts concerning the Sunday session of January 22, that "secret conclave" in which Philip Phillips had a part. We cannot say that he had with him on that occasion his written proposition. It is reasonably clear, however, that he had already committed it to writing, probably, as he recalled, at Douglas' request on the Thursday previous. And either he or Douglas may have used it as a basis for some discussion; but of this discussion there is no recorded trace. The publicity already given to Dixon's amendment since the previous Monday would have made it an easy matter for President Pierce and the other members of the conference to discuss that too, had they so desired. Neither Phillips' nor Dixon's respective propositions can be clearly differentiated in the language of the law. On that language both of them, it may plausibly be argued, probably left a trace. Only this thought does the writer wish to emphasize by way of conclusion: the scanty records left by Philip Phillips in manuscript or in print need leave no doubt that any careful

study of his career in the thirty-third congress must throw a side light on the repeal of the Missouri compromise. Like many another, known or unknown to history, he aided the process making for this result. In the writer's judgment, the repeal of the Missouri compromise can not be ascribed to any single man. The result of an historical process, the repeal was accomplished, as everybody knows, in the spring of 1854. Such accomplishments in legislation as the repeal — whatever we may think of them — are rarely brought about without the active efforts and earnest coöperation of many minds.

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THE BEGINNINGS OF RAILROADS IN THE SOUTHWEST

By the coming of the year 1830 the continued search for better cotton land had brought into the states of Alabama, Mississippi, and Tennessee a population of more than eight hundred thousand. The most pressing economic problem of these people was the transporting of their cotton to market. Up to this time they had made use of the only practicable means of transportation available to them, the rivers; and the course of these rivers inevitably determined for them the selection of their markets. To Mobile came all the products of southern Alabama brought down by the Tombigbee and the Alabama rivers and their tributaries; to New Orleans came all the trade of that portion of Mississippi tributary to the Pearl river and of that part of Tennessee lying along the Tennessee and the Cumberland. But none of these three states could be said to have a common market. Northern Alabama turned its economic back on southern Alabama and traded with New Orleans over the long course of the Tennessee, the Ohio, and the Mississippi; the extreme west of Tennessee found its market in Memphis; the western part of Mississippi traded with Natchez and Vicksburg. Each state was a house divided; in each state the home market had a surpassing rival in New Orleans.

The fear of New Orleans is the beginning of wisdom: this might well be the text of any one who essays to write the economic history of the old south. Certainly in 1830 the outdistanced rivals of New Orleans were wise enough to recognize whom they had need to fear. Baltimore, Charleston, Mobile, Memphis, Natchez, and Vicksburg were all engaged in making plans for the transfer to themselves of the trade that New Orleans possessed in the west. They planned to neutralize the rivers by the building of railroads. Baltimore had actually begun its road to Cincinnati; under the leadership of Hayne and Calhoun, Charleston was projecting a road to Louisville and Cincinnati;

Mobile was clamoring for a road northward to the Tennessee that might bring to it the trade of north Alabama and perhaps of all west Tennessee; Memphis, Vicksburg, and Natchez were planning roads into the interior in order to secure the commerce that belonged to New Orleans almost as by birthright. Confronted by these sudden attacks on its commercial supremacy, New Orleans was far from sitting a passive victim. Realizing the inadequacy of the Mississippi as a means of transportation, that city, too, made its plans for a railroad. Out of such a maze of clashing ambitions as these came the beginnings of railroads in the southwest.

The keystone in the transportation struggle in the old southwest was the Tuscumbia and Decatur railroad begun in 1831 and finished in 1834.[1] It was forty-five miles long and was built for the purpose of carrying freight around Muscle shoals in the Tennessee. The road was in fact a feeder for New Orleans, since boats were unable to get past the shoals except in extremely high water.[2] If Mobile could connect with this road — or with the Tennessee above it — it would be able to divert to itself all the trade not only of northern Alabama but of the Tennessee river region as well, since it would be a shorter route than the river way to New Orleans. The first thought of Mobile was for a canal connecting the Tennessee and the Coosa, but the expense of this project made it so hopeless that agitation was begun for a railroad.[3] In the session of 1835-1836 the Alabama legislature chartered the Mobile and Tennessee railroad and the hopes of Mobile rose high.[4] The preceding legislature had already chartered the Montgomery and West Point to the Georgia line, and the Alabama and Mississippi to the Pearl river region.[5] Both these roads, to the Tennessee and to the Pearl, had for their avowed object the tapping of the New Orleans trade and the business men of that city began to show

[1] *Decatur Clarion*, December 19, 1834. Quoted in the *National Banner and Nashville Whig*, January 5, 1835.

[2] Originally a canal had been planned around the shoals but this project failed for lack of means to finish its construction, although the United States gave to Alabama four hundred thousand acres of land to aid in the work. *Alabama State Intelligencer* (Tuscaloosa), June 4, 1831.

[3] *Alabama State Intelligencer*, April 13, 1831.

[4] *Southern Advocate* (Huntsville, Alabama), January 5, 1836.

[5] *Mobile Commercial Register*, January 23, 1834.

signs of alarm. In Tennessee, however, plans were being made of a still more alarming character.

In 1831 the Tennessee legislature had chartered a railroad from Memphis to Muscle shoals and this was rechartered in 1834 under the name of the Mississippi and Atlantic railroad company.[6] The name indicated the vaulting ambition of Memphis. Its plan was nothing less than to form a railroad connection with Charleston by building to Muscle shoals, utilizing the Tuscumbia and Decatur for its full length, and extending it to meet the Georgia roads building sturdily west from Augusta-Hamburg. The newspapers of west Tennessee kept this project actively before the people and an internal improvement convention at Columbia in September, 1834, gave it public indorsement.[7] The same convention indorsed the plan for a railroad from Memphis to Baltimore by way of Knoxville and Harpers Ferry and appointed a committee to ask congress for the requisite funds for financing a survey. Major General E. P. Gaines of the United States army was the sponsor for both these ideas as well as for many others of an even more latitudinous nature, and it was due to his exertions that a United States engineer was detached to conduct the survey.[8] By the last of October he had finished both surveys and reported to Gaines that the 985 miles from Memphis to Baltimore might be bridged at the cost of twenty-five million dollars; the road to Charleston might cost thirty millions.[9] This report was a tonic to the southwest, which handled imaginary millions with the same deftness that it did actual pennies and quite customarily without perceiving any essential difference between the two. It was proposed to ask the United States for a loan of ten millions; Virginia was to give ten millions, Tennessee an equal sum, and the remainder was to be raised by private subscriptions. General Gaines wrote open letters to the governors of the states through which the proposed lines were to pass and with this the southwest settled down into the comfortable conviction that the

[6] *Southern Advocate*, April 22, 1834.

[7] *National Banner and Nashville Whig*, September 24, 1834. Quoted from the *Columbia Observer*.

[8] *Ibid.*, September 24, 1834. Quoted from the *Jackson* (Tennessee) *Truth Teller*.

[9] *New Orleans Bulletin*, October 24, 1834.

roads were as good as built.[10] In 1836 the Tennessee portion of the road to Baltimore was chartered under the name of the Middle and East Tennessee.[11] If either of these roads were built the trade of Tennessee would be lost to New Orleans. That city had already begun to bestir itself.

It found an ally in Nashville. The glorification of Memphis would mean a corresponding decrease in the importance of Nashville and it had little more to hope for from Mobile than from Memphis. Consequently Nashville threw cold water vigorously on the plans of both cities. The *Nashville Whig* declared the Memphis-Charleston project "hopeless and visionary" and waged a war of fierce invective with the Memphis *Gazette* and the Tuscumbia *North Alabamian*.[12] Nashville had recently welcomed a move from Louisville for a railroad connection with that place, but this hope died when the Kentucky legislature chartered a macadam road instead of a railroad between the two cities.[13] Thus disappointed, Nashville turned a willing ear to the persuasions of New Orleans.

Early in December, 1834, a mass meeting had been held in New Orleans to initiate agitation for a railroad to Nashville and from this time on the newspapers of the two cities gave plentiful publicity to the idea in their every issue. The plan was to have the road cross Mississippi west of the Pearl river, cross the Tennessee at Colbert's ferry near the old crossing of the Natchez trace, run through the northwest corner of Alabama, and terminate on the Cumberland at Nashville. By connecting with the Tennessee river and with the Tuscumbia and Decatur it would bring by a direct route to New Orleans the trade that now went thither over the long, roundabout courses of the rivers. No road to Memphis or Mobile could possibly compete with such a road as this. A company was organized, petitions were sent to the four states asking for charters, an engineer was secured from the new Louisville and Lexington, and by the summer of 1835 four groups of surveyors were at work laying out the route.[14]

[10] *National Banner and Nashville Whig*, October 6, 1834. These letters are to be found in the contemporary numbers of the *National Intelligencer* (Washington, D. C.).

[11] *Ibid.*, February 22, 1836.

[12] *Ibid.*, October 6, November 7, 1834.

[13] *Ibid.*, November 3, 1834.

[14] *Ibid.*, January 2, 1835.

In the spring of 1835 Louisiana granted a charter.[15] A little later Alabama, after much-divided counsels, took similar action, stipulating that the Tennessee should not be crossed higher up than Waterloo. In May the company sent out an address to the people of the different states asking their support. The road would be completed, it said, in five years at a cost of six millions. Trains would run over it at a speed of more than ten miles an hour.[16] On the thirtieth of May subscription books were opened in the principal cities and in January, 1836, the Tennessee legislature granted a charter.[17] The company had already begun building north from New Orleans to the state line, had laid out a manufacturing town on the Tangipbro, and had bought $500,000 worth of materials.[18] It seemed that only a charter from Mississippi was needed to insure success.

But the Mississippi legislature proved recalcitrant and this spelled disaster for the road. The New Orleans and Nashville had asked for a right of way west of the Pearl river and if this were granted it would be at the expense of the river cities, Natchez and Vicksburg, through which the trade of west Mississippi was accustomed to go. In this emergency the cities made common cause against the common enemy and their representatives in the legislature opposed the granting of the charter.[19] Moreover, the river cities were building railroads of their own into the Pearl river territory; Vicksburg was building toward Jackson with the expectation of connecting there with the railroad to Mobile; Natchez was building toward the Pearl at Canton. Both these roads were applying for charters in the session of 1836.[20] The application of the New Orleans and Nashville for a charter locating the road west of the Pearl brought on a fight for the control of the west Mississippi trade, and New Orleans lost. The river cities received the charters they asked for but the legislature adjourned without granting the petition of the New Orleans and Nashville. The senate voted to grant the right of way west of the Pearl but the house insisted that it be east

[15] *New Orleans Bulletin*, January 2, 1835.
[16] *Southern Advocate*, May 19, 1835.
[17] *National Banner and Nashville Whig*, January 20, 1836.
[18] *Ibid.*, December 12, 1836.
[19] *Mississippi Free Trader* (Natchez), December 8, 1836.
[20] *Ibid.*, February 19, March 4, 1836.



of the Pearl and the two were unable to come to any agreement.[21] There was nothing to be done but to wait for the next session and in the meantime to try to overcome the hostility of the river cities. Fortunately for New Orleans, the alliance of the river cities was a precarious one; they distrusted New Orleans less than they did each other. At Natchez the influential

[21] *Mississippi Free Trader*, February 26, 1836.

Free Trader espoused the cause of New Orleans, bringing forward a plan for the union of the New Orleans road and the Natchez line. The defection of Natchez was decisive and in January, 1837, the legislature granted the charter permitting the New Orleans and Nashville to locate its line west of the Pearl.[22]

With the granting of this charter the way seemed clear for a gigantic struggle over the trade of the entire southwest; for both the Mobile and the Memphis interests had been busy and the Mississippi and Atlantic was being graded from Memphis to La Grange.[23] But it was now the year 1837 and the money panic brought all railroading in the southwest to a sudden close. In March, 1837, the New Orleans and Nashville, at the end of its resources and despairing of aid from the legislatures, suspended its operations and discharged its employees. Mobile gave up all hope as it became impossible to collect subscriptions, and when a railroad convention was finally held in Huntsville in September, 1838, did not even send delegates.[24] In Tennessee there were similar conditions. The governor called the legislature in special session but in his message he made no allusion to the railroads — the first omission of the subject in five years. An internal improvement convention held in May at Nashville stormily debated the question of the railroads but adjourned without making specific recommendations.[25] What made the confusion worse in Tennessee was that a state bank had been created for the purpose of helping to finance the railroads and it had been grossly mismanaged.[26] Alabama and Mississippi had also extended state aid to their railroads and now in the financial crisis they were unable to meet their obligations. The three states had a total debt of twenty-five millions. They could give no more aid; their best efforts were needed to save themselves.

In this manner the panic of 1837 brought an end to the most ambitious railroad schemes of the southwest. Yet the decade was not altogether barren of results; some of the smaller plans

[22] *Mississippi Free Trader*, January 19, 1837; *Mobile Commercial Register*, January 30, 1837.

[23] *National Banner and Nashville Whig*, February 6, 1837.

[24] *Mobile Commercial Register*, March 23, 1837, October 1, 1838.

[25] *National Banner and Nashville Whig*, March 24, May 19, 1837.

[26] *Daily Republican Banner* (Nashville), October 9, 1839.

had prospered. In Mississippi, Natchez had built twenty-five miles along the Natchez trace to Washington, the old capital.[27] Vicksburg had built an equal distance toward Jackson. This was something, at any rate, with which to begin the new decade, although the other companies had contented themselves with securing banking privileges and issuing worthless paper money.[28] In Tennessee the only thing accomplished was the grading of the Memphis road for forty miles toward La Grange. Alabama had its well-built Tuscumbia and Decatur of forty-five miles — a valuable road whether it was ever extended or not. In Louisiana fifty-eight miles had been built, of which over twenty belonged to the New Orleans and Nashville.

The following table shows the condition of the railroads in the southwest on January 1, 1840.[29]

Name	Course	Opened	Length	Completed	Being Graded	Locomotives
Hiwassee	Knoxville to Georgia		97		70	
Memphis and La Grange	Memphis to La Grange		50		40	
Somerville branch	M. and L. to Somerville		13		10	
Mississippi	Natchez to Canton	1839	140	25	15	4
Vicksburg and Jackson	Vicksburg to Jackson	1839	45	25	20	4
Jackson and Brandon	Jackson to Brandon		12		12	
Raymond	V. and J. to Raymond		6		6	
Grand Gulf and Port Gibson	Grand Gulf to Port Gibson		7½		7½	
Montgomery and West Point	Montgomery to West Point		85		65	
Selma and Tennessee	Selma to Gunter's Landing		170		27	
Wetumpka and Coosa	Wetumpka to Fort Williams		56		35	
Cahawba and Marion	Cahawba to Marion		27		27	
Linden and Demopolis	Linden to Demopolis		22		10	
Mobile and Cedar Point	Mobile to Cedar Point	1837	26	5	4	1
Tuscumbia and Decatur	Tuscumbia to Decatur	1834	46	46		2

The importance of the decade 1830-1840 lies not so much in what it did as in what it intended to do. It outlined the railroad program for the next two decades and there was hardly a railroad built in the southwest before the civil war that was not projected during this earlier period. The rivalries of 1830

[27] *Mississippi Free Trader*, August 1, 1839.

[28] *Mobile Commercial Register*, March 24, 1837; *Mississippi Free Trader*, January 12, 1839.

[29] *American railroad journal*, 5:344. The Selma and Tennessee was all that was left of the original Mobile and Tennessee project. The Wetumpka and Coosa was designed to build around the shoals in the Coosa and thus to aid in the transportation to Mobile.

were also the rivalries of 1850. During the next two decades the fight for commerce went merrily on between New Orleans and the other southern cities, widening into a contest for the trade of the west and even of the Pacific as well. This early period initiated the method of railroad-building that was to continue in use long after. Southern railroads were to be built with southern money and for this reason public sentiment had to be constantly aroused. The favorite instrument was the convention and thousands of these were held in the south in the thirty years immediately preceding the civil war. The local press was utilized and it is from the newspapers, indeed, that the story of the railroads is to be most readily gathered. This decade, too, was prophetic of the defects that were to make themselves felt in the building of the southern roads for the next twenty years. The different lines were of different gauges, the material equipment was flimsy, the grades were heavy, and great reliance was placed on inclined planes. Railroads were looked upon as auxiliaries to the rivers rather than as main lines of transportation. Finally, this decade brought into public prominence the promoters who were to be most responsible for the building of the southern roads — Hines of Tennessee, Woodruf of Louisiana, Calhoun of Georgia, and Gadsden, whose home, indeed, was in Charleston but whose indomitable perseverance and business acumen were to make themselves felt throughout the entire south.

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THE POLICY OF ALBANY AND ENGLISH WESTWARD EXPANSION

Of all the communities in colonial America none exerted a larger influence upon matters of general concern than the fur-trading post of Albany. Few though such matters were, they were none the less important. With the rise of the French power in America all the colonies were confronted with questions of French expansion, Indian relations, and the extension of English influence into the west. The well-known congress held at Albany in 1754 to consider these very questions was but the last of a series of intercolonial conferences held for the same purpose and at the same place. Situated as it was on the remote frontier of the province of New York, its very existence bound up with a single interest, that of the fur trade, a Dutch community in the midst of a province ruled by England but already cosmopolitan, Albany seemed to possess all the characteristics making for provincialism and isolation; and yet this village of a few hundred souls on the banks of the Hudson was for three quarters of a century the diplomatic center of British North America.

That it was so was due partly to its unique geographical position, partly to the character of its political relationships. Albany was situated at the intersection of two of the most important lines of communication on the continent. Northward ran the route through the upper Hudson and Lake Champlain to Canada, the inevitable path of invasion in either direction. Westward through the Mohawk valley stretched the route to the lakes and the Mississippi basin, the easiest natural route to the interior between the St. Lawrence waterway and the southern end of the Appalachian mountain chain.

Quite as important in determining the policy and the interests of Albany was its long-standing alliance with the Iroquois confederacy or Five nations. Through the power derived from its organization, the genius of its leaders, and above all because of the arms purchased at Albany, that confederation had imposed

its hegemony upon the Indian tribes of half the continent, and its war parties roamed the Indian trails eastward into Maine, westward to the Mississippi, southward to the Carolinas, and northward far into Canada. Though claimed by the English governors of New York as subjects, the Iroquois were in reality during the last half of the seventeenth century what they proudly asserted themselves to be, the subjects of no master, but an independent power in America, equal in fighting strength to either the French or the English, and able to incline the balance of power in one direction or the other.[1] But since the continuance and extension of their power depended upon their securing a ready supply of arms and ammunition, they maintained a firm alliance with the Dutch traders of Albany, and in turn the traders of Albany became the sponsors for the good behavior of the Iroquois toward other English communities, and to some extent the aiders and abettors of their designs against their enemies, whether Indian or French.

The later policy of the Albany traders was largely influenced by trade methods developed during the period of Dutch rule. From the first the center of the Indian trade was at Fort Orange, built where Albany now stands, whither the tribes of the upper Hudson and above all the Iroquois brought their furs. Here for a time the situation was complicated by the conflicting claims of the West India company and the proprietors of the colony of Rensselaerswyck; but through the vigorous action of Stuyvesant, the last Dutch governor, a *modus vivendi* was concluded, by which the company held the fort and the settlement immediately about it, which Stuyvesant organized as the village of Beverwyck, while the rest of the settlement, which was practically coterminous, was left under the jurisdiction of the Rensselaers and their agents. From this time the former rivalry largely ceased, and in important matters the two communities acted together in their dealings with the Indians and the development of a trade policy.[2]

[1] Cadwallader Colden, *The history of the five Indian nations of Canada which are dependent on the province of New York in America, and are a barrier between the English and the French in that part of the world* (New York, 1904), 1:69; Louis Armand de Lom d'Arce, baron de Lahontan, *New voyages to North-America* (London, 1735), 1:24.

[2] Herbert L. Osgood, *The American colonies in the seventeenth century* (New

The trade methods of the settlement, as developed in the last years of Dutch rule, continued substantially unaltered well into the eighteenth century. The most noteworthy feature was the tendency to restrict trade to the settlement and to discourage the development of a class of wandering traders like the *coureurs de bois.* Among the numerous laws of New Netherland governing the fur trade, one only, and that dating from 1652, prohibited going to the Mohawk and Seneca country with goods.[3] Other and later regulations speak of "runners" and "brokers," and from the laws and other documents it is clear that the practice of the traders at Fort Orange was to hire brokers, usually Indians, to go into the woods about the settlement and waylay the Indians coming in with their furs. Once a broker had secured possession of an Indian, the Indian was conducted to the house of the broker's employer and there was forced to sell his furs for what the trader would pay.[4] The abuses of this system resulted in an attempt, apparently not wholly successful, to restrict the trade to the confines of the settlement. Posts were set up beyond which traders were forbidden to go, and it even became necessary to forbid lounging about these posts to waylay the Indians.[5] Nothing appears in these later ordinances about going to the Indian country to trade, whence it may be inferred that the practice was at least uncommon, and that already it was the policy of the traders not to go out after the trade, but to take what came to them.

As a corollary of this policy the Albany traders vigorously opposed the establishment of any settlements that might intercept the trade coming to Albany. When a settlement was projected at Schenectady, the protests of Albany were so successful that the settlement was permitted only on condition that the settlers would pledge themselves not to engage in the

York, 1904-1907), 2:115-117; John R. Brodhead, *History of the state of New York* (New York, 1853), 1:140 ff., *passim.* The documents will be found in *Documents relative to the colonial history of the state of New-York,* edited by Edmund B. O'Callaghan (Albany, 1853-1887), 14:89 ff., *passim.*

[3] *Laws and ordinances of New Netherland, 1638-1678,* edited by Edmund B. O'Callaghan (Albany, 1868), 137.

[4] *Ibid.,* 190, 366, 378, 381, 383-384, 394; *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed), 13:39, 185-186; 14:92.

[5] *Laws of New Netherland* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 425-427; *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 13:175.

Indian trade; and when, shortly after this, the English took Fort Orange, one of the terms of the agreement made on that occasion was "that the former order forbidding the Inhabitants of Schonectade to trade with the Indians for Beaver . . . be strictly observed."[6] The matter continued to give trouble, for the order was renewed by Andros as late as 1687.[7] In fact this opposition to the establishment of any settlement that might interfere with Albany's monopoly of the fur trade was not overcome until the building of Oswego in 1727.

Perhaps the most important reason for this restrictive trade policy was the absence of serious competition. To the English, who were the chief rivals of the Dutch, the trade of the upper Hudson was inaccessible. The assertion by Massachusetts Bay in 1659 of a claim to the region north of Fort Orange as preliminary to the development of the Indian trade there, though it alarmed the Dutch, did not result in action.[8] The French were more favorably situated, and as early as 1635 had traded with the Onondaga; but the persistent enmity of the Iroquois and frequent wars between them and the French prevented the French from being dangerous competitors.[9]

Thus until 1664 the Fort Orange community was free to devote itself to trade and was singularly untroubled by political problems. In the wars of the French and the Iroquois the Dutch assumed a position of neutrality, continuing to furnish the Indians with arms, but ransoming French prisoners who fell into their hands. The odds seemed altogether in favor of the Iroquois, so that it was the opinion of Stuyvesant that unless the French government gave Canada more vigorous support it was in great danger of destruction.[10] The good understanding of the Dutch with the Iroquois was largely confined to the Mohawk tribe, the easternmost of the Five nations. Intercourse with the

[6] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 13:215, 219, 244, 253; 14:559; *Laws of New Netherland* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 442-443.

[7] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 13:533.

[8] Brodhead, *History of the state of New York*, 1:654-655, 671-672; Arthur H. Buffinton, "New England and the western fur-trade, 1629-1675," in *Publications of the Colonial society of Massachusetts*, 18:176 ff.

[9] *Narratives of New Netherland, 1609-1664*, edited by J. Franklin Jameson (*Original narratives of early American history* — New York, 1909), 149.

[10] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 13:205.

other tribes of the confederacy was intermittent and knowledge of their political relations was fragmentary. Governor Stuyvesant, on one occasion, in presenting the Seneca with a keg of powder, actually admonished them not to use it against the Mohawk.[11] This indifference to political questions coupled with an intense absorption in the maintenance of trade monopoly long continued to be characteristic of a majority of the traders of Albany.

The year 1664 brought a vast change in the complexion of affairs, ending the isolation of Albany and inaugurating a period of greater competition. Fort Orange with the rest of New Netherland passed into the possession of the English and received an English garrison. In that same year the French crown assumed a far larger measure of control over Canada, which now felt the revivifying effects of the genius of Colbert. As a result the Albany community soon became involved, not of choice but of necessity, in an intricate diplomatic struggle in which the destinies of a continent were at stake. The chief parties to the struggle were the French, the English, and the Five nations. Albany was the point where these conflicting interests focused; it became the center of negotiation, plot, and intrigue. To the English Albany became an all-important outwork against the French, the bulwark and frontier of all the colonies. To the French it stood as a rival for control of the fur trade, for English influence over the Iroquois, and for English control of a desired ice-free outlet down the Hudson to the sea. To the Iroquois Albany was an economic necessity, the source of supply of firearms which enabled them to achieve and maintain mastery over all the Indian nations east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio. It is questionable whether the Albanians themselves, with a few exceptions, ever grasped the importance of their position. To them the chief question continued to be the prosperity of the fur trade, but their policy, played upon as it was by so many divergent and conflicting interests, could not but have an important bearing upon the future of the continent.

[11] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 13:185. The Dutch called all the four western tribes of the Five nations Seneca. See *Handbook of American Indians north of Mexico*, edited by Frederick W. Hodge (Smithsonian institution, Bureau of American ethnology, *Bulletin* 30 — Washington, 1907), part 2, p. 503.

Seemingly the situation was a very complex one, but in reality it can be reduced to very simple terms. The decisive factor was the control of the west, by which is meant primarily the country around the Great lakes; for the interest common to all parties was the fur trade, and the lake country was the chief source of supply. Here lay hunting grounds of the western tribes, who took their furs to Montreal or sold them at Michilimackinac and other French posts in the region; here also the Iroquois killed the beaver which they sold at Albany for clothing, ornaments, rum, but above all for firearms with which to prosecute their designs.[12] The western tribes who supplied the French could not without French support stand against the Iroquois, and subjugation of those tribes by the Iroquois, or an alliance between the two, meant the diverting of their trade to Albany; hence the strenuous efforts of the clearest headed among the rulers of Canada, men like Talon, Frontenac, and Callières, to subjugate or destroy the Iroquois and to build up and maintain the influence of France in the interior; hence also the opportunity of Albany, by supporting the Iroquois in their wars with the western tribes, or in negotiations for a friendly understanding, to turn the stream of furs from the western country from Montreal to Albany and to supplant French influence by English throughout the whole interior.

That the Albany traders failed to make the most of their opportunities is the opinion of not a few contemporary writers. "To their Scandalous & Unpatriot Conduct," wrote Peter Wraxall in 1754, "has in a great measure been owing that Progress of the French on this Continent, w^{ch} I fear is now come to so formidable a heigth as not to be repeled."[13] In considering this failure two facts must be kept in mind. In the first place, the community remained Dutch. "They are all Dutch at Albany," wrote Governor Clinton as late as 1745.[14] Being Dutch, Albany did not share the rising national enmity of the

[12] On the lake country as the principal source of supply for the fur trade, see *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 9:65, 80.

[13] Peter Wraxall, *An abridgment of the Indian affairs contained in four folio volumes, transacted in the colony of New York, from the year 1678 to the year 1751*, edited by Charles H. McIlwain (*Harvard historical studies*, volume 21 — New York, 1915), 132, note 1.

[14] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 6:286.

English for the French or the ambitions of English governors of the province to advance the interests of the British empire in America. The most striking feature of Albany policy was its prevailingly economic character and the small extent to which it was governed by political considerations. Wraxall's opinion "that the Dutch of Albany & the adjacent Country have ever made an imediate temporary Interest their only rule," while harsh, is not unjust.[15] That the policy of Albany in most instances was to the immediate pecuniary advantage of the traders cannot be gainsaid. Whether a more farsighted policy would not in the long run have been more profitable financially, as argued by Colden, is incapable of proof either way. In any case, from a political standpoint, the policy of Albany was frequently detrimental to the best interests of the British empire, of the neighboring English colonies, and even of the rest of the province of New York.

The other factor of supreme importance in determining the policy of Albany was its relations with the Five nations. Trade with them was the basis of Albany's prosperity, and the very existence of Albany depended upon preserving friendship with them. Hence Albany policy could not at any time diverge widely from that of its Indian allies. Thus it was difficult for the Albany traders to favor a policy of sending out traders into the west as long as the Iroquois preferred to play the part of middlemen, themselves carrying English rum and blankets to the western tribes. Hence also the fact that so often the French — naturally, but probably incorrectly — attributed to Albany instigation the various attempts of the Iroquois either to subjugate the western tribes or to make peace with them for the sake of getting their trade. So also, the much-condemned policy of neutrality between Albany and Canada was primarily an Iroquois policy which Albany adopted.

Before the English conquest the Dutch traders of Fort Orange had been content with a trade policy, paying little or no attention to the political problems which were connected with trade. Such a policy could not be maintained, and from the time when Albany passed under English control to the beginning of the

[15] Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 152, note 1. See also *The letters and papers of Cadwallader Colden, 1730-1742* (*Collections of the New York historical society for the year 1918* — New York, 1919), 260.

last French war Albany policy passed through three distinct phases. In the twenty years following the conquest, without making any essential changes in their trade policy, the Albanians learned the necessity of considering the political situation also and acquired a wider horizon of knowledge. Following this comes a period of intense rivalry with the French, when the traders of Albany reached out for control of the western fur trade and joined the New England colonies in an attempt to conquer Canada. After the failure of this ambitious program Albany adopted the policy of neutrality and trade with Canada which writers like Colden and Wraxall thought of as the typical Albany policy and so bitterly condemned. In this last period, however, especially in the long period of peace following Queen Anne's war, Albany ceased to have a single policy and lost some of its importance as a trade and political center. Some traders sought the lakes, where they competed with the French for the trade of the western tribes, while others continued the trade with Canada. The interests of these two groups were not the same, and Albany policy lost its former unity.

Before a sketch of the main features of these periods is attempted, it is necessary to explain the exact nature and extent of Albany influence and the machinery by which it was exercised and maintained. In the days of Dutch rule control over the fur trade and Indian relations was normally exercised by the local board of magistrates, known collectively as commissaries, although matters of special importance were referred to the governor and the council at New Amsterdam. These commissaries were appointed by the governor from a list submitted by the outgoing board.[16] This system was continued, at least in outline, until Albany was made a city in 1686. Under the new city charter control of these matters was vested in the common council of mayor, aldermen, and assistants. As aldermen and assistants were elected by the inhabitants of Albany possessing the franchise, nearly all of whom were Indian traders, control over matters of concern not merely to Albany and the province of New York, but to all the English colonies on the continent, centered in a small group of men possessing special knowledge,

[16] See Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs*, 48, note 1, and McIlwain, Introduction to *ibid.*, liv ff; also *Letters and papers of Cadwallader Colden, 1730-1742*, p. 260.

it is true, but possessing also a vested interest in the trade and traditions of a self-regarding policy.[17] While there were at least three instances of governors naming certain men to control Indian relations in order better to insure the carrying out of their own ideas, in every case until Clinton's appointment of William Johnson Indian relations were under the care of Albany men.[18]

It was the board of Indian commissioners which conducted negotiations with the Indians and looked after Indian relations generally; it reported to the governor of the province, who was officially charged with the oversight of such matters. The dependence of the governor upon the board and its secretary, who was also town clerk of Albany, was great. He was dependent always for information, which was given in a form colored by Albany interests and prejudices; dependent often for a policy, since many of the governors had no policy of their own and left the management of Indian affairs almost wholly in the hands of the commissioners; and dependent also for aid in carrying out any policy of his own. In case the policy of the governor was not favored by the commissioners, the chances of its success were small, for the governor seldom had any trustworthy means of communicating with the Indians except through them. While the governor occasionally distributed presents to the Indians, trade relations were all with the traders, some of the most influential of whom were sure to be on the board. Governors came and went, reflecting temporarily the policy or lack of policy of the British government, or developing one of their own; but the one constant factor in British Indian policy was the policy of Albany.

The outstanding feature of the years following the English conquest was the rise of French hostility and French competition in the fur trade. The program of Colbert and Talon included not only the effective occupation of the west for France, but also the extermination of the Iroquois and the acquisition, by purchase or otherwise, of an ice-free outlet down the Hudson

[17] *Colonial laws of New York from the year 1664 to the revolution* (Albany, 1894-1896), 1:195 ff.

[18] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 5:363, 365; Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 132; see also *ibid.*, 212, for an instance of the appointment of an entire new board of Indian commissioners in 1738.

to the sea.[19] Success in such a program would have given France a monopoly of the fur trade and the importance of Albany would have declined. The Albanians were first made aware of their peril when in February, 1666, a force of several hundred French and Indians, sent to chastise the Mohawk, appeared near Schenectady.[20] Later in that same year war broke out between France and England, and the English government urged upon the northern colonies an attack upon Canada. After failing to secure the coöperation of the New England colonies in such an attack, Governor Nicolls of New York fell in with the Albany policy of arranging peace between the French and the Mohawk, "such as may bring in beaver to Albany," at the same time laboring to convince the Dutch traders that the French were grasping at the whole fur trade. Peace was accordingly arranged, but the effect of the whole episode upon the traders of Albany was to change their attitude toward the French from one of friendly neutrality to one of hostility.[21] Thus at the time of the Dutch reconquest in 1673 we find the magistrates of Albany complaining of "the designs and undertakings of our enemies the French," a complaint they certainly would not have made ten years before.[22]

From this time the situation in its broad outlines did not change. The French extended their occupation of the west, but they failed to subdue the Iroquois, then at the zenith of their power, and they could not persuade the Stuart kings, so complaisant in other respects, to cede them the province of New York. Henceforth the western fur trade was divided between Albany and Montreal in varying proportions, but only at rare intervals did the traders of Albany challenge the French for the political control of the west.

In their competition for the fur trade the Albany traders had one advantage which never ceased to embarrass the French. That was the greater cheapness of English goods. The staples of the trade were guns and powder, rum or brandy, and various

[19] Thomas Chapais, *Jean Talon intendant de la Nouvelle-France* (Quebec, 1904), 116 ff., 345 ff.; *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 9:25, 30, 57, 60, 66, 72.

[20] *Ibid.*, 3:118.

[21] *Ibid.*, 120, 121, 137, 138-142, 146-148.

[22] *Ibid.*, 2:594.

kinds of woolens used by the Indians for blankets and clothing. According to all accounts the advantage in favor of English goods at all times was very great. A table of relative prices compiled about 1689 shows that the English were paying from two to four times as much for furs as were the French. Colden's monumental report on the fur trade of 1724 bears witness to the same general fact. The only notable exception throughout the whole period of French competition was that in the years following Queen Anne's war French powder was cheaper and better.[23] We have here perhaps the principal reason why England outdistanced its competitors in the race for commercial supremacy despite the superior political position which they often enjoyed.

Another advantage of the Albany traders resulted from the conflict of policies in Canada. Men like La Salle and Frontenac desired the largest extension of French influence regardless of the means, and therefore favored the *coureurs de bois*, who undoubtedly did much to gain for France the trade of the western tribes. But there was another party, to which, because of its objection to the sale of brandy to the Indians and to the disorderly lives of the *coureurs*, the strong clerical interests of Canada lent their support; this party favored confining the trade to Montreal, where it could be more effectively regulated, thereby leaving the missionaries as the only representatives of France among the western tribes. As this party frequently secured the ear of the French government, a vacillating policy resulted, which would have given the traders of Albany, had they availed themselves of it, no little advantage over their French rivals.[24]

In the twenty years succeeding the English conquest, how-

[23] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 5:633, 728; 9:84, 408. See also *The documentary history of the state of New-York*, edited by Edmund B. O'Callaghan (Albany, 1849), 1:444. A statement of Charlevoix will be found in McIlwain, Introduction to Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs*, xliv, note 1. See also the valuable article of Benjamin Sulte, "Le commerce de France avec le Canada avant 1760," in *Proceedings and transactions of the Royal society of Canada*, second series, volume 12, section 1, p. 45 ff.

[24] Ida A. Johnson, *The Michigan fur trade* (Lansing, 1919), 4-6, 25-29; *Jesuit relations and allied documents. Travels and explorations of the Jesuit missionaries in New France, 1610-1701*, edited by Reuben G. Thwaites (Cleveland, 1896-1901), 65: 272, note 37.

ever, it continued to be the policy of the Albany traders to restrict trade to the settlement and, what is more, to enforce a monopoly of the trade in favor of Albany. The exact date when this monopoly was obtained is uncertain, but it was legally recognized as early as 1676 and was reaffirmed in the most complete manner in the charter of 1686.[25] Documents of the period show that trade methods were unchanged. Danckaerts, who visited Albany in 1680, describes it as a small, palisaded village of eighty or ninety houses lying against the hill which rises sharply from the river and on which the capitol now stands. At the entrance of the town were built trading houses in which the Indians lodged when in the midsummer months they brought in their furs for sale.[26] Thus it appears that trade was still carried on mainly, if not wholly, in the settlement. Nowhere do we hear of wandering traders like the *coureurs de bois*, nowhere the suggestion of a trade policy different from that of the period of Dutch control.

With their trade monopoly and the advantages of cheaper goods and a more settled policy, the traders of Albany were in a position to challenge the French for control of the western fur trade, to strike for a monopoly of the trade not merely of a province but of a continent. Success in such a policy would carry with it almost inevitably the destruction of French power in America and the consequent extension of English power over all the northern part of the continent. Such a policy demanded imagination, boldness, insight, and it involved no inconsiderable risks. The stolid Dutch burghers of Albany possessed neither the capacity for imagination nor the gambler's propensity for taking large risks, which would have enabled them to initiate and carry out such a policy.[27]

Nevertheless, in the years following the English conquest the competition of Albany began to alarm the French. Some of

[25] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 13:532; New York colonial manuscripts, in the New York state library at Albany, 27:144, 175; *Colonial laws of New York*, 1:210-211.

[26] *Journal of Jasper Danckaerts, 1679-1680*, edited by Bartlett B. James and J. Franklin Jameson (*Original narratives of early American history* — New York, (Albany, 1910), 1:146, 386.

[27] See William Cunningham, *An essay on western civilization in its economic aspects* (*Mediaeval and modern times* — Cambridge, 1898-1900), 212, 217, for a similar criticism upon Dutch colonial policy in general.

the trade of the western tribes began to find its way to Albany, partly through the Iroquois, partly through renegade *coureurs de bois*, who, fearing to return to Montreal, carried their furs thither. Practically all our evidence on this point comes from French sources, for the records of the New York Indian commissioners do not begin until 1679, and the English governors in their scanty correspondence make no mention of it.[28]

The first French complaint of English competition in the west dates from 1670, when, according to the French account, the Iroquois sent a mission to make peace with the Ottawa, which told the latter of the low prices of goods at Albany and offered to accompany them thither the following spring. The intrigue was thwarted by means well known to the French and was one of the principal incentives to the building, in 1673, of Fort Frontenac, which was intended not only to prevent intercourse between the western tribes and Albany, but also to hinder the passage of the Iroquois across the lakes to their hunting grounds.[29] A renewal of this intrigue two or three years later was ascribed both by Frontenac and by the Jesuit missionaries among the Ottawa to Albany instigation.[30] No evidence either way has come to light from Albany sources, but the presumption is against the very natural supposition of the French. That the traders of Albany would welcome additional trade is unquestioned, but that they knew enough about the situation west of the lakes to start such an intrigue is very doubtful. On the other hand, it was a settled policy of the Iroquois, and one that greatly embarrassed the Albanians later in their attempts to draw the western tribes to Albany, to play the part of middlemen between Albany and the west, and no one familiar with Iroquois policy will question that they needed no instigation to conduct an intrigue of this kind.[31] In the absence of other evidence of Albany enterprise in the west at this period the most that can be said with certainty is that the Albanians would approve of this move.

[28] McIlwain, Introduction to Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs*, lxxxvi-xc.

[29] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 9:80, 84-85.

[30] *Ibid.*, 95; *Jesuit relations* (Thwaites, ed.), 57:21-25.

[31] On the Iroquois as middlemen, see McIlwain, Introduction to Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs*, xlii-xliv and notes.

The building of Fort Frontenac immensely strengthened the position of the French in the west and served for a time to overawe the Iroquois, who promised to give up the attempt to divert the Ottawa trade to Albany.[32] In the years immediately following, it was the *coureurs de bois* who gave the most trouble to the French authorities. According to Frontenac, these lawless traders began as early as 1671 to carry their furs to Albany, and the evil greatly increased, especially in the time of La Barre, Frontenac's incompetent successor, who was himself accused of having a share in the profits of the trade.[33] Frontenac charged Governor Andros with intending to use one of these renegades named Péré to divert the western trade to Albany. The evidence does not bear out the accusation. Indeed, it appears that Péré was arrested and sent to London, where he was kept in prison for eighteen months.[34] In 1679 the New York council passed an order that French coming into the colony without passes should be arrested and sent to the West Indies.[35] This was perhaps due to a mistaken belief in a rumor of war between England and France, but even after the coming of Dongan, in 1683, the council ordered that Canadians trading at Albany bring a pass from their governor. Here, too, the relations of the home governments played a part, for when Dongan asked the advice of his master, the Duke of York, he was told to "weigh well whether y^e^ French Govern^r^ in those parts may not take offence at it, soe as may cause some misintelligence betweene our Nations."[36] It is not to be inferred that the trade between Albany and Canada was broken up, for in the time of La Barre, if we may trust the reports of his enemies, English and Dutch traders were even allowed to come to Montreal and Quebec to trade.[37] On the other hand, it is clear that the authorities of Albany and the province of New York did not, in their handling

[32] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 9:117-119.

[33] *Ibid.*, 91, 146, 159, 203, 206, 211-212, 215, 230, 278.

[34] Frank H. Severance, *An old frontier of France; the Niagara region and adjacent lakes under French control* (New York, 1879), 1:29; *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 3:479; 9:129, 132.

[35] New York colonial manuscripts, 28:123, 124; 29:149; *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 9:137-139, 200; 14:769.

[36] *Ibid.*, 3:341, 474; 14:771.

[37] *Ibid.*, 9:212, 230, 278.

of this situation, make the best use of their opportunity to attract still more of the western trade to Albany.

Clearly, in the case of the *coureurs de bois*, the initiative lay with them and not with the Albanians. What drew them to Albany was the cheapness of English goods and the stern edicts of their own government, not any scheme of the Albany traders to use them to develop a western trade. Indeed, a great opportunity to use them in that way was allowed to slip, and the Albany traders were content with that portion of the western trade which found its way into their hands by the illicit trade with Montreal.

Of the presence of traders from Albany in the west in these years there is no satisfactory evidence. True, the Iroquois admitted to La Barre in 1684 that they had brought the English to the lakes,[38] though we have no evidence beyond this bare statement, and the number of English who penetrated that far into the interior cannot have been large. Dongan, who was much impressed by the lack of enterprise on the part of the English, made the definite assertion that before his arrival, in 1683, no man from his government had been beyond the Seneca country.[39] There is certainly no evidence of any change in the general trade policy of Albany or of any attempt at active penetration of the west.

The French, however, were genuinely alarmed at the amount of trade that found its way to Albany, and especially by the fact that the Indians had learned that higher prices were to be obtained there. This alarm is reflected in the memoir of La Chesnaye, himself an important trader, who pointed out that by trading at Albany the western tribes had the opportunity not only of getting cheaper goods in exchange for their furs, but also of making peace with their enemies, the Iroquois; he concluded, "If we once lose them [*the western tribes*], we lose them forever. Thus will be lost not only the fur trade, but the colony."[40] Similarly La Salle's plans for the discovery and

[38] Helen Broshar, "The first push westward of the Albany traders," in the Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 7:233; Colden, *History of the five Indian nations*, 1:68.

[39] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 3:395.

[40] *Collection de manuscrits contenant lettres, mémoires, et autres documents histori-*

settlement of the west were influenced in part by the fear that the English would make the most of their opportunity to cut off the fur trade and by the hope of preventing such a catastrophe.[41] But the noteworthy thing is that these men were influenced rather by fear of what the English might do than by what they had already done.

The years from 1664 to 1680 were years of unstable equilibrium in America. The French were struggling under difficulties to perfect their control over the western tribes and the western fur trade on which the life of Canada depended. The Iroquois were nominally at peace with the French and their western allies, but victories over the Susquehanna and other Indian tribes had increased their insolence. The Albany traders were doing a profitable business by taking the trade which flowed in to them, even from Canada itself, and must at least have become aware of the possibility of diverting all the western trade to Albany. This equilibrium was roughly upset in 1680 by a savage attack of the Iroquois upon the Illinois, among whom La Salle and his lieutenant Tonty had been establishing French influence.

The alarm of the French and their western allies was extreme. Frontenac hinted, and the Intendant Duchesnau definitely charged, that the English had instigated the attack.[42] The Jesuit priests living among the Iroquois reported that these Indians were extending their raids in all directions, destroying or incorporating with themselves tribes allied to the French, and were ready to fling themselves upon Canada.[43] At a conference of officials and leading citizens held at Quebec in

ques relatifs à la Nouvelle-France, recueilles aux archives de la province de Québec, ou copiés à l'étranger; mis en ordre et édité sous les auspices de la législature de Québec (*Collection de documents relatifs à l'histoire de la Nouvelle-France* — Quebec, 1883-1885), 1:255. This valuable and apparently little-known collection of sources for the history of Canada was printed by the government of the province of Quebec from transcripts secured for the Massachusetts archives. See *Narrative and critical history of America*, edited by Justin Winsor (New York, 1884-1889), 4:366.

[41] Francis Parkman, *La Salle and the discovery of the great west* (Frontenac edition — Boston, 1910), 346; *Découvertes et établissements des Français dans l'ouest et dans le sud de l'Amerique septentrionale, 1614-1754, mémoires et documents originaux*, edited by Pierre Margry (Paris, 1881), 1:332.

[42] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 9:147, 162.

[43] *Jesuit relations* (Thwaites, ed.), 62:54 ff., 153.

October, 1682, to consider the situation, it was agreed by the whole assembly that in the last four years the English had left nothing undone to animate the Iroquois against the French.[44]

Evidence of English complicity, aside from these assertions, is wanting. As a later French governor pointed out, at a time when relations between the Iroquois and the French were far more strained than they were in 1680, war between the Iroquois and the French was not welcome to the Albany traders, because it prevented the Iroquois from hunting. The French themselves recognized that the Iroquois had reasons of their own for the attack, in that they had just subdued the Susquehanna and were looking for new conquests. They also hoped to overawe the western tribes and get control of their trade, which they would divert to Albany, themselves acting as middlemen.[45] The Iroquois explanation was that their enemies had hunted upon their lands and had killed all the beaver, both male and female, contrary to Indian custom.[46] These reasons of themselves are sufficient to explain the action of the Iroquois. It must be repeated that satisfactory evidence of English complicity is lacking and that the best reason for believing that the English had no hand in the attack lies in the general policy of Albany, which was not to reach out actively after trade or to mix in the political relations of remote tribes with such an end in view. That the French should suspect the Albanians was quite natural, for the attack upon the Illinois was the sort of policy they would have adopted under similar circumstances, but in the absence of confirmatory evidence French suspicions cannot be accepted as positive proof.

At this juncture Frontenac was succeeded by the incompetent La Barre, and Thomas Dongan, an Irish Catholic who had seen service in the French army, came to govern the province of New York. By general agreement his advent marks the appearance of a new spirit in English dealings with the French and Indian problem. It marks also the beginning of a new period in Albany policy.

At the very beginning of his term of office Dongan's attention

[44] *Jesuit relations* (Thwaites, ed.), 62: 156 ff. *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 9:194.

[45] *Ibid.*, 162, 198.

[46] Colden, *History of the five Indian nations*, 1:69.

was called to the importance of Albany and the fur trade by the attempt of representatives of William Penn to purchase of the Iroquois lands on the upper Susquehanna, a move which, if successful, would have diverted much of the fur trade from Albany to Philadelphia.[47] From that moment Dongan gave almost his whole attention to the fur trade and the problem of French and Indian relations. In an interview with some Mohawk sachems who came to New York at this time Dongan outlined his policy. He requested them not to trade with the French nor even to go to Canada without his permission, to persuade their brethren whom the French had enticed to Canada to return, and to make peace with the western tribes and open for them a path to Albany.[48]

The corner stone of his policy was the maintenance of the Iroquois alliance. "They are now fast to us," he wrote, "and we must keep them soe, for if they were otherwise, they are able to ruin all y^e^ Kings Collonys in those parts of America." To that end he suggested on a later occasion the expulsion of the Jesuits then laboring among them and the sending of English missionaries in their place, as well as the building of a chain of forts connecting Albany with the lakes.[49] At the time of La Barre's expedition against the Iroquois in 1684 he was able to persuade them to acknowledge English sovereignty by permitting the erection of the arms of the Duke of York in their villages.[50] He also insisted that "noe Christians . . . converse with them anywhere but at Albany and that not without my licence."[51]

But Dongan's greatest claim to distinction lies in his comprehensive view of the situation in America. Primarily he conceived of it as a struggle between the French and the English for control of the fur trade. The question of boundaries was in comparison a minor one to be settled by the home governments.[52]

[47] Brodhead, *History of the state of New York*, 2:375; *Documentary history of the state of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 1:393 ff.

[48] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 14:771-773.

[49] *Ibid.*, 3:363, 394-395, 429, 477, 510, 511; Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 14.

[50] Colden, *History of the five Indian nations*, 1:44, 45.

[51] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 3:393.

[52] *Ibid.*, 395, 455, 460.

It was to get a better grip on the fur trade that he suggested the erection of forts on the lakes, especially at Niagara, to be connected with Albany by a chain of forts through the Iroquois country.[53] It was for this purpose also that he attempted to open a trade with the western tribes.

The disgraceful failure of La Barre's attack on the Iroquois in 1684 paved the way for such an attempt, for it strengthened the alliance of the Iroquois and the English, caused them to despise the French, and shook French influence in the west. In 1685 Dongan began issuing passes to parties to go out to hunt and trade among the Indians.[54] One of the parties sent out by him in that year reached Michilimackinac and had such success that in the winter of 1686-1687 he dispatched two large parties to the same place; but the French, now thoroughly aroused, captured both and broke up this promising attempt to challenge their control of the west.[55]

Here was something quite new in the trade policy of Albany, as Dongan himself distinctly states. Not only does he make the statement already quoted that before his time no one from his government had been beyond the Seneca country, but in the same letter he says, "It will be very necessary for us to encourage our young Men to goe a Beaver hunting as the French doe." And in another letter he writes: "the Kings subjects here living plentifully have not regarded making discoveries into the country until of late being encouraged by me."[56]

What was the origin of Dongan's policy? Was it the natural outgrowth of the growing interest at Albany in the western trade, inspired perhaps by the Albany traders, or was it his own? The French, who had long suspected their Albany rivals of hostile intrigues, adopted the former explanation. "The whole," writes Denonville, La Barre's successor, "is an intrigue of the Orange merchants who make presents to the Colonel [*Dongan*]"; and on another occasion he speaks of "the policy of M. Dongan and his merchants." Still later he represents Dongan as no longer master of the merchants "with whose in-

[53] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 3: 477, 511.

[54] *Ibid.*, 9:309, 320; New York colonial manuscripts, 34, part 1, pp. 67, 69, 117.

[55] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 3:395, 436-437, 476, 487-489.

[56] *Ibid.*, 396, 476.

terests, in order to extract money from them, he must identify himself."[57] The ascription of low personal motives to Dongan was certainly beside the mark, especially in view of the fact that in 1692 he was still in debt for money spent in the defense of New York.[58]

Against such a view must be set the fact, significant in itself, that the coming of Dongan changed the whole situation. A new element had been added producing powerful reactions. Before his coming there is no satisfactory evidence of any change from the traditional policy of Albany; after his arrival we see a new and definite policy adopted and put in operation. The letters of Dongan show a largeness of conception, a grasp of the situation in all its details coupled with the ability to fix upon the essentials, which betoken a superior intelligence at work. While Dongan unquestionably sanctioned former practices, such as the Albany monopoly of trade and the right of the Albany magistrates to manage Indian affairs, and while he worked with them and showed them many favors, the whole trend of Albany policy, not only in the years that preceded his rule but in the years that followed, bears witness against the view that the impulse to trade expansion came from Albany and not from him.

From the standpoint of Albany policy the notable thing is that the traders supported Dongan. If they did not initiate the new policy, neither did they oppose it, as they did the policy of some later governors. Perhaps, indeed, they did not regard it as wholly new. Dongan's first mention of the western trade was to suggest that the Iroquois open a road over which western tribes could come to Albany. Such also was his advice to the Iroquois at the great conference of 1684, and again in 1687.[59] With such a policy the traders of Albany could have no quarrel; it was merely an expansion of their previous policy. But the idea of going after the trade, of encouraging the development of an English counterpart of the *coureurs de bois*,

[57] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 9:298, 310, 337. Broshar, "The first push westward of the Albany traders," in the MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW, 7:228-241, seems to hint at such an interpretation of Dongan's policy.

[58] *Acts of the privy council of England*, edited by Almeric W. Fitzroy (Hereford, 1908), colonial series, 2: xxxv-xxxvi, 236, 252.

[59] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 3:439; 14:773; Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 13.

of building forts on the lakes as centers of English influence and trade — these were foreign to Albany policy both before and after Dongan's time.

The impulse to trade expansion given by Dongan was not immediately lost, but conditions in the years just following the capture of Dongan's trading parties did not favor success. Undisguised warfare broke out between the Iroquois on the one hand and the French and their western allies on the other. Trade languished. Nicholas Bayard wrote from Albany in 1689 that there had been little trade for three years.[60] The war at first went in favor of the Iroquois, whose terrible massacre at La Chine in the summer of 1689 nearly paralyzed Canada and led to the abandonment of Fort Frontenac.[61] French influence in the west sank to a low ebb and the western tribes sought peace with the Iroquois. Unfortunately Albany was in no position to take advantage of this turn of events, for 1689 was the year of the revolution. At New York Leisler overthrew Nicholson, the lieutenant of Andros, but Albany refused to recognize Leisler's authority and continued under its own charter government, which took the name of "the convention." At Albany discontent was rampant. Some wished to renew the attempt to trade with the west, others favored an attack on Canada by way of reprisal.[62] So great was the depression that it was necessary for the convention in August, 1689, to forbid the departure from the city of all persons able to bear arms.[63]

While matters were still unsettled the terrible Schenectady massacre occurred in February, 1690. Frontenac had returned to Canada and this was his method of restoring the morale and the prestige of the French with their Indian allies. The effect was instant. Albany was in "extream agony";[64] most of the women were sent to New York for safety. The very existence of the city was imperiled. Appeals were sent to the New England colonies for assistance and for aid in an attack upon

[60] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 3:599.

[61] Colden, *History of the five Indian nations*, 1:96-97.

[62] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 3:593, 599.

[63] *Documentary history of the state of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 2:84.

[64] Report of Captain Bull, in Massachusetts archives, 35:236; *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 3:717.

Canada. "If Albany be destroyed," the Albany agents wrote, "w^ch^ is the principal land Bulwark in America against the French then there is not only an open road for [the] French and Indians to make incursions in yo^r^ Hono^rs^ Territoryes but the 5 Nations who are now for us will be forced to turn their ax the other way."[65] Nothing was said about the fur trade; it was now a question of self-preservation.

The resulting ambitious attempt of the northern colonies to conquer Canada without English assistance failed and the years that followed were lean years for Albany. Again and again we hear of the poverty of the people, the lack of trade, the loss of population.[66] According to the census taken in 1698, the city lost a quarter of its population during the preceding decade. Even as late as 1700 complaint was made to Governor Bellomont that the Indian trade had "wholy gone to decay."[67]

The experience of these years had a profound effect upon Albany policy and was the direct cause of its passing into another phase. Not only did all attempts to secure coöperation in another attack upon Canada fail, but the other northern colonies refused to obey even a royal order to furnish their quotas for the defense of the New York frontier.[68] The Iroquois, who also suffered heavy losses, became incensed at the failure of the colonies to aid them and, feeling that the whole burden of the war rested on them, began in 1693 negotiations for peace.[69] Though the negotiations were inconclusive, Governor Fletcher reported that many people in the province favored the making of peace providing the French and their allies would spare New York.[70] Thus was foreshadowed that policy of neutrality which Albany successfully maintained in the earlier part of the next war. From this time on it was the firm conviction of Albany that success against the French depended upon concerted action by all the colonies backed by English assistance. Failing that, the traders of Albany preferred to maintain a neutrality which enabled them to continue their

[65] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 3: 692-698. The quotation will be found on page 694.

[66] *Ibid.*, 3:817; 4:13, 53, 245.

[67] *Ibid.*, 4:337, 753.

[68] *Ibid.*, 84, 101 ff., *passim.*

[69] Colden, *History of the five Indian nations*, 1:191 ff., 214.

[70] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 4:84.

trade and spared them both loss of life and the cost of defensive measures.

In view of the desperate plight of Albany in these years it is not surprising that efforts to open a western trade were few. With a view to trade the Iroquois were encouraged to make peace with the western tribes, but the French were able to prevent the success of their efforts.[71] The ambitious attempt in the years 1692-1694 to open a trade with the Shawnee and the tribes living south of Lake Erie, although it carried a party of Albany traders far into the Indian country and alarmed the French, was a failure.[72] English goods occasionally found their way into the hands of the western tribes through the Iroquois or wandering Mohegan, but not in large quantities.[73] That the Albanians would have been glad to open a trade with the west we cannot doubt, but the political situation was such that success was all but impossible.

Thus ended the period when Albany policy was most aggressive and, from the standpoint of the interests of the empire and the other colonies, most commendable. If the initial impulse to trade expansion came from Dongan, at least the Albany traders for a time accepted his forward-looking program without reservations. It should also be said that failure was due largely to a combination of circumstances over which Albany had no control, and especially to that fatal inability to coöperate which beset all colonial operations against the French. The result was to leave Albany weakened, embittered, determined for the future to play a safe game.

It was the coming of peace which ushered in the last phase of Albany policy, the one which Wraxall, Colden, and others have so bitterly condemned. The period from 1697 to 1754 is too long and too full of incidents to treat in detail; only the out-

[71] *Ibid.*, 3:842; 4:45; Charles A. Hanna, *The wilderness trail, or the ventures and adventures of the Pennsylvania traders on the Allegheny path, with some new annals of the old west, and the records of some strong men and some bad ones* (New York, 1911), 1:136.

[72] The best accounts of this episode, both partially documented, are Hanna, *The wilderness trail*, 1:137-143, and George W. Schuyler, *Colonial New York. Philip Schuyler and his family* (New York, 1885), 2:182 ff. See also Broshar, "The first push westward of the Albany traders," in the MISSISSIPPI VALLEY HISTORICAL REVIEW, 7:238-240.

[73] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 9:569-570, 586, 646.

lines of Albany policy can be given. One of the first results of peace was the reopening of trade with Canada.[74] Made desperate by many years of poor trade, the Albanians were glad to find an opening anywhere. In part this trade was carried on by some of the prominent men of Albany, who journeyed in person to Montreal, in part by the Christian Iroquois domiciled at Caughnawaga, near Montreal, who went and came with little hindrance from either government.[75] "This same Trade from Albany to Canada is at this day carried on—(The 19 Febry 1754," is the laconic note of Wraxall.[76] There is no evidence that in the intervening years it suffered interruption, war or no war. During Queen Anne's war the Caughnawaga came and went as before, even with the consent of Governor Cornbury.[77] His successor, Hunter, did attempt to stop it, probably with no great success, for his attempt came at the very close of the war.[78] After the war it went on with redoubled vigor, and in the next intercolonial war, that of 1744-1748, Governor Clinton had the same question to deal with and met the same opposition in Albany that his predecessors had had to face whenever they attempted to touch this traffic.[79]

Closely connected with this trade was the policy of neutrality, toward which events had tended during King William's war. That policy was in part due to the experiences of Albany during the war, but in larger measure to the policy of the Iroquois, who had made peace with the French and the western tribes in 1701. Henceforth the confederacy resorted to the policy of maintaining the balance between the French and the English, and in the later intercolonial wars it played but a minor part.[80]

[74] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 4:556, 569, 571, 574, 690, 792.

[75] *Ibid.*, 574, 662, 690, 692, 747.

[76] *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 119, note 1.

[77] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 4:978, 984; 9:811, 813.

[78] New York colonial manuscripts, 58:5,7.

[79] Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs*, 119; McIlwain, Introduction to *ibid.*, lxxxiv; *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 6:371, 399, 413, 416; *Correspondence of William Shirley, governor of Massachusetts and military commander in America, 1731-1760*, edited by Charles H. Lincoln (New York, 1912), 1:452-453.

[80] Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 219, note 1; Pierre François Xavier de Charlevoix, *History and general description of New France*, translated by John G. Shea (New York, 1781), 5:221; *Letters and papers of Cadwallader Colden, 1711-1729*, p. 129.

Having just made peace, the Iroquois determined not to resume hostilities when in 1702 war broke out between England and France. The French were only too glad to escape from their raids but, in order to secure neutrality, had to agree to spare the New York frontier.[81] This policy of neutrality was very acceptable to the Albanians, who were thus able to carry on trade both with the Iroquois and with Canada.[82] The result of this policy was that the burden of the war fell wholly upon New England, whose frontier was mercilessly ravaged and desolated by French and Indian war parties from Canada. Albany policy during this war was well known to Clinton, who accused the Albanians of attempting to pursue the same policy in his time for the sake of security and trade with Canada.[83] There can be no better example of the fact, not always recognized, that the colonies fought the French or not as their own interests demanded, with little or no regard for the interests and wishes of the home government.

The province of New York also benefited by the policy of neutrality, whereby it was spared the cost of defense, and as long as Cornbury was governor this policy was acceptable to the representative of the British government.[84] Cornbury did urge upon the home government the conquest of Canada,[85] but he appears to have felt that in the absence of aid from England and in view of the failure of all previous attempts to secure coöperation from the other colonies, it was better for New York to remain quiet. When in 1709 the British government set on foot an expedition against Canada, the province, largely through the efforts of Lovelace (Cornbury had been recalled), did its share, but the policy of Albany was unchanged. We have the significant statement that "at Albany where they trade with the French at Canada, the Handlers, i.e. Traders are against it, the Farmers for it."[86] When after the failure of the expedition of 1711 the New England governors, smarting

[81] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 9:736, 738, 747, 766, 769, 815.

[82] Joel Munsell, *Annals of Albany, 1609-1858* (Albany, 1850-1859), 4:129, 130; *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 9:745.

[83] *Ibid.*, 6:371. See also *ante*, note 79.

[84] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 4:983.

[85] *Ibid.*, 977; 5:32.

[86] *Ibid.*, 81.

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[84] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 4:983.

[85] *Ibid.*, 977; 5:32.

[86] *Ibid.*, 81.

under the sense of failure and their continued losses, sent Hunter, the successor of Lovelace, a joint remonstrance against the policy of neutrality in the hope of engaging the Five nations in the war as a defense for their own frontiers, a committee of the New York council, to which it was referred, submitted a disingenuous report to the effect that "We are not Conscious that there has beene during this Warr any Neutrality betweene y^e^ people of Albany or any other people of this province and y^e^ ffrench and their Indians."[87] But earlier in the same year, 1712, Secretary Clarke had written, "The country seem generally averse to a Rupture between them [the French and the Iroquois], and rather than be at the expense of supplying them with Ammunition in such a Case and defending their Frontiers . . . choose to sit contented under this precarious security."[88]

The year following the peace of Ryswick saw also an increase of English influence among the western tribes. Here we see two conflicting sets of ideas at work. What may be termed the typical Albany policy was to attract the western tribes to Albany, but there was at least one Albanian, Robert Livingston, who believed that the true way to extend English influence in the west was to go out after trade and to establish English posts in the west after the French manner. The significance of Livingston lies in the fact that he was chiefly responsible for the policy of the two most vigorous exponents of western advance after the time of Dongan, Bellomont and Burnet, and forms a link between their policy and Dongan's. Livingston was a Scotchman who had married into the influential Schuyler family of Albany and had been town clerk of Albany and secretary for Indian affairs since 1675. His knowledge of Indian affairs was unsurpassed, but his influence over the Indians never equaled that of his Dutch brother-in-law, Peter Schuyler. Though he was interested in the Indian trade, as was practically everyone at Albany, his principal ambition was to acquire a great landed estate, an ambition he was able to gratify.[89]

If the accusation of lack of enterprise on the part of the

[87] The protest is in Massachusetts archives, 2:448; the report of the council committee is in New York colonial manuscripts, 57:2. See also *Journal of the legislative council of the colony of New York, 1691-1775* (Albany, 1861), 1:331.

[88] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 5:237.

[89] Schuyler, *Colonial New York*, 1:243-286.

traders of Albany needs further confirmation, it is to be found in the memorial and reports of Livingston to Bellomont, whose chief adviser on Indian affairs he was. Livingston specifically accuses the Albanians of "sloth and negligence" in allowing the French to get the advantage of them in the western trade. His plan of redressing the balance was to make peace between the western tribes and the Five nations, to build a fort where the French shortly built Detroit to be the center of English influence in the west and another among the Five nations as a halfway station, and, finally, to encourage "bushloping," or going after the trade. "We shall never be able to rancounter the French," he remarks, "except we have a nursery of Bushlopers as well as they." [90]

The plan outlined in these documents was substantially adopted by Bellomont as his own, although he was content to urge the erection of a fort in the Onondaga country as a means of attracting the western tribes to trade and apparently he did not project a fort on the lakes.[91] In attempting to carry out this policy he encountered the hostility of the Five nations, who, as he said, preferred to knock the western Indians on the head and take their furs rather than to see them go to Albany to trade, as well as the opposition of a strong party at Albany, headed by Peter Schuyler. In part this Albany opposition was due to the fact that Schuyler had been the friend of Fletcher, Bellomont's predecessor, and had profited by his friendship to get large grants of land, which Bellomont worked hard to vacate.[92] But this Albany opposition must also be attributed to the disfavor with which the traders viewed a proposed change from their traditional policy. This was recognized by Livingston, whose statement of the fundamentals of that policy is altogether admirable: "The City of Albany always practis'd to hinder such settlements, because they have ingrossed the Indian trade in this Province, and having built large houses and made good farms and settlements near to Albany care not to leave them to go further into the Country and will not suffer others to goe beyond them to intercept the trade." [93]

[90] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 4:500, 648-652. The quotation is on page 650.

[91] *Ibid.*, 717, 782, 784.

[92] *Ibid.*, 717, 725, 782-784.

[93] *Ibid.*, 874.

Bellomont's projects came to nought owing to his death and to the outbreak of a fresh war with France which speedily followed. Twenty years later his work was resumed by Burnet, but meantime the policy of drawing the western tribes to Albany, to which no one could take exception, was meeting with a considerable measure of success. The chief reason for this lay in the inadequacy of French policy rather than in the efforts of the Albany traders. The lure of cheap goods and English rum was irresistible; only the uncertain attitude of the Iroquois, despite the fact that peace had officially been made, and the efforts of Frontenac and his successor, Callières, kept the western tribes from resorting to Albany in still larger numbers. With the death of Frontenac and Callières the constructive era of French Canada virtually ended. They represented all that was most vigorous in French expansion, all that was most determined in its resistance to English influence in the west. Under Vaudreuil, the successor of Callières, the party of contraction gained the ascendancy, the party which favored the abandonment of the western posts, the canceling of the licenses to trade, and the turning over of French interests in the west to the Jesuits.[94]

At his first conference with the Indians, in 1702, Lord Cornbury, Bellomont's successor, acting doubtless under the advice of the Albany Indian commissioners, for he had but lately come to the province, outlined a policy of bringing the western tribes to Albany to trade. At Albany he found five Indians belonging to the tribes assembled about the new French post of Detroit inquiring the price of goods, and he not only invited them to come again but urged them to settle at Niagara or some other place nearer Albany.[95] Similarly Hunter urged the Five nations to let the far Indians come to Albany to trade.[96] Evidence that these efforts met with a partial success comes from both French and English sources. Cornbury wrote in 1708 that after five years he had succeeded in getting some of the western

[94] Francis Parkman, *Count Frontenac and New France under Louis XIV* (Frontenac edition — Boston, 1907), 439-442; William Kingsford, *History of Canada* (Toronto, 1887-1898), 2:415.

[95] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 4:979-981, 990.

[96] *Ibid.*, 5:221.

tribes to come to Albany to trade, and entries in Wraxall's *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* show the presence of western Indians at Albany from time to time.[97]

From the French side we have the reports of Vaudreuil of extensive trade between Albany and the tribes about Detroit. These reports were confirmed by a special agent sent by the French government in 1707 to investigate conditions in the west; he reported that the amount of trade was considerable, especially from Detroit. In 1711 Vaudreuil wrote that the Indians of Lake Superior went every year to Albany to trade and that if care were not taken the English would soon be masters of all the upper tribes.[98]

But the only way of permanently maintaining English influence in the west, especially as long as the French held posts there, was likewise to establish trading posts and to develop a class of itinerant traders like the *coureurs de bois*. This was repugnant to traditional Albany policy, and there is no evidence that it was adopted in these years. A little effort on the part of the French, and the long journey to Albany could be prevented, as indeed it was prevented or hindered in many cases.[99] Albany was getting a fraction only of the western trade, when a more vigorous policy would have given it a far larger share. At the same time it must be recognized that there was always to be considered the hostility of the Five nations to any plan which would deprive them of their place as middlemen, and the presumption that any was being made to establish an English post in the west and to build up a large political influence there would have so stirred the French that neutrality must have ceased. Neutrality, trade with Canada, trade at Albany — these were all parts of a consistent whole. A more vigorous policy for higher stakes would have entailed greater risks, and the Albanians never believed in taking great risks for larger ends as long as trade was fairly satisfactory.

[97] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 5: 65; Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 48, 55, 66, 67, 68, 87, 90.

[98] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 9:763, 807, 819-824; *Wisconsin historical collections*, 16:251-260; *Michigan pioneer and historical collections*, 33:532.

[99] For examples, see Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 44-45, 48, 56, 64-65, 68, 78.

After the war trade both with the west and with Canada increased by leaps and bounds. Primarily this was due, in both cases, to the economic advantages possessed by the English, especially in the manufacture of strouds, a coarse woolen blanketing which was one of the staples of the Indian trade. So great was this advantage that the French government was compelled to permit the company which had a monopoly of the Canadian fur trade to buy strouds in England for export to Canada, and in addition it fostered the establishment of a manufactory of woolens at Montpellier, which, however, functioned only imperfectly.[1] But the easiest way to get strouds was to buy them at Albany. For some time no attempt was made in New York to prohibit this trade, but Canadian policy varied. In general it was prohibited, but on extraordinary occasions it might be legalized.[2] But whether technically legal or illegal it continued, being regarded as mutually advantageous. As before, it was carried on chiefly by the Christian Iroquois of Caughnawaga. Thus the French secured goods necessary for the Indian trade, and Albany with little or no effort on its part got a share of the western fur trade via Montreal. Hunter wrote in 1720 that the value of this trade was from ten to twelve thousand pounds a year.[3]

Two reasons may be assigned for the weakness of French influence in the west in these years. One was the policy of restriction which was still in the ascendancy in Canada. During the war the system of issuing licenses to trade had been abandoned, the post at Michilimackinac had been given up, and the sale of brandy had been forbidden. At the close of the war the post at Michilimackinac was reëstablished, the system of licenses was partially restored, and in 1717 the sale of brandy in limited amounts was permitted. But in 1720 both were discontinued, only to be restored in 1726. In each case the policy

[1] Edouard Richard, *Supplement to Dr. Brymner's report on Canadian archives, 1899* (Ottawa, 1901), 520, 543; *Report concerning Canadian archives for the year 1904* (Ottawa, 1905), appendix K, 35, 39.

[2] Richard, *Supplement to Dr. Brymner's report on Canadian archives, 1899*, pp. 126, 545; *Report concerning Canadian archives for 1904*, appendix K, 73, 108; *Collection de manuscrits relatifs à la Nouvelle-France*, 3:2, 12, 17, 23, 24, 42.

[3] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 5:552. On the importance of this trade, see also the monumental report of Colden on the fur trade (1724), *ibid.*, 726 ff.

of restriction was relaxed on representation from Canada that such action was absolutely necessary if the trade of the western tribes was to be preserved.[4]

The second reason for French weakness in the west was the war with the Fox Indians, which broke out in 1712 and lasted until 1731.[5] This, however, affected chiefly the position of the French in the far west. They still held Detroit and Fort Frontenac, and through the efforts of Joncaire and other agents were able to gain considerable influence among some of the Five nations, notably the Seneca and the Onondaga.[6] As early as 1716 Joncaire had a trading house in the Seneca country, which he later located at Niagara, where in 1726 the trading house was turned into a fort.[7]

Despite French influence in the region of the lakes various western tribes continued to come to Albany to trade, where they were of course welcomed. In 1719 the Albany commissioners made to them the significant statement that goods could be obtained more cheaply at Albany than from the French because the French themselves had no goods but what they got at Albany.[8] In 1714 and again in 1717 laws were passed by the assembly to encourage the western tribes to come to Albany. By 1720 we find the Indian commissioners speaking of the coming of the western tribes as a usual thing.[9]

Not only did the western tribes resort in increasing numbers to Albany, but there appeared now at that place for the first time since the impulse given by Dongan was lost a movement on the part of some of the traders to go out after trade. In 1716 a party of six traders got permission to open a trade at Ironde-

[4] Richard, *Supplement to Dr. Brymner's report on Canadian archives, 1899,* pp. 119, 520, 543; *Report concerning Canadian archives for the year 1904,* appendix K, 73; *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 9:870, 949, 953, 957.

[5] For the Fox war, see Louise P. Kellogg, "The Fox Indians during the French regime," in Wisconsin historical society, *Proceedings,* 1907, pp. 173 ff., and Francis Parkman, *A half-century of conflict* (Frontenac edition — Boston, 1906), 1: chapter 14.

[6] Kingsford, *History of Canada,* 2:415; Severance, *An old frontier of France,* 1: chapters 11, 13.

[7] Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 112 ff., *passim,* 117, 118, 124 ff.

[8] *Ibid.,* 112, 117, 122-123, 135.

[9] New York colonial manuscripts, 62:80; *Colonial laws of New York,* 1:828, 917.

quoit on Lake Ontario, and in 1720 Vaudreuil reported that the English had had a trading post at Niagara for several years, giving that as his chief reason for establishing a French post there.[10] Thus, as Wraxall points out, there developed at Albany two groups of traders, one trading with Canada, the other with the Five nations and the western tribes. According to his estimate the Canadian trade was the one which gave the largest returns. In 1725 the commissioners attempted to give an estimate of the quantity of furs obtained from these two sources — this at a time when trade with Canada was illegal. Fifty-two canoes and nearly one hundred persons had engaged in the western trade, going to the newly established trading post at Oswego, whence they had brought 788 bundles of furs. Forty-three canoes of western Indians had come to Albany and Schenectady, bringing 200 bundles. One hundred and seventy-six bundles of beaver and deer skins had come from Canada.[11]

Two conflicting principles were here at work. Trade with Canada was easy, profitable, without risk. By it the furs of the west came to Albany via Montreal. Such a policy, however, ignored the political factors underlying trade. If the French sold goods to the western tribes, they would maintain their influence among them. If the western tribes came to Albany or bought goods of Albany traders on the lakes, the political influence of the English was thereby increased. Furthermore, the trade with Canada tended to lessen English influence among the Five nations, for when reproached for permitting French influence among them, they cleverly called attention to the fact that the French got their goods for trade at Albany.[12]

Governor Hunter, one of the best of New York's governors, was hostile to this trade and promised to try to stop it, but he appears to have accomplished nothing by the end of his term.[13] Fortunately his successor, Burnet, was also his friend, relied on the same advisers, and continued Hunter's policy. Again Robert Livingston comes to the front as an advocate of ex-

[10] Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 112, 113, 133; *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 9:897.

[11] Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 140-141, 159-160.

[12] *Ibid.*, 119, 126. For later instances see also *ibid.*, 193, 195, 195 note 1.

[13] *Ibid.*, 120; *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 9:876.

pansion. During the brief interregnum between Hunter and Burnet, while Peter Schuyler as senior member of the council was in charge of the province, Livingston suggested the suspension of the trade with Canada for a period of three months, this to be accompanied by a vigorous effort to build up a direct trade with the west by sending men to Niagara and the Seneca country.[14] Apparently this suggestion did not meet with the approval of Schuyler, for nothing was done until Burnet arrived, and one of the first acts of Burnet was to drop Schuyler from the council and appoint a new board of Indian commissioners.[15]

The way was now open for the initiation of a new policy comprehending the prohibition of trade with Canada and a vigorous extension of English enterprise into the west. Livingston was made speaker of the assembly and put through an act forbidding trade with Canada;[16] but this was only the beginning of trouble. The trade with Montreal was too profitable to many influential Albany traders to permit of the enforcement of the act. The following year it was felt necessary to enact a law which provided that any suspected of trading with Canada might be tendered an oath and all who refused to take it were to be considered *ipso facto* guilty.[17] Despite the fact that the trade between Albany and Canada could not be entirely broken up, Burnet considered his policy successful, judged by the increasing trade with the western tribes.[18]

The opposition at Albany was bitter and violation of the act against trade with Canada was persistent, even on the part of some of the leading traders.[19] But in this case it appears that the attitude of Albany was determined not so much by fear of the consequences of opening a direct trade with the west as by

[14] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 5:559-560.

[15] Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 132; *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 5:578.

[16] *Ibid.*, 580; *Colonial laws of New York*, 2:8-12.

[17] *Ibid.*, 2:98; *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 5:682.

[18] *Ibid.*, 709, 739. See also Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 135, 139, 141, 144, 145 note 1, 151.

[19] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 5: 740-742; Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs*, 156; McIlwain, Introduction to *ibid.*, lxxiv, note 1.

the fact that Burnet was seriously disturbing a vested interest. Nevertheless, this opposition is but one more proof of the indifference of the Albany traders to the extension of English influence among the western tribes. But one prominent Albanian, Livingston, seems to have supported the Burnet policy, and the task of defending that policy was undertaken by no Albanian, but by Cadwallader Colden, whose memorial on the fur trade remains the ablest statement of the reasons for its adoption.[20]

Prohibition of trade with Canada was only half of Burnet's program. The other half was the establishment of a fortified post near Niagara as a center of English trade and influence among the western tribes. Beginning in 1721 Burnet sent out each year a party of traders to trade with the western tribes and to counteract the influence of Joncaire among the Seneca.[21] No permanent establishment was made until 1725, when a trading post was set up at the mouth of the Onondaga river, later known as Oswego, and here in 1727 a fort was built.[22] There was opposition at Albany also to this part of Burnet's scheme, for we find him accusing the traders of trying to arouse the Iroquois against it. The Iroquois also opposed it, at least covertly, for it endangered their position as middlemen, and it is not unlikely that their protests against the sale of rum at Oswego were due in part to the fear of loss of trade.[23]

As far as the attitude of Albany is concerned, McIlwain is probably correct in saying that there was a conflict between retailers and wholesalers, between the New York merchants and their Albany connections, who profited by the easy trade with Canada, and the small traders who were now ready to reach out for a direct trade with the west.[24] Apparently there had grown up at Albany since the peace of Utrecht a class of small traders

[20] Printed in *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 5:726-732.

[21] *Ibid.*, 632, 641, 666, 715, 719.

[22] *Ibid.*, 712, 734; Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 152, 156, 158, 159, 161; *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 9:952.

[23] Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 160, 161, 173-174.

[24] McIlwain, Introduction to *ibid.*, lxxiv. See also *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 5:710.

akin to the French *coureurs de bois*, who made one or more trips yearly to Oswego to buy furs. Once this method of trade was fairly started it became more popular. The commissioners reported in 1726 that "People encourage that Trade now to emulation even those who were at first against it." [25] Very likely the profits of a direct trade with the Indians free from the restrictions which were thrown about that at Albany made this trade very attractive, nor should the fact be passed over that it was possible to trade with the French also at Oswego.[26]

The trade with Canada, on the other hand, had become largely a wholesale trade. According to James Alexander, a friend of Burnet and Colden, at the time when Burnet initiated his policy the Indian trade was largely in the hands of a certain New York merchant, conjectured by McIlwain to have been Stephen de Lancey.[27] What the relation was between him and those traders at Albany who persistently violated the acts against trade with Canada is not clear, but all those who profited by the Canada trade naturally opposed the policy of Burnet. So strong was the opposition that in 1726 the act prohibiting trade with Canada was repealed and in its place an act was passed imposing a double duty on goods shipped northward, that is to Canada.[28]

Meantime the opponents of Burnet had submitted their case to the board of trade and the privy council, seeking the disallowance of the acts. The remonstrance was signed by London merchants engaged in the trade with New York and alleged that the effect of the act prohibiting trade with Canada had been to decrease the quantity of Indian goods exported to New York and the amount of furs imported, "in consequence wherof the Price of Furs is raised Five and Twenty and Thirty per Cent, to the great prejudice of several British manufactures." Arguments concerning the political effect of the acts were added, but these show so little comprehension of the true situation that they do not deserve notice. While the grounds of opposition were almost purely economic, the defense of Burnet's policy,

[25] Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 163.

[26] *Ibid.*, 159, 161.

[27] Colden, *History of the five Indian nations*, 2:58; McIlwain, Introduction to Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs*, lxvii, note 4.

[28] *Colonial laws of New York*, 2:281.

which was largely the work of Colden, was based on the political advantages which would flow from it, the gaining for the English of the trade and the friendship of the tribes of the west and the consequent diminution of French influence among them. It was admitted that temporary dislocation of trade would result.[29]

The question before the privy council, therefore, was whether the immediate economic interests of English merchants and their New York correspondents should be allowed to outweigh the probable advantages, both economic and political, of the extension of English trade and influence among the tribes of the interior, and it was quite in keeping with the general trend of British policy in the age of Walpole that economic considerations triumphed over political. In 1729 the acts were disallowed.[30] Ultimately the New York assembly found a solution of the difficulty in the imposition of an equal duty on Indian goods shipped to Canada or Oswego, the proceeds to be used for the support of the fort and garrison at Oswego.[31]

It is apparent that in this contest of policies the Albany traders played but a small part. The chief opponents of the Burnet policy were London and New York merchants, its chief defender a member of the New York council with no strong Albany affiliations. That the English had economic advantages which promised to enable them to displace the French in the fur trade, Colden amply demonstrated. What the political repercussions of such a policy, if honestly attempted, would have been it is impossible to say. That the French would have opposed it by every means at their disposal is certain. But the attempt was never made. Colden put the case clearly when he wrote: "Our merchants were fond of the Canada Trade, because they sold large Quantities of Goods without any Trouble, the French taking them from their Doors; whereas the Trade with the Indians is carried on with a great deal of Toil and

[29] The principal documents in the case are printed in Colden, *History of the five Indian nations*, 2:1-57. See also *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 5:726-732, 740 ff., *passim*.

[30] *Acts of the privy council of England* (Fitzroy, ed.), colonial series, 3:209-214; 6:204-208; *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 5:897-899.

[31] *Colonial laws of New York*, 2:705.

Fatigue, and as to the Interest of the Country, they either never thought any thing about it, or if they did, had no regard to it."[32] So the chance of securing a monopoly of the western fur trade was allowed to pass.

Nevertheless the results of the establishment of Oswego were not negligible. When the merchants of Montreal first heard of it they were so incensed that they persuaded the governor to set on foot an expedition to raze the fort. On second thought, however, the governor abandoned this idea, and the question was left for the home governments to settle by the leisurely processes of diplomacy.[33] Oswego therefore remained the only tangible result of a half century of effort to extend English influence into the region of the Great lakes.

As to the commercial results of the establishment of Oswego, James Alexander, a member of the New York council and a friend of the Burnet policy, estimated the trade of New York in 1740 at five times what it had been before Burnet put his policy into execution.[34] During the war of 1744-1748 trade was interrupted, but after the war it was vigorously resumed. An official report upon the trade at Oswego in 1749 sets its value for the preceding year at £21,406.[35] The political results were not commensurate with the commercial, but Oswego did offset the strong influence of Joncaire among the western Iroquois and was described by Lieutenant Governor Clarke as "the only Barrier against the French to all the Provinces from this to Georgia."[36]

The establishment of Oswego tended to lessen the importance of Albany. While the Canada trade remained and doubtless some trade with the Iroquois, much of the Indian trade was now carried on at Oswego by Albany traders who resorted thither. Furthermore, owing partly to the presence of an Eng-

[32] Colden, *History of the five Indian nations,* 2:53-54.

[33] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 9:968, 996 ff.

[34] Letter of J. A. Esq., in Colden, *History of the five Indian nations,* 2:58. See also Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 198.

[35] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 6:538. See also Frederick W. Barnes, "The fur traders of early Oswego," in *Proceedings of the New York state historical association,* 13:128-137.

[36] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 6:227.

lish fort on the lakes, but more to the long period of peace, settlement spread far up the Mohawk valley. Some of the settlers, notably William Johnson, carried on a trade with the Indians. Johnson, in fact, won for himself in a very short space of time a position of influence among the Indians comparable to that exerted half a century before by Peter Schuyler.[37] The Albany magnates themselves speculated more and more in land, buying tracts of the Indians in the region north and west of Albany.[38] As the Indians saw the whites steadily encroaching upon their lands, too often as a result of purchases tainted by fraud, they became incensed, and the good understanding which had existed between them and the Albanians began to give place to scarcely concealed hostility. Encroachment on their lands and shameless cheating by the traders had by the time of the outbreak of the third French war in 1744 brought matters to such a pass that, according to Colden, "The Indians . . . will on no occasion trust an Albany man," and in 1745 some of the Five nations told Conrad Weiser, "We could see Albany Burned to the ground or Every Soul taken away by the great King and other people planted there."[39]

When after thirty years of peace war again broke out between England and France, it was natural for the Albany commissioners to use such influence as they still possessed in favor of that policy of neutrality which had served Albany so well during Queen Anne's war.[40] Only through such a policy would the frontier be safe from Indian attacks and only so could the trade

[37] William L. Stone, *The life and times of Sir William Johnson, bart.* (Albany, 1865), 1:56 ff., 81, 187, 378. According to Anne M. Grant, *Memoirs of an American lady; with sketches of manners and scenery in America, as they existed previous to the revolution* (Boston, 1809), 217 ff., Johnson's influence was due to his fair dealing.

[38] On the rage for land speculation at this time, see Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 246; also a letter from Johnson to his uncle, Peter Warren, dated May 6, 1739: "people here are mad Everry day purchasing land & Surveying." The original of this letter was in the Johnson papers at Albany, part of which were destroyed in the disastrous fire of 1911. At some date before the fire, work was begun on the publication of the Johnson papers and considerable page proof had been collected. It is from page 7 of this proof that the above quotation is taken. See also *Calendar of council minutes, 1668-1783* (New York state library, *Bulletin* 58 — Albany, 1903), 320-333.

[39] *Letters and papers of Cadwallader Colden, 1730-1742*, p. 260; McIlwain, Introduction to Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs*, lxxxiii.

[40] *Ibid.*, 223, 230, 233, 235, 237, 241, 242.

with Canada continue. Oswego also, the defenseless condition of which was well known, would be safe.[41] But Clinton, the new governor, was determined to bring his province into the war against the French, and a bitter quarrel ensued, which resulted in the resignation of the Indian commissioners and Clinton's appointment of William Johnson to have military command of the Iroquois.[42]

Although Johnson resigned in 1750 and for a brief period there were again Albany Indian commissioners, this resignation of the old board virtually marks the end of Albany control of Indian affairs and consequently of Albany policy.[43] The policy of local control of the fur trade and Indian relations had broken down. The time had come when the management of what was of interest to all the colonies and to the home government could no longer be intrusted to a small group of Albany traders. The imperial authorities had come to a realization of the necessity of some other system for the regulation of Indian affairs, and with the definite appointment of Johnson in 1755 as Indian superintendent Albany ceased to exert any large influence upon the conduct of Indian relations. The meeting of the Albany congress in 1754 to consider the Indian problem in all its ramifications was but a parting testimony to the place Albany had held for three quarters of a century.

Judged by an ideal standard, judged also in the light of opportunity, the policy of Albany was narrow, shortsighted, selfish. A great chance to extend English influence in the west, to cripple Canada by sapping its economic foundations, and to place the English colonies definitely beyond the reach of French power was neglected. The overwhelming victory of England in the last intercolonial war was by no means inevitable. Wraxall in 1754 spoke of "that Progress of the French on this Continent, w^{ch} I fear is now come to so formidable a heigth as

[41] *Documents relative to the colonial history of New-York* (O'Callaghan, ed.), 6:225, 227; 9:1106.

[42] *Ibid.*, 6:286, 302, 371-372, 399, 408, 411, 413, 416, 439; Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 246, 248 note 2; *Correspondence of William Shirley*, 1:452.

[43] Stone, *Life and times of Sir William Johnson*, 1:385, 395, 414; Johnson papers, 23: 110, 131, 138, 139, 167; McIlwain, Introduction to Wraxall, *Abridgment of the Indian affairs*, xcvii-xcviii.

not to be repeled,'' and he was not alone in this fear.[44] But judged by the standards of that time Albany policy need not be so severely condemned as it has been by its New York and New England opponents. In stubborn devotion to their own local interests and disregard of the general welfare the Albany traders were not, perhaps, sinners above others. The whole period was one when the sense of any community of interest had scarcely developed. It was the misfortune of Albany that its immediate economic interests caused the adoption of a policy which was peculiarly detrimental to the interests of the neighboring colonies and of the empire. Nor can it be affirmed beyond the peradventure of a doubt, when one considers the multiplicity of factors entering into the problem of the extension of English influence into the west, that a bolder and more vigorous policy would have brought earlier or more favorable results.

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[44] *Abridgment of the Indian affairs* (McIlwain, ed.), 132 note 1. For other evidences of feeling in America at this time, see Arthur H. Buffinton, ''British and French imperialism in North America,'' in the *Historical outlook*, 10:495.

NOTES AND DOCUMENTS

Hints Relative to the Division and Government of the Conquered and Newly Acquired Countries in America

The memorial which follows has not altogether escaped the scrutiny which has been given to every document known to be connected with the framing of the new western policy of the British government in 1763.[1] That it was preserved by Lord Shelburne in his personal archives has drawn some attention to it. But neither authorship nor date appears from the draft in the Lansdowne manuscripts nor from the contemporary copy among the board of trade papers in the public record office.[2] The natural inference of the principal student of these matters, Mr. Clarence W. Alvord, has been that this document was called forth by the investigations of the board of trade in the summer of 1763. He has therefore not distinguished it especially from a group of similar papers accumulated by Shelburne and the board during that busy period of inquiry into the exigent American situation.[3]

A bit of further evidence not before noted makes it possible to assign to it a more definite position — and that precisely at the point of departure of the whole momentous discussion. On May 5, 1763, the Earl of Egremont, secretary of state for the southern department, sent to the board of trade a request for a report on the policy to be pursued in organizing the new possessions in America.[4] Egremont's letter, while it has been

[1] The most recent and in many respects probably the definitive discussion of the origins of the proclamation of 1763 appears in Clarence W. Alvord, *The Mississippi valley in British politics, a study of the trade, land speculation, and experiments in imperialism culminating in the American revolution* (Cleveland, 1917), 1:chapters 6, 7. After extensive research the author has amplified and in some particulars modified the views set forth in his earlier article, "The genesis of the proclamation of 1763," in *Michigan pioneer and historical collections*, 36:20-52.

[2] Lansdowne manuscripts, volume 48. See Historical manuscripts commission, *Fifth report*, appendix, 216; Public record office, Colonial office papers, 5:323.16 (formerly Board of trade papers, Plantations general, 18:169).

[3] Alvord, *Mississippi valley in British politics*, 1:165-168.

[4] *Documents relating to the constitutional history of Canada, 1759-1791*, edited

thought to reveal his "consciousness of those concrete issues inherent in the formulation of a western policy that were to divide factions,"[5] gave clear leading in only one particular: the advisability of adhering strictly to the policy, which he had already developed, of enforcing previous purchase of Indian lands. Moreover, the papers communicated with his inquiry, as they were named in the published list appended to the letter, were mainly of an informational rather than of a definitely suggestive character. The initiative in the framing of policy, it has seemed, was passed over by the responsible minister to the board of trade under the presidency of Lord Shelburne.

But this assumption, which minimizes the influence of Egremont, rests upon the use of an incomplete list of the items transmitted by him to the board. The complete list, as entered in the board of trade journal of May 6, included, notably, the document here reproduced.

It is possible that the authorship of the "Hints" may yet be determined by a more critical examination than has been made of the draft among the Lansdowne manuscripts.[6] But more important than the precise authorship of the draft is the question of responsibility for its suggestions — which must, in view of all the facts, be ascribed to Egremont. The secretary of state would hardly have singled out this memorial for presentation to the board at that juncture, when he was communicating queries to which it offered positive answers, if the policies

by Adam Shortt and Arthur G. Doughty (*Report on Canadian archives,* Sessional papers, number 18 — Ottawa, 1907), 93-96.

[5] Alvord, *Mississippi valley in British politics,* 1:161.

[6] Mr. Hubert Hall has kindly examined the document in the public record office and has confirmed the indorsement; it is certainly a copy and throws no light on this point. His further inquiries of Miss Edith Moodie reveal that Messrs. B. F. Stevens and Brown have no note as to the handwriting of the draft in the Lansdowne manuscripts.

To this note the following guess may be added. Governor Henry Ellis was Lord Egremont's chief adviser in colonial affairs. (Quotation in Alvord, *Mississippi valley in British politics,* 1:159). It should also be noted that Francis Maseres was convinced that Ellis wrote the proclamation of 1763 and asserts that William Grant of London saw that document in "Ellises handwriting before it was published." Was he the author of this memorial? *Maseres letters, 1766-1768,* edited by W. S. Wallace (Toronto, 1919). C. W. A.

outlined clashed with his own views. At one point, it should be noted — the proposal with regard to Senegal — the "Hints" advocated a procedure but recently pressed upon Egremont by the Company of merchants trading to Africa and already accepted by the crown, as Egremont notified the board in his letter of May 5.[7] Moreover, the significant suggestion of an Indian boundary line — apparently the first explicit proposal of that device[8] — followed logically from Egremont's established policy with regard to western lands. Again, the proposal that "all Matters cognizable by Law" within the Indian territory "should be reserved to the Civil Power in any of the Neighbouring Provinces" was strongly supported by Egremont, against the contrary opinion of the board, in his reply on July 14 to the board's report of June 8.[9] For the purposes of civil administration he then urged that the Indian country "be ascribed to the Government of Canada," unless the board should suggest "any other Distribution, which might answer the purpose more effectually."

The extent to which the suggestions transmitted by Egremont were embodied in the proclamation of October 7 may be seen by comparison of those passages especially which dealt with the division of Florida into two provinces;[10] with the expansion of the territory of Georgia southward to the St. Mary's; with

[7] "Memorial of the committee of the Company of merchants trading to Africa," in Public record office, Colonial office papers, 5:323.16 (formerly Board of trade papers, Plantations general, 18:161).

[8] See Max Farrand, "The Indian boundary line," in the *American historical review*, 10:783-785, for a discussion of the origins of the idea. The proposals of Sir William Johnson and George Croghan there cited were of later date than the "Hints." "Dean Tucker's fanciful scheme" for clearing a path a mile wide through the woods at the back of the colonies, alluded to by Farrand on the authority of Jared Sparks and Benjamin Vaughan, was apparently a confused reference by the latter to the plan of Galfridus Gray, who in 1725 proposed that method to prevent the insults of the Indians. It is true, as Mr. Farrand surmised, that Gray's chimerical project did not exercise "any considerable influence in shaping the governmental policy in this particular"; but that it was taken seriously by the board of trade is evidenced by the notable array of colonial experts questioned concerning it. Board of trade journals, January 27, February 2, June 23, 1726.

[9] *Documents relating to the constitutional history of Canada, 1759-1791* (Shortt and Doughty, eds.), 102, 108.

[10] The earliest suggestion of such a division has hitherto been found in the board of trade report of June 12, 1763. See Clarence E. Carter, "Some aspects of British administration in west Florida," in the Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 1:364, and Carter, "The beginnings of British West Florida," *ibid.*, 4:318.

the reorganization of the West Indian governments; with the extension of the boundaries of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia; with the Indian boundary line; and with the promise of representative governments in the new provinces. Indeed, the only proposals of major importance which the board of trade altogether ignored were those for the division of Canada into two provinces and for the establishment of civil jurisdiction in the Indian country. It is true that the framers of the proclamation failed to distinguish as carefully as the author of the memorial between the situation in Canada, where the latter recommended representative government only "when Circumstances are so much changed as to render it expedient," and that in the Floridas, where the Georgia or Nova Scotia type of government might, he believed, "be adopted at once." Of particular interest are the arguments presented for an Indian boundary line. The mercantilist view is clearly stated, as is the advantage of diverting settlers to Nova Scotia and the Floridas; but no doubt is left as to the temporary character of the expedient.

From the provenience of this memorial, from its content, from the fact that most of its proposals were adopted, the "Hints" may fairly be regarded as the key document in the series which culminated, more or less fortuitously, in the proclamation of October 7, 1763.

VERNER W. CRANE

Hints relative to the Division and Govérnment of the conquered and newly acquired Countries in America.[11]

The Country call'd Canada is of such vast Extent, that, for the greater Convenience of governing its Inhabitants there seems to be a Necessity of dividing it into two Provinces at least, and of establishing in each a distinct Government.

Quebec, of Course, should be the Capital of the Lower province, comprehending the Isle of Orleans, the Settlements on the South Eastern Banks of S^{t}. Lawrence to a certain Distance, and all the Territory on the North West Side of that River, lying to the Eastward of Trois Rivieres.

Montreal might with equal propriety be made the Capital of the Upper province, which may include not only that Tract of Land between Lake Champlain and S^{t}. Lawrence but likewise all the Country on the North West Side of that River above Trois Rivieres.

The Civil Government of these Provinces would be best administered

[11] Public record office, Colonial office papers, 5:323. 16, transcript in the possession of the Historical society of Pennsylvania.

for some time, by a Governor & Council only, who should be vested with the same legislative Powers as have been conferred on the General Assemblies in those provinces where the Royal Government has been settled in it's greatest purity; and when Circumstances are so much changed as to render it expedient, His Majesty may indulge His new Subjects in that part of the World with Representatives in General Assembly which would at once convert what before was a Despotic Government into one of Liberty.

In regard to the Ecclesiastical Establishment in Canada there occurs but two Methods of putting that upon any tolerable footing; One is to make no immediate Alteration, but let the regular Clergy of the several Communities now subsisting there gradually die off, without suffering them to be replaced, and then grant to such of the Canadians, as may still adhere to Popery, the same Indulgence as is allowed to His Majesty's Roman Catholick Subjects in Ireland, who by the Capitulation of Limerick were in similar Circumstances.

The other Method is, to take the Revenue of the regular Clergy immediately into the Hands of Government, and allow to the Individuals of which those Communities are composed, Stipends or Pensions for Life and Permission to exercise their religious Functions hereafter only as secular Priests — With respect to the Secular Clergy: They, it is conceived, may, without any great Inconvenience be permitted to continue on their usual Footing.

As every part of the British Dominions however circumstanced should be under some Jurisdiction or other, it is proposed, that all the Southern Coast of Labradore, from the Island of Anticosti to Hudson's Streights, may be annexed to the Newfoundland Government, and that in order effectually to assert our Right to that Coast an Establishment may be immediately formed upon it, at or near the Streights of Belleisle, where there are many commodious Harbours formerly resorted to by the French and Esquimeaux, for the Purposes of Traffick and Fishing.

It might also be necessary to fix upon some Line for a Western Boundary to our ancient provinces, beyond which our People should not at present be permitted to settle, hence as their Numbers increased, they would emigrate to Nova Scotia, or to the provinces on the Southern Frontier, where they would be usefull to their Mother Country, instead of planting themselves in the Heart of America, out of the reach of Government, and where, from the great Difficulty of procuring European Commodities, they would be compelled to commence Manufacturs to the infinite prejudice of Britain.

All the Country to the Westward of this Boundary may be put under the immediate Protection and Care of the Officers commanding

at the distant posts. But as many of the King's Subjects will necessarily have Occasion to go beyond this Line for Trade and other purposes, and may have Disputes among themselves, or with the Indians, it would be proper that the Decision of such Differences, and indeed, that all Matters cognizable by Law should be reserved to the Civil Power in any of the Neighboring Provinces.

The Island of S^{t}. John in the Gulph of S^{t}. Lawrence, and Isle Royal, which are so near to Nova Scotia, should be united to it forthwith, and make a part of that Government.

Georgia, which is at present of too narrow Limits ever to become a flourishing Province, should be extended Southward to the River S^{t}. Marys, and a Line running Westward from thence to S^{t}. Mark's in the Bay of Apelache, would be a proper Boundary on that Side.

All the Peninsula Southward of this Line ought to be comprized in the Province of Florida, and the Country situated between S^{t}. Mark's and the River Mississippi, should be formed into another province.

Perhaps the very best Mode of Government for these new provinces, which 'tis likely, will be settled either by foreign Protestants or the King's natural born Subjects who are intitled to British Liberty, would be that of Georgia or Nova Scotia, which has been the latest formed, is the freest from a Republican Mixture, and the most conformable to the British Constitution of any that obtains amongst our Colonies in North America, and might therefore be adopted at once, without any material Alteration.

Granado, the Granadillo's & S^{t}. Vincent's may be put under one Governmen^{t} which may be exactly similar to that of the Leeward Islands, unless, on account of the Number of French already settled upon them, it should be thought more adviseable to adopt the Plan proposed for the Government of the Canadian Provinces.

As Tobago is itself a considerable Island entirely unsettled and lying at a Distance from the Others, it may, with propriety either have a particular Government of it's own or continue as it is, united to that of Barbados, with which it's future Inhabitants can have an easy Intercourse, by means of the Trade Winds, a Convenience which they could not have with respect to Granado, were they connected with that Government.

The Island of Dominica so detached from the King's other Possessions in those Parts, and lying in the Center of the French Sugar Islands may be made a separate and perhaps a military Government at least for the present.

The Fort at Senegal which is not of more Importance than that at Gambia, or those on the Gold Coast may, in time of Peace at least, be

put under the Direction of the African Committee in the same Manner as the other Forts are in that Quarter, and it would be extremely proper to have a small Establishmen[t] immediately at Portlandie, were it only as a Mark of Possession and Right to that part of the Gum Coast, which, otherwise may one Time, be usurped by the French.

Jefferson's Plan for a Military Colony in Orleans Territory

Jefferson's plans for the settlement and control of the territory acquired from France in 1803 afford an interesting study in the attempt to harmonize abstract theory and actual practice in government. Jefferson as president found it somewhat difficult to carry into effect the theories which he had enunciated in the declaration of independence. His scheme for the establishment of a military colony in Orleans territory is a good illustration of his turning away from theory when a definite political situation seemed to demand it.

There were at least two reasons why Jefferson desired the planting of such a colony. In the first place, the western boundary of the acquired territory was in dispute and trouble with the Spaniards was imminent. In the second place, internal discontent in the territory over the form of government had its influence in determining Jefferson's attitude. Although the government under the act of March 2, 1805, was a great improvement over that under the Breckinridge bill of 1804, nevertheless the inhabitants of Orleans territory were not satisfied. The causes of this discontent are enumerated in Jefferson's correspondence.

Jefferson was not satisfied with conditions as they existed in the new territory. On April 2, 1806, he expressed himself to Senator Plumer of New Hampshire on a bill which provided that two million acres of land in the territory of Orleans be surveyed and divided into townships and lots, each alternate lot of one hundred and sixty acres to be given to a free able-bodied male not an inhabitant of the territory or of the Mississippi territory on condition that he would live there and cultivate the same ——— years and render ——— years of military service in the militia of the United States. Jefferson told Plumer that the bill was, in his estimation, the most important one then pending in congress. Louisiana was exposed to attack and it was necessary that provision should be made for

its defense. Nearly half of its inhabitants were such that they could not be depended on in case of an invasion. It would be impolitic and expensive to raise a standing army; and it was doubtful if the militia from the states would consent to go and stay there any considerable length of time. There was no means of compelling them to do it. If lands were given as bounties, able-bodied men would settle there and have an interest in defending the territory.

Plumer answered that he considered the bill as establishing a new principle in our government, a sort of feudal system, based on military tenure. He required more time to satisfy himself as to how far it would affect the constitution and the legal system. He feared the danger of sudden innovations in government.[1]

The bill to which Jefferson referred had been introduced in the senate, in the form of a resolution, on March 6, 1805, by Senator Worthington of Ohio. The text of the resolution gives certain details, especially as to the location of the proposed settlement, not contained in Plumer's report. It reads as follows:

Resolved, That, in order better to provide for the defence of the Territory of Orleans, a tract of land, not exceeding in any case ———— acres, to be located out of a tract of land not exceeding two millions of acres, to be surveyed between the Achafalaya, the Red river, and a meridian line passing by the fort at Natchitoches, shall be given, free of all expenses, other than those of survey expenses and office fees, to every citizen of the United States above twenty-one years of age, and not at present residing either in said Territory or in the Mississippi Territory, who shall, before the————day of————next, become an actual settler on such tract, and shall actually improve, and continue to cultivate and reside on the same————years thereafter; on condition, that such actual settler, and his sons, above the age of eighteen years, at any time or times, during the said period of———— years, be liable to be called into service for the defence of the said Territories of Orleans and Mississippi, and under obligation, during the same period, to continue in such service for any length of time which may be necessary.[2]

[1] "Plumer's register," 1, April 3, 1806, in the Library of congress. This is the third volume of Plumer's manuscript journal, "Memorandum of the proceedings in Congress." For further information concerning the record of events left by Plumer, see Everett S. Brown, *The constitutional history of the Louisiana purchase* (Berkeley, 1920), vi-vii.

[2] *Annals of congress*, 9 congress, 1 session, 164.

On March 12 the senate took the motion into consideration and ordered it referred to Senators Worthington of Ohio, Anderson of Tennessee, Adair of Kentucky, Bradley of Vermont, and Smith of Maryland.[3] The committee, through its chairman, Worthington, on March 21 reported a bill in conformity with Worthington's proposals. It was ordered to its second reading.[4] The bill narrowly escaped defeat when, on March 27, the senate divided equally on the question, Shall the bill pass to the third reading? The question was decided in the affirmative by the vote of the president of the senate, George Clinton.[5] On April 4, only two days after Jefferson's conversation with Plumer, further consideration of the bill was postponed until the next session of congress.[6] This seemingly put an end to the bill for, although on February 6, 1806, Worthington gave notice that he would on the following day "bring in a bill to encourage a settlement in the western district of Orleans,"[7] presumably his former measure, no further mention of it was found.

Jefferson, however, was not yet ready to give up his plan, as is shown by a letter, dated January 13, 1807, which he wrote to John Dickinson. He said that discontent in the territory of Orleans was due to the prohibition of the importation of foreign slaves, to the administration of justice in forms foreign to the people and all the more abhorrent because of the corruption of lawyers, and to the question of land titles.[8] Because of trouble with the French element, Jefferson proposed the enlistment of thirty thousand native-born Americans, to be transported at public expense and settled on bounties of one hundred acres of land each, west of the Mississippi, on condition of two years' military service should that country be attacked within a period of seven years. Besides providing for the defense of the country on the spot, the addition to the population would entitle the territory to become a state, with a majority of Americans, thus making it an American rather than a French state.

[3] *Annals of congress*, 9 congress, 1 session, 182.

[4] *Ibid.*, 191.

[5] *Ibid.*, 206-207.

[6] *Ibid.*, 228.

[7] *Ibid.*, 9 congress, 2 session, 62.

[8] These are the chief causes of discontent enumerated in a letter of Governor Claiborne to Madison, May 16, 1806, in *Official letter books of W. C. C. Claiborne, 1801-1816*, edited by Dunbar Rowland (Jackson, Mississippi, 1917), 3:299.

"This," concluded Jefferson, "would not sweeten the pill to the French but in making that acquisition we had some view to our own good as well as theirs, and I believe the greatest good of both will be promoted by whatever will amalgamate us together." [9]

The settlement and control of western Orleans territory was not accomplished in the manner planned by Jefferson. It is not necessary here to discuss the general land policy of the United States government, or the neutral-territory plan of the settlement of the dispute with Spain over the western boundary.[10] Jefferson's desire to protect the frontier and to insure the Americanization of the new territory is an interesting side light on the history of the territorial policy of the United States.

EVERETT S. BROWN

[9] Thomas Jefferson, *Writings* (Monticello edition — Washington, 1904), 11:135-137.

[10] Thomas M. Marshall, *A history of the western boundary of the Louisiana purchase, 1819-1841* (Berkeley, 1914).

BOOK REVIEWS

Edited by Lester B. Shippee

A history of the United States. By Edward Channing. Volume v, The period of transition, 1815-1848. (New York: Macmillan company, 1921. 623 p. $5.00)

Post hoc, ergo propter hoc is the fundamental argument of history. One may suppose, therefore, that Mr. Channing may justify himself in tracing "the main springs of our national development" (page 3, note 1) to the long period of war which closed the eighteenth and ushered in the nineteenth century. "In such times," he writes, "the mind breaks adrift from its everyday moorings and turns to thought and theories that in peaceful hours seemed fantastic and incapable of attainment. War leads to a loosening of the mind, to a breaking of associations, to new thoughts and groupings; and humanity leaps from one stage of civilization to another. In the thirty-five years after 1815, men and women threw off the shackles of the past" (page 2). Hence, writes Mr. Channing, came all the social changes that make that era conspicuous. In a footnote the curious reader is referred to the writings of F. J. Turner for "a radically different view."

The reviewer's first thought on reading these lines was: "So this is the effect of the world war on the historical mind. I was expecting it." Maturer consideration, after the reading of the book was completed, has not altered that opinion; but another cause for Mr. Channing's interpretative method has become apparent. This lies in his reaction to the aggressive scholarship of the western historians, of whom Mr. Turner is so eminent a leader. The whole volume reveals evidence of the influence of these westerners, and it is as conspicuous in Mr. Channing's criticisms and innuendoes as in his generous acceptance of their conclusions, for the footnotes bristle with references to the works of scholars living in "Cisappalachia." We of the west, although not ready to accept Mr. Channing's rather naïve interpretation of the causes of our national development, will not quarrel with him, for we are overpowered with the evidence offered by this volume that he has discovered the existence of the west. Like every first explorer, Mr. Channing names this discovery of his. "Transappalachia" is the chosen name. It is sonorous to the ears; still, there may be an objection to the burden thus placed on the reader of locating on which side of the mountains lies

Harvard university. Even those living nearer the center of population than does Mr. Channing understand Latin, when it is sufficiently simple.

The volume is a rather surprising output from Mr. Channing's laboratory. Here are eighteen chapters equally divided between what may be called social statics and political dynamics; but even one of the chapters embodied in the latter, that on "Western lands and settlements after 1840," falls by right into the first category. This first part of the volume ranges over the whole gamut of social experience. There are chapters on the "Westward march," the "Urban migration," the "First labor movement," followed by accounts of the south, religious changes, education, and literature. On the whole, these are all very well done and are enlivened by the dry humor which crops out in all Mr. Channing's writings. The account of transportation is particularly interesting, not so much, perhaps, in its analysis of a developing power in society as in the humorous aspects of the subject. In examining an historical tapestry, Mr. Channing finds his chief delight in the composition of the fringes. Certainly those parts of his narrative which appear best suited to his literary style belong to what may be called his illustrative material.

The devotion of over half the book to social statics limits very materially the space apportioned to political history. The result is at times a very thin narrative when compared to the corresponding parts of the preceding volumes. This difficulty of apportionment might have been overcome by weaving into the chapters on politics some parts of the chapters devoted to a description of the social life. For instance, three pages are assigned to an inadequate account of the land system, and no notice is taken of the part played by it in national politics. Senator Benton was perhaps not one of our greatest statesmen, but surely he deserves more than one mention (according to the index) and that concerning the Mexican war. The index does not call the reader's attention to the significant fact noted on page 570 that Benton was the father-in-law of Frémont. The facts concerning Benton which have appealed to Mr. Channing may be important, but how is it possible to write a history of this period without a mention of the demands for an alteration of the land law by the westerners of whom Benton was surely the spokesman? So paramount in politics was this issue that both Clay and Calhoun thought it necessary to develop plans for the disposal of the land or of the income derived from it.

Although the book proves that Mr. Channing has discovered the west, he has not learned to appreciate the significance of events in "Cisappalachia" in the development of the United States. These events possess in his eyes an antiquarian interest or an illustrative value, but they have not perverted his eastern point of view. Here is his summary

of the westward movement which created nine new states: "Those who sought the lands over the mountains in the earlier time were actuated mainly by the love of adventure, by the lure of the wilderness; stern economic necessity had not as yet touched the people of the older settled area. From 1800 to 1820, the embargo, the war, and the hard times spurred on migration; but it was not until the financial revulsion of 1837 and the critical years thereafter that eastern people sought the western wilds in great numbers" (page 40). Does he mean by eastern people those living in the northeast? A sentence on the same page seems to give the passage that meaning. He writes, "Until the opening of the National Road, travel toward the Mississippi valley was arduous, dangerous, and prolonged,— and that highway served mainly the needs of Pennsylvania and the states to the southward."

Mr. Channing's opposition to the western interpreters of American history is displayed in his treatment of many subjects and crops out frequently in the footnotes. This tendency may be illustrated by his account of the election of Andrew Jackson, which is always claimed by writers with a western bias as an example of Cisappalachian influence. In note 1 on page 376 there are quoted statements by Mr. McLaughlin and Mr. Paxson to that effect. In answering these upholders of westernism, Mr. Channing analyzes the electoral vote and proves to his satisfaction that it was by the votes of New York and Pennsylvania that democracy was enthroned. "Indeed, however one manipulates the figures," he writes, "it would seem that Jackson was raised to the presidency by the over-representation of the South combined with the employment of most unjustifiable methods by his partisans in Pennsylvania and in New York. On the whole, possibly it was more honorable to have been defeated in 1828 than to have been elected" (page 376).

Many a defeated candidate can draw consolation from the thought of the last sentence. In his analysis of the vote Mr. Channing has overlooked the explanation of western historians. They do not manipulate the figures but claim the western parts of New York and Pennsylvania and the whole of other eastern states as western in character. Thus Mr. Channing's arguments do not meet the issue.

One vital factor in the development of the west — it is not the only one — is entirely omitted from the volume. The reader will find on consulting the index only two references to the Indians; one is in a note on Indian treaties, which is placed at the end of a chapter, and the other is a short description of California Indians. The efforts to move the Indian tribes across the Mississippi reached their culmination during the period covered by the book, and the most all-embracing explanation of Jackson's popularity is to be found in his accomplishment of this

Indian policy. In this connection there should have occurred some description of the formation of the last American frontier and of that great popular illusion, the American desert, which stayed the western advance of population for at least two decades; but you will seek in vain for any mention of these trivial affairs, oh ye men of Cisappalachia!

Since this review is written for western men and women, its emphasis has lain naturally on Mr. Channing's treatment of events in which Cisappalachians are interested, and the reviewer may have appeared somewhat unfair to a writer of such pronounced eastern affiliations as is Mr. Channing, even though he is writing a *History of the United States.* In the choice of the subject to be treated Mr. Channing has exercised the privilege of the modern pragmatic historian — the doctrine is actually preached by a group of scholars — of practicing subjectivity; but after his choice has once been made, he has maintained usually the objectivity of treatment demanded by science. The reviewer has thoroughly enjoyed the reading of the book, for there is something distinctly captivating in the author's subtle cynicism. His style is typically that of New England and his sense of duty to his subject is very evidently a product of the New England conscience. In closing let the reviewer declare his delight that Mr. Channing has shown a disposition to disagree with the men of the west. He has emphasized a view which is too frequently ignored by the futurists of Cisappalachia. Long may he live to poke fun at us!

C. W. A.

The agrarian crusade. A chronicle of the farmer in politics. By Solon Justus Buck, Ph.D. [The chronicles of America. Edited by Allen Johnson under the supervision of the committee on publication of the Yale university council] (New Haven: Yale university press, 1920. 215 p.)

The latter half of the nineteenth century witnessed an economic revolution in the United States which for historical purposes may be divided into two closely related lines of development: first, the industrial revolution; and, second, the agricultural revolution. The agricultural revolution was a transformation of farming from a primitive, pioneer, largely self-sufficing occupation into a modern business organized on a scientific, capitalistic, commercial basis. The principal factors contributing to this revolution were: (1) the large empire of virgin land and the liberal land policy of the federal government; (2) the rapid growth of population and immigration; (3) the introduction of improved farm machinery; (4) the extension and development of transportation facilities; (5) the growth of domestic and foreign markets; and (6) the establishment of agencies for the promotion of scientific knowledge relat-

ing to agriculture. Among the agencies constituting the sixth factor may be mentioned the federal and state departments of agriculture, the agricultural colleges and experiment stations, agricultural societies and fairs, the agricultural press, and farmers' organizations. The transformation in agriculture which these six factors produced during this period was so rapid and complete and the problems to which this transformation gave rise were so numerous and complex that it may properly be called an agrarian revolution. To this important field of American history comparatively little attention has been given. It has, indeed, been completely overlooked, not to say ignored, by the nation's historians. It is encouraging, however, to note that a few students are beginning to turn their attention to this field. Among the most noteworthy contributions to the subject is Mr. Buck's volume on *The agrarian crusade.*

Farmers' organizations in the United States may be divided into two classes: first, those that seek to promote some special end or industry; and, second, those that seek to unite the farmers as a class. Among the former may be mentioned farmers' elevator companies, coöperative creamery associations, and live stock shipping associations; while the latter include such organizations as the granger, greenback, and the populist movements. It is to the latter type of organization that Mr. Buck addresses himself.

The author describes the agrarian crusade as "a series of radical agitations on the part of farmers to better their lot." While "these movements have manifested different degrees of coherence and intelligence," they have all "had something of the same purpose and spirit, and all may justly be considered as stages of the still unfinished agrarian crusade." With these considerations in mind, the author has undertaken "to sketch the course and to reproduce the spirit of that crusade from its inception with the granger movement, through the greenback and populist phases, to a climax in the battle for free silver."

The first five chapters are devoted to a review of the granger movement, considered under the following chapter headings: "The inception of the grange," "The rising spirit of unrest," "The granger movement at flood tide," "Curbing the railroads," and "The collapse of the granger movement." The causes of agrarian discontent after the civil war, the economic and political activities of the grange, and the causes of the rapid decline of the grange in the later seventies are described in a manner both interesting and instructive. The subject has been treated much more fully and satisfactorily, however, in the same author's *The granger movement (Harvard historical studies,* volume XIX), published in 1913. This volume reports a thorough and comprehensive statement of the granger movement. The chapters devoted to the subject in the

book under review constitute virtually a brief popularization of the more extended study.

The sixth chapter deals with the greenback interlude. The seventh chapter reviews the condition of the farmer in the eighties, thus furnishing the historical basis for a consideration of the people's party and the populist movement of the early nineties to which the eighth and ninth chapters are devoted. The movement for free silver and the presidential campaign of 1896 constitute the subject matter of chapters eleven and twelve, while the thirteenth chapter concludes the volume with a brief review of radical movements since 1896. The author's concluding observation is that "The two most hopeful developments in American politics during recent years have been the progressive movement with its program of social justice, and the growth of independent voting — both developments made possible in large part by the agrarian crusade."

Mr. Buck's account of the agrarian crusade represents an attempt to present a clear, concise, and connected narrative of the farmers' movement in the United States from the close of the civil war to the present. As such it has been well done. The general reader will find it both interesting and instructive. Such a study, however, has the defects of its merits. The specialist will be disappointed with the brevity and exceedingly general character of the narrative. For the benefit of those who desire a more thorough and comprehensive account of the granger, greenback, populist, and progressive movements, not to mention minor movements and organizations, a useful bibliography is appended. The value of the book is impaired by the comparative absence of footnotes. Judged, however, in harmony with the general purpose and spirit of the series to which the volume belongs, one might say that it represents a worthy contribution to the history of this period.

LOUIS BERNARD SCHMIDT

Woodrow Wilson and the world war. A chronicle of our own times. By Charles Seymour. [The chronicles of America. Edited by Allen Johnson under the supervision of the committee on publication of the Yale university council] (New Haven: Yale university press, 1921. 382 p. $5.00)

Woodrow Wilson as I know him. By Joseph P. Tumulty. (New York: Doubleday, Page and company, 1921. 553 p. $5.00)

As yet the number of formal works dealing specifically with Woodrow Wilson, aside from the more general accounts which more or less incidentally bring him into prominence, is exceeded by the many books which have Theodore Roosevelt as their subject. This number, however, increases steadily, and two deserving attention are the books of Mr. Tumulty and Mr. Seymour. They are the more welcome as it becomes

increasingly apparent that the former president is not going to write his own side of the story, and the student is forced to content himself with such light as may be shed by those who have come in contact with him, and by the documents already available or to be forthcoming from time to time.

Two very different types of work are these contributions under consideration. Mr. Tumulty's is the testimony of an associate and friend, little tempered by critical analysis. Mr. Seymour, on the other hand, approaches his subject from the point of view of a scholar accustomed to sifting materials and weighing evidence. The scope of the two works is not exactly the same; nevertheless the difference is not so great as might be expected. Mr. Tumulty, who became Mr. Wilson's private secretary soon after the latter's entrance into politics, devotes some space to his chief's earlier public career, but much more attention is paid to the eight years from 1913 to 1921, and it is with this period that *Woodrow Wilson and the world war* has to do.

Though partisan and to a certain extent avowedly a defense of Mr. Wilson and his course, the secretary's book does add in some degree to the materials which will in the end allow a real appraisal of the man around whom has waged such bitter controversy. Some intimate disclosures are calculated to correct certain widespread impressions which the author is convinced are erroneous. For instance, he denies the charge that Mr. Wilson was incapable of seeing any side of an issue but his own, that he was impervious to argument. Equally, however, does his narrative substantiate what Mr. Seymour thinks was one of the principal causes of the president's failure to win the support necessary to carry his policies to completion: an inability to "capitalize his personal advantages in his political relations."

Despite their approach from different angles and with different motives for writing the two authors manage in many respects to present surprisingly similar portraits of the man who forms the central figure of their narratives. Mr. Tumulty, with all his Irish ardor, emphasizes the human side of Mr. Wilson, his lovableness as exhibited to those who had broken through the crust of shy reserve which enveloped him, his high idealism, his belief in the long run in the soundness of the people whose aspirations he was able to voice. Mr. Seymour, weighing meticulously the mistakes as well as the constructive successes of the president, comes to the conclusion that Mr. Wilson was not an originator, was lacking in the ability to work as one of a team, was slow to adjust himself to new conditions, to emerge from the provincialism which blinded him at first to the significance of the European struggle. His idealism, however, Mr. Seymour does not ignore or underestimate. Nor does he deny a capacity for growth which in the end brought the president for

the moment into the most commanding position in the world. But, though he "lacked the capacity for carrying to practical success the ideal which he preached," particularly at the Versailles conference, . . . "To assume that he must accordingly be adjudged a failure is to ignore the significance of the ideals to which he awakened the world. Much there was that was unattainable and intangible, but its value to mankind in the development of international relations may be inestimable."

While Mr. Seymour has attempted to state without prejudice his impressions of Mr. Wilson — and few there will be who can find fault with his marshaling of facts on which to base his estimate — it is impossible that his conclusions will meet with universal approbation. Men will as strongly approve of or as ardently detest the former president and all his works. Friends of Mr. Wilson will be inclined to believe that something less than justice is done in the characterization. They will deny that "his most notable characteristic is the will to dominate"; but, on the other hand, anti-Wilsonites will vehemently reject the qualification that "in conference he is apt to be tolerant of the opinions of others, by no means dictatorial in manner, and apparently anxious to obtain facts on both sides of the argument." Such a statement finds confirmation in the account of how the president sought information from and relied on the advice from the "experts" who accompanied him to Paris. Admirers will not agree that he "lacks . . . the power of quick decision which is apt to characterize the masterful executive," that he "is prone to temporize, anxious to prevent an issue from approaching a crisis, evidently in the hope that something may 'turn up' to improve the situation and obviate the necessity of conflict." As time passes and rancor subsides a middle ground will gradually be assumed by those who care to harbor an impartial judgment; a happy mean which undoubtedly will be somewhat removed from the stand taken by Mr. Tumulty or Mr. Dodd on the one hand, and at least equally far from that taken by Mr. Wilson's detractors or the other. And while Mr. Seymour's more stringent extremes will be deserted and something more will be granted to Mr. Wilson than Mr. Seymour is willing to concede, his portrait will very likely come to be accepted in its general outlines as approaching the middle ground.

Both authors, the one outspokenly, the other in a more guarded manner, bear witness to the opposition which amounted to downright personal hostility and which arose to an appreciable extent from Mr. Wilson's liberal attitude, not alone with respect to his views of a just peace, but in all his domestic policies. What was distressingly obvious during the days between the armistice and the signing of the treaty by the German envoys, namely, that Wilson faced an implacable although

sometimes intangible mass of conservative reaction, is amply evidenced in the pages of *Woodrow Wilson and the world war.* This same kind of dead weight of opposition blocked or attempted to block the internal policies favored by the president prior to the entrance of America into the war. Mr. Tumulty adduces incident after incident to demonstrate the nature and extent of the forces which planted themselves against the program which Mr. Wilson laid out for his administration.

In estimating *the world war* in so far as it can be dissociated from *Woodrow Wilson* only praise can be recorded. In reducing to the compass of one of the volumes of the *Chronicles* the mass of material, the multiplicity of facts involved in a study of America and its relation to the struggle, Mr. Seymour's book is an admirable piece of work. From the tangle of events the salient features are extracted to make an absorbing yet veracious and balanced story. In places the presentation becomes absolutely brilliant, as, for example, in the chapter on the "Ways of the peace conference." As a real contribution to American historiography the volume takes its place among the foremost not only of the *Chronicles* but of all works dealing with very recent events.

In *Woodrow Wilson as I know him* Mr. Tumulty has maintained a running commentary on public events as they involved the personality of his central theme. Many gaps exist if one is seeking a comprehensive tale, and, it must be said, there are not a few omissions which detract from a satisfactory account of affairs as they revolved about the person of the president. Somewhat unconsciously, one must believe, the best foot is put forward. Still, while there is not very much that is new in the book, aside from some letters, dispatches, and personal conversations detailed by the secretary, and while what is given often merely whets the appetite for more, one is glad to have this contribution, and Mr. Tumulty has done no more than he should in presenting an aspect which for the time appears to be pushed into the background.

L. B. Shippee

A history of Minnesota. By William Watts Folwell. In four volumes. Volume I (St. Paul: Minnesota historical society, 1921. 533 p. $5.00)

The commonwealths of the northwest which have long waited the scholarly and adequate telling of their history in a form which may be utilized by the average reader seem at length in a fair way to have this want supplied. Within recent years such a history of Illinois, in five volumes, edited and in part written by Clarence W. Alvord, has appeared; work on the first volume of a similar history of Wisconsin has been under way for several years; and the Minnesota historical society now presents the first installment of a comprehensive history of Minnesota, which is to be completed in four volumes, by William Watts Folwell, president emeritus of the University of Minnesota.

Mr. Folwell is a veteran scholar but not a professional historian. A native of New York state and a graduate of Hobart college, he began his professional career as a teacher of mathematics in his alma mater in 1858. Soon thereafter he became interested in comparative philology, and in 1860 he went to Germany to study at the University of Berlin. After a year or more of study and travel in Europe, he returned to the United States and for more than three years served as an officer of engineers in the union army. Following the close of the war, four years more were spent in business and in the study of economics and politics. In 1869 Mr. Folwell came to Minnesota as president of the state university, which office he continued to fill for fifteen years. For twenty-three years more he served the institution in the double capacity of librarian and professor of political science; he retired from this work in 1907.

It was chance, apparently, which led Mr. Folwell to turn his attention to the field of local history. In his prefatory introduction, which with a quite unnecessary degree of modesty he terms "An apology," we are told that the writer some years ago contributed to a jubilee number of a local paper a sketch of Minnesota history. This led to an invitation to prepare a volume on his adopted state for the *American commonwealths* series. The task proved "an agreeable recreation for which [he trusts] to be forgiven." In the course of executing it, however, much material was accumulated which could not be utilized in the limited work in hand; later, upon retiring from the university, with an assured subsistence and a prospect of continued working strength, Mr. Folwell allowed himself "to ramble again in that congenial [field] of Minnesota history," producing the present work without thought of monetary reward, but rather as the capstone to his lifetime of public service to the state of his adoption.

Happy indeed must be the lot of such an author, and fortunate the commonwealth which is the recipient of such service! Yet the author's performance invites attention anew to the question, far from novel, as to what the course of preparation should be to qualify one to write history. "It is difficult to conceive," observes the editor of this work, himself the product of a very different course of historical training from that undergone by the author, "of anyone better equipped than Dr. Folwell to write a comprehensive and critical history of Minnesota," although Mr. Folwell himself submits his work to the judgment of the "tolerant" reader simply as the offering of an amateur.

What, then, shall be said for our modern schools for the training of historical specialists? For clearly if they do not afford men a better equipment for writing history than that possessed by the simple amateur whose training has been intrusted to chance, it will be difficult to

justify their existence. In the main the reviewer inclines to agree with the editor. For the modern historical specialist something of good may undoubtedly be said. But over against his positive achievements stands the crushing fact that the people for whom he writes will not read his work. And we were even told, at the recent St. Louis meeting, by an eminent exemplar of the art, that except as a matter of professional toil the specialists do not even read the works of one another. Whatever the shortcomings of the older writers like Prescott and Bancroft, their works were widely read; more, they are still being read by their countrymen. The fault of the modern specialist seems to be that he has lost touch with life, and since literature is but the expression of life his writings have become divorced from literature. As between the narrow specialist, therefore, who, ignorant of the life of the present, seeks to reconstruct the life of the past, and the writer equipped with such a training as Mr. Folwell has enjoyed, we would unhesitatingly choose the latter to write our history.

It is an ancient truism that a tree is known by its fruit, and with this short airing of our more or less apposite views we turn to a consideration of this first fruit of Mr. Folwell's scholarship. The volume spans practically two centuries of time, from the beginning of Minnesota's recorded history to the close of the territorial period in 1857. Since four volumes are to be printed, it follows that to the ensuing period of approximately sixty years the remaining three will be devoted. This spacing agrees fairly well with that of the *Centennial history of Illinois*, the first volume of which comes down to 1818, the year of admission to statehood, leaving the ensuing century to be covered at the rate of twenty-five years to the volume. It is in striking contrast with the proportion adopted a few years ago by Reuben G. Thwaites in his history of Wisconsin in the *American commonwealths* series, full two-thirds of which was devoted to the story of Wisconsin prior to admission to statehood. To continue the comparison with the first volume of the *Centennial history of Illinois*, the space actually devoted to narrating the history of the two commonwealths in the pre-statehood period is substantially the same in the two works; but there is a striking distinction between them in that the story Mr. Alvord had to trace is far more intricate and complex than that told by Mr. Folwell. Another distinction becomes apparent from an examination of the chapter headings of the two volumes. Mr. Alvord devotes his first chapter to a physiographical sketch, "The land in the making." Mr. Folwell, notwithstanding the counsel of Mr. Warren Upham, who provides the book with a set of useful maps, has no such chapter, and throughout the work pays scant attention to the matter of physiography. In the Illinois volume the period of British domination is reached only with chapter 12,

over halfway through the book; in the Minnesota volume it is reached with chapter 3, one-eighth of the way through the book. The Illinois volume devotes 67 pages to the thirty-year period of American rule ending with 1818; the Minnesota volume, 200 pages to the eight-year period ending in 1857. These facts are noted with no thought of criticism, or implication that the treatment in either case is not justified; rather to make clear the fact that Mr. Alvord saw fit to devote vastly more space to the earlier period of his narrative, while in Mr. Folwell's work the French and British periods receive relatively scant consideration, the bulk of the volume being devoted to the last few years of American settlement and development.

Having read the book with considerable care and such degree of comprehension as might be brought to the task, the reviewer records the judgment that it is a scholarly and substantial piece of work, a mine of information conscientiously garnered about early Minnesota. It does not detract materially from this general judgment that now and then the interpretations of the writer seem open to question. One follows with pleasure the deft analysis of the lucubrations of certain earlier writers upon the movements of those tantalizing explorers, Radisson and Groseilliers, and their reputed discovery of the Mississippi (pages 11-14). One may regret that the story which has grown up about the westward exploration of Jean Nicolet was not treated in similar fashion (page 5). The designation of the traders as "parasites" upon the Indians (page 106) seems to the reviewer indefensible. The trader performed an indispensable service for the native, one on which, indeed, his very existence commonly depended. We may admit that the trader often overreached the native, but this admission does not alter the character of his service. Again, we cannot accept the implication involved in the statements concerning the treaties of peace with the northwestern tribes in 1815-1816, to the effect that these treaties were due to "the establishment of American citizens in the Indian trade of the Northwest" (pages 133-134). These tribes had been at war with the United States, fighting as allies of Great Britain, and under the leadership of such men as Black Hawk and Robert Dickson their warriors had fought with their white allies around Detroit and had scalped American women and children along the Ohio frontier. The conclusion of these treaties was but a logical and necessary consequence of the conclusion of peace with Great Britain, and the factor stated by the author as causative was merely one incidental result of these measures. Robert Dickson having been mentioned, it may be noted incidentally that the only notice of his career in the volume is confined to a footnote reference on page 100. Surely this is scant treatment of such a career in a volume which undertakes to tell the history of primitive Minnesota. It is to be

explained, doubtless, by the broader fact that the war of 1812, the period, perhaps, of Dickson's greatest importance in the history of the northwest, receives practically no consideration.

Mention of this last fact brings us to perhaps the gravest reflection which must be made upon the volume — the point of view and the sweep of vision of the author. Comparatively little effort is made to connect the history of Minnesota with the wider sweep of world events outside the borders of the author's chosen land. Some mention of those events is, of course, to be found, but commonly one gains from this book but little comprehension of their course or significance. Thus, when the reader comes to the occupation of Minnesota by American settlers, he finds no satisfactory explanation of who the settlers were, of why they came to Minnesota and how. Thus to tell the story of the settlement of Minnesota, or indeed of any western state, is to tell it only in part; and the portion left untold may be quite as important as that which is narrated.

We return, in conclusion, to the starting point — the question what should be the course of training to fit one for the task of writing history. The work under consideration supplies no answer to this question. Here is a simple amateur who guilelessly strays into the historical field at the end of a busy lifetime of important achievement as an all-around scholar and man of the world, and produces a book which is burdened to the point of oppression with the characteristic earmarks of scholarship. The style is as plain and devoid of adornment as a Doric column. There is no sweep of historic imagination, no suggestion of the romance of history. Remove the labels from the manuscript and one might readily make the mistake of identifying it as the painstaking and uninspired effort of some typical exemplar of the modern school of historical specialists. Compare, for example, the opening paragraph of the book with the corresponding one of Alvord's *Illinois country*. Mr. Folwell's paragraph is a useful, correct, and commonplace résumé of the beginnings of French activity in America. Mr. Alvord's sentences are instinct with imagination and literary charm — writing such as can be found nowhere in Mr. Folwell's book. The examples tend utterly to confound our *a priori* reasoning. The moral, if any, seems to be that historians, like poets, are not the product of any set formula. The schools may refine, but they cannot create historical talent.

M. M. Quaife

Spain's declining power in South America. 1730-1806. By Bernard Moses. (Berkeley: University of California press, 1919. 440 p. $4.00)

Mr. Moses has made debtors of all students in his field, but he has also caused them some bibliographic difficulties. His *Establishment of*

Spanish rule in America appeared in 1898. Ten years later he published *South America on the eve of emancipation* and, in as much as the volume treated almost wholly of the southern part of the continent, he promised to follow it with another devoted to the northern portion. Now, we understand, these two volumes are out of print and the plates are destroyed. Their place has been taken by the two volumes, *The Spanish dependencies of South America,* which appeared in 1914, and the present work. The bibliographic difficulties are increased also by publication under different auspices.

But in these times one cannot stress uniformity of publication. Rather the increasing number of workers in the field will welcome the volume and will congratulate the author for making more accessible the fruits of his life work. Publication in this field has not greatly advanced beyond the pioneer stage that Mr. Moses set more than a score of years ago. He still follows the topical method of his earlier books. Perhaps no other method is possible. Certainly the output of monographs is not yet sufficient for any student to perceive a real unity in the Spanish colonial field. It may exist, however, and such works as the present will stimulate the search for it.

This volume and its companion work, *The Spanish dependencies,* should have a wider use than their predecessors. The increasing number of students of Hispanic-American history will find it valuable for supplemental work, although its usefulness is circumscribed, as in the case of the others, by a paucity of notes, coupled at times with an irritating failure to be definite and by the lack of a complete bibliography. The volume, however, is readable and, like its companions, is evidently intended for the general public rather than the specialist. Those who miss the trim, scholarly-like appearance of the earlier volumes will find the subject matter, for the most part, incorporated in their successors. A comparison with the former works shows some revision of text, some incorporation of new material, and frequent omission of extensive quotations. Occasionally these changes do not make for definiteness. For instance, the sentence "While the colonists of Chile were anticipating evils that might proceed from the encroachment of foreigners" *(Eve of emancipation,* 230) becomes in the present work (page 390) "While the inhabitants of the viceroyalty were contemplating the results," et cetera. This tendency to generalize instead of using the more specific statements of the earlier edition is quite marked. The author doubtless has data to warrant the generalization, but he might have indicated it in a different way.

One welcomes the four chapters relating specifically to northern South America. These contain the new material promised in the earlier volume. One of these chapters shows an interest in scientific work in

New Granada, especially in botany, that will surprise most readers. The others treat of the rebellion of the comuneros, and other evidences of political discontent that led up to the wars of independence. The brief chapter on Miranda summarizes but in no sense supplants the work of W. S. Robertson. The work as a whole fills for Spanish America the place formerly occupied by the volumes of R. G. Watson, now long out of print, and renders necessary a similar work on Brazil under Portuguese control. Gradually the gaps in the colonial history of our southern neighbors are being filled in and as a pioneer in this work Mr. Moses holds an honorable place.

I. J. C.

John Wentworth. Governor of New Hampshire, 1767-1775. By Lawrence Shaw Mayo. (Cambridge: Harvard university press, 1921. 208 p.)

The task of writing a biography of Governor Wentworth is not an easy one, for his farsighted constructive policies were cut short by the outbreak of the revolutionary war, which compelled him to flee in utter defeat after a sane and vigorous, but unsupported, attempt to uphold royal authority. By a judicious blending of biography and history, however, Mr. Mayo has succeeded in presenting a clearly lined biography and in narrating historical events in proper subordination and yet with thoroughness. His work will be indispensable for the period of New Hampshire history which it covers — one already included in Belknap's great classic to the composition of which Wentworth contributed valuable assistance — and valuable for general colonial history.

The archives of New Hampshire and Nova Scotia and pertinent manuscript collections, along with the *New Hampshire provincial and state papers* and other printed sources, have been thoroughly searched for the material on which the work is based. More extensive use of the loyalist commission papers would have added some illuminating detail, but would not have changed basic statements and conclusions.

John Wentworth was born in 1737 with an inherited future. His grandfather, also John, was lieutenant governor from 1717 to 1730, and his uncle Benning was governor from 1741 to 1766. As in politics, so in society and trade his was the leading family in the province. After his graduation at Harvard in 1755 — in the same class with John Adams — and a business apprenticeship at home he was sent to London, in 1763, as his father's representative. There his rank and his attractive personality enabled him to make valuable friends in aristocratic circles. The most remarkable of these was the Marquis of Rockingham, a young man who became leader of the whigs and head of the government in 1765. In that year Wentworth, too, was appointed one of the agents of the province, and he counseled the whigs in the repeal of the stamp act and

in other phases of their American policy. Meanwhile his uncle had become unpopular at home because of his questionable accumulation of one hundred thousand acres of land in twenty years, and unsatisfactory to the government because of his lax administration of his other office of surveyor-general of the king's woods. One of his deputies resided in Ireland. Through his nephew's influence removal was softened into advice to resign. This intervention was doubtless sincere, but his effort was not lessened by the hope — for hope he must have had — that he would be his uncle's successor. This hope was fulfilled and his English sojourn culminated gloriously in his appointment, in 1766, as governor of New Hampshire and surveyor-general of the king's woods in North America. He was then twenty-nine years of age.

After engaging servants and purchasing horses for his establishment, he sailed for Charleston, South Carolina, to examine the woods in the southern colonies. On his way north he visited William Byrd at Westover, William Bayard in New York, and other prominent men, all of whom became loyalists in later years. This is significant of the formation of a group of active supporters of the government, and shows what political use an able and tactful man like Wentworth might make of an intercolonial office like that of surveyor-general. He reached New Hampshire in June, 1767, and was joyously received and inducted into office with great ceremony and festivity.

The conquest of Canada had removed the dangers from the north and had made Vermont and New Hampshire the connecting area between the colonies and the St. Lawrence valley. The province therefore became an attractive frontier for settlement, and was active, prosperous, and inspired by high hopes for the future. Portsmouth, the capital, had about forty-five hundred inhabitants. It was a town of stately colonial mansions — the homes of the much-intermarried families which composed the aristocracy that ruled the province and controlled most of its trade.

Mr. Mayo, following Belknap, divides the province into the northeast, dominated by aristocracy, the Merrimack valley, dominated by Massachusetts representative government and the Scotch-Irish, and the Connecticut valley, dominated by Connecticut and frontier democracy. Topographically and, in a measure, politically and economically this is correct; but its absoluteness is impinged upon by Mr. Mayo's own narrative — to go no further. The northeast needed no assistance from the valleys to overthrow the royal government in 1775. And only a minority of the Portsmouth ruling caste were so conscientiously loyalist that they endured unto banishment and confiscation. Exeter, the chief seat of disaffection, is but twelve miles southwest of Portsmouth, with which it has tidewater communication. On the other hand, the men of the valleys, including the Scotch-Irish, furnished their due proportion of banished

loyalists — some of them new settlers who had been in the British army in the French war.

The topography did have economic consequences in turning the trade routes of the interior down valley into Massachusetts and Connecticut and it still has. The new governor saw the necessity of turning these east to Portsmouth, if the province was to be united and prosper as a whole. This meant cutting roads, which were necessary of themselves to the growth of the new settlements. Although the financial side of the undertaking was difficult, two hundred miles of rough forest ways were thus secured, passable for horses and ox teams.

A reform, which was demanded by the people through the assembly, was the division of the province into counties. All public and judicial business was centered at Portsmouth and involved intolerable journeys from the interior. The council, the seat of power of the ruling clique, opposed the division because it would diminish their profits and power. But the governor was more broad-minded and arranged a compromise which secured decentralization.

Through the efforts of the governor a good map of the province, much needed, was compiled from surveys in 1772 by Samuel Holland, a distinguished engineer of the British army in the French war and then in charge of the government survey of the coast of North America. It was not published, however, until 1784, when Paul Wentworth, a loyalist and a friend of the governor, brought it out in London. It is a valuable and beautiful map. Holland received only necessary expenses for his work and Paul Wentworth, nothing. But they were not so disinterested as Mr. Mayo's narrative would indicate. The loyalist commission papers show that Holland held extensive tracts of land in Vermont and New Hampshire and some of his assistants held less extensive tracts; and that Paul Wentworth claimed compensation before the commission for the loss of lands in New Hampshire, both for himself and as agent for the governor and others.

Wentworth's executive capacity shows itself as clearly in the office of surveyor-general as in that of governor. The revival of enforcement of the timber laws was a difficult and dangerous task, for they were detested. Land owners were indignant at having their finest pines cut for the navy without compensation. But Wentworth knew the character of the people of whom he was, at bottom, one. When trees were cut he gave the owner of the land first chance at hauling the timber and paid him in coin if he did so. The unfamiliar clinking of coin went far to soften his hatred of the broad arrow.

Wentworth was esteemed in spite of his sumptuous manner of living and his association with the "close corporation" which controlled the government and trade of the province. His enforcement of the laws had

been vigorous, reasonable, and impartial; and his policy for the advancement of the province was practical, sound, ably applied, and hence was appreciated. Yet, consciously or unconsciously, the people realized that it was part of a new English policy which meant a strengthening of royal rule and a weakening of local independence. The governor's attitude, as trouble became serious, was one of avoiding extremes. He criticized the harsh and unintelligent execution of the acts of parliament; and he deprecated the popular haste in rushing into excesses. He believed in the fundamental loyalty of the people, but recognized that the change from impulsive violence to calm determination, grounded on principle, was most dangerous to the continuance of British authority.

He managed to preserve quiet in the province until December, 1774, when the people captured Fort William and Mary and carried away the powder and some of the cannon. Even then, and after Lexington, as Mr. Mayo's excellent narrative shows, his courageous moderation went far to prevent useless and destructive violence. But in June, 1775, he was compelled to flee with his family and friends to the fort; and thence, before long, to the *Scarborough,* man-of-war, which in August, the month of his thirty-eighth birthday, carried them to Boston. In September he returned to the Isles of Shoals to prorogue the assembly. It was his last visit to his native province.

He went to Halifax with the British army and thence to New York and Long Island. There he was instrumental in organizing one of the famous loyalist corps, Governor Wentworth's volunteers, a fact which Mr. Mayo fails to mention. Early in 1778 he went to England. His name headed the list of loyalists in the New Hampshire banishment and confiscation acts. His property was sold for the benefit of the state; but he was so heavily in debt, especially to his father, who was not a loyalist and who remained in the state, that the net profit was small. With becoming and deserved courtesy the state returned to him his family portraits and the furniture of his Portsmouth house.

In 1783 he went to Halifax as surveyor-general under a new commission. In 1792 he became governor — technically lieutenant governor — of Nova Scotia and he held the office until 1808. He was made a baronet in 1795. There he pursued the same farsighted policy which had distinguished his administration in New Hampshire. He died in 1820.

Mr. Mayo lines his character with the words "amiability, intelligence, resolution, and physical vigor." A supporter of England on principle, Wentworth bore no rancor toward his opponents among whom, in the end, were most of his family and friends.

The volume has a good, but not elaborate, index. Under "Jeremy Belknap" there should be a reference to page 23, note 2. A bibliography and list of manuscript sources should have been added. The reproduc-

tions of important portraits of the governor and Lady Wentworth enhance the value of the work. The paper, typography, and make-up of the book are of an excellence which is particularly pleasing in these days.

ASA CURRIER TILTON

Trail makers of the northwest. By Paul Leland Haworth. (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and company, 1921. 277 p. $2.50)

This is a delightful book. Mr. Haworth is an enthusiast about the far northwest, and in addition to being for years an eager reader of its literature he has himself turned explorer and in this rôle has achieved the twofold exploit of giving names to mountain peaks and in turn having his own name conferred upon one by the Canadian geographical board, in recognition of his exploits. With a gleam of dry humor he records that Mount Haworth is "one of the ugliest, most God-forsaken peaks, in all Canada."

Both as historian familiar with the literature and as explorer and hunter of big game, then, the author is admirably equipped to write a book for "boys — of whatever age." In view of his avowed object, however, it need not be expected that the present volume will make any fresh contribution to our knowledge of the northwest, apart from the records of his own discoveries. He has endeavored not merely to describe some of the famous explorations of this region, but also to afford a picture of the manner of life, both animal and human, which prevails there.

The work opens with a useful chapter on the beaver, whose valuable fur was the lure responsible for the exploration of a large part of North America. This is followed by chapters on the discovery of Hudson bay and the Great lakes, the two principal avenues of approach to the northwest. Further historical chapters deal with the work of Radisson, of Samuel Hearne, of Verendrye, Mackenzie, Alexander Henry the younger, and Sir John Franklin. The explorations of Amundsen and other modern-day explorers are next recounted, and in this connection are included the author's own expeditions in the years from 1910 to 1920. The life of the northland is sketched in chapters on "Methods of travel," "How the Red river half-breeds hunted the buffalo," "Further sidelights of Indian life," and "The brotherhood of trappers and prospectors of today."

The style of the book is simple and readable. In the reviewer's judgment Mr. Haworth has worthily achieved his purpose, and it is to be hoped that his book will find its way into the hands of all healthy American boys. The purpose of the work precludes any exhaustive historical evaluation on the part of the reviewer. Attention may be called, however, to three items of doubtful validity. Radisson and

Groseilliers may have reached the Mississippi ten years before Jolliet and Marquette, but an unqualified statement that they did so (page 20) is hardly justifiable, even in a book for boys; their winter quarters in 1661, instead of being somewhere in the region northwest of Lake Superior (page 21), were at Point Chequamegon, on its southern shore; finally, the name of the English nobleman, Sir George Carteret, who befriended the explorers at Boston, is given (page 22), probably through some compositor's error, as "Cartwright."

The book is freely illustrated, oftentimes from photographs taken by the writer.

M. M. Quaife

The story of mankind. By Hendrik Van Loon. (New York: Boni and Liveright, 1921. 479 p. $5.00)

Written for children, profusely sprinkled with drawings by the author to bring out graphically the significance of the text, this summary of human progress trimmed down to the compass of an ordinary novel may be read with interest and, possibly, occasional profit by those who feel that they have long ago put behind them the books of childhood. A critic looking for overstatement, understatement, and misstatement will find them all. Probably each specialist will be inclined to say, as he did of Wells's *Outline,* that the treatment of every field except his own is good. The critic, however, might do well to read again the preface and then turn to the chapter entitled "Colonial expansion and war," with its subheading, "A chapter which ought to give you a great deal of political information about the last fifty years, but which really contains several explanations and a few apologies." Whether or not the explanations are deemed satisfactory, the paragraphs which allow the reader to get Mr. Van Loon's point of view, something of his personal bias, supply something which authors of books for grown-ups in some cases might well include in their prefaces. To quote the prospectus of many a work designed for consumption by a public tolerant of summer book agents, "the illustrations alone are worth the price of the book."

Pan-Americanism. Its beginnings. By Joseph Byrne Lockey. (New York: The Macmillan company, 1920. 503 p. $5.00)

One might characterize this volume as a thesis in political science based on three decades of inter-American relations. The author starts off by devoting his first chapter to a definition of the term "pan-Americanism." Not all his readers will agree with his definition (pages 33-35), nor will they grant that his subsequent chapters are wholly in keeping with it; but there will hardly be two opinions about the historical value of the work. The author traces, in turn, the movements

for independence and national organization in each of the important sections of Hispanic America, discusses some "Monarchical plots" and their failure, reviews the early relations of the United States and Great Britain with each section and with Hispanic America as a whole, and presents at length the attitude of the Hispanic countries toward the Monroe doctrine and Bolivar's pan-American congress. Chapter 7, "Early projects of continental union," and chapter 11, which treats of the attitude that Argentine, Brazil, and Chile assumed toward the plans of Bolivar, are the most important chapters of this book.

Bibliography and footnotes show that Mr. Lockey has made excellent use of the printed sources, including contemporary newspapers, both in English and in Spanish. He is familiar with the works of Paxson, Robertson, and Manning, and makes worthy additions to their offering. He has also availed himself of a host of occasional articles. An extended examination reveals no significant lacunæ in possible printed sources. One may ask why there has been no recourse to manuscript material, especially such as was available in Washington, but the exigencies of the world war, in which the author served, may in part explain that omission. Those who are teaching American diplomatic history or the history of Hispanic America will welcome this new addition to their stock in trade. Mr. Lockey has done more than complete a doctor's thesis; he has contributed a worthy volume in a field where American scholars were already held in high repute.

I. J. C.

A history of the people of Iowa. By Cyrenus Cole. (Cedar Rapids: The Torch press, 1921. 572 p. $10.00)

In its general outline the history of Iowa is similar to that of the other northern states. There is a French period, a Spanish period corresponding to the British rule east of the Mississippi, a period of Indian wars, beginning later and ending later than those of the old northwest, a territorial period, and, lastly, a period of statehood. An author could not avoid these divisions if he would. The similarity continues even more striking through the period of statehood. The coming of the settlers, the organization of institutions — political, educational, religious, and social — the establishment of industry, the building of transportation facilities, and the endless struggle over political control: these are the topics about which Mr. Cole writes. The régimes of France and Spain touched the land of Iowa but lightly. Of the Indians only two episodes figure in Iowa history, the Black Hawk war and the Inkpaduta massacre. These barely touch the Iowa land and the author has to defend himself for the extensive notices he gives them. The chief bands of Indians were the Sauk and the Foxes and they were there only for a few years following the disastrous defeat of Black Hawk,

1832 to 1843. With this preliminary matter the author takes up the first 125 pages, with two later chapters sandwiched in — almost one-fourth of the volume — before the real history of "the people of Iowa" begins.

The territorial period extends from 1838 to 1846, during which frontier society had its usual struggles with Indians, land speculators, and border criminals. As was the case in all the western states of its latitude, early Iowa was democratic in politics, protestant in religion, and decentralized in its institutions. The state entered national politics prominently during the slavery struggle of 1850 and during the succeeding seventy years has held an influential place. Such is the story Mr. Cole has told.

The author is not a historian and he avoids the historian's faults at times too carefully. One can read for hours in the text and not be annoyed by date or location. In the chapter on the Black Hawk war, for instance, the author does not indicate whether it happened in the era of grace or before. He admits having read everything ever written on Iowa history but the text is based on secondary materials almost exclusively.

From the standpoint of the average reader the volume is commendable. It reads. The writer has a very pleasant style, the result of long practice. He often verges on mush and occasionally falls in, as in the chapter on Black Hawk and Keokuk. It is hardly worth while to try to polish Black Hawk into a hero. He belongs with Pontiac, Little Turtle, and Tecumseh — no more. The author shows a predilection for his own state which is entirely commendable and excusable. It is customary in our latitude for each state to have one or more candidates for the presidency. Another tendency of the author, that of attributing everything worth while in the state to a New England origin, might be questioned. He does, however, concede, on page 254, that poker-playing came from the south.

A few typographical errors have escaped the proof reader. The dates on page 34, lines 3 and 4, are evidently wrong. "Later," on page 56 at the end of the first paragraph; "Jeffreon," in line 2 on page 61; "commander," in line 7 on page 95; and "inculculable" in the last line on page 124, are a few of these slips so dear to reviewers.

Daniel H. Burnham. Architect, planner of cities. Two volumes. By Charles Moore. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin company, 1921. 260, 238 p. $20.00)

In his biography of Daniel Burnham, Mr. Moore has given to the public not only a very complete account of the achievements of one of the best-known and most successful architects of the late nineteenth

and the early twentieth centuries, but also incidentally many interesting studies of his coworkers in architecture, landscape architecture, painting, and sculpture. So many sketches of the politicians and business men of the period are also included that the two volumes are of interest not only to architects but also to general readers.

In the first three chapters of volume I are described the early experiences of the firm of Burnham and Root in the growing city of Chicago, their opportunities following the great fire, their part in the development of steel skeleton construction for tall commercial buildings, the keen knowledge displayed by Burnham, his rise to success and his acknowledged position among practitioners in Chicago, and his appointment in 1891 as chief of construction for the World's Columbian exposition. Chapter 4 contains a very careful and interesting account of the preliminary work for that exposition, but to an architect it is disappointing because so little is said concerning the actual execution and effect of the plans. The following chapters show how the success of the fair made of Burnham not only a nation-wide figure in architecture, with rewards of no mean kind, but also a better and more versatile architect by bringing him in contact with such masters of the classic style as McKim, Post, St. Gaudens, and Olmstead.

Chapter VIII has a clear and at the same time amusing account of Burnham's dealings with Washington officials in his attempt as president of the American institute of architects to secure enforcement of the Tarnsey act. Chapters 10 and 11 deal with his pioneering, as chairman of the Sanate park commission, in city planning, a science in which he was to become famous not only in this country but abroad. In chapters 12, 13, and 14 Burnham is found struggling with our narrow-minded. bigoted officials and politicians in his efforts to secure recognition for his ideal of a better Washington, while at the same time he is developing plans for the improvement of Cleveland, San Francisco, and West Point. A description of his visit to Manila at the request of President Taft and his report to the Harvard overseers for the improvement of Harvard yard conclude volume I.

Volume II contains an account of the activities of Burnham from 1906 to the time of his death in 1912. It tells of the completion of the designs for the union station at Washington, the conferences with President Cassatt and with Washington politicians, the frequent visits to Europe for information and recreation, the plans for the Washington post office, the disputes about the location of the Grant and Lincoln memorials, his studies for the Washington cathedral. Of most interest, however, in the volume is the narrative of the inception and completion of the great plan for Chicago, in which work he associated with him E.

H. Bennett and Jules Guerin. Chapter 23 and a portion of the preceding and following chapters tell of the appointment of Burnham by President Roosevelt as chairman of the ill-fated commission of the fine arts and of his visit to the London city planning conference in 1910, and give first-hand information about Burnham's views concerning the organization of the American academy in Rome.

In his interest in general history and contemporary occurrence, Mr. Moore sometimes loses sight of his subject, so that his style is at times disjointed and discursive. He presents very clearly, however, the characteristics of Mr. Burnham — his passion for dominating situations, his keen business instinct, his tireless vigor, the spirit that kept him fighting for his beliefs, the driving force that made him the confidant not only of members of his own profession, but also of other men of large affairs.

The book is excellently printed and very completely illustrated, many of the illustrations being in color. There are also a number of reproductions of the work of architects other than Burnham to illustrate the carrying out of schemes in which Burnham was the guiding mind. Copious footnotes and references and a very complete list of all the works of the firm of Burnham and Root and of the D. H. Burnham company make this work a valuable reference book for architects and city-planners. We can only hope that other architects of our time may have as faithful a chronicler as Mr. Moore has been of D. H. Burnham, architect, planner of cities.

JAMES H. FORSYTHE

A cycle of Adams letters. 1861-1865. Edited by Worthington C. Ford. With illustrations. Two volumes. (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin company, 1920. xiv, 298, 280 p.)

The posthumous fame of Henry Adams must bring a cynical smile to his ghost. The popular acclaim, which he posed as despising but which in reality he desired, has certainly been awarded him. Everybody read his *Education,* and many turned for the first time to his other works that had made him one of the first American historians. Since then his essays and letters have been exploited; and now come these two substantial volumes of letters from the hand of his father, his brother Charles, and his own, selected by that notable editor, Worthington C. Ford. The period covered by the correspondence is one of tremendous import to the United States and in the events that were shaking the nations the three Adamses played an important part, the younger Charles in the army, and the father and Henry in London attending to our national affairs at the Court of St. James.

So much space was given in the *Education of Henry Adams* to the episodes in London at this critical time that the reader naturally expects further light from this collection of letters. In this he is dis-

appointed. The minister was not a great letter-writer and his position made it necessary for him to be discreet, while the boy Henry reveals little about the problems of diplomacy, in which during later life he was so greatly interested. His letters are well written and at times illuminating as to his own state of mind, but their offering to the historical student is, on the whole, rather slight.

The letters of Charles Francis Adams are in a different class. The army life quickened his development and he sees affairs with the intelligence of a man. His account of camp life, of action, his estimates of the men around him, and his criticism of the administration, both civil and military, are illuminating. In many ways the reviewer is inclined to count them as among the best letters from the military standpoint that have been written by an American, and perhaps even that limitation is not necessary.

C. W. A.

Thirty-fifth annual report of the Bureau of American ethnology. To the secretary of the Smithsonian institution. In two parts. Part 1, 1913, 1914. (Washington: Government printing office, 1921)

The *Thirty-fifth annual report of the Bureau of American ethnology,* part 1, is a quarto volume of 32 pages of "report" and 760 pages of an exhausting presentation of Kwakiutl texts, by Mr. Franz Boas. It is excellently printed, on fine paper; and it will be read by nobody. It could not possibly have any value except to rare students of language, and it would be very difficult for them to use it on account of the way in which it is arranged.

It purports to give the Kwakiutl texts and literal translations, but these are printed separately. The English is not, however, a literal translation, because it "reads smoothly," and no exact translation of Indian language can do that. Consequently the reader who has no knowledge of the words or grammar of the Kwakiutl — and there is not one in a million, even of those who may examine the book, who has any such knowledge — will be forced to guess at the identification of the original words and their translations.

There is no vocabulary and there are no explanatory notes — no semblance of a guide to the intricacies of this carefully prepared Rosetta stone. To illustrate the deficiency, nearly every sentence begins with the word "wä," which apparently has some of the quality of an interjection and some of that of an adverb of time. When it is translated at all it is translated without any uniformity. No doubt the sense is given in the translation in each case, but the presentation furnishes the student a puzzle instead of definite and readily understood information.

It is painful to see people of supposed intelligence persist in printing translations in this scoliophrenic style, when the only possible way of

making them really useful to anybody is to print the exact translation of each word under that word. The sense of a passage so presented can be easily understood by any student of languages, and he can make his own free translations. It also gives him the clew to the arrangement of words in the sentence in the language under investigation; that is as important a feature of its grammar as any other one feature.

There is a slight improvement in the explanation of the sounds of the letters and characters used, although Mr. Boas says: "In accordance with the rules laid down in the report of transcribing American languages, adopted by a committee of the American Anthropological Association and printed by the Smithsonian Institution, I have adhered to the alphabet used in the previous publications on the Kwakiutl." Notwithstanding this formidable backing, which is chiefly the product of his own cult, he actually explains that one character represents the sound of "*i* in *hill*," another the sound of "*e* in *fell*," and a third the sound of "*aw* in *law*."

This adoption of the mode of all American dictionaries is fairly encouraging; but the sole guide to the consonant sounds is the German anthropological rot of "anterior palatal sonants" and "alveolar spirant surds," which has made so much of the work of the Bureau of ethnology incomprehensible to the average American student. Worse than this, there is an attempt at very delicate phonetic distinctions that reminds one of the Hudibrastic ability to

> "Distinguish and divide
> A hair twixt north and northwest side."

Consider this passage: "The velar series are *k* sounds pronounced with the soft palate. *x* corresponds to *ch* in German *Bach*. The palatal series corresponds to our *g* (hard) and *k*. *x* is like *x*, but pronounced farther forward. *g'* and *k'* sound almost like *gy* and *ky* (with consonantic *y*); *x'* is the German *ch* in *ich*." There are very few Americans, even of those who know German, who have mastered the pronunciation of the German *ch*; and as for distinguishing between the "*ach-laut*" and the "*ich-laut*"—if there is in fact any real distinction between them — it were a simpler task to pronounce the Russian and Polish place names that were so much in evidence in the world war.

In all seriousness, this volume is as much a waste of public funds as anything in the public view; and what is worse, it is not due to the vagaries of "Senator Sorghum," or to the machinations of "grafters." It is the deliberate performance of men selected for their supposed scientific attainments, protected by the most impregnable of nonpartisan, civil service fortifications, and visible to the public only through a haze created by their own organizations and publications. The whole system

is worse than a portentous humbug. When one considers the small amount available for ethnological work, the widespread desire of American taxpayers for information on the languages of the tribes who inhabited the United States and left their place names on all sides, and the rapid progress of those languages toward extinction, the publication of such a volume as this by the government is a misdemeanor, if not a crime.

J. P. Dunn

A history of the Canadian bank of commerce. With an account of the other banks which now form part of its organization. By Victor Ross. Volume I. (Toronto: Oxford university press, 1920. 516 p.)

In this first volume upon the history of the Canadian bank of commerce the author traces the development of several of the institutions which were later absorbed by the present bank of commerce. The material presented has to do for the most part with the activities of the men who formed these early banks and with descriptive accounts of the gradual development of the institutions to the point where they lose their separate identities through amalgamations.

The history of the growth of these institutions is given in detail which at times becomes wearisome in spite of the journalist's emphasis upon those details which are expected to be most entertaining to the general reader. Many of these details relate to such matters as the attempts to find a satisfactory currency to meet the needs of these early communities, suspension of specie payments by the banks, and the relations between the government and the institutions. These are of great interest to the student of economic conditions. Other descriptive material, such as the types of keys in use, has a less important place in such a work.

What is probably the most important portion of this volume is that in which the author gives attention to the general economic conditions of early Canada as a background for his description of the early attempts to provide satisfactory mediums of exchange and to form financial institutions. It is to be regretted, however, that in this connection so little attention is given to monetary and banking principles and to the scientific explanation and results of the incidents narrated. A typical example appears on page 127, where the author states the fact that the notes issued by the government of Prince Edward island depreciated until thirty shillings in the island currency were equal to only twenty in sterling. No explanation is given and we learn no lesson from this experience.

On pages 4 and 32 very brief references are made to the Halifax currency, a mere money of account with no corresponding coins. In terms of this money, silver dollars from the West Indies and South America as well as British, Spanish, Portuguese, and French coins were given official rating and the author writes of various attempts to keep

the coins at home by overrating them. Such incidents as this are of the greatest interest and value and deserve more than passing mention.

In connection with the description of conditions in early Canada the author takes occasion to refer frequently and sometimes at length to the banking and currency experiences of the United States. It was quite the usual thing for the organizers of a Canadian bank first to study the methods in use by institutions in Boston and New York, and the present close connection between the latter city and Canadian banks had its beginning in a very early period.

F. Warren Stehman

New England in the life of the world. By Howard Allen Bridgman. (Boston: The Pilgrim press, 1920. 395 p. $4.00)

This is what the author calls the "New England Dynamic." He takes more or less for granted what New England is, and is concerned with that impulse which, from the time when New England was scarcely planted, caused New Englanders to believe it their highest duty to make the world resemble New England. It is particularly appropriate to paint this almost unique contribution of character and leadership to the molding of other communities on the three hundredth birthday of this parent teacher who seems to have landed full powered on Plymouth Rock, like Minerva from the brow of Zeus. This is, however, not a volume written for an occasion, but a long-wrought work, which will have a permanent value.

Mr. Bridgman follows the geographic method of Mathews' *Expansion of New England,* to which he makes his acknowledgments. His special contribution is that he deals with the movement in terms of individuals. He has devoted a lifetime to acquiring a personal familiarity with the men and women who have carried New England ideas and traits through the world. He probably possesses a wider personal acquaintance with them than any one now living. This treatment gives a human tone to the movement and will make this book a necessary companion of Mrs. Mathews' work, though it is to be feared that there are too many characters to create in the reader that sense of intimacy which the author undoubtedly possesses. In 368 pages of text about a thousand life stories are told.

Within the United States these characters are of all professions and occupations. Living in one of these New England colonies, the reviewer cannot entirely agree with the author's selection of persons, but he finds the treatment of those selected sound. Outside the United States the story is largely one of missionary activity — a chapter of that history of missions the writing of which is perhaps the greatest desideratum for the understanding of the modern age.

Carl Russell Fish

My generation. An autobiographical interpretation. By William Jewett Tucker. President emeritus of Dartmouth college. (New York: Houghton Mifflin company, 1919. 464 p. $4.00)

Mr. Tucker did his service for the middle west largely by proxy through those whom he trained at Andover or later attracted to Dartmouth. However, after leaving college, Mr. Tucker taught for a time at Columbus, Ohio, during the period of the civil war, and served with the United States Christian commission at Nashville and on Sherman's march to the sea. He also spent some months after his theological course in investigating religious conditions in Missouri and Kansas, but he found there little chance for constructive religious work. The present volume does not dwell upon these episodes, but rather upon the work at Andover and Dartmouth that made him the inspiring teaching executive of his generation. From the illuminating details of the narrative the reader will readily construct the magnetic personality that never strove for personal recognition, but never failed to get it. The story of the famous "Andover controversy" that now seems so remote, and of the upbuilding of the "New Dartmouth" of which he was the prime mover, is modestly but effectively told, with a charm that must impress even those who never came into personal contact with the author. The "New reservation of time" with which he closes the volume indicates that even as president emeritus he did not divorce himself from the intellectual currents that he did so much to stimulate during a busy, productive career.

I. J. C.

Catalogue of materials in the Archivo general de Indias for the history of the Pacific coast and the American southwest. By Charles E. Chapman, Ph.D. (Berkeley: University of California press, 1919. 755 p.)

Mr. Chapman's book arouses respect not unmixed with despair. The substantial tome is in itself a worthy tribute to the compiler's industry and good judgment during two busy years at Seville. Its inception and production bespeak a healthful spirit of coöperation between an organization founded to perpetuate state loyalty and the department of history at the state university. Moreover, the *Catalogue* and a growing list of valuable monographs to which the author has already contributed form worthy monuments to the tactful leadership of the late Mr. H. Morse Stephens and the wisely directed propaganda that he conducted throughout his adopted state, a propaganda that his successor has ably continued and extended.

The *Catalogue* is of primary importance for the early history of California, with incidental reference to Texas, New Mexico, and the border states af Mexico. The plan may well serve as a model for similar volumes, while the information it contains will be helpful to all who

treat of the far southwest. In the introduction one gets a good description of the Archivo general de Indias, and from the selections made by the author — he could select for comment only portions of the material available — and from his comments, one may judge what types of documents are to be found there. In all Mr. Chapman has described some 6,200 items ranging in time from 1597 to 1821. One must perform a task of the sort to appreciate the work involved, but the bulk of the volume is some criterion. A complete index adds to its usefulness.

I. J. C.

The audiencia in the Spanish colonies. As illustrated by the *audiencia* of Manila (1538-1800). By Charles Henry Cunningham, Ph.D. [University of California publications in history, volume IX] (Berkeley: University of California press, 1919. 479 p.)

This volume is a study of Spanish colonial institutions from the routine records rather than from creative legislation. It clearly demonstrates that until we have a series of such studies for all the various European colonies we shall be unable to interpret progress in different national jurisdictions, or to make just comparisons between them. Furthermore, Mr. Cunningham's book is a good example of the best method of making such a study. The *audiencia* was a judicial body that in the colonies exercised administrative functions as well. A score of them existed at one time or another in the Spanish colonies. The *audiencia* in the Philippines was a part of Spain's general governmental machinery, so that whatever concerned that tribunal touched the others, and through a study of its development one may gain an impression of the workings of the institution elsewhere. Differences in local detail will afford material for subsequent studies.

Mr. Cunningham presents a pioneer work in English and he has done his task well. In an introductory chapter he describes the *audiencias* briefly, lists them with the dates of their creation or refounding, and mentions the functions of other officials that might have dealings with them. Having thus cleared the way, he tells of the establishment of the *audiencia* at Manila (one chapter), treats of its judicial functions (two chapters), its semijudicial and administrative functions (one chapter), and then details its relations with the government (four chapters) and with the church (two chapters). He gives an astounding wealth of detail. His bibliography both of printed works and of manuscript collections is very complete, and he has a good index. Most of his citations of manuscripts are of those in the Archivo general de Indias, from which members of the California school have drawn so much productive material. His volume thus takes its place in worthy company and it will prove useful to all who are delving in the field of Hispanic history.

I. J. C.

Sources of English history of the seventeenth century, 1603-1689, in the University of Minnesota library. With a selection of secondary works. Compiled by James Thayer Gerould. [Research publications of the University of Minnesota. Bibliographical series, number 1] (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1921. 565 p. $4.00)

In reviewing another research publication of the University of Minnesota, the London *Spectator* a few months ago remarked that "historians are coming to regard it [*Minneapolis*] as the center of historical studies of the Stuart period." One reason for this fame is to be found in the notable collection of books, pamphlets, and newspapers here catalogued and largely collected by the university's former librarian, Mr. J. T. Gerould — a collection which was undertaken, so Mr. Gerould tells us, at the instance of Mr. Wallace Notestein, then a member of the University of Minnesota faculty, and which has been so well utilized by Messrs. Notestein and Relf in their *Commons debates for 1629 critically edited.*

The value of the collection to the student is made infinitely greater by this careful catalogue, which fills 565 pages and includes nearly 5,000 items, about four-fifths being sources. In addition to the listing of items under such headings as calendars, collections of tracts, collected works, parliamentary debates, and newspapers, the sources are further classified under the heading "General, 1603-1689," under seven lesser chronological subdivisions, and, finally, under the heading "Works published in or related to the events of each year of the period." In part the value of the bibliography will be found to lie in the "unlocking for other libraries," as Mr. Gerould calls it, of the contents of such reprint collections as the *Somers tracts, Harleian miscellany,* and the publications of a score or so of learned societies, by this separate cataloguing of their material. In addition to printed works, there are listed a few original manuscripts and quite a number of photographic copies of manuscripts from British archives, mostly dealing with proceedings in parliament in the troubled reign of Charles I. Brief bibliographical notes are appended wherever necessary. There is a comprehensive index of authors, persons mentioned in the titles, and titles of anonymous and pseudonymous works.

The cataloguing, annotation, and proof reading have been very carefully done. There are a few variations of typographical style which are of no importance; about the only mistake, however, the reviewer has noted is the inclusion under the year 1630 of Sir Thomas Smith's *De republica anglorum libri tres,* with no indication that this is merely a continental translation of his *Commonwealth of England,* first published in 1583 — a work which finds no place in this collection in the English original.

NEWS AND COMMENTS

Edited by Lester B. Shippee

One of the articles in the *Catholic historical review* for October, 1921, contains material with some bearing on the history of the Mississippi valley — namely, Sister Mary Agnes McCann's "Religious orders of women of the United States."

Students of western history, and particularly those of the Pacific coast, will find interest in Walter N. Sage's account of "The gold colony of British Columbia," which is printed in the December, 1921, issue of the *Canadian historical review.*

The Bureau of American ethnology prints as bulletin number 74 Alfred M. Tozzer's *Excavation of a site at Santiago Ahuitzotla, D. F. Mexico* (Washington: Government printing office, 1921. 55 p. Maps and plates). The mound where the excavation was made is located not far from Mexico City.

The *William and Mary college quarterly historical magazine* for October, 1921, has in "Virginia Indian trade to 1673," by A. J. Morrison, and "Letters of Patrick Henry, Sr., Samuel Davies, James Maury, Edwin Conway and George Trask," two contributions of some interest to students of western history.

The *Iowa journal of history and politics* for October, 1921, devotes two-thirds of its bulky volume to a minute account of "The legislature of the thirty-ninth general assembly," prepared by John E. Briggs. The remainder of the number consists of bibliographical material and items pertaining especially to Iowa.

Three articles make up the bulk of the September, 1921, number of the *Indiana magazine of history.* These are "New Albany and the Scribner family," by Mary Scribner Collins Davis, "Judge Miles Cary Eggleston," by Blanche Goode Garber, and the concluding portion of Charles H. Money's account of "The fugitive slave law in Indiana."

In the January, 1921, issue of the *Pennsylvania magazine of history and biography* are found "James Wilson and James Iredell: a parallel and a contrast," by Hampton L. Carson, LL.D., "Thomas Rodney," a continuation of the Rodney letters, by Simon Gratz, and "Charles Lee — stormy petrel of the revolution," by Edward Robins.

In a number composed of a miscellany of varying types the January, 1922, *Register of the Kentucky state historical society* has for a leading article "A history of the coal industry in Kentucky," by Dr. Willard Rouse Jillson, director and state geologist of the Kentucky geographical society, who read the paper before the Filson club in Louisville in November.

The *Wisconsin magazine of history* for December, 1921, has three leading articles: "Memories of early Wisconsin and the gold mines," by John B. Parkinson, "Documenting local history," by Joseph Schafer, and "Historic spots in Wisconsin: St. Nazianz, a unique religious colony," by W. A. Titus. The documents consist of a series of letters written by Eldon J. Canright during service in the world war.

Mr. F. H. Hodder has brought out a revision of his *Outline maps for a historical atlas of the United States* under the title *Outline historical atlas of the United States, illustrating territorial growth and organization* (Ginn and company). Following the maps a series of notes explains the territorial changes which are to be graphically shown by the student.

In 1910 the Riverside press issued a limited edition of a little book entitled *Boston common, scenes from four centuries,* by M. A. de Wolfe Howe. This work with a postscript noting changes in the past ten years, particularly those wrought by the exigencies of the world war, now appears in a new edition with a different format from that of the large paper original (Boston: Houghton Mifflin company, 1921. 89 p.).

A subcommittee on American history in the high school, with Mr. Louis B. Schmidt as chairman, has prepared a *Syllabus for the study of American history in the high schools of Iowa.* The outline, which is rather detailed, is accompanied by a selected bibliography, the titles of which might well serve as a guide to those filling in the history section of a high school library.

The Pilgrim tercentenary celebration at the University of Illinois, 1920 (University of Illinois, 1921. 42 p.) is a pamphlet putting in permanent form the address of Mr. Evarts B. Greene, "The place of the Pilgrims in American history," and Mr. Ernest Bernbaum's poem, "The Puritan Pilgrim to them that sit in the seats of the scorners." The address and the poem were the principal parts of the program commemorating Pilgrim day at the university.

In the *American economic review* for December, 1921, are two articles of interest to students of history. These are a discussion of "Cycles of strikes," by Alvin H. Hansen, and "The cost of living as a factor

in wage adjustments in the book and job branch of the Chicago printing industry,'' by Francis H. Bird. Other articles in this number are ''Failure of the merchant marine act of 1920,'' by E. S. Gregg, and the ''Economic basis for business regulation,'' by Rexford G. Tugwell.

Washington county giants is the title of volume VII, number 6, of the Indiana historical society *Publications*. This study of physical and not necessarily mental giants is prepared by Harvey Morris and is introduced with a foreword by J. P. Dunn. Not the least significant part of this contribution is found in the appendixes, particularly in the statistical tables, where those interested in the westward drift of population may find something more than the satisfaction of a passing curiosity.

Recent numbers of the *Palimpsest* contain several interesting sketches of more than local significance. In the October, 1921, issue are found ''The way to Iowa,'' by Bruce E. Mahan, and ''From New York to Iowa,'' by Lydia Arnold Titus. ''Old Fort Atkinson,'' by Bruce E. Mahan, and ''The beginnings of Burlington'' are in the November number, while that of December prints an account of a ''Race riot on the Mississippi,'' by Ruth A. Gallaher, ''Augustus Caesar Dodge,'' by J. P. Irish, and the story of ''An Indian ceremony.''

The twelfth chapter of the Reverend John Rothensteiner's account of ''The northeastern part of the diocese of St. Louis under Bishop Rosati'' appears in the October, 1921, issue of the *Illinois Catholic historical review*. Other articles are ''The time and place for a monument to Marquette,'' by Joseph J. Thompson, ''Centenary of St. Mary's college, St. Mary, Kentucky,'' by Alphonseus Lesousky, ''Sister Mary Victoire Bossé,'' by Elizabeth M. Blish, ''The Slovaks of Chicago,'' by Stephen J. Palikar, and ''Illinois' first citizen — Pierre Gibault,'' by Joseph J. Thompson.

The *Journal of negro history* for October, 1921, is entirely devoted to a study of ''The negro migration of 1916-1918,'' by Henderson H. Donald. Mr. Donald considers earlier movements of a similar nature and then in considerable detail presents the various aspects of his study, including the causes, volume of movement, and effects of the migration on the north and the south as well as upon the migrants themselves. The writer concludes that the extraordinary migration of 1916-1918 differs from the general trend of the previous half century only in volume.

At Charlottesville, Virginia, on November 3, 1921, was unveiled the George Rogers Clark memorial, executed by Robert Aitken of New York and presented to the University of Virginia by Paul Goodhue McIntire

who had previously bestowed upon that institution many valuable gifts. The memorial was formally presented by Professor Lefevre, speaking in behalf of the donor, and it was accepted by President Alderman. The oration of the day was an historic address on "George Rogers Clark and the conquest of the northwest," delivered by Mr. Archibald Henderson of the University of North Carolina.

The *Missouri historical review* for July, 1921, contains one more of the papers elicited by Missouri's centennial celebration, "A century of Missouri legal literature," by John D. Lawson. Other contributions in this issue are "Missourians in China," by J. B. Powell, "The Missouri and Mississippi railroad debt," by E. M. Violette, "Atchison county's memorial at Rock Port, Missouri," by John C. Stapel, "Influence of the Mississippi valley on the development of modern France," by Maurice Casenave, "The followers of Duden," by William G. Bek, "Popularizing state history," by Floyd C. Shoemaker, and "Shelby's expedition to Mexico," by John N. Edwards.

The extension division of the University of Wisconsin has published an *Introduction to the study of United States history,* prepared by Carl Russell Fish (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1921. 75 p. $.60). It is intended, according to the preface, "to furnish the background of information essential for the intelligent appreciation of national development, and in some degree to supply the lack of introductory lectures usually given in the classroom." The pamphlet begins with a consideration of physical features and briefly summarizes the salient characteristics of American growth through the adoption of the articles of confederation.

Again the *Michigan history magazine* comes out in a double number, for July-October, 1921. Among the many contributions which fill its nearly three hundred pages are "Polygamy at Beaver island," by Milo M. Quaife, "Historic spots along old roads and new," by Willard M. Bryant, "Overland to Michigan in 1846," by Sue I. Silliman, "Pioneer days in Wexford county," by Clarence Lewis Northrup, "Rail growth of Michigan's capital city," by Glen K. Stimson, "Historical sketch of the Muskegon schools," by Addie Littlefield, "The story of Battle Creek's first bank," by Forest G. Sweet, and "Early days in Dearborn," by Henry A. Haigh.

The railroads of Mexico, by Fred Wilbur Powell (Boston: The Stratford company, 1921. 226 p. $2.00) is a useful little book for gaining additional light on one phase of the present Mexican situation. A sketch of the situation under the Diaz régime, when the era of Mexican railroad building really got under way, together with a summary of present conditions, is followed by a discussion of financial, governmental, and

engineering problems now existing, and by the conclusions the author has drawn from his investigations. A very full bibliography, a good index, and a map showing the location of railroads are not the least valuable features of the book.

Students of history in the Mississippi valley should find much of interest and suggestion in an article by Dixon Ryan Fox on "State history," printed in the December, 1921, number of the *Political science quarterly.* It is noteworthy that Mr. Fox discovers in the states of the Mississippi valley the most activity and the greatest accomplishment, as well as the most forward-looking policy, of any portion of the United States in the field of state and local history in the proper sense of the word. The subsequent article on recent historical publications of Illinois, to appear in the following number of the *Quarterly,* should likewise engage the attention of those who believe in the utility of work in local fields.

The *Hispanic-American historical review* for August, 1921, has Joseph J. Hill's "Old Spanish trail," which, as the writer states in his summary, "is but a chapter in the larger theme, 'The opening of the southern trails to California'." Other leading articles in this number deal with subjects in the Mexican and South American field. I. A. Wright contributes a note on the "Second congress of Hispano-American history and geography, Seville, May, 1921"; in the bibliographical section C. K. Jones carries further his "Hispanic-American bibliographies," and Arthur S. Aiton and J. Lloyd Mecham, fellows under the foundation established by the Native sons of the golden west, discuss briefly the Archivo general de Indias and give practical hints for working therein.

In the April, 1921, number of the *Ohio archaeological and historical quarterly* appear articles by Alexander S. Wilson, M.D., concerning "The Naga and the Lingam of India and the serpent mounds of Ohio," by William C. Mills on "Flint ridge," and a memorial article on George Frederick Wright. The October issue is wholly devoted to the subject of John Brown. Two poems, one by William D. Howells and the other by Coates Kinney, are reprinted, and four articles, "John Brown," by C. B. Galbreath, "The execution of John Brown," by Murat Halstead, "John Brown at Harper's Ferry and Charlestown," by S. K. Donovan, and "John Brown — additional notes," by C. B. Galbreath, make up the symposium. Halstead's article is a reprint from the *New York Independent,* and Donovan's is a lecture, many times given but never before printed.

The Denoyer-Geppert company has published a pamphlet called *The world remapped: a summary of the geographical results of the peace settlement after the world war* (Chicago, 1921. 70 p.). This hand-

book, containing no maps in itself, summarizes briefly but adequately the new map of Europe. For teachers and all others interested in the subject this is a valuable little compendium and is so arranged as to give concisely but in sufficient detail to be understandable the changes both great and small which resulted from the deliberations of the conference at Versailles. Specific references are made to the Harding European series of maps, but if it is used in connection with any good atlas it is possible to trace the somewhat bewildering shifts which make the new map such a different affair from the old one.

Number 1 of volume I of the *Chronicles of Oklahoma,* January, 1921, has been published as the first issue of a quarterly by the Oklahoma historical society. Among the articles which appear in this number are "The separation of Nebraska and Kansas from the Indian territory," a paper read before the Mississippi valley historical association in Nashville by Roy Gittinger, "The history of no-man's land, or old Beaver county," by Morris L. Wardell, and "The Cheyenne dog soldiers," by W. S. Campbell. A series of letters written by General Stand Watie during the civil war gives some interesting side lights on the division which existed among the Indian tribes of the then Indian territory over the question whether or not the south should be supported; the Choctaw and the Chickasaw were southern sympathizers, while the Cherokee, Creek, and Seminole were divided in opinion.

Mattie Austin Hatcher, in an article entitled "Conditions in Texas affecting the colonization problem, 1795-1801," adds another chapter to the valuable contributions on the history of the trans-Mississippi southwest which have made the *Southwestern historical quarterly* a periodical of permanent worth. The October, 1921, issue also has Edwin P. Arneson's discussion of "Early irrigation in Texas," a continuation of the "Journal of Lewis Birdsall Harris, 1836-1842," and the first installment of "The Bryan-Hayes correspondence." Guy Morrison Bryan was a classmate and fraternity brother of Rutherford B. Hayes at Kenyon college and the two kept up the friendship formed at college, and the letters, the publication of which begins with this number of the *Quarterly,* were written at intervals from 1843 to 1892, a year before the death of Hayes. Williams, the biographer of Hayes, did not have access to the Bryan letters, which he believed had been destroyed; hence their publication affords further light on certain phases of American history for over a generation. Those printed in the October number were written between 1843 and 1849.

The Knights of Columbus historical commission, which has recently been attracting attention by its offer of prizes for historical essays and

more pretentious works, has published *The Monroe doctrine: the vital necessity of its continued maintenance,* by Thomas H. Mahoney, assistant district attorney, Suffolk district, commonwealth of Massachusetts. A foreword is supplied by Rear Admiral W. S. Benson, U.S.N. In form and in evidence of research to secure the information necessary to present, as Admiral Benson states in the foreword, "an arrangement of the materials already at hand and accessible to anybody, which sets forth and emphasizes the American aspect of the Monroe doctrine," little can be found to criticize. In spirit, however, this work appears to be a rather definite piece of anti-British propaganda. While few will find fault with the statement of facts, the interpretation, and particularly the method of mingling the interpretation with the facts, lays not only the author but the commission as a whole open to justifiable suspicion as to the motives which underlie the whole project involved in the announced plans of that body.

Priestly in America, 1794-1804, by Edgar F. Smith (Philadelphia, 1921), is an interesting account of this famous scientist, with particular emphasis on his activities as a chemist. The author allows letters and contemporary documents to tell the story, so that there is much which is not available elsewhere in print. From the point of view of historians it is to be regretted that more space was not given to Priestly's political activities.

The Massachusetts historical society has published the *Journals of the house of representatives of Massachusetts, 1718-1720.* The excellence of the editorial work is assured by the name of Worthington C. Ford on the committee of publication, and Mr. Ford has written the brief preface. There are no footnotes but there is an excellent index.

In *The plot against Mexico,* by L. J. Bekker (New York, Knopf), we have an ephemeral volume that two years ago derived some importance from the agitation for intervention then current in some circles. Fortunately intervention never occurred, even when Mexico subsequently changed masters, and concessionaires have been able to "muddle through," although the status of Mexico still remains uncertain. The book did some service in stabilizing public opinion at the time of its issue.

The fifteenth annual meeting of the Mississippi valley historical association, which will be held in Iowa City on May 11, 12, and 13, promises to be unusually interesting. Printed programs will be mailed to all members before the meeting. Mr. Benjamin F. Shambaugh, superintendent of the State historical society of Iowa, is the chairman of the local committee on arrangements.